Opinion · Ohlaw Ohio
TARY v. BOARD, 161 Ohio St. 251 (1954)
119 N.E.2d 56
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Ohlaw Ohio
- Jurisdiction
- Ohlaw
- Date
- 1954-03-31
- Topic
- general
TARY v. BOARD, 161 Ohio St. 251 (1954) 119 N.E.2d 56 TARY, APPELLEE v. BOARD OF REVIEW, BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, ETAL., APPELLANTS. No. 33646Supreme Court of Ohio. Decided March 31, 1954.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed TARY v. BOARD, 161 Ohio St. 251 (1954). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
TARY v. BOARD,161 Ohio St. 251(1954)
119 N.E.2d 56
TARY, APPELLEE v. BOARD OF REVIEW, BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, ET
AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 33646
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided March 31, 1954.
1. In determining whether work is suitable for a claimant under Section 1345-6, General Code (Section4141.29, Revised Code), which is a part of the Unemployment Compensation Act,"theadministrator shall * * * consider the degree of risk to theclaimant's * * * morals."
2. The test of an individual's morals is subjective, and one's morals is dependent upon the bona fide conscientious beliefs of the individual and his sense of duty.
3. Where a claimant under the Unemployment Compensation Act is a long-standing and conscientious member of a religious sect which teaches as one of its tenets that secular work on Saturday is a violation of the law of God, and where the claimant did not engage in work on Saturday in his last employment, his rejection in good faith of proffered employment which requires work on Saturday will be excused as being unsuitable and a risk to"claimant's * * * morals."
On October 12, 1948, Regina Tary, hereinafter referred to as the claimant, was employed by Konopak Dalton, certified public accountants of Toledo, Ohio, to do statistical work and was so employed until her employment was terminated on November 11, 1949. At no time during this period of employment was she required to work on Saturdays.
Thereafter, she applied for unemployment benefits. Her application was approved on November 25, 1949, and she received such benefits until January 13, 1950. On that date she was referred by a representative of the Ohio State Employment Service for employment which would have required her to work half a day on Saturdays. She refused to accept employment on this referral. The Administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation thereupon suspended her unemployment compensation benefits, and she appealed to the Board of Review of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. The referee affirmed the decision of the administrator and the Board of Review disallowed the application for a further appeal.
She then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County which reversed the action of the Board of Review.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
The matter is now before this court following the allowance of a motion to certify.
The Seventh-Day Adventist denomination holds that to perform secular work on its seventh day of the week is a violation of the law of God, and any member guilty of such violation is subject to the penalty of expulsion from the organized body of the Church.
The claimant refused to accept the position referral of January 13, 1950, because such employment required her to work on the Sabbath recognized by the Church to which she belonged.
InKutv.Albers Super Markets, Inc.,146 Ohio St. 522,66 N.E.2d 643, this court held that an employee who refused to work on Saturday, which was the day he observed as his Sabbath, was notavailable during the entire week for work in his usualtrade or occupationand was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
At that time, Section 1345-6, General Code (120 Ohio Laws, 666, 682), read in part as follows:
"a. No individual shall be entitled to any benefits unless he or she
"* * *
"(4) is able to work and available for work inhis usual tradeor occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for which he isreasonably fitted;* * *
"* * *
"d. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual:
"* * *
"(2) has refused to accept an offer of work forPage 254which he isreasonably fitted* * *." (Emphasis added.)
On May 23, 1949, Section 1345-6, General Code, was amended (123 Ohio Laws, 178, 192, Section4141.29, Revised Code), effective August 22, 1949, to read in part as follows:
"a. No individual shall be entitled to any benefits unless he or she
"* * *
"(4) is able to work and available forsuitable workand is actively seeking such work, either at a locality in which he has earned wages subject to the Unemployment Compensation Act during his base period or at a locality where such work is normally performed; * * *
"* * *
"d. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual:
"* * *
"(2)has refused without good causeto accept an offer ofsuitable work, or has refused to accept a referral tosuitableworkwhen directed to do so by a local employment office of this state or another state;
"* * *
"f.In determining whether any work is suitable for aclaimantin the administration of the provisions of this act, the administrator shall, in addition to the determination required under subsection (e) above, consider the degree of risk to the claimant's health, safety, andmorals, his physical fitness for the work, his prior training and experience, his prior earnings, the length of his unemployment, the distance of the available work from his residence and his prospects for obtaining local work." (Emphasis added.)Page 255
Although Section 1345-6, General Code, was again amended in 1949, effective October 18, 1949, which last amendment is controlling in the instant case, there was no appreciable change in the provisions as last above quoted.
It should be noted that, at the time theKut casewas decided, Section 1345-6, General Code, provided for a standard based on thefitnessof the claimant for the work.
By reason of the 1949 amendments, however, the standard is now whether the work issuitablefor the claimant, subject to the test that"in determining whether any work is suitable * * * theadministrator shall * * * consider the degree of risk to theclaimant's * * * morals."
The claimant contends that to have engaged in the employment to which she was referred would have been a risk to her morals, because it would have required her to work on her Sabbath.
Is there a risk to a "claimant's morals" to require him to engage in work on Saturdays when his bona fide religious convictions compel him to abstain from secular work on Saturdays?
"Morals" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary as the "science or doctrine of conduct, especially as to the sense of duty."
There is no risk to the morals of a nonbeliever or a Christian who observes the Sunday Sabbath, if he works on Saturday, because such employment does not violate his "sense of duty." What is moral to one person may be immoral to another. Moral standards change. Some acts which are considered moral today were deemed highly immoral a century ago, and conversely the standards of today recognize some things as being immoral which were formerly considered right and proper.
The test in the instant case, however, is not whetherPage 256the proffered employment presents a risk to the morals of a majority of our citizens, but, as the statute specifies, whether it presents a risk to the "claimant's * * * morals."
The first moral obligation of a person is to remain true to his religious convictions and to conform to what he believes to be his sense of duty. Where one has been schooled to believe in and practice the tenets of a faith which compels him to abstain from secular work on Saturdays, and, by reason of such training and his conscientious affiliation with the church of such a faith, possesses a fixed, definite and immutable conviction that he must refrain from secular work on Saturdays, it would seriously offend the moral conscience of such a person to require him to engage in secular work on Saturday.
The test of an individual's morals is subjective, and one's morals is dependent upon his conscientious beliefs. The precepts of a religion in which one believes are an integral and essential part of one's morals.
We are of the opinion that the acceptance of the proffered employment by the claimant in the instant case would have seriously offended the"claimant's * * * morals"based on her sense of duty and her religious conscience. The evidence is uncontradicted that her refusal to accept was not fanciful, actuated by bad faith, or prompted by a desire to remain in the ranks of the unemployed, but was based solely on the fact that the proffered employment involved a risk to her morals.
The language in the 1949 amendment is substantially similar to that of the Unemployment Compensation Acts of many states. In a large majority of these states, such provisions have been interpreted to excuse rejection of proffered employment if such employment involves violation of religious conscience and thereby tends to offend a"claimant's * * * morals."Page 257
The decision of this court inKutv.Albers Super Markets,Inc., supra, was based upon statutory language which was substantially and materially different from that of the present statute. It is our interpretation that the General Assembly intended, by the 1949 amendments, to confer rights based upon bona fide moral convictions. Conscientious religious beliefs constitute an integral part of an individual's morals.
In view of this interpretation of the statute, it is unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional questions raised by the claimant.
In accordance with the views herein expressed, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.Judgment affirmed.
TAFT, ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MIDDLETON and HART, JJ., dissent.
The statute itself, Section 1345-6, General Code, subsection e (123 Ohio Laws, 559), specifically enumerates the instances where the applicant for compensation will not be denied benefits because of refusal to accept new work. They are:
"(1) As a condition of being so employed, he would be required to join a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain membership in and observe the lawful rules of any such organization; or
"(2) The position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute; or
"(3) The work is at an unreasonable distance from his residence * * * or
"(4) The remuneration, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the locality."
In addition Section 1345-6, subsection f, provides that in determining whether any work is suitable for a claimant, the administrator shallconsiderthe degree of risk to claimant's health, safety and morals, physical fitness for the work, prior training and experience, prior earnings, length of unemployment, distance of available work from his residence and his prospects for obtaining local work.
In the case ofChambersv.Owens-Ames-Kimball Co.,146 Ohio St. 559,67 N.E.2d 439, 165 A.L.R., 1373, this court held:
"An interpretation of the terms of Section 1345-6 e (1), General Code, which would permit a member of a labor organization to refuse an offer of work on the ground that its acceptance would violate the rules of his organization and still remain eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, while a nonmember of a labor organization by virtue of the terms of the same statute would not be eligible for such benefits if hePage 259refused to accept the same work tendered under the same circumstances, would result in an unconstitutional operation of the statute."
The unemployment compensation law is not based upon the premise that one may refuse employment because of some personal belief or because of membership in a certain organization, and at the same time enjoy unemployment compensation at the indirect but real expense of another who must accept the same character of employment or suffer a loss of compensation.
WEYGANDT, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.