Opinion · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE v. STATE OF R.I., 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005)
NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE OF R.I., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. STATEOF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS; DONALD L. CARCIERI, in hisofficial capacity as GOVERNOR; PATRICK C. LYNCH, in his Off. capacityas the Att’y GENERAL; STEVEN M. PARE, in his Off. capacity asColonel of the R.I. State Police; JUSTICES OF RHODE ISLANDDISTRICT & SUPERIOR COURTS; TOWN OF CHARLESTOWN; CHARLESTOWN POLICEDEPARTMENT, Defendan
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2005-05-12
- Topic
- general
NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE v. STATE OF R.I., 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005) NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE OF RHODE ISLAND, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. STATEOF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS; DONALD L. CARCIERI, in hisofficial capacity as GOVERNOR; PATRICK C. LYNCH, in his official capacityas the ATTORNEY GENERAL; STEVEN M.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE v. STATE OF R.I., 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., Assistant Solicitor, was on brief, for appellee the Town of Charlestown and Charlestown Police Department.
Claire J. Richards, Special Counsel, was on brief, for appellee Governor Donald L. Carcieri.
Neil F.X. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee State of Rhode Island.
Following this incident, both the Narragansetts and the State of Rhode Island filed suits disputing the issue of whether the Tribe's operation of a smoke shop and sale of cigarettes on the Tribe's settlement lands are exempt from the application and enforcement of Rhode Island's cigarette tax laws. The State initially filed its complaint in Rhode Island state court and the Narragansetts removed the case to federal district court in an attempt to have it decided together with the Tribe's complaint, which was brought in federal district court. The district court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the state case and remanded it to the state court. However, the district court treated the State's motion for summary judgment in its case as a motion for summary judgment in the Tribe's federal case and decided the federal case accordingly. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and the Narragansett Tribe now brings the instant appeal.
We must decide three questions related to this incident. First, we are asked whether the district court could exercize jurisdiction over the State's complaint. Second, we must decide whether the Narragansett Tribe has sovereign immunity from the Rhode Island tax on cigarettes, focusing on whether the legal incidence of the cigarette tax falls on the tribe or the consumer of the cigarettes. Finally, we must determine whether the State exceeded its authority in the enforcement of its cigarette tax on settlement lands in violation of the Tribe's sovereignty.
The Narragansett Indian Tribe is a federally recognized
Indian tribe located in the State of Rhode Island.
Under the terms of the JMOU and Settlement Act, the State provided 900 acres to the Narragansetts and the Federal government agreed to provide funding for the purchase of an additional 900 acres. These lands comprise the 1800 acres we refer to as the settlement lands. In exchange for this provision of land to the Tribe, the State negotiated for and received the continued applicability of State law to the settlement lands.
The sale of cigarettes in Rhode Island is governed by a number of statutory requirements, including taxation provisions.
Every person engaged in the sale of cigarettes in Rhode Island must first obtain a license from the State Tax Administrator.R.I. Gen. Laws §44-20-2.In addition to this licensing requirement, Rhode Island imposes an excise tax on cigarettes sold, distributed, held, or consumed within its borders.R.I. Gen. Laws §44-20-12.The tax is collected through the sale of cigarette stamps, which must be affixed to all packages of cigarettes possessed within the State (with limited exceptions).R.I.Gen. Laws §44-20-13,44-20-18,44-20-30.State law also requires a retailer to add a sales tax to the sale price of the cigarettes.R.I. Gen. Laws §44-18-19.
Moreover, Rhode Island, with the assistance of the Federal government, has a system by which it collects sales taxes on cigarettes from consumers who reside in the State and purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers.
On July 1, 2003, the Narragansett Indian Tribe's Tribal Council passed a resolution authorizing the opening of a tribally owned Smoke Shop to sell cigarettes. The Tribe stipulated that the purpose of opening the Smoke Shop was to provide a means for economic development for the Tribal Nation. The Tribe imported unstamped cigarettes from other states and stored them in anticipation of the Smoke Shop's opening. The Smoke Shop, which opened on July 12, 2003, was located entirely within the Tribe's settlement lands. The Shop offered unstamped, untaxed cigarettes for sale to both tribal and non-tribal members without collecting Rhode Island's seven percent retail sales tax from any of its customers. As stipulated before the court below, "a large proportion of the Shop's customers were not members of the Tribe."
The day the Smoke Shop opened, the Rhode Island State Police sought a search warrant to search the Smoke Shop for alleged violations of Rhode Island's cigarette tax laws, specifically, the possession and sale of unstamped cigarettes, which is a misdemeanor offense.
Both the Narragansetts and the State brought suit over this incident. The district court found that it had jurisdiction over the Tribe's case, which was originally brought in federal district court.
Faced with cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that: (1) the legal incidence of the State's Cigarette Tax falls on the consumer, and not the Tribe; (2) the State did not violate federal law or the Tribe's sovereign rights when it enforced its criminal statutes by executing a search warrant, and making arrests pursuant to that warrant, on tribal land; and (3) the Tribe must comply with the Cigarette Tax if it wishes to continue selling cigarette products on the settlement lands.
The Tribe asserts that the well-pleaded complaint rule did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the State's complaint, which the Tribe removed from state court to federal district court.2The federal district court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the State's complaint because (1) the State did not bring its "claims under the Settlement Act;" (2)28 U.S.C. § 1362does not provide a viable basis for federal jurisdiction because it "only vests jurisdiction in a federal court over actions
The Tribe argues that the district court should have applied the "artful pleading rule" to the State's complaint.3But the alleged federal issue — whether the State has authority to tax the Tribe under the Settlement Act — is a defense. Even had it been preemptively included and argued against in the State's complaint, it would not have given rise to federal question jurisdiction over the State's complaint.
It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution.
The question of whether the legal incidence of Rhode Island's cigarette tax scheme falls on the Narragansett Tribe, as dealers of cigarettes, or merely on the consumer or non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes, will likely determine whether the Narragansetts are required to comply with the tax scheme. The Narragansetts argue that the legal incidence of Rhode Island's cigarette tax falls directly on the Tribe and its members, and that the tax may not be enforced against the Tribe without express congressional authority. The State, on the other hand, argues that the legal incidence of the cigarette tax, as stated in the language of the Rhode Island statute, rests on the consumer rather than the Tribe.
If the legal incidence of the cigarette tax falls on the Tribe itself, it presents serious tribal sovereignty concerns that might preclude the State from enforcing its tax due to the United States' recognition of the Narragansetts as a sovereign Indian tribe.
The district court determined that the legal incidence of Rhode Island's cigarette tax falls on the consumer and not the Narragansett Tribe, noting that the pass through provision in Rhode Island's statute was plain.
In adjudicating matters of state law, federal courts ordinarily defer to the decisions of state courts. For example, in
The Narragansett Tribe cites
However, "[i]n situations wherein federal immunity is affected by a determination as to which party to a transaction bears the legal incidence of a state tax, the federal courts `are not bound by the state court's characterization of the tax.'"
The Narragansett Tribe argues that the district court should not have applied federal law. Citing
The Tribe, however, ignores Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. For example, in
Even if we were to consider the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in
It is not required that the law expressly state that the tax must be passed on to the ultimate purchaser for a State to require a tribe to collect cigarette taxes from non-Indian purchasers and remit it to the State.
The State posits that it has raised two independently sufficient grounds on which we might affirm the district court's judgment, even if the legal incidence of the tax is found to fall on the Tribe. Since we find that the legal incidence of the tax does not fall on the Narragansett Tribe, we find it unnecessary and inappropriate to decide these questions. The grounds put forth by the State are (1) that the settlement lands are not "Indian country,"4and (2) that direct taxation of the Tribe by the State is allowed pursuant to both section 1708 of the Settlement Act,25 U.S.C. § 1708(a), and the Tribe's consent,5implicit in its agreement to subject the settlement lands to the "full force and effect" of "all laws of the State of Rhode Island," in the Joint Memorandum of Understanding between the Narragansett Tribe and the State of Rhode Island, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1453, at 26,
The Narragansetts, on the other hand, want us to declare that the settlement lands are Indian country and that the State does not have authority to tax the Tribe directly because Congress did not expressly and unequivocally consent to state taxation of the Narragansett Tribe.
We find it unnecessary and inappropriate to decide these questions today. Because we affirm the district court's holding that the legal incidence of Rhode Island's cigarette tax falls on the consumer and not the tribal distributor, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the tax would be valid if it were a direct tax on the Tribe.D. Sovereign immunity and the State's enforcement of its laws on theTribe's settlement lands
The Narragansetts claim that the State of Rhode Island exceeded its authority in enforcing its cigarette laws against the government of the Narragansett Indian Tribe and that the State thereby violated the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The State argues, conversely, that since the State's civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction apply to the settlement lands pursuant to25 U.S.C. § 1708, the State has concomitant ability to enforce its laws there, including those governing the sale of cigarettes. The State also argues that the Tribe's sovereign immunity was abrogated by section 1708, and therefore tribal sovereign immunity does not bar the State's enforcement of its laws on the settlement lands.
The Tribe asks us to consider six distinct questions regarding the enforcement of Rhode Island's cigarette laws on the settlement lands, including (1) whether the State may invoke its jurisdiction over the settlement lands to enforce its cigarette tax on the government of the Narragansett Indian Tribe (a Land/Tribe distinction); (2) whether the State may issue and serve a search warrant for property of the tribal government; (3) whether the State may enter tribal lands to serve a warrant; (4) whether the State may confiscate Tribal government property while on the settlement lands; (5) whether the State can require the Tribe to purchase a license; and (6) whether the State was bound to use less intrusive means in order to enforce the cigarette tax.
We have determined that, since the legal incidence of Rhode Island's cigarette tax falls on the consumer, rather than the tribal distributor, the Narragansetts are obligated to comply with the State's cigarette tax laws as they pertain to cigarettes sold to non-Indian consumers. Therefore, by selling unstamped cigarettes to non-Indian consumers, the Smoke Shop operators violated Rhode Island tax law, which is a criminal offense. This brings us to the questions regarding what measures the State may take to enforce its cigarette tax laws.
Drawing the line between the sovereign rights of the Narragansett Tribe and the State of Rhode Island is complicated by the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, which provides for the continued applicability of Rhode Island's civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction over the settlement lands.
"Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."
The Narragansett Tribe argues that its sovereign immunity is a complete defense to the State's enforcement of its cigarette laws against the Tribe. The State responds that Congress, by granting jurisdiction to the state in25 U.S.C. § 1708, abrogated the Tribe's sovereign immunity on the settlement lands. In
However, this does not mean that we agree with the State that Section 1708(a) abrogates the Tribe's sovereign immunity altogether. On the contrary, we have recognized and enforced the Tribe's sovereign immunity in the past.
[T]he mere fact that the Settlement Act cedes power to the state does not necessarily mean . . . that the Tribe lacks similar power and, thus, lacks `jurisdiction' over the settlement lands. Although the grant of jurisdictional power to the state in the Settlement Act is valid and rather broad, . . . we do not believe that it is exclusive. To the contrary, we rule that the Tribe retains concurrent jurisdiction over the settlement lands. . . .
The Tribe's immunity does not, however, provide a complete defense to the enforcement of State laws. There remains a question of the extent to which the State may encroach upon the Tribe's settlement lands to enforce its criminal laws. Neither this Court, nor the Supreme Court, has issued definitive guidance on this question.2. Whether the State may invoke its jurisdiction over the settlementlands to enforce its cigarette tax
The district court considered the holdings of
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. When, however, state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land, as exemplified by our decision in [Colville]. . . . It is also well established in our precedent that States have criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians for crimes committed . . . off the reservation. While it is not entirely clear from our precedent whether the last mentioned authority entails the corollary right to enter a reservation (including Indian-fee lands) for enforcement purposes, several of our opinions point in that direction. In [Colville], we explicitly reserved the question whether state officials could seize cigarettes held for sale to non-members in order to recover the taxes due.
The Narragansett Tribe argues that the district court came to the wrong conclusion for several reasons. First, the Tribe asserts that its sovereign immunity is a complete defense to enforcement of the State's laws on the settlement lands. The Tribe relies heavily on a Ninth Circuit decision,
The Tribe has not explained, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided, what prescription of federal common law, if any, enables the Tribe to maintain an action for declaratory relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. This case is therefore remanded for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
Second, the Narragansetts argue that we should not rest our decision on
The Court did, however, determine that the State of Washington's interest in enforcing its valid taxes was sufficient to justify seizures of shipments of unstamped cigarettes as contraband while they were in transit, traveling to the reservations.
Unlike the State of Washington in
The Tribe contends that a distinction should be made between the jurisdiction the State was given over the settlement lands and any power the State might have over the Tribe itself. The Tribe argues that the grant of jurisdiction that Congress gave to the State of Rhode Island merely subjected "the settlement lands . . . to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State,"25 U.S.C. § 1708(a), not the Narragansett Tribal government. The Tribe asserts that Congress intentionally limited this jurisdiction to the settlement lands, and that it knew how to write the Act to cover the Tribe as well if it had so intended.
In ascertaining the intent of Congress in statutes regulating Indian tribes, we must read the statutes against a backdrop of Indian sovereignty.
Congress did not expressly give the State jurisdiction over the Narragansett Tribe in Section 1708. While we have said that the grant of jurisdictional power to the State is broad, we have also found that "the Tribe retains concurrent jurisdiction over the settlement lands,"
The Tribe asserts that the opening and operation of the Smoke Shop was a tribal government activity. The Narragansetts' Smoke Shop was opened pursuant to a resolution passed by the Narragansett Tribal Council with the stated purpose of providing economic development for the Tribal Nation. The Tribe, therefore, asserts that sovereign immunity precludes the State of Rhode Island from entering the settlement lands, serving a warrant on the tribal activity, and confiscating tribal government property as contraband.
While retained tribal sovereignty has never been precisely defined, the Supreme Court has offered the following description:
Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights" in matters of local self-government.Worcesterv.Georgia,6 Pet. 515, 559,8 L.Ed. 483(1832) . . . Although no longer "possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty," they remain a "separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations."United Statesv.Kagama,118 U.S. 375,381-382,6 S.Ct. 1109,1112-1113,30 L.Ed. 228(1886).SeeUnited Statesv.Wheeler,435 U.S. 313,98 S.Ct. 1079,55 L.Ed.2d 303(1978). They have power to make their own substantive law in internal matters, seeRoffv.Burney,168 U.S. 218,18 S.Ct. 60,42 L.Ed. 442(1897) (membership);Jonesv.Meehan,175 U.S. 1,29,20 S.Ct. 1,12,44 L.Ed. 49(1899) (inheritance rules);United Statesv.Quiver,241 U.S. 602,36 S.Ct. 699,60 L.Ed. 1176(1916) (domestic relations), and to enforce that law in their own forums, see, e.g.,Williamsv.Lee,358 U.S. 217,79 S.Ct. 269,3 L.Ed.2d 251(1959).
Precedent dictates that the determination of whether the Tribe's retained rights of sovereignty or the State's residual authority takes precedence should involve an interest balancing test that "[t]est[s] the sturdiness" of the barriers each presents and makes a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake."
The district court applied the test this Court used in
In
While Rhode Island and Maine are similar to the extent that each state has reached a settlement with its Indian tribes which has been enacted by Congress, the provisions of the Maine Settlement Act and Implementing Act are very different from the Rhode Island Settlement Act, which did not limit the jurisdiction of the Narragansett Tribe, but rather provided the State with concurrent jurisdiction. In
This is not to say that many of the
The next question concerns the extent to which the State may enforce its cigarette laws directly against the Narragansett Tribal government. We find that it is worthwhile to consider the fact that the Narragansett Tribe's sovereign immunity has not been abrogated and that there exist means by which the State could have enforced its cigarette tax laws which would have been more respectful of the Tribe's sovereignty.
The doctrine of tribal immunity is settled law today. The Supreme Court has refused to abandon or narrow this doctrine despite arguments that tribal businesses have become far removed from tribal self-governance and internal affairs.
For example, in
Today we have held that the State's cigarette tax laws are applicable to sales to non-Indian customers on the settlement lands. The State of Rhode Island has numerous alternatives that it may use to enforce its cigarette tax on the settlement lands without violating the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The State's hands will not be completely tied while the Tribe continues to operate its Smoke Shop in violation of the State's cigarette laws. Although the operation of the Smoke Shop without complying with Rhode Island's cigarette tax laws is certainly not a sovereign right retained by the Narragansett Tribe, the Tribe does have a right of sovereign immunity that should be respected the State. For these reasons, we hold that the State violated the Tribe's sovereign rights when it enforced the criminal provisions of its cigarette tax laws by executing a search warrant against the Tribal government's Smoke Shop, forcibly entering the Shop and seizing the Tribe's stock of unstamped cigarettes, and arresting tribal officials who were acting in their official capacity.
- Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation. ↩
- Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, it must be clear from the plaintiff's complaint that there is a federal question.
LouisvilleNashville R.R.v.Mottley,211 U.S. 149,152(1908). ↩
- The "artful pleading rule" bars a plaintiff from concealing a necessary federal question by omitting it from the complaint.
FranchiseTax Bd.v.Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,463 U.S. 1,22(1983). ↩
- Indian country is usually "the benchmark for approaching the allocation of federal, tribal, and state authority with respect to Indians and Indian lands."
Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I.v.Narragansett Elec. Co.,89 F.3d 908,915(1996) (quotingIndian Country,U.S.A.v.Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,829 F.2d 967,973(10th Cir. 1987)). Indian country is defined by Congress as including:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, . . . (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1151;seeNarragansett Elec. Co.,89 F.3d at 915. The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this definition to issues of both criminal and civil jurisdiction.Id.at 915; (quotingCaliforniav.Cabazon Bandof Mission Indians,480 U.S. 202,208(1987)). ↩ - Congress has granted the consent of the United States to States wishing to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservation Indians,25 U.S.C. § 1322(a), and25 U.S.C. § 1324confers upon the States the right to disregard enabling acts which limit their authority over such Indians. However, "the Act expressly provides that the State must act `with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country,'25 U.S.C. § 1322(a), and must `appropriately (amend its) constitution or statutes.'25 U.S.C. § 1324."
McClanahanv.State TaxComm'n of Arizona,411 U.S. 164,177-78(1973). ↩
- We recognize that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for a question regarding whether the Court should abandon the
WhiteMountain Apacheinterest-balancing test in favor of a preemption analysis based on the principle that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent.Prairie Band Potawatomi Nationv.Richards,379 F.3d 979(10th Cir. 2004),cert. granted,73 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-631). ↩