Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Arkansas v. Sullivan

532 U.S. 769

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2001-05-29
Topic
litigation

holding that the Arkansas Supreme Court may not interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than the United States Supreme Court's own federal constitutional precedents provide | holding that the Arkansas Supreme Court may not interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than the United States Supreme Court’s own federal constitutional precedents provide | holding that a state supreme court may not interpret the United States Constitution to provide different protection than the Supreme Court’s federal constitutional precedents provide | holding that a traffic violation arrest will not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search | concluding that subjective motivations are irrelevant with regard to validity of an arrest | holding that an arrest supported by probable cause and following a traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of police officer's subjective motivation to search vehicle for evidence of crime | holding that a traffic violation arrest will not be rendered invalid by -5- J-A20033-14 the fact that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search | finding that states are not permitted to interpret the Fourth Amendment as offering greater protection than determined by the United States Supreme Court | finding that states are not permitted to interpret the Fourth Amendment as offering greater protection than determined by the United States Supreme Court | holding the state court is without authority to interpret the United States Constitution more restrictively than the United States Supreme Court | rejecting Arkansas Supreme Court's finding that the "subjective intent" language in Whren was non-binding dicta | rejecting Arkansas Supreme Court’s finding that the "subjective intent” language in Whren was nonbinding dicta | rejecting the conclusion that the “subjective intent” language of Whren was nonbinding dicta, inapplicable to a pretextual arrest | explaining states may restrict police power under state law to a greater degree than the Supreme Court holds is necessary under the Federal Constitution | rejecting a state court’s holding that “it may interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than [the] Court’s own federal constitutional precedents provide” | rejecting a state court's holding that "it may interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than [the] Court's own federal constitutional precedents provide" | holding (continu ed...) -4- In addition, a more expansive interpretation of Article I, Section 7 is not appropriate in this context. We have previously recognized that when interpreting Article I, Section 7, we will depart from federal precedent only when “(1 | restating the rule that “‘subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis’” (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)) | reiterating Whren’s holding that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis” | reiterating Whren’s holding that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis” | reversing state court’s determination that a traffic stop supported probable cause was nonetheless improper because of the officer’s subjective motivations | reversing granting of motion to suppress based on officer's alleged "improper subjective motivation" | reversing suppression of drug-related evidence and holding that it is irrelevant whether a traffic-violation arrest was a pretext for a drug search, as long as there was probable cause for the traffic arrest | applying Whren objective probable cause rule for civil traffic stop to criminal arrest | rejecting Arkansas Supreme Court’s conclusion that it could construe the federal con- stitution to provide greater protection than United States Supreme Court’s own precedents would provide | rejecting Arkansas Supreme Co

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ARKANSAS v. SULLIVAN,532 U.S. 769(2001)
ARKANSASv. KENNETH ANDREW SULLIVAN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. 00-262.
Decided May 29, 2001
When the Arkansas police officer who stopped respondent Sullivan for speeding and improper window tenting remembered intelligence on Sullivan regarding narcotics, he arrested Sullivan for traffic violations and carrying a weapon and, during an inventory search of the vehicle, discovered a bag of drugs and drug-related materials. Sullivan was charged with,inter alia, various state-law drug offenses. The trial court granted Sullivan's motion to supress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was a pretext to search him and therefore violated theFourthandFourteenth Amendments. After affirming, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the State's rehearing petition, rejecting the State's argument that the court took into account the officer's subjective motivation in disregard ofWhren v.United States,517 U.S. 806, and holding that, even ifWhrenprecludes inquiry into an arresting officers subjective motivation, that court could interpret the United States Constitution more broadly than this Court.Held:The State Supreme Court's decision on rehearing is flatly contrary to this Court's controlling precedent. Its decision that the drug-related evidence should be supressed because the police officer had an improper subjective motivation motivation for making the stop cannot be squared with this Court's holding inWhren, supra, at 813, that"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-causeFourth Amendmentanalysis." The State Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it may interpret the Federal Constitution to provide greater protection than this Court's own precedents provide, is foreclosed byOregon v. Hass,420 U.S. 714.

Certiorari granted;340 Ark. 315,11 S.W.3d 526, and340 Ark. 318-A,16 S.W.3d 551, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In November 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police Department stopped respondent Sullivan for speeding and for having an improperly tinted windshield. Taylor approached Sullivan's vehicle, explained the reason for the stop, and requested Sullivan's license, registration,Page 770and insurance documentation. Upon seeing Sullivan's license, Taylor realized that he was aware of "`intelligence on [Sullivan] regarding narcotics.'"340 Ark. 318-A, 318-B,16 S.W.3d 551,552(2000). When Sullivan opened his car door in an (unsuccessful) attempt to locate his registration and insurance papers, Taylor noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the car's floorboard. Taylor then arrested Sullivan for speeding, driving without his registration and insurance documentation, carrying a weapon (the roofing hatchet), and improper window tinting.

After another officer arrived and placed Sullivan in his squad car, Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle pursuant to the Conway Police Department's Vehicle Inventory Policy. Under the vehicle's armrest, Taylor discovered a bag containing a substance that appeared to him to be methamphetamine as well as numerous items of suspected drug paraphernalia. As a result of the detention and search, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding.

Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was merely a "pretext and sham to search" him and, therefore, violated theFourthandFourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Pet. for Cert. 3. The trial court granted the suppression motion and, on the State's interlocutory appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.340 Ark. 315,11 S.W.3d 526(2000). The State petitioned for rehearing, contending that the court had erred by taking into account Officer Taylor's subjective motivation, in disregard of this Court's opinion inWhrenv.United States,517 U.S. 806(1996). Over the dissent of three justices, the court rejected the State's argument thatWhrenmakes "the ulterior motives of police officers . . . irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop" and denied the State's rehearing petition.340 Ark., at 318-B,16 S.W.3d, at 552.Page 771

The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to followWhrenon the ground that "much of it isdicta."340 Ark., at 318-A,16 S.W.3d, at 552. The court reiterated the trial judge's conclusion that "the arrest was pretextual and made for the purpose of searching Sullivan's vehicle for evidence of a crime," and observed that "we do not believe thatWhrendisallows" suppression on such a basis. Id., at 318-C,16 S.W.3d, at 552. Finally, the court asserted that, even if it were to conclude thatWhrenprecludes inquiry into an arresting officer's subjective motivation, "there is nothing that prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more rights."340 Ark., at 318-C,16 S.W.3d, at 552.

Because the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision on rehearing is flatly contrary to this Court's controlling precedent, we grant the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.fn*As an initial matter, we note that the Arkansas Supreme Court never questioned Officer Taylor's authority to arrest Sullivan for a fine-only traffic violation (speeding), and rightly so. SeeAtwaterv.Lago Vista, ante, p. 318. Rather, the court affirmed the trial judge's suppression of the drug-related evidence on the theory that Officer Taylor's arrest of Sullivan, although supported by probable cause, nonetheless violated theFourth Amendmentbecause Taylor had an improper subjective motivation for making the stop. The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding to that effect cannot be squared with our decision inWhren, in which we noted our "unwilling[ness] to entertainFourth Amendmentchallenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers,"Page 772and held unanimously that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-causeFourth Amendmentanalysis."517 U.S., at 813. ThatWhreninvolved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, is of no particular moment; indeed,Whrenitself relied onUnitedStatesv.Robinson,414 U.S. 218(1973), for the proposition that "a traffic-violation arrest . . . [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was `a mere pretext for a narcotics search.'"517 U.S., at 812-813.

The Arkansas Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it may interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than this Court's own federal constitutional precedents provide, is foreclosed byOregonv.Hass,420 U.S. 714(1975). There, we observed that the Oregon Supreme Court's statement that it could "`interpret theFourth Amendmentmore restrictively than interpreted by the United States Supreme Court'" was "not the law and surely must be an inadvertent error."Id., at 719, n. 4. We reiterated inHassthat while "a State is freeas a matter of itsown lawto impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards," it "may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter offederalconstitutional lawwhen this Court specifically refrains from imposing them."Id., at 719.

The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
Justice GINSBURG, with whomJustice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, andJustice Breyerjoin, concurring.
The Arkansas Supreme Court was moved by a concern rooted in theFourth Amendment. Validating Kenneth Sullivan's arrest, the Arkansas court feared, would accord police officers disturbing discretion to intrude on individuals' libertyPage 773and privacy. See340 Ark. 318-A, 318-B,16 S.W.3d 551,552(2000) (expressing unwillingness "to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity"). But this Court has held that such exercises of official discretion are unlimited by theFourth Amendment. SeeAtwaterv.Lago Vista, ante, p. 318;Whrenv.United States,517 U.S. 806(1996). Given the Court's current case law, I join the Court's opinion.

InAtwater, which recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense, this Court relied in part on a perceived "dearth of horribles demanding redress." ante, at 353. Although I joined a dissenting opinion questioning the relevance of the Court's conclusion on that score, see ante, at 372 (opinion ofO'Connor, J.) I hope the Court's perception proves correct. But if it does not, if experience demonstrates "anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests," ante, at 353 (opinion of the Court), I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent. SeeVasquezv.Hillery,474 U.S. 254,266(1986) (observing that Court has departed fromstare decisiswhen necessary "to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained") (quotingBurnetv.Coronado Oil Gas Co.,285 U.S. 393,412(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).Page 774
  1. Sullivan's motion for leave to proceedin forma pauperisis granted. We have jurisdiction under28 U.S.C. § 1257notwithstanding the absence of final judgment in the underlying prosecution. SeeNew Yorkv. Quarles,467 U.S. 649,651, n. 1 (1984) ("[S]hould the State convict respondent at trial, its claim that certain evidence was wrongfully suppressed will be moot. Should respondent be acquitted at trial, the State will be precluded from pressing its federal claim again on appeal"). ↩