Opinion · Orlaw Oregon
MARTINEZ v. TANKERSLEY, 92 Or. App. 526 (1988)
759 P.2d 323
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Orlaw Oregon
- Jurisdiction
- Orlaw
- Date
- 1988-11-16
- Topic
- general
MARTINEZ v. TANKERSLEY, 92 Or. App. 526 (1988) 759 P.2d 323 MARTINEZ et al, Respondents, v. TANKERSLEY et al, Appellants. 85-0921C; CA A43833Oregon Court of Appeals.Argued and submitted March 18, 1988 Affirmed as modified August 17, 1988Reconsideration denied September 30, 1988Petition for review allowed November 16, 1988 (307 Or. 145)See later issue Oregon Reports Appeal from Circuit Court, Washington County. Jon B.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed MARTINEZ v. TANKERSLEY, 92 Or. App. 526 (1988). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
MARTINEZ v. TANKERSLEY,92 Or. App. 526(1988)
759 P.2d 323
MARTINEZ et al,Respondents,v. TANKERSLEY et al,Appellants.
85-0921C; CA A43833
Oregon Court of Appeals.
Argued and submitted March 18, 1988
Affirmed as modified August 17, 1988
Reconsideration denied September 30, 1988
Petition for review allowed November 16, 1988 (307 Or. 145)
See later issue Oregon Reports
Jon B. Lund, Judge.
D. Michael Dale, Hillsboro, argued the cause forPage 527respondents. With him on the brief was Spencer M. Neal, Oregon Legal Services Corp. and Ginsburg, Gomez, and Neal, Hillsboro.
Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Rossman and Deits, Judges.
Paragraph 3 of declaratory judgment modified to read:
"Defendants may require plaintiffs or other employes or agents of Oregon Legal Services Corporation to disclose the identities of the invitors. Plaintiffs or other employes or agents of Oregon Legal Services Corporation may visit the invitors without being accompanied, monitored or supervised in any matter by defendants or their agents, employes or any other person acting in concert with defendants";
otherwise affirmed.Page 528
Defendants own and operate a farm on which migrant farm workers hired by defendants for seasonal work reside. Plaintiffs Martinez and Perez were employed by defendants and resided on the farm from June 26 to July 10, 1985. In early July, 1985, they invited plaintiffs Pallack, Escobedo and other OLS staff to visit them at the work camp to discuss legal problems. When the OLS employes attempted to visit the workers, defendants ordered them to leave the camp immediately, without inquiring who had invited them. Consequently, plaintiffs filed this action under ORS659.121and the Oregon Farmworker Access Act, ORS659.280to ORS659.295. ORS659.295provides:
"It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to expel or evict from housing referred to in ORS659.280to659.295or to discharge, demote, suspend from employment or in any other manner discriminate or retaliate against an employe or any member of the employe's household for the reason that the employe or any member of the employe's household has:
"(a) Reported or complained concerning possible violations of ORS659.280to659.295; or
"(b) Conferred with or invited to residential areas, any authorized person or invited person.
"(2) Complaints may be filed with the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries in the same manner as provided in ORS659.040to659.110and659.121for the enforcement of an unlawful employment practice. Violation of ORS659.280to659.295subjects the violator to the same civil and criminal remedies and penalties as provided in ORS659.110and659.121. A person denied access under ORS659.285is a person aggrieved for purposes of ORS659.121."Page 529
Plaintiffs obtained a temporary order, restraining defendants from denying OLS employes the right to visit farmworkers at the camp and from discriminating and retaliating against the persons who had extended the invitation. On August 29, 1985, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction. It provided for continuance of the temporary restraining order but, in addition, ordered that OLS staff could not be required to disclose the identity of their clients and other invitors.
At a show cause hearing for a permanent injunction, defendants acknowledged the farmworkers' statutory right to invite and meet with persons in the residential area of the camp but insisted that the preliminary injunction was wrong in holding they had no right to verify the invitation by asking visitors to identify who had invited them. On June 10, 1986, the trial court issued another order modifying the preliminary injunction and granted defendants the right to require persons coming on their property to disclose the identity of invitors.
At the trial, before a different judge, the court received testimony on the factual background of the action, although it agreed with defendants that the primary issue was whether the statute requires an invitee to disclose to a labor camp owner or operator the name of the invitor. The court concluded that the statute does not require disclosure. Paragraph 3 of the judgment provided:
"Plaintiffs or other employees or agents of Oregon Legal Services Corporation shall not be required to disclose to defendants the identities of their clients or other invitors and may visit their clients or invitors without being accompanied, monitored or supervised in any matter by defendants or their agents, employees, or any other person acting in concert with defendants[.]"
It also granted a permanent injunction restraining defendants from discriminating and retaliating against farmworkers who invited OLS staff to the camp. The court awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs over defendants' objection that it was plaintiffs who insisted on the trial of facts, although it was unnecessary, because only the meaning of the statute was at issue.
ORS659.285(1) provides:
"Employers shall not restrict access by authorized persons or invited persons to any housing owned, rented or in anyPage 530manner controlled by the employer where employes are residing. Authorized persons or invited persons must announce their presence on the premises upon request."
ORS659.280provides, in part:
"(2) `Authorized person' means government officials, medical doctors, certified education providers and county health care officials.
"* * * * *
"(4) `Invited person' means persons invited to a dwelling unit by an employe or a member of the employe's family residing with the employe."
The bill originally permitted free and full access by the public to the housing areas of labor camps. The legislature, however, in response to landowners' objections regarding the protection of their property rights, narrowed the terms of the act to permit access to migrant workers' housing only by authorized and invited persons. As a consequence, a landowner can lawfully exclude or expel from a camp anyone who is unauthorized or has not been invited. Authorized or invited persons may be required to announce their presence on request.
To say that a landlord must allow access only to those who are authorized to enter or who have invitations from an employe or his family, but that he may not verify the existence of that invitation, simply makes no sense and is unnecessary to accomplish the legislative purpose to ensure access to invited persons. We hold that a landowner may verify the fact that a person coming on the property has been invited by a resident by requiring the invitee to reveal the source of the invitation. Plaintiffs argue that to require the invitee to reveal the identity of the invitor will result in harrassment or retaliation against the invitor. A sufficient remedy has been provided by the legislature, which anticipated that problem. ORS659.295. The trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute.
The trial court further ordered that defendants may not interfere with plaintiffs' visits at the labor camp and provided for certain other conditions. Those parts of the judgment are not in issue on this appeal.
Defendants' only other assignment of error is thatPage 531the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs. They argue that the issue before the trial court was one of statutory interpretation which required no trial. They argue that plaintiffs requested an unnecessary hearing on the facts and were, therefore, not entitled to attorney fees. Plaintiffs' complaint, however, was broader than defendants acknowledge. Although defendants are correct that the matter of statutory interpretation could have been resolved without evidence taking, plaintiffs never abandoned their claim that defendants had engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory practices and that it was necessary to enjoin such practices. The trial court properly received evidence on the question of whether defendants should be enjoined from retaliatory conduct. It did not err in awarding plaintiffs attorney fees.
Paragraph 3 of declaratory judgment is modified to read:
"Defendants may require plaintiffs or other employes or agents of Oregon Legal Services Corporation to disclose the identities of the invitors. Plaintiffs or other employes or agents of Oregon Legal Services Corporation may visit the invitors without being accompanied, monitored or supervised in any matter by defendants or their agents, employes or any other person acting in concert with defendants";
otherwise affirmed.Page 532