American Automobile Assn. v. United States

Mr. Justice Clark

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this suit for refund of federal income taxes the petitioner, American Automobile Association, seeks determination of its tax liability for the years 1952 and 1953. Returns filed for its taxable calendar years were prepared on the basis of the same accrual method of accounting as was used in keeping its books. The Association reported as gross income only that portion of the total prepaid annual membership dues, actually received or collected in the calendar year, which ratably corresponded with the number of membership months covered by those dues and occurring within the same taxable calendar year. The balance was reserved for ratable monthly accrual over the remaining membership period in the following calendar year as deferred or unearned income reflecting an estimated future service expense to members. The Commissioner contends that petitioner should have reported in its gross income for each year the entire amount of membership dues actually received in the taxable calendar year without regard to expected future service expense in the subsequent year. The sole point at issue, therefore, is in what year the prepaid dues are taxable as income.

In auditing the Association’s returns for the years 1952 through 1954, the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion under § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1 *689 determined not to accept the taxpayer’s accounting system. As a result, adjustments were made for those years principally by adding to gross income for each taxable year the amount of prepaid dues which the Association had received but not recognized as income, and subtracting from gross income amounts recognized in the year although actually received in the prior year. A net operating loss claimed for 1954 and corresponding carry-back deductions were greatly reduced, and tax deficiencies were assessed for 1952 and 1953. Petitioner paid the deficiencies and its timely claim for refund was denied. Suit to recover was instituted in the Court of Claims, but the court sustained the Commissioner,-Ct. Cl.-, 181 F. Supp. 255. Recognizing a conflict between the decision below and that in Bressner Radio, Inc., v. Commissioner, 267 F. 2d 520, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 813. We have concluded that for tax purposes the dues must be included as income in the calendar year of their actual receipt.

The Association is a national automobile club organized as a nonstock membership corporation with its principal office in Washington, D. C. It provides a variety of services2 to the members of affiliated local automobile clubs and those of ten clubs which taxpayer itself directly *690 operates as divisions, but such services are rendered solely upon a member's demand. Its income is derived primarily from dues paid one year in advance by members of the clubs. Memberships may commence or be renewed in any month of the year. For many years, the association has employed an accrual method of accounting and the calendar year as its taxable year. It is admitted that for its purposes the method used is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles. The membership dues, as received, were deposited in the Association’s bank accounts without restriction as to their use for any of its corporate purposes. However, for the Association’s own accounting purposes, the dues were treated •in its books as income received ratably3 over the 12-month membership period. The portions thereof ratably attributable to membership months occurring beyond the year of receipt, i. e., in a second calendar year, were reflected in the Association’s books at the close of the first year as unearned or deferred income. Certain operating expenses were chargeable as prepaid membership cost and deducted ratably over the same periods of time as those over which dues were recognized as income.

The Court of Claims bottomed its opinion on Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180 (1957), finding that “the method of treatment of prepaid automobile club membership dues employed [by *691 the Association here was,] ... for Federal income tax purposes, ‘purely artificial.’ ” 181 F. Supp. 255, 258. It accepted that case as “a rejection by the Supreme Court of the accounting method advanced by plaintiff in the case at bar.” Ibid. The Association does not deny that its accounting system is substantially identical to that used by the petitioner in Michigan. It maintains, however, that Michigan does not control this case because of a difference in proof, i. e., that in this case the record contains expert accounting testimony indicating that the system used was in accord with generally accepted accounting principles; that its proof of cost of member service was detailed; and that the correlation between that cost and the period of time over which the dues were credited as income was shown and justified by proof of experience. The holding of Michigan, however, that the system of accounting was “purely artificial” was based upon the finding that “substantially all services are performed only upon a member’s demand and the taxpayer’s performance was not related to fixed dates after the tax year.” 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20. That is also true here.4 As the Association’s own accounting expert testified:

“You are dealing with a group or pool. Any pooling or risk situation, particular members may in a particular year require very little of a specific service that is rendered to certain other members. I wouldn’t know what the experience on that would be, but I would think it would be rather irregular between individual members. ... I am buying the *692 availability of services, the protection .... Frankly, the irregularity of the actual furnishing of the maps and helping you out when you run out of gasoline and so on, I frankly don’t think that has a blessed thing to do with the over-all accounting.”

It may be true that to the accountant the actual incidence of cost in serving an individual member in exchange for his individual dues is inconsequential, or, from the viewpoint of commercial accounting, unessential to determination and disclosure of the overall financial condition of the Association. That “irregularity,” however, is highly relevant to the clarity of an accounting system which defers receipt, as earned income, of dues to a taxable period in which no, some, or all the services paid for by those dues may or may not be rendered. The Code exacts its revenue from the individual member’s dues which, no one disputes, constitute income. When their receipt as earned income is recognized ratably over two calendar years, without regard to correspondingly fixed individual expense or performance justification, but consistently with overall experience, their accounting doubtless presents a rather accurate image of the total financial structure, but fails to respect the criteria of annual tax accounting and may be rejected by the Commissioner.

The Association further contends that the findings of the court below support its position. We think not. The Court of Claims’ only finding as to the accounting system itself is as follows:

“22. The method of accounting employed by plaintiff during the years in issue has been used regularly by plaintiff since 1931 and is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles and practices and was, prior to the adverse determination by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, customarily and generally employed in the motor club field.”

*693 This is only to say that in performing the function of business accounting the method employed by the Association “is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles and practices.” It is not to hold that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the Treasury.5 Likewise, other findings merely reflecting statistical computations of average monthly cost per member on a group or pool basis are without determinate significance to our decision that the federal revenue cannot, without legislative consent and over objection of the Commissioner, be made to depend upon average experience in rendering performance and turning a profit. Indeed, such tabulations themselves demonstrate the inadequacy from an income tax standpoint of the pro rata method of allocating each year’s membership dues in equal monthly installments not in fact related to the expenses incurred. Not only did individually incurred expenses actually vary from month to month, but even the average expense varied — recognition of income nonetheless remaining ratably constant. Although the findings below seem to indicate that it would produce substantially the same result as that of the system of ratable monthly recognition actually employed, we consider similarly unsatisfactory, from an income tax standpoint, allocation of monthly dues to gross monthly income to the extent of actual service expenditures for the same month computed on a group or pool basis. In addition, the Association’s election in 1954 to change its monthly recognition formula6 to one which treats one-half of the dues as income in the year of receipt *694 and the other half as income received in the subsequent year, without regard to month of payment, only more clearly indicates the artificiality of its method, at least so far as controlling tax purposes are concerned. Moreover, the Association realized that the findings of the Court of Claims were not alone sufficient for its purposes. In its petition for rehearing below, petitioner specifically asked that they be amended and enlarged, especially as to No. 22 set out above. Rehearing and amendment were denied.

Whether or not the Court’s judgment in Michigan controls our disposition of this case, there are other considerations requiring our affirmance. They concern the action of the Congress with respect to its own positive and express statutory authorization of employment of such sound commercial accounting practices in reporting taxable income. In 1954 the Congress found dissatisfaction in the fact that “as a result of court decisions and rulings, there have developed many divergencies between the computation of income for tax purposes and income for business purposes as computed under generally accepted accounting principles. The areas of difference are confined almost entirely to questions of when certain types of revenue and expenses should be taken into account in arriving at net income.” House Ways and Means Committee Report, H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48. As a result, it introduced into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 452 and § 462,7 which specifically permitted essentially the same practice as was employed by the Association here.8 Only one year later, however, *695 in June 1955, the Congress repealed these sections retroactively. It appears that in this action Congress first overruled the long administrative practice of the Commissioner and holdings of the courts in disallowing such deferral of income for tax purposes and then within a year reversed its own action. This repeal, we believe, confirms our view that the method used by the Association could be rejected by the Commissioner. While the claim is made that Congress did not “intend to disturb prior law as it affected permissible accrual accounting provisions for tax purposes,” H. R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, the cold fact is that it repealed the only law incontestably permitting the practice upon which the Association depends. To say that, as to taxpayers using such systems, Congress was merely declaring existing law when it adopted § 452 in 1954, and that it was merely restoring unaffected the same prior law when it repealed the new section in 1955 for good reason, is a contradiction in itself, “varnishing nonsense with the charm of sound.” Instead of constituting a merely dupli-cative creation, the fact is that § 452 for the first time specifically declared petitioner’s system of accounting to be acceptable for income tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing position of the Commissioner and courts to the contrary. And the repeal of the section the following year, upon insistence by the Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax accounting would have a disastrous impact on the Government’s revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that petitioner’s system was not acceptable for tax purposes. To interpret its careful consideration of the problem otherwise is to *696 accuse the Congress of engaging in sciamachy. We are further confirmed in this view by consideration of the even more recent action of the Congress in 1958, subsequent to the decision in Michigan, supra. In that year § 455 9 was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. It permits publishers to defer receipt as income of prepaid subscriptions of newspapers, magazines and periodicals. An effort was made in the Senate to add a provision in § 455 which would extend its coverage to prepaid automobile club membership dues.10 However, in conference the House Conferees refused to accept this amendment. Senator Byrd explained the rejection of the amendment to the Senate (104 Cong. Rec., Part 14, p. 17744):

“It was the position of the House conferees that this matter of prepaid dues and fees received by nonprofit service organizations was a part of the entire subject dealing with the treatment of prepaid income and that such subject should be left for study of this entire problem. . . 11

It appears, therefore, that, pending its own further study, Congress has given publishers but denied auto *697 mobile clubs the very relief that the Association seeks in this Court.

To recapitulate, it appears that Congress has long been aware of the problem this case presents. In 1954 it enacted § 452 and § 462, but quickly repealed them. Since that time Congress has authorized the desired accounting only in the instance of prepaid subscription income, which, as was pointed out in Michigan, is ratably earned by performance on “publication dates after the tax year.” 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20. It has refused to enlarge § 455 to include prepaid membership dues. At the very least, this background indicates congressional recognition of the complications inherent in the problem and its seriousness to the general revenue. We must leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event, must have wide ramifications. The Committees of the Congress have standing committees expertly grounded in tax problems, with jurisdiction covering the whole field of taxation and facilities for studying considerations of policy as between the various taxpayers and the necessities of the general revenues. The validity of the long-established policy of the Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional procedures in the tax field is clearly indicated in this case.12 Finding only that, in light of *698 existing provisions not specifically authorizing it, the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in rejecting the Association’s accounting system was not unsound, we need not anticipate what will be the product of further “study of this entire problem.” Affirmed.

A taxpayer’s “net income shall be computed ... in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the *689 books . . . but ... if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. . . .” 63 Stat. 24, 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 41. See also the similar provision in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. (1958 ed.) § 446.

These generally include furnishing road maps, routing, tour books, etc.; emergency road service through contracts with local garages; bail bond protection; personal automobile accident insurance and theft protection; and, in some of its divisions, motor license procurement, brake and headlight adjustment service, notarial duties and advice in the prosecution of small claims.

In 1952 and 1953 dues collected in any month were accounted as income to the extent of one-twenty-fourth for that month (on the assumption that the mean date of receipt was the middle of the month), one-twelfth for each of the next eleven months, and again one-twenty-fourth in the anniversary month. In 1954, however, guided by its own statistical average experience, the Association changed its system so as to more simply reach almost the same result by charging to year of receipt, without regard to month of receipt, one-half of the entire dues payment and deferring the balance to the following year.

Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F. 2d 697, and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F. 2d 722, may be distinguished from the present case on the same grounds which made them distinguishable in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20.

The Hearing Commissioner of the Court of Claims had specifically found as fact that petitioner's “method of accounting . . . clearly reflected its net income for such years.” The court, however, did not adopt that finding.

See note 2, supra.

26 U. S. C. (1952 ed., Supp. II) §§452, 462, repealed, 69 Stat. 134 (1955).

The Senate Report included this language:

“Under the 1939 Code, regardless of the method of accounting . . . amounts are includible in gross income by the recipient not later than *695 the time of receipt if they are subject to free and unrestricted use by the taxpayer even though the payments are for goods or services to be provided by the taxpayer at a future time.” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 301.

26 U. S. C. (1958 ed.) §455.

An unsuccessful attempt to induce congressional action on this problem was made last year, see H. R. 11266, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., which passed the House August 24, 1960, 106 Cong. Rec. 17482, but failed to draw any action by the Senate before adjournment. An identical bill is currently pending, see H. R. 929, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., and H. R. Rep. No. 381 accompanying the bill and recommending its passage. Under that measure the taxpayer’s liability to its members “shall be deemed to exist ratably over the period . . . that such services are required to be rendered, or . . . privileges . . . made available.” (Emphasis added.)

The Eighty-fourth Congress started the study of “legislation dealing with prepaid income and reserves for estimated expenses . . . .” S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6.

In 1955 it was estimated that transitional loss of revenue under § 452 and § 462, repealed that year, would total in excess of a billion dollars. H. R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. That this impact on the revenue continues to be an important factor in congressional consideration of the problem is indicated by the observation of the House Committee on Ways and Means that a “transitional rule” is necessary “to minimize the initial revenue impact” of the measure currently pending. H. R. Rep. No. 381, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. That the system used by petitioner here is, perhaps, presently not uncommon may be indicated by the fact that during this Term alone several cases involving similar systems have reached this Court.