Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Ashcroft v. Mattis
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 52 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1977)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1977-05-16
- Topic
- general
holding that a claim for declaratory relief is moot where the "primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that [the plaintiff! will obtain emotional satisfaction from' [the] ruling” | holding that plaintiff had not satisfied standing 13 requirements where “present interest in the controversy is that [plaintiff] will obtain 14 emotional satisfaction from a ruling” | holding that a claim for declaratory relief is moot where the “primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that [the plaintiff] will obtain emotional satisfaction from [the] ruling” | holding that "[f]or a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which 'calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts' " (citations omitted) | holding that the plaintiff, whose first son was killed by police while attempting to escape arrest, had no 675 F.2d at 691. Contra id. at 702 (Tjoflat, J., concurring standing to obtain a declaratory judgment on the in part and dissenting in part | holding no standing in moot case regarding wrongful death of one son, finding it was "speculative" that another son "might" have been in danger of wrongful death in the future due to involvement with police | “[ejmotional involvement in a lawsuit is not enough to meet the case-or-controversy requirement”; plaintiff must have an available remedy | for declaratory judgment there must be dispute which calls for adjudication of present right upon established fact, not advisory opinion | after plaintiff abandoned claim for damages, no longer a live case or controversy for court to decide constitutionality of challenged statute | court does not have jurisdiction to issue “advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts” | claim for declaratory relief moot when no “present right” is involved and the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction of a favorable ruling | claim for declaratory relief moot when no “present right” is involved and the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction of a favorable ruling | claim for declaratory relief moot when no "present right" is involved and the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction of a favorable ruling | “[S]peculation” regarding future contingencies that “might” occur “is insufficient to establish the existence of a present, live controversy.” | court found no case or controversy to determine constitutionality of statute where claim for damages had been dismissed | “For a 3 The Attorney General “may bring a civil action on behalf of the State.” HRS § 28-94(a) (emphasis added); see also HRS § 28-2.5(a | “‘[D]eadly force’ means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” | claim for declaratory relief moot when no “present right” is involved | a request for declaratory relief, standing alone, does not save an otherwise moot case | “For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.” (quotation marks omitted) | justiciability required for federal declaratory judgment to issue | “For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which “calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937) | emotional involvement is not enough to meet case-or-controversy requirement | raising jurisdictional issue sua sponte | raising jurisdictional issue sua sponte
Citator
- Cited by
- 124 opinions
Appellee’s 18-year-old son was shot and killed by police while attempting to escape arrest. Appellee filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the police officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He sought to recover damages, and also to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Missouri statutes authorizing the police action were unconstitutional. 1 The District Court held that a defense of good faith had been established, and denied both forms of relief. No appeal was taken from the denial of damages, but appellee did seek review of the denial of declaratory relief. The Eighth Circuit held that declaratory relief was available and remanded for consideration of *172 the merits of the constitutional issue. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F. 2d 588 (1974).
On remand, appellee filed an amended complaint, in which he made no claim for damages. The Missouri Attorney General was allowed to intervene in defense of the statutes, and the case was then submitted on stipulated facts. The District Court upheld the statutes, Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (1975), but was reversed by a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 547 F. 2d 1007 (1976). The Attorney General brought an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) from the holding that the state statutes were unconstitutional.
Although we are urged to consider the merits of the Court of Appeals’ holding, we are unable to do so, because this suit does not now present a live “case or controversy.” This suit was brought to determine the police officers’ liability for the death of appellee’s son. That issue has been decided, and there is no longer any possible basis for a damages claim. Nor is there any possible basis for a declaratory judgment. For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which “calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 242 (1937). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941). Here, the District Court was asked to answer the hypothetical question whether the defendants would have been liable apart from their defense of good faith. No “present right” of appellee was at stake. Indeed, appellee’s primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that he will obtain emotional satisfaction from a ruling that his son’s death was wrongful. 2 Appellee’s *173 Motion to Affirm 5-6, n. 1. Emotional involvement in a lawsuit is not enough to meet the case-or-controversy requirement; were the rule otherwise, few cases could ever become moot.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to direct the District Court to dismiss the second amended complaint.
It is so ordered.
These statutes permit police to use deadly force in apprehending a person who has committed a felony, following notice of the intent to arrest. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 559.040 and 544.190 (1969); see Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F. 2d 588, 591, and n. 4 (CA8 1974).
The second amended complaint also alleges that appellee has another son who “if ever arrested or brought under an attempt at arrest on suspicion of a felony, might flee or give the appearance of fleeing, and would therefore be in danger of being killed by these defendants or other police officers . . . .” 3 App. in Mattis v. Schnarr, No. 75-1849 (CA8), p. 5 *173 (emphasis added). Such speculation is insufficient to establish the existence of a present, live controversy.