Opinion · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
HARPER v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., 318 Fed.Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2009)
318 Fed.Appx. 540
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2009-03-10
- Topic
- general
HARPER v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., 318 Fed.Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2009) Tyler Chase HARPER, a minor, by and through his parents Ron and CherylHARPER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 07-55224.United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.Submitted June 24, 2008.[fn*]Resubmitted March 6, 2009. Filed March 10, 2009. [EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.][fn*] The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed HARPER v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., 318 Fed.Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2009). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
Paul V. Carelli, IV, Esq., Jack M. Sleeth, Jr., Esq., Stutz Artiano Shinoff Holtz, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
We cannot adjudicate the Harpers' claims for equitable and declaratory relief because they are moot. Both Chase and Kelsie Harper have graduated from Poway High School, and the School's speech policies were significantly amended in February of 2008.1Equitable relief, therefore, would be ineffective.See Village of Gambell v. Babbitt,999 F.2d 403,406(9th Cir. 1993). Because Cal. Educ. Code §48950provides only for injunctive and declaratory relief, the state, law claim is moot, as well.
The only issue remaining, then, is the claim for nominal damages against the defendants in their individual capacities. Under these rather unusual circumstances, in which we are asked to award nominal damages on the basis of a school policy that is no longer in existence, we decline to reach the difficult substantive constitutional question at issue. Instead, we agree with the district court and conclude that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.See Pearsonv. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___,129 S.Ct. 808,818,172 L.Ed.2d 565(2009). Given, the present state of the law and the parameters of the specific policies challenged, it is not the case that "a reasonable official would understand that [the School's policies] violate[]" the First Amendment.Saucierv. Katz,533 U.S. 194,202,121 S.Ct. 2151,150 L.Ed.2d 272(2001). We therefore hold that those officials sued in their individualPage 542capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the claims for equitable and declaratory relief isVACATEDAS MOOT.The district court's dismissal of the claims for nominal damages isAFFIRMEDon the ground of qualified immunity.VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
- [EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] ↩
- The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.SeeFed.R.App.P.34(a)(2). ↩
- This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ↩
- For this reason, although weGRANTthe motion for joinder of B.M., who is currently a student at Poway High School, his joinder does not save the equitable claims from mootness. If B.M. seeks to challenge the new policies, he must do so in a separate action, as such a challenge would present a different set of legal and factual issues. ↩