Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Allen v. Georgia
Allen v. Ga., 166 U.S. 138 (1897)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1897-03-15
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- upholding state court’s dismissal of appeal of escaped prisoner and refusal to reinstate appeal against constitutional due process attack
- upholding state’s dismissal of appeal of defendant who escaped and was recaptured during appeal
- rejecting the defendant’s claim that a state court’s dismissal of his appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and its subsequent refusal to reinstate the appeal upon his later recapture violated due process
- applying civil rule to decide that it did not violate due process to dismiss death-penalty defendant's writ of error in the Georgia Supreme Court because the defendant had escaped even though he was later recaptured
- defendant who absconded during pendency of CPL 30.30 motion and failed to appear on date motion scheduled to be heard forfeited claim
- “[W]e have repeatedly held that we would not hear and determine moot cases.”
- accused who escaped custody and was fugitive from justice when Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed writ of error was not denied due process of law and such dismissal was justified by accused’s abandonment of case
- "We might ourselves have pursued a different course in this case, but that is not the test. The [appellant] must have been deprived of one of those fundamental rights, the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our interference."
Citator
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- Cited by
- 153 opinions
Headnotes
- Constitutional Law — Due Process A state court's exercise of discretion over its own procedure will not be held to deprive a party of due process of law unless the party has been deprived of a fundamental right indispensable to the liberty of the citizen; it is not enough that a different course might have been pursued. 166 U.S. at 143
- Civil Procedure — Dismissal of Writ of Error A state appellate court may dismiss an escaped convict's pending writ of error where the convict remains a fugitive beyond the time fixed for surrender, because by escaping from legal custody he abandons his right to prosecute the writ. 166 U.S. at 143
- Civil Procedure — Moot and Abandoned Cases Courts will not hear and determine moot cases or cases in which no bona fide controversy remains pending; in civil cases the settled practice is to dismiss when there is no real dispute, and the same course may be taken in criminal cases if state law or practice authorizes it. 166 U.S. at 142–143
- Constitutional Law — Waiver by Escape An escaped defendant waives whatever right he had to be heard under the Constitution by fleeing custody and failing to appear and prosecute his exceptions as ordered, and the court may prescribe the conditions upon which an escaped convict will be permitted to appear and prosecute his writ. 166 U.S. at 143–144
ALLEN v. GEORGIA,166 U.S. 138(1897)
17 S.Ct. 525
ALLENv. GEORGIA.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA.
No. 641.
Submitted January 19, 1897.
Decided March 15, 1897.
After defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death by the Superior Court of Bibb County, he made a motion for a new trial which was overruled, whereupon he sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State, which was assigned for hearing upon the 4th day of March, 1895. The case having been called upon that day, it was made to appear to the court by affidavits that Allen, after his conviction andPage 139sentence, had escaped from jail, and was at that time a fugitive from justice. Upon this showing, the court ordered that the writ of error be dismissed, unless he should within sixty days surrender himself to custody, or should be recaptured within that time, so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and should furnish evidence thereof by filing the same in the clerk's office.
On May 6 — which was more than sixty days thereafter — the court made a further order, in which, after stating that the plaintiff in error had not surrendered himself to custody, and furnished evidence thereof as required, and that he had not been rearrested since his escape from jail, it was ordered that the writ of error be finally dismissed.
This judgment was, on July 13, 1895, made the judgment of the Superior Court of Bibb County. Afterwards Allen, having been recaptured, was, on the 25th of April, 1896, resentenced to death by the Superior Court, and thereupon made application to one of the justices of this court for a writ of error, which was duly granted — plaintiff assigning as error that the dismissing of his writ of error by the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia was a denial of due process of law.
It appeared from the record that, after the writ of error had been finally dismissed on May 6, 1895, Allen was subsequently recaptured and, upon April 25, 1896, was resentenced to death by the court in which he had been convicted. While thePage 140precise question here involved has never before been presented to this court, we have repeatedly held that we would not hear and determine moot cases, or cases in which there was not at the time abona fidecontroversy pending. In a similar case from the Supreme Court of Nebraska,Bonahanv.Nebraska,125 U.S. 692, wherein it appeared that, pending the writ of error from this court, the plaintiff in error had escaped, and was no longer within the control of the court below, it was ordered that the submission of the cause be set aside, and unless the plaintiff were brought within the jurisdiction of the court below on or before the last day of the term, the cause should be thereafter left off the docket until directions to the contrary. A like order under similar circumstances was made inSmithv.UnitedStates,94 U.S. 97.
In civil cases it has been the universal practice to dismiss the case whenever it became apparent that there was no real dispute remaining between the plaintiff and the defendant, or that the case had been settled or otherwise disposed of by agreement of the parties, and there was no actual controversy pending.Lordv.Veazie, 8 How. 251;Gainesv.Hennen, 24 How. 553, 628;Clevelandv.Chamberlain, 1 Black, 419;Wood-Paper Co. v.Heft, 8 Wall. 333;Dakota Countyv.Glidden,113 U.S. 222;Littlev.Bowers,134 U.S. 547;Californiav.San Pablo c. Railroad,149 U.S. 308.
We know at present of no reason why the same course may not be taken in criminal cases if the laws of the State or the practice of its courts authorize it. To justify any interference upon our part, it is necessary to show that the course pursued has deprived, or will deprive, the plaintiff in error of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Without attempting to define exactly in what due process of law consists, it is sufficient to say that, if the Supreme Court of a State has acted in consonance with the constitutional laws of a State and its own procedure, it could only be in very exceptional circumstances that this court would feel justified in saying that there had been a failure of due legal process. We might ourselves have pursued a different course in this case, but that is not the test. The plaintiff in error must have beenPage 141deprived of one of those fundamental rights, the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our interference.
We cannot say that the dismissal of a writ of error is not justified by the abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ. By escaping from legal custody he has, by the laws of most, if not all, of the States, committed a distinct criminal offence; and it seems but a light punishment for such offence to hold that he has thereby abandoned his right to prosecute a writ of error, sued out to review his conviction. Otherwise he is put in a position of saying to the court: "Sustain my writ and I will surrender myself, and take my chances upon a second trial; deny me a new trial and I will leave the State, or forever remain in hiding." We consider this as practically a declaration of the terms upon which he is willing to surrender, and a contempt of its authority, to which no court is bound to submit. It is much more becoming to its dignity that the court should prescribe the conditions upon which an escaped convict should be permitted to appear and prosecute his writ, than that the latter should dictate the terms upon which he will consent to surrender himself to its custody.
The course pursued in this case is approved by the ruling of many courts in different States, and notably in the case ofCommonwealthv.Andrews,97 Mass. 543, where the defendant escaped during the pendency of his case in the Supreme Court. It was held that, not being present in person, he could not be heard by attorney; that if a new trial were ordered, he was not there to answer further, and that if the exceptions were overruled, a sentence could not be pronounced or executed upon him, p. 544. "So far as the defendant had any right to be heard under the constitution, he must be deemed to have waived it by escaping from custody, and the failing to appear and prosecute his exceptions in person, according to the order of court under which he was committed." InShermanv.Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 677, upon a similar state of facts, the court ordered that the writ of error be dismissed, unless the defendant should appear before a certain day. This judgment was afterwards approved inPage 142Leftwichv.Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 716. In the case ofGenet,59 N.Y. 80, the defendant escaped, pending the settlement of a bill of exceptions, and the court declining to proceed with the settlement of the proposed bill, the case was carried before the Court of Appeals, and the action of the Court of Oyer and Terminer affirmed. See alsoPeoplev.Redinger,55 Cal. 290;Wilsonv.Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 526;Greshamv.State,1 Texas App. 458;McGowanv.People,104 Ill. 100;Warwickv.State,73 Ala. 486;Statev.Conners,20 W. Va. 1;Statev.Wright, 32 La. Ann. 1017;Woodsonv.State,19 Fla. 549;Sargentv.State,96 Ind. 63;Moorev.State,44 Tex. 595;Statev.Craighead, 44 La. Ann. 968;Zardentav.State, 23 S.W. 684;Gatliffv.State,28 S.W. 466.
The course pursued in this case has also received the approval of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia in several prior cases.Maddenv.The State,70 Ga. 383;Osbornv.TheState,70 Ga. 731;Gentryv.The State,91 Ga. 669.
The constitution of the State of Georgia, Art.6, Sec.2, Par.6, requires the Supreme Court to dispose of every case at the first term, unless prevented by providential causes; and, by section 4271 of the Code, this enactment is repeated, with a further provision that no continuance shall be allowed except for providential cause. Indeed, it is admitted that it would be useless to ask the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia to reinstate this case, or to grant to the plaintiff in error any relief whatever, because under the rules and decisions of that court, and under the statutes of the State of Georgia, as construed by that court, such relief would be denied. Whether the court should give the plaintiff sixty days, or until the last day of the term, to appear and surrender himself to custody, was a matter for the court to determine, and even if there were error in that particular, it would not constitute a denial of due process of law.
The order of the Supreme Court dismissing the writ of error must, therefore, beAffirmed.Page 143