Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Arciniega v. Freeman
404 U.S. 4
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1971-10-26
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding that pro se complaints “hovvever inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
- holding that defendant’s meetings with convicted felons were "more than 'incidental contacts’ ”
- holding a parole condition restricting association with persons with criminal record was not intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts while working on a legitimate job for a common employer
- requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"
- interpreting supervised release condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors to exclude “casual or unavoidable contact with minors in public places”
- rejecting a nearly identical argument because “it is well established that associational conditions do not extend to casual or chance meetings.”
- rejecting a vagueness challenge to the same communication condition at issue here
- “association” in parole condition did not extend to “incidental contacts” on a legitimate job for a common employer
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Arciniega v. Freeman. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 138 opinions
Headnotes
- Civil Procedure — General Summary Judgment — Mandatory Entry (Rule 56(c)) - **Statement:** Rule 56(c) mandates that summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. - **Citation:** 477 U.S. 321 (1986)
Petitioner’s parole was revoked by the Federal Parole Board because of association with other ex-convicts. In a petition for habeas corpus, petitioner contended that the record did not disclose any evidence in support of this conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the revocation on the sole ground that petitioner worked at a restaurant-nightclub that employed other ex-convicts. 439 F. 2d 776.
The Parole Board has wide authority to set conditions, 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a), and here petitioner was forbidden to “associate” with other ex-convicts. But the Board’s own regulations require “satisfactory evidence” of a parole violation to justify an arrest warrant. 28 CFR § 2.35. We do not believe that the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer. Nor is such occupational association, standing alone, satisfactory evidence of non-business association violative of the parole restriction. To so assume would be to render a parolee vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire .ex-convicts, hires more than one. Absent a clear Parole 'Board directive to this effect, we cannot sustain the *5 judgment of the Court of Appeals that on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records is sufficient evidence of parole violation. If there is in this record other evidence of forbidden association or evidence of other parole violations, neither the Court of Appeals nor the United States has identified it.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.