Opinion · Nclaw North Carolina
McBRIDE v. CHOATE, 37 N.C. 610 (1843)
37 N.C. 610
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Nclaw North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- Nclaw
- Date
- 1843-01-01
- Topic
- general
McBRIDE v. CHOATE, 37 N.C. 610 (1843) MARY McBRIDE v. RICHARD CHOATE, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.,AND OTHERS.Supreme Court of North Carolina (June Term, 1843.) 1. An administrator in this State is only accountable for the assets of his intestate which were in this State at the death of the intestate. 2. A husband has no right to dispose by will of a remainder in a slave belonging to his wife after the expiration of a life estate.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed McBRIDE v. CHOATE, 37 N.C. 610 (1843). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
McBRIDEv. CHOATE,37 N.C. 610(1843)
MARY McBRIDE v. RICHARD CHOATE, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.,
AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
(June Term, 1843.)
2. A husband has no right to dispose by will of a remainder in a slave belonging to his wife after the expiration of a life estate.
The matters in controversy are stated in the opinion delivered in this Court.
The defendant Aaron Woodruff denies by his answer in the most positive and precise terms any participation in the alleged scheme to carry off the slaves referred to in the bill, or any knowledge thereof. The other defendant states in his answer that Isham Choate at his death owned two slaves in this State; that the defendant obtained letters of administration on thePage 451estate of the said Richard here, took the said slaves into his possession, and sold them, and that these were the only effects of the deceased which came to his hands as administrator, and he then avers that he hath fully administered the said effects, and sets forth an account of his administration. He denies that the said Isham Choate carried off or sold the slaves, as charged in the bill, and insists that the plaintiff, at the death of the tenant for life, did not own the residuary interest of the said slaves, but that the same had vested in her husband while living, and was effectually disposed of by his will.
The proofs do not establish the charge in the bill against the defendant Woodruff. The only evidence which tends to implicate him is that of a single witness, Samuel Bangus, who deposes that after Isham Choate's death he saw among his papers in Georgia an instrument purporting to have been executed by Elizabeth Woodruff to said Isham for a negro woman and two children, and that this instrument purported to be attested by Aaron Woodruff, but he does not know that the signature was that of the defendant Aaron. As to him, therefore, the bill must be dismissed with costs. The proofs are satisfactory that Isham Choate got the negroes from Elizabeth Woodruff, carried them off clandestinely to Georgia, and thence removed them to New Orleans for the purpose of selling them, and that this was done with full knowledge that the said Elizabeth (613) had but a life estate in them and with intent to keep to himself the full price thereof. It is clear that the plaintiff ought to have some redress for this injury, and it is just that Isham Choate's estate should refund this dishonest gain. But the defendant Richard is administrator only of that part of the estate which was, at the death of the intestate, in North Carolina, and according to the account exhibited hath fully administered it. The plaintiff is entitled to a reference, if she disputes the account, but if she admits it her bill must also be dismissed against this defendant. Should the plaintiff take the reference on the administration account, it will be proper to have a reference also to ascertain what was the price which Isham Choate received for the negroes, and whether these negroes or any of them or their increase born since the sale of them were alive at the death of Elizabeth Woodruff.
There is no weight in the objection made that the interest in remainder vested in the plaintiff's husband while alive, and after his death passed by his will.Poindexter v. Blackburn,36 N.C. 286;Hardie v. Cotton, ib., 61;Revel v. Revel,19 N.C. 271.Page 452
It may be that in a case like this relief might be had at law, but for the reasons stated in the case ofCheshire v. Cheshire, ante, 569, it is a fit one also for the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
PER CURIAM. Decreed accordingly.Cited: Weeks v. Weeks,40 N.C. 121;Plummer v. Brandon, ib., 194;Parish v. Merritt,48 N.C. 40;Arrington v. Yarborough,54 N.C. 75.
(614)