Adams v. Williams

Me. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a “stop and frisk,” as well as of possession of heroin that was found during a full search incident to his weapons arrest. After respondent’s conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A. 2d 245 (1968), this Court denied certiorari. 395 U. S. 927 (1969). Williams’ petition for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court and by a divided panel of the Second Circuit, 436 F. 2d 30 (1970), but on rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals granted relief. 441 F. 2d 394 (1971). That court held that evidence introduced at Williams> trial had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person and car, and thus the state court judgments of conviction should be set aside. Since we conclude that the policeman’s actions here conformed to the, standards this Court laid down in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we reverse.

Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone early in the morning on car patrol duty in a high-crime area of Bridgeport, Connecticut. At approximately 2:15 a.m. a person known to Sgt. Connolly approached his cruiser *145 and informed him that an individual seated, in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.

After calling for assistance on his car radio, Sgt. Connolly approached the vehicle to investigate the informant’s report. Connolly tapped on the car window and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the sergeant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from Williams’ waistband. The gun had not been visible to Connolly from outside the car, but it was in precisely the place indicated by the informant. Williams was then arrested by Connolly for unlawful possession of the pistol. A search incident to that arrest was conducted after other officers arrived. They found substantial quantities of heroin on Williams’ person and in the car, and they found a machete and a second revolver hidden in the automobile.

Respondent contends that the initial seizure of his pistol,, upon which rested the later search and seizure of other weapons and narcotics, was not justified by the informant’s tip to Sgt. Connolly. He claims that absent a more reliable informant, or some corroboration of the tip, the policeman’s actions were unreasonable under the standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio, supra.

In Terry this Court recognized that “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id., at 22. The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necéssary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. *146 See id., at 23. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the' time. Id., at 21-22; see Gaines v. Craven, 448 F. 2d 1236 (CA9 1971); United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F. 2d 396 (CA8 1970).

The Court recognized in Terry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect. “When an officer is justified in. believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” he may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons. 392 U. S., at 24. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law. So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop,1 and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dan-gérous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose. Id., at 30.

Applying' these principles to the present case, we believe that Sgt. Connolly acted justifiably in responding to his informant’s tip. The informant was known to him personally and had provided him with information in the past. This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip. The informant here came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene. Indeed, under *147 Connecticut law, the informant might have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint had Sgt. Connolly’s investigation proved the tip incorrect.2 Thus, while the Court’s decisions indicate that this informant’s unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, see, ,e. g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible stop of Williams.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent’s argument that reasonable cause, for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person. Informants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover, every sitüation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situations — for example, when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime — the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response.

While properly investigating the activity of a person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was sitting alone in a.car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly *148 had ample reason to fear for his safety.3 When Williams rolled down his window, rather than complying with the policeman’s request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams’ waist became an even greater threat. Under these circumstances the policeman’s action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable. The loaded gun seized as a result of this intrusion was therefore admissible at Williams’ trial. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 30.

Once Sgt. Connolly had found the gun precisely where the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon. Probable cause to arrest depends “upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers’]- knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing-that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964). In the present case the policeman found Williams in possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted by the informant. This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informant’s further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding' circumstances, certainly suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the *149 gun. Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction. See Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 311-312 (1959). Rather, the court will evaluate generally the circumstances at the time of the arrest to decide if the officer had probable cause for his action:

“In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (1949).

See also id., at 177. Under the circumstances surrounding Williams’ possession of the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful. See Brinegar v. United States, supra; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The fruits of the search were therefore properly admitted at Williams’ trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.

Reversed.

Petitioner does not contend that Williams acted voluntarily in rolling down the window of his car.

Section 53-168 of the Connecticut General Statutes, in force at the time of these events, provided that a “person who knowingly makes to any police officer ... a false report or a false complaint alleging that a crime or crimes have been committed” is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Figures reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that 125 policemen were murdered in 1971, with all but five of them having been killed by gunshot wounds. Federal Bureau of Investigation .Law Enforcement Bulletin, Feb. 1972, p. 33. According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings ' occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated' in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings — A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93. (1963).