Opinion · Board of Immigration Appeals

GRIJALVA

21 I. & N. Dec. 472

Type
Opinion
Court
Board of Immigration Appeals
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1996-07-01
Topic
general

holding that ineffective assistance of counsel is an “exceptional circum- stance” justifying reopening and rescission of an in absentia order | recognizing that provision of notice might be challenged on the basis that notice was never received | finding that ineffective assistance of counsel may amount to “exceptional circumstances” in the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order | noting that ineffective assistance of counsel can amount to “exceptional 880 Interim Decision #3312 circumstances” within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2) (1994) | determining that counsel’s incorrect instruction that a hearing had been continued and the alien should not appear at the Immigration Court was prejudicial when the alien relied on that instruction and failed to appear | concluding an alien showed prejudice where the alien failed to appear because he was incorrectly informed by his attorney’s staff that there had been a continuance and he did not need to appear at the hearing | finding rescission of an in absentia deportation order under § 242B(e)(3)(A), when petitioner filed to reopen within 180 days of the deportation order due to exceptional circumstances | finding that a respondent who did not receive proper notice from his attorney and who has complied with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988 | finding that a respondent who did not receive proper notice from his attorney and who has complied with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988 | ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” justifying the reopening of a deportation made in absentia | “[A]n alien is not required to show prejudice in order to rescind an order of deportation entered following a 10 SANCHEZ ROSALES V. BARR hearing conducted in absentia under [former] section 242B(c)(3) of the Act.” | “[A]n alien is not required to show prejudice in order to rescind an order of deportation entered following a 10 SANCHEZ ROSALES V. BARR hearing conducted in absentia under [former] section 242B(c)(3) of the Act.” | finding the claimant had satisfied the hozada standards | finding 569 (6th Cir. 1975)

Citator

Cited by
26 opinions
Interim Decision #3284


Interim Decision #3284



    In re Gustavo Alonzo GRIJALVA-Barrera, Respondent

                              File A14 205 803 - Tucson

                                Decided June 14, 1996

                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

   An order of deportation issued following a hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded
under section 242B(c)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)
(Supp. V 1993), where an alien properly establishes that his failure to appear was the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel which amounts to “exceptional circumstances” within the
meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act.

FOR RESPONDENT: Gloria A. Goldman, Esquire, Tucson, Arizona

FOR IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Thomas Michael O’Leary,
General Attorney

BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, HURWITZ, and VILLAGELIU, Board Members.

HURWITZ, Board Member:

   In a decision dated April 2, 1993, an Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. The respondent
has appealed that decision. The appeal will be sustained, and the record will
be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.
   The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United
States as a lawful permanent resident on January 20, 1964. On April 2, 1991,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause
charging the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. III
1991), as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation. The respon-
dent was scheduled to appear for a hearing before an Immigration Judge on
March 1, 1993, for consideration of his previously filed application for relief
from deportation. At that time, he failed to appear. Because no reason was
evident for the respondent’s absence, the Immigration Judge conducted the
hearing in absentia pursuant to section 242B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b
(Supp. V 1993), found the respondent deportable as charged, determined that

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he had abandoned any potential applications for relief, and ordered him
deported from the United States.
   On March 15, 1993, the respondent, through counsel, filed a motion to
reopen before the Immigration Judge. See generally Matter of Gonza-
lez-Lopez, 
20 I&N Dec. 644
 (BIA 1993). The respondent argued that his
motion should be granted because his failure to appear was due to the misdi-
rection of his counsel, who was unable to attend the hearing. The Immigra-
tion Judge denied the motion to reopen on April 2, 1993, remarking that
respondent’s counsel had “engaged in tactics of delay which could only be
characterized as contumacious.”
   On appeal, the respondent, through new counsel, argues that the proceed-
ings should be reopened and the record remanded to the Immigration Judge
based upon the ineffective assistance of his former counsel.1 According to the
respondent, on the morning of the scheduled hearing, an employee of his
prior attorney called to inform him that there had been a continuance and that
he should not appear at the Immigration Court. The respondent later learned
that the hearing had been conducted in absentia, that his application for relief
had been deemed abandoned, and that he had been ordered deported. In sup-
port of his appeal, the respondent has submitted evidence that he filed a com-
plaint against his former counsel with the State Bar of Arizona, and that he
informed counsel of the allegations made against him. The respondent also
has included an affidavit from his former counsel which corroborates the
respondent’s account of events.
   An order issued following proceedings conducted in absentia pursuant to
section 242B(c) of the Act may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen
which demonstrates that the alien failed to appear owing to exceptional cir-
cumstances, because he did not receive proper notice of the hearing, or
because he was in Federal or State custody and failed to appear through no
fault of his own. Section 242B(c)(3) of the Act; see also Matter of Gonza-
lez-Lopez, supra. The term “exceptional circumstances” refers to exceptional
circumstances beyond the control of the alien, such as serious illness of the
alien or death of an immediate relative, but not including less compelling cir-
cumstances. Section 242B(f)(2) of the Act.2
   Upon review of the record, we find that the respondent has established suf-
ficient grounds for reopening these proceedings. Initially, we find that he has
properly shown ineffective assistance by his former counsel. In Matter of
Lozada, 
19 I&N Dec. 637
 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 
857 F.2d 10
 (1st Cir. 1988), the

   1 We note that the respondent has alleged ineffective assistance by both of his former

attorneys, Mr. William Redondo and Mr. Mark Redondo. However, we will consider only the
allegations concerning Mr. Mark Redondo, as he was the respondent's counsel of record at the
time of the March 1, 1993, in absentia hearing and subsequent motion to reopen.
   2 We note that an alien is not required to show prejudice in order to rescind an order of

deportation entered following a hearing conducted in absentia under section 242B(c)(3) of the
Act. Cf. Patel v. INS, 
803 F.2d 804
 (5th Cir. 1986).

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Interim Decision #3284


Board held that a motion to reopen or reconsider based upon a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel requires that (1) the motion be supported by an
affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the
agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to the actions to be
taken and what representations counsel did or did not make to the respondent
in this regard; (2) counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned
be informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given an opportu-
nity to respond; and (3) the motion reflect whether a complaint has been filed
with the appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of
counsel’s ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not.
   We find that the respondent has satisfied all three of the requirements set
forth in Matter of 
Lozada, supra.
 The motion is supported by a statement
which sets forth the actions taken by the respondent’s former counsel,
includes evidence that counsel was informed of the allegations leveled
against him and was provided an opportunity to respond, and includes a copy
of a complaint filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities informing
them of the respondent’s allegations. The respondent’s contentions are cor-
roborated by the sworn affidavit of his prior attorney, as well as by the tran-
script of proceedings in this case. Therefore, we conclude that the respondent
has made a convincing claim of ineffective assistance by his former counsel.
   Furthermore, the level of incompetence involved in this case establishes
that the respondent’s absence was the result of exceptional circumstances
within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act. We point out that the
respondent, who had no reason not to rely on his counsel at this juncture, was
blatantly misled regarding his need to appear at the scheduled hearing. Coun-
sel’s inappropriate behavior was recognized by the Immigration Judge in his
decision. We consider also that the respondent is a longtime resident of the
United States who had a pending application for relief before the Immigra-
tion Judge. This suggests that he would have appeared but for the misrepre-
sentations by his former counsel.
   Under these circumstances, we conclude that the respondent has estab-
lished that his failure to appear for the scheduled deportation hearing was the
result of exceptional circumstances, as required by section 242B(c)(3) of the
Act. Accordingly, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge for
further proceedings.
   ORDER:            The appeal is sustained, and the record is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing decision.




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