Opinion · Ohlaw Ohio

GRANDLE v. RHODES, 169 Ohio St. 77 (1959)

157 N.E.2d 336

Type
Opinion
Court
Ohlaw Ohio
Jurisdiction
Ohlaw
Date
1959-04-01
Topic
general

GRANDLE v. RHODES, 169 Ohio St. 77 (1959) 157 N.E.2d 336 GRANDLE, APPELLANT v. RHODES, AUD., APPELLEE. No. 35669Supreme Court of Ohio. Decided April 1, 1959.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed GRANDLE v. RHODES, 169 Ohio St. 77 (1959). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

GRANDLE v. RHODES,169 Ohio St. 77(1959)
157 N.E.2d 336
GRANDLE, APPELLANT v. RHODES, AUD., APPELLEE.
No. 35669
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided April 1, 1959.
Underground Parking Commission — Expenditures from HighwayImprovement Fund restricted — Taxpayer's successful suit toenjoin expenditures from public funds — Allowance of taxpayer'sattorney fees denied.

1. Section 5a, ArticleXIIof the Constitution of Ohio, closely restricts the expenditure of the fees and taxes received in relation to vehicles using the public highways to purposes directly connected with the construction, maintenance and repair of highways and the enforcement of traffic laws; and the words, "other statutory highway purposes," as used in such section cannot be extended to comprehend the payment of fees to attorneys of a taxpayer who in an action brought for such purpose successfully blocks the disbursement of a sum of money appropriated by the General Assembly for a preliminary study in connection with the contemplated construction of a parking garage underneath the Statehouse grounds in Columbus.

2. Under the provisions of Sections22and29, ArticleIIof the Constitution of Ohio, before money may be taken from the state treasury specific authorization therefor must be by action of the General Assembly in the manner prescribed, and, where it appears that there has been no authorization by the General Assembly for the withdrawal of funds, the doors of the state treasury must remain closed to those seeking attorney fees for services rendered in a taxpayer's successful action to prevent the expenditure of public funds.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.

In its present aspect, this cause involves an application for the allowance of attorney fees directed initially to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County and which was denied. Such adjudication was affirmed on an appeal on questions of law to the Court of Appeals, and an appeal as of right and the allowance of a motion to certify the record place the matter before this court for disposition.

The litigation at hand arose in this way:

As shown by the case ofGrandlev.Rhodes, Aud.,166 Ohio St. 108,139 N.E.2d 328, on rehearing,166 Ohio St. 197,140 N.E.2d 897, Grandle succeeded in preventing the expenditurePage 78of $64,500 by the Director of Highways of the state of Ohio from the Highway Improvement Fund to pay the cost of certain engineering studies and surveys connected with the proposed construction of a parking garage for motor vehicles under the Statehouse grounds in Columbus.

Following the final judgment for Grandle by this court on March 6, 1957, on the rehearing, the cause was returned to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County for further proceedings, including the making of an order against the Auditor of State prohibiting the expenditure of the $64,500, or any part thereof, for the purpose above described.

Grandle having instituted the action as a taxpayer and having attained his objective, his counsel then applied for an allowance to them of attorney fees for their successful efforts.
Mr. John A. Lloyd, Jr., andMr. James G. Andrews, Jr., for appellant.Mr. William SaxbeandMr. Mark McElroy, attorneys general, andMr. Hugh A. Sherer, for appellee.
ZIMMERMAN, J.
The claim for the allowance of attorney fees is predicated entirely on Section 5a, ArticleXIIof the Constitution of Ohio, which reads:

"No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways, or to fuels used for propelling such vehicles, shall be expended for other than costs of administering such laws, statutory refunds and adjustments provided therein, payment of highway obligations, costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of public highways and bridges and other statutory highway purposes, expense of state enforcement of traffic laws, and expenditures authorized for hospitalization of indigent persons injured in motor vehicle accidents on the public highways."

Both the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Appeals in essence took the position that the "costs," referred to inPage 79the above-quoted section, are the "costs of administering such laws"; and that "such laws" have reference exclusively to "fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways, or to fuels used for propelling such vehicles" and may not be extended and broadened to embrace costs incurred for the services of attorneys in successfully prosecuting the kind of action brought by Grandle. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the lower courts.

It is important to note that involved herein are funds which were paid into the state treasury and which were specifically appropriated therefrom to the use of a state agency for a particular and limited highway purpose, wholly foreign to the payment of attorney fees in an action of the character inaugurated by Grandle.

In further considering this matter, Sections 22 and 29 of Article II of the Constitution should not be ignored. The former section plainly states in part that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of a specific appropriation, made by law." And the latter section provides in part: "Nor shall any money be paid, on any claim, the subject matter of which shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law, unless such compensation, or claim, be allowed by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly."

It would seem evident that any allowance of attorney fees made to Grandle's counsel would be payable from the state treasury, and there is no legislative action discoverable, statutory or otherwise, to sanction such an expenditure. CompareState, exrel. Yontz, v.West, Registrar of Motor Vehicles,135 Ohio St. 589,21 N.E.2d 987, where attorney fees were allowed from tax funds before they had reached the state treasury.

We are aware of the case ofHarbagev.Tracy, Aud.,64 Ohio App. 151,28 N.E.2d 520(appeal dismissed,136 Ohio St. 534,27 N.E.2d 141), wherein the allowance of attorney fees in a taxpayer's action involving public funds was approved. However, so far as that case may be in conflict withPage 80what has been said here, it must give way. Other cases decided by this court and cited in the briefs of opposing counsel are not directly in point on the precise question now before us.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.Judgment affirmed.

WEYGANDT, C.J., and MATTHIAS, J., concur.

TAFT, J., concurs in paragraph two of the syllabus and in the judgment.

HERBERT, J., concurs in paragraph one of the syllabus and in the judgment.

STEWART and BELL, JJ., dissent.
STEWART, J., dissenting.
The application for attorney fees in the present case contemplates the payment of those fees out of the $64,500 which had been preserved from illegal expenditure by the taxpayer appellant, which fees he claims are a part of his expense in the preservation of the fund. In my opinion, since that $64,500 had been appropriated by the General Assembly as a part of the highway maintenance appropriation, Sections 22 and 29 of Article II of the Constitution are inapplicable.

The remaining question is whether Section 5aof Article XII of the Constitution prohibits the expenditure of any part of the preserved fund for the attorney fees for which application is made.

In my opinion, the words, "other statutory highway purposes," as used in Section 5a, Article XII of the Constitution, should be extended to comprehend the payment of fees to the attorney of a taxpayer who, in an action brought for such purpose, has prevented the illegal disbursement and dissipation of a fund governed by such constitutional provision, so that the fund may be utilized for the highway purposes for which it was intended.

BELL, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.Page 81