Opinion · Supreme Court of South Carolina

Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc. v. Crane National Vendors Division of Unidynamics Corp.

319 S.C. 556

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction
South Carolina
Date
1995-09-18
Topic
general

finding that when all of the evidence goes to the reasonableness of a party’s actions, the statute of limitations issue becomes one for the jury to decide | holding one's assurances to injured party that defects can be corrected coupled with attempts to correct them is conduct that "may lead the injured party to reasonably believe that it will receive satisfaction without resort to litigation." | holding the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions | holding the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions | "Wyoming is a discovery jurisdiction, which means that a statute of limitation is triggered when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action." | general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one | general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one | “The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one.” | "The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." | amendment to general contract statute of limitations reducing period from six to three years did not impliedly repeal South Carolina’s UCC statute of limitations of six years | general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one | "The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." | "The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." | "The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." | “The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one.” | “The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one.” | general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one | "The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." | “Section 15-3-535 extended the ‘discovery rule’ to actions governed by § 15-3-530(5).” | applying the discovery rule to a breach of contract action | Davis Adv. Sh. No. 21 at 22

Citator

Cited by
26 opinions
*558 Finney, Chief Justice:

This certified question presents one question of law arising under the Uniform Commercial Code 1 (U.C.C.): Is the applicable statute of limitations that found in the U.C.C. at S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-725 (1976) or is it the general statute of limitations, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (Supp. 1994)? We hold that the U.C.C. statute of limitations applies.

The U.C.C. statute of limitations is six years, § 36-2-725, while the general contract statute of limitations is three years. § 15-3-530(1) (Supp. 1994). If the general statute applies, then this plaintiff’s actions are barred, while it may proceed if the U.C.C. statute controls.

The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one. Mims v. Alston, 312 S.C. 311, 440 S.E. (2d) 357 (1994). This rule dictates application of the U.C.C. statute. Defendants contend, however, this Court should find the 1988 amendment to the general contract statute of limitations, reducing the period from six years to three, impliedly repealed the U.C.C. statute. They point out that when the legislature first enacted the U.C.C., it rejected the U.C.C. drafters’ suggestion of a four-year period of limitations in favor of the six-year period then found in the general statute. Based upon this legislative action in 1966, it is contended we should find an implied repeal of the U.C.C. statute in 1988 when the general statute was amended. We disagree.

The enactment of a later general statute does not repeal an earlier more specific statute. Mims v. Alston, supra. Similarly, we decline to hold the amendment of a general statute impliedly affects an earlier specific statute. Further, repeal by implication is disfavored, and is found only when two statutes are incapable of any reasonable reconcilement. Id. Here, there is no conflict. The U.C.C. statute of limitations applies to actions arising under that act, while § 15-3-530(1) applies to other types of general contract actions. In addition to our general policy disfavoring repeal by implication, the U.C.C. itself expressly disclaims the applicability of the doctrine to its provisions. S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-104 (1976).

*559 Actions arising under Article 2 of the U.C.C. are governed by § 36-2-725’s statute of limitations. To the extent this holding is inconsistent with dicta in Dandy v. American Laundry Machinery, Inc., 301 S.C. 24, 389 S.E. (2d) 866 (1990) overruled in part on other grounds Garner v. Houck, 312 S.C. 481, 435 S.E. (2d) 847 (1993); Santee Portland Cement v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 299 S.C. 269, 384 S.E. (2d) 693 (1989); and Dillon County School Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E. (2d) 555 (Ct. App. 1985), they are overruled. Accordingly, we

Answer the certified question.

Moore, Waller and Burnett, JJ., concur. Jean H. Toal, Acting Associate Justice, not participating.
1

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-101 thru 36-11-108 (1976 and Supp. 1994).