X-G-W

                                                              Interim Decision #3352




                          In re X-G-W-, Applicant

                              Decided June 25, 1998

                          U.S. Department of Justice
                   Executive Office for Immigration Review
                       Board of Immigration Appeals


      Due to a fundamental change in the definition of a “refugee” brought about by
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110

 Stat. 3009-546, the Board of Immigration Appeals will allow
reopening of proceedings to pursue asylum claims based on coerced population control
policies, notwithstanding the time and number limitations on motions specified in 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

 (1997).

John C. Lin, Esquire, New York, New York, for applicant

Dione M. Enea, Assistant District Counsel, for the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Before: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, Chairman; VACCA, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VIL-
LAGELIU, COLE, ROSENBERG, MATHON, GUENDELSBERGER, and GRANT,
Board Members. Concurring Opinion: FILPPU, Board Member. Dissenting Opinion:
HEILMAN, Board Member.

SCHMIDT, Chairman:

     The applicant has filed a motion to reopen exclusion proceedings ask-
ing the Board to reconsider our prior decision in this case, dated May 10,
1996, denying asylum in the United States and withholding of deportation
to the People’s Republic of China. The motion to reopen is untimely. We
would therefore normally lack jurisdiction to consider it. See 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c) (1997). However, because of the significant changes to the asylum
law enacted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of 

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110

 Stat.
3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), we will consider motions to reopen to apply for
asylum based on coerced population control policies pursuant to this
Board’s authority “to reopen or reconsider on its own motion in any case
in which we have rendered a decision.” See 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(a). We will
grant the applicant’s application for asylum on a conditional basis, and we
also will grant his application for withholding of deportation.



                                           71
Interim Decision #3352


                         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

     In our prior decision in this case, we found the applicant excludable
under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

8 U.S.C. § 1182

(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1994), for failure to possess a valid immi-
grant visa upon his arrival in the United States. Further, we agreed with
the Immigration Judge that, notwithstanding the applicant’s credible tes-
timony concerning his punishment for violating China’s “one couple, one
child” policy, enforcement of the family planning policy was not, by
itself, deemed to create a well-founded fear of persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Matter of Chang, 

20 I&N Dec. 38

 (BIA 1989); see also Matter
of G-, 

20 I&N Dec. 764

 (BIA 1993). We therefore dismissed the appli-
cant’s appeal on May 10, 1996.
     Sweeping changes in the immigration laws were enacted 4 months
later. Pertinent to this case, section 601(a)(1) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at
3009-689, amended the definition of a “refugee” by adding the following:

  [A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary ster-
  ilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a proce-
  dure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
  deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who
  has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or
  subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have
  a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.

Section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1101

(a)(42)(Supp. II 1996).
     In light of this significant change in the asylum law, the applicant,
through counsel, filed with the Board a motion to reopen exclusion pro-
ceedings, arguing that under section 601 of the IIRIRA, he is now eligi-
ble for a grant of asylum and withholding of deportation based on his pun-
ishment for violating China’s “one couple, one child” policy.

                          II. LIMITS ON REOPENING

     Pursuant to the regulations at 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(2), only one motion to
reopen is allowed and must be filed with the Board not later than 90 days
after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, or,
on or before September 30, 1996, whichever date is later. The applicant’s
motion to reopen our May 10, 1996, order was not filed until February 6,
1997. It is therefore untimely.
     The time and number limitation set forth in 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(2), does
not, however, apply to (1) motions to reopen certain types of in absentia
cases, (2) motions to reopen that are agreed upon by all parties, or (3)
motions to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of depor-

                                           72
                                                     Interim Decision #3352


tation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of national-
ity, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have
been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(3),
The applicant’s motion to reopen does not arise in the context of an in
absentia proceeding, does not proffer evidence of changed circumstances
arising in China, and is opposed by the Service. Thus it does not fall with-
in any of the exceptions enumerated in 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(3).
      In addition to the exceptions listed above, the Board retains limited
discretionary powers under the regulations to reopen or reconsider cases
sua sponte in unique situations where it would serve the interest of jus-
tice. Matter of J-J-, 

21 I&N Dec. 976

 (BIA 1997); 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(a). We
find that this case represents such a situation.
      This case presents a difficult dilemma for the Board because a marked
change in the refugee law, which was meant to provide relief to individu-
als suffering persecution on account of coerced population control poli-
cies, is running up against a change in the regulations intended to bring
finality to immigration decisions and to prevent successive and frivolous
motions designed to delay deportation. We believe that the change in the
asylum law supports reopening in this case for reasons similar to those
that allow reopening to apply for asylum based on changes in country
conditions in the alien’s country of nationality. 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(3)(ii).
There is no indication that the applicant in this proceeding delayed apply-
ing for asylum or purposefully filed dilatory motions, which is what the
1996 motions regulations sought to prevent. Rather, a significant change
in the immigration law made relief available to the applicant on the basis
of the same asylum application he filed initially, and he has filed his
motion promptly following the new developments.
      In response to this situation, affecting many of our recently decided
cases, we will accept motions to reopen, which might otherwise be barred
by 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(2), to pursue applications for asylum based on
coerced population control policies. The motions should continue to be
filed in accordance with all other regulatory requirements for filing a
motion to reopen, including the submission of the appropriate fee or fee
waiver form.


                       III. THE ASYLUM CLAIM

     The applicant testified at his hearing that he and his wife had two
children in China born 1 year apart. This is a violation of the “one couple,
one child” policy, which at most allows for a second child, under certain
circumstances, after a determined number of years have passed since the
birth of the first child. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
Dep’t of State, China - Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum

                                    73
Interim Decision #3352


Applications (Dec. 20, 1994). As a result of their violation, the applicant’s
wife was made to undergo a tubal ligation, the applicant and his wife were
fined, and the applicant was dismissed from his government forestry job.
The Immigration Judge found the applicant’s testimony to be credible and
determined that there were no adverse factors that would prevent an asy-
lum grant. Indeed, the Immigration Judge concluded that he would have
granted the applicant’s request for asylum were it not for the Board’s
holding in Matter of Chang, supra.
    The applicant’s punishment for violating China’s population control
policies falls squarely within section 101(a)(42) of the Act, as amended by
section 601 of the IIRIRA, which supersedes our prior ruling in Matter of
Chang, supra. Under the new refugee definition, the applicant appears to
have suffered past persecution in China on account of political opinion
and is presumed under 

8 C.F.R. § 208.13

(b)(1) (1996) to have a well-
founded fear of future persecution. Matter of X-P-T-, 

21 I&N Dec. 634

(BIA 1996); see also Matter of H-, 

21 I&N Dec. 337

 (BIA 1996). This
presumption may be rebutted by a showing that country conditions have
changed to the extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear
of persecution if returned to China. Such a rebuttal has not been offered.
Indeed, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that it was will-
ing to discuss with the applicant the possibility of filing a joint motion at
a later date. Therefore, the applicant’s application for asylum will be
granted on a conditional basis under Matter of X-P-T-. The applicant is
also entitled to withholding of deportation under Matter of X-P-T-, supra.


                            IV. CONCLUSION

    Due to the fundamental change in asylum law enacted by the IIRIRA,
the Board will allow reopening for asylum claims based on coercive fam-
ily planning policies, which might otherwise be barred by 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(2), where the alien had previously presented persuasive evidence of
persecution based on China’s “one couple, one child” policy, and where
the Board previously denied asylum based on Matter of Chang, supra.
The motion must be properly filed with the Board and must be supported
by evidence of prima facie eligibility for asylum based on the new defini-
tion of a refugee. In this case, we will reopen the applicant’s proceedings
and grant his application for asylum, on a conditional basis, and his appli-
cation for withholding of deportation.
    ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted and the Immigration
Judge’s September 12, 1995, order of exclusion and deportation is vacated.
    FURTHER ORDER: The applicant is granted asylum, condi-
tioned upon an administrative determination by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service that a number is available for such a grant under

                                     74
                                                     Interim Decision #3352


section 207(a)(5) of the Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1157

(a)(5)(Supp. II 1996).
    FURTHER ORDER: The applicant is granted withholding of
deportation.

Vice Chairman Mary Maguire Dunne, and Board Members Philemina M.
Jones and Lori S. Scialabba did not participate in the decision in this case.

CONCURRING OPINION: Lauri Steven Filppu, Board Member

     I respectfully concur.
     I write separately because I find much force in the views expressed by
the dissent and because I am troubled by the failure of the majority to
address the regulatory history of the current motion regulations, a history
which shows some consideration and rejection of “changed law” as a
basis for overriding the general limitations on motions to reopen. 

61 Fed. Reg. 18,900

, 18,901-02 (1996).
     I agree with the dissent that we should ordinarily leave it to the
Attorney General or Congress to prescribe whether changes in the law
should be accompanied by a relaxation of the time and number restric-
tions on motions. After all, many changes in substantive law do not auto-
matically translate into a grant of benefits. For example, a particular
change may simply create new opportunities to apply for discretionary
relief, creating varying degrees of possible success for different appli-
cants. Aliens who have final determinations requiring their departure
should not routinely be entitled to reopening, under the Board’s own
authority, merely because they have remained in the United States long
enough after their final orders, such that they can advance some facially
plausible arguments for eligibility under new legislation.
     Nevertheless, I do not understand the majority to set any precedent as
to how we may view other changes in law in relation to invoking our own
authority to reopen cases irrespective of the time and numerical limita-
tions contained in the regulations. Rather, we have before us an unusual
situation. Congress has, in effect, reversed the result of our past case law
in relation to so-called “coercive population control” persecution cases.
While the relevant legislation set a numerical limit with regard to asylum
grants, no such limit exists as to grants of withholding of deportation
under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1253

(h) (1994), or withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the
Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1231

(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996), as enacted by section 307(a)
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Division C of 

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110

 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612.
And, importantly, in my view, the applicant here is clearly entitled to sec-
tion 243(h) relief by virtue of the Immigration Judge’s rulings below and
our decisions in Matter of X-P-T-, 

21 I&N Dec. 634

 (BIA 1996), and

                                     75
Interim Decision #3352


Matter of C-Y-Z-, 

21 I&N Dec. 915

 (BIA 1997).
    For these reasons, as well as the majority’s reasons, I find this case to
present an exceptional situation, and I therefore concur in the majority’s
orders. See Matter J-J-, 

21 I&N Dec. 976

 (BIA 1997).

    DISSENTING OPINION: Michael J. Heilman, Board Member

     I respectfully dissent.
     The applicant’s motion to reopen is untimely and does not fall within
any of the exceptions enumerated in 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c)(3) (1997). The
majority cites an important change in the asylum law as the reason for tak-
ing, sua sponte, untimely motions to reopen based on coerced population
control policies. While I would agree that the change in the asylum law is
important, there is simply no authority in the regulations for allowing
reopening out of time based on changes in law.
     The majority recognizes a conflict in our laws. Section 601 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C of 

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110

 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (“IIRI-
RA”), changed the definition of a “refugee” in the Immigration and
Nationality Act to include those who have suffered persecution as a result
of coerced population control policies. However, of equal significance,
section 545(d) of the Immigration Act of 1990, 

Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104

Stat. 4978, 5066, commands the Attorney General to promulgate regula-
tions which establish strict practice guidelines before the Board and the
Immigration Courts for the express purpose of expediting review and put-
ting an end to successive and dilatory motions meant to delay deportation.
See section 242 of the Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1252

 (1994); Stone v. INS, 

514 U.S. 386, 400

 (1995).
     In response to proposed motions regulations, commenters argued that
a 90-day period was insufficient time for aliens to present new evidence,
avail themselves of changes in law, or seek additional forms of relief. In
promulgating the final rule, the Department of Justice summarized the
reasoning behind the new regulation as follows:

    After careful consideration, the Department has decided to retain both the time and
  number limitations applicable to motions to reopen. The provision instituting
  motions reform is statutorily required. The Immigration Act of 1990 states that “the
  Attorney General shall issue regulations with respect to * * * the period of time in
  which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be offered in deportation proceed-
  ings, which regulations shall include a limitation on the number of such motions that
  may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions.” The Joint
  Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955,
  101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) . . . , explained this provision as follows: “Unless the
  Attorney General finds reasonable evidence to the contrary, the regulations should
  state that such motions be made within 20 days of the date of the final determina-


                                          76
                                                             Interim Decision #3352

  tion in the proceeding and that such motions be limited to one motion to reopen and
  one motion to reconsider.”

    ....

    After carefully weighing all of the comments, the Department has decided to retain
  the amount of time to file a motion to reopen at 90 days as provided in the May 1995
  proposed rule. The 90-day time period represents a considerable extension beyond
  the 20 days suggested in the Conference Report. A time frame of 90 days for filing
  motions to reopen will provide parties an opportunity to avail themselves of changed
  law, facts, and circumstances.

Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 

61 Fed. Reg. 18,900

,
18,901-02 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
     It is clear, therefore, that the approach adopted by the majority was
specifically considered and rejected in promulgating 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

(c). We
should thus not use our limited power to reopen sua sponte to circumvent
the regulations where we believe it would be fair to do so. Matter of J-J.

21 I&N Dec. 976

 (BIA 1997). We are bound by the regulations. Matter of
Ponce de Leon, 

21 I&N Dec. 154

 (BIA 1996). They mark the extent of our
jurisdiction and must be faithfully observed, as they are mandatory and
not subject to our equitable discretion. Therefore, in a situation such as
this, where a change in law would generate time or number barred
motions to reopen, only Congress or the Attorney General should provide
for either another exception in the regulations or for an orderly fix to the
immediate inconsistency. It should not be up to the Board to give one
change in law greater importance than the other or to resolve a conflict in
the laws by carving out an exception in the regulations where one does not
exist. As we noted in Matter of Tiwari, 

19 I&N Dec. 875

 (BIA 1989), “A
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that ‘a specific provision
prevails over a more general one. . . .’” 

Id.

 at 881 (quoting Castaneda-
Gonzalez v. INS, 

564 F.2d 417, 423

 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
     An example of an orderly regulatory fix for a change in law can be
found in section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act, Title II of 

Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111

 Stat. 2193, 2196 (1997)
(“NACARA”), which allows certain aliens from Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Eastern Europe who have final orders of removal to file motions to
reopen to apply for suspension of deportation based on a change in law
making suspension of deportation available to them. NACARA specified
that the Attorney General would designate a time period in which motions
to reopen could be filed with the Board or the Immigration Courts with-
out regard to the time and number restrictions of 

8 C.F.R. § 3.2

. Notice
was accordingly issued in the regulations by the Attorney General allow-
ing a 240-day period in which special NACARA motions could be filed.
See Motion to Reopen: Suspension of Deportation and Cancellation of

                                          77
Interim Decision #3352


Removal, 

63 Fed. Reg. 3154

 (1998). As the IIRIRA did not authorize any
exception to the motions regulations for victims of coerced population
control persecution, I respectfully dissent.




                                 78