Department of Education v. Brown

                   PRELIMINARY PRINT

             Volume 600 U. S. Part 1
                             Pages 551–569




       OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                    OF


   THE SUPREME COURT
                               June 30, 2023


Page Proof Pending Publication


                   REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions




    NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
  the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
  of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
  pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
                         OCTOBER TERM, 2022                              551

                                  Syllabus


  DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. v. BROWN
                  et al.
  certiorari before judgment to the united states
       court of appeals for the fth circuit
    No. 22–535. Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023
To alleviate hardship expected to be caused by the impending resumption
  of federal student-loan repayments that had been suspended during the
  multi-year coronavirus pandemic, Secretary of Education Miguel Car-
  dona announced a substantial student-loan debt-forgiveness plan (Plan).
  The Plan discharges $10,000 to $20,000 of an eligible borrower's debt,
  depending on criteria such as the borrower's income and the type of
  loan held. The Secretary invoked the Higher Education Relief Oppor-
  tunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act), which authorizes the
  Secretary “to waive or modify any provision” applicable to federal “stu-
  dent fnancial assistance” programs “as may be necessary to ensure that
  . . . recipients of student fnancial assistance” are no worse off “fnan-
  cially in relation to that fnancial assistance because” of a national emer-
Page Proof Pending Publication
  gency or disaster. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1098bb(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–
  (D). The HEROES Act also exempts rules promulgated pursuant to
  it from the otherwise-applicable negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-
  comment processes.
     Before the Plan took effect, various plaintiffs—including respondents
  here—sued to enjoin it. Respondents Myra Brown and Alexander
  Taylor are two borrowers who do not qualify for the maximum relief
  available under the Plan. Their one-count complaint alleges that the
  Secretary was required to follow notice-and-comment and negotiated-
  rulemaking procedures in promulgating the Plan, which all agree he did
  not do. Brown and Taylor argue that the HEROES Act's procedural
  exemptions apply only when the rule promulgated is substantively au-
  thorized by the Act, and because the HEROES Act does not authorize
  the Plan (they argue), the Secretary was required to follow negotiated
  rulemaking and notice and comment. The District Court rejected their
  argument regarding the scope of the HEROES Act's procedural exemp-
  tions, but nevertheless vacated the Plan as substantively unauthorized.
  This Court granted certiorari before judgment to consider this case
  alongside Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which presents a similar chal-
  lenge to the Plan.
Held: Because respondents fail to establish that any injury they suffer
 from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan, they
552          DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                                 Syllabus

  lack Article III standing, so the Court has no jurisdiction to address
  their procedural claim. Pp. 560–569.
     (a) “This case begins and ends with standing.” Carney v. Adams,
  592 U. S. –––, –––. The Court's authority under the Constitution is
  limited to resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. The
  Court's jurisprudence has “established that the irreducible constitu-
  tional minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plaintiff
  must plead and—ultimately—prove. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
  

504 U. S. 555, 560

. Those elements are: (1) a “concrete and particular-
  ized” injury that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the
  defendant and (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
  

Id.,

 at 560–561 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). But
  where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that she has been deprived of a
  procedural right to protect her concrete interest, she need not show that
  observing the contested procedure would necessarily lead to a different
  substantive result. 

Id., at 572, n. 7

. Pp. 560–562.
     (b) As articulated in this Court, respondents' claim and theory of
  standing are twofold: First, because the HEROES Act does not substan-
  tively authorize the Plan, the Secretary was obligated to follow typical
  negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment requirements. Second,
  if the Secretary had observed those procedures, respondents might have
Page Proof Pending Publication
  used those opportunities to convince him not only that proceeding under
  the HEROES Act is unlawful, but also that he should instead adopt a
  different loan-forgiveness program under the Higher Education Act of
  1965 (HEA), and to make that program more generous to respondents
  than the Plan. Respondents assert there is at least a chance that this
  series of events will come to pass now if this Court vacates the Plan.
  Pp. 562–563.
     (c) Respondents' standing claim most clearly fails on traceability:
  They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan relief
  under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department's (allegedly unlaw-
  ful) decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act. Pp. 563–569.
        (1) Signifcantly, respondents are not claiming that they are injured
  by not being suffciently included among the Plan's benefciaries: They
  think the Plan is substantively unlawful and instead seek debt forgive-
  ness under the HEA. But a decision regarding the lawfulness of the
  Plan does not directly affect respondents' ability to obtain loan relief
  under the HEA; the Department's authority to grant loan relief under
  the HEA (upon which the Court does not pass) is not affected by
  whether the Plan is lawful or unlawful. Any connection between loan
  forgiveness under the two statutes is speculative.
     While it is true that the Court's procedural-standing case law toler-
  ates uncertainty over whether observing certain procedures would have
                        Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)                     553

                                  Syllabus

  led to (caused) a different substantive outcome, see Lujan, 

504 U. S., at 572, n. 7

, the causal uncertainty here is not so limited. Instead, the
  uncertainty concerns whether the substantive decisions the Department
  has made regarding the Plan under the HEROES Act have a causal
  relationship with other substantive decisions respondents want the De-
  partment to make under the HEA. There is no precedent for tolerating
  this sort of causal uncertainty. Respondents cannot show that the de-
  nial of HEA loan relief—their ostensible injury—“fairly can be traced
  to” the Department's decision to grant loan relief in the Plan. Simon
  v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 

426 U. S. 26

, 42–43.
  There is little reason to think that the Department's discretionary deci-
  sion to pursue one mechanism of loan relief under the HEROES Act has
  anything to do with its discretionary decision to pursue (or not pursue)
  action under the HEA. “The line of causation between” the Depart-
  ment's promulgation of the Plan and respondents' lack of benefts under
  the HEA “is attenuated at best,” Allen v. Wright, 

468 U. S. 737, 757

,
  and all too dependent on “ `conjecture,' ” Summers v. Earth Island In-
  stitute, 

555 U. S. 488, 496

. Pp. 564–567.
       (2) Respondents' attempts to tie the Plan to potential HEA relief
  are unavailing. Although the Department has occasionally referred to
  “one-time” student-loan relief in publicizing the Plan, the Plan itself con-
Page Proof Pending Publication
  tains no such reference. And any incidental effect of the Plan on the
  likelihood that the Department will undertake a separate loan-
  forgiveness program under a different statute is too weak and specula-
  tive to show that the absence of HEA-based loan forgiveness is fairly
  traceable to the Plan. See, e. g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42–43. To the
  extent the Department has determined that the Plan crowds out other
  efforts to forgive student loans, that determination is a discretionary
  one that respondents may petition the Department to reconsider. Fi-
  nally, respondents cannot demonstrate causation on the theory that the
  Department's failure to observe the requisite procedural rules cost them
  a chance to obtain debt forgiveness; they do not want debt forgiveness
  under the HEROES Act, and nothing the Department has done de-
  prives them of a chance to seek debt forgiveness under the HEA. Re-
  spondents cannot meaningfully connect the absence of loan relief under
  the HEA to the adoption of the Plan, so they have failed to show that
  their injury is fairly traceable to the Plan. Pp. 567–568.
Vacated and remanded.

  Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

  Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for petition-
ers. With her on the briefs were Principal Deputy Assist-
554          DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                                 Counsel

ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Fletcher, Vivek Sur i, Yaira Dubin, Michael S. Raab,
Thomas Pulham, and Brian Siegel.
  J. Michael Connolly argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Cameron T. Norris, Gilbert C.
Dickey, James F. Hasson, and Steven C. Begakis.*
   *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Americans for
Prosperity Foundation et al. by J. Marc Wheat, Michael Pepson, and Cyn-
thia Fleming Crawford; for Borrower Advocacy and Legal Aid Organiza-
tions by Joshua Rovenger and Persis Yu; for the Empire Center for Public
Policy, Inc., et al. by Misha Tseytlin and Timothy L. McHugh; for the
Foundation for Government Accountability by Stewart L. Whitson; for the
Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute et al. by Theodore H. Frank and Curt A.
Levey; for Legal Scholars by Jeffrey B. Dubner and Sean A. Lev; for Local
Governments by Jonathan B. Miller, Joshua A. Rosenthal, Atleen Kaur,
Mark Griffn, Arturo G. Michel, James D. Smiertka, Peter M. Bollinger,
Leslie J. Girard, John P. Markovs, Diana P. Cortes, Sheena Hamilton,
Lyndsey M. Olson, and Ronald A. Hope; for the National Education Asso-
ciation by Alice O'Brien and Jeffrey W. Burritt; for Samuel L. Bray et al.
Page Proof Pending Publication
by Melissa Arbus Sherry; and for Jed Handelsman Shugerman by Brian
H. Pandya. Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for Arch-
City Defenders et al. by Seth E. Mermin; for the Cato Institute et al. by
Anastasia P. Boden and Ilya Shaprio; for Six Veterans' Organizations by
Boris Bershteyn; and for Student Loan Experts by Christopher J. Wright
and Stephen W. Miller.
   Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak,
Solicitor General, and Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, Benjamin M.
Flowers, Solicitor General, Sylvia May Mailman, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Ashley Moody of
Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Theo-
dore E. Rokita of Indiana, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Missis-
sippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, John M. Formella of New Hampshire,
Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken
Paxton of Texas, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of
Wyoming; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sek-
ulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, Jordan A. Sekulow, and Laura B.
Hernandez; for the Buckeye Institute by David C. Tryon and Robert Alt;
for Sen. Marsha Blackburn et al. by Steven A. Engel and Michael H. Mc-
Ginley; for Elisabeth DeVos et al. by Alexander Akerman; for Michael
                       Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)                    555

                           Opinion of the Court

  Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
   In August 2022, the Secretary of Education announced a
large-scale student-loan forgiveness program. He pledged
to discharge hundreds of billions of dollars in student-loan
debt owed by millions of borrowers. According to the Sec-
retary, the discharge was necessary to alleviate hardship
caused by the impending resumption of loan repayments,
which had been suspended during the multi-year coronavirus
pandemic, and he therefore invoked authority that he
claimed he enjoyed under the Higher Education Relief Op-

W. McConnell et al. by William R. Levi; for Howard McKeon et al. by
Caleb Kruckenberg; and for 128 U. S. Representatives et al. by Jennifer
L. Mascott and R. Trent McCotter.
   Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts et al. by Elizabeth N. Dewar, Acting Attorney General of Massachu-
setts, and Yael Shavit, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of Califor-
Page Proof Pending Publication
nia, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen
Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne
E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown of Mary-
land, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford
of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico,
Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Ellen F.
Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha
of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson of
Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for the America First Pol-
icy Institute by Craig W. Trainor and Rachel Jag; for the American Feder-
ation of Teachers et al. by Yelena Konanova, Faith E. Gay, and Max H.
Siegel; for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner; for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Robert E.
Dunn, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Amy Miller; for the Landmark Legal
Foundation by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard
P. Hutchison; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
et al. by Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, David Hinojosa, and Genevieve
Bonadies Torres; for the New Civil Liberties Alliance by Markham S.
Chenoweth and Russell G. Ryan; for the Protect Democracy Project by
Justin Florence and Genevieve Nadeau; for George Miller by Elizabeth
B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; and for Lawrence A. Stein by Mr. Stein,
pro se.
556       DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                      Opinion of the Court

portunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act). 

117 Stat. 904

, codifed at 

20 U. S. C. § 1070

 et seq. The following
month, the Secretary directed that specifc actions be taken
to implement the loan-forgiveness plan (Plan). The amount
of relief available to a borrower under the Plan depends on
various criteria, including the borrower's income and the
type of loan the borrower holds.
   Before the Plan took effect, however, various plaintiffs—
including respondents here—sued to enjoin it. Respondents
are two individual borrowers who, for different reasons, do
not qualify for the maximum relief available under the Plan.
They argue that the Department of Education promulgated
the Plan without following mandatory procedures known as
(1) negotiated rulemaking and (2) notice and comment. The
District Court held in favor of respondents, and we granted
certiorari before judgment to consider this case alongside
Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which presents a similar
Page Proof Pending Publication
challenge to the Plan.
   Ultimately, however, we do not resolve respondents' pro-
cedural claim because we conclude that they lack standing to
bring it. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and
remand with instructions to dismiss. We simultaneously
deny as moot the Department's application for a stay pend-
ing appeal.
                               I
                              A
   The Court's opinion in Biden v. Nebraska, 

600 U. S. 477

(2023), recounts the relevant background of the HEROES
Act, so only a brief summary is provided here. The Act au-
thorizes the Secretary of Education “to waive or modify any
provision” applicable to federal “student fnancial assistance”
programs “as may be necessary to ensure that . . . recipients
of student fnancial assistance” who live or work in a declared
disaster area, or suffer direct economic hardship as a result
                   Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)           557

                      Opinion of the Court

of a national emergency, “are not placed in a worse position
fnancially in relation to that fnancial assistance because”
of the disaster or emergency. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1098bb(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–(D).
   In addition to this substantive grant of authority, the
HEROES Act dispenses with certain procedural rules for
actions taken pursuant to it.
   First, the HEROES Act permits the Secretary to imple-
ment any “waivers and modifcations authorized or required”
by the Act without engaging in the “negotiated rulemaking”
that is typically required before proposing regulations relat-
ing to student fnancial assistance. § 1098bb(d). Negoti-
ated rulemaking is a lengthy deliberative process involving
many stakeholders. Pursuant to this process, the Secretary
must frst obtain “advice of and recommendations” from a
long list of sources, including “individuals and representa-
tives” of groups “such as students, legal assistance organiza-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tions that represent students, institutions of higher educa-
tion, State student grant agencies, guaranty agencies,
lenders, secondary markets, loan servicers, guaranty agency
servicers, and collection agencies.” § 1098a(a)(1). Then,
informed by this consultation, the Secretary must submit
draft regulations for consideration in a negotiation process
involving participants who are “chosen by the Secretary
from individuals nominated by” such groups. § 1098a(b)(1).
Only after taking these steps may the Secretary “publis[h]
proposed regulations in the Federal Register,” ibid., accom-
panied by a summary of the information the Secretary re-
ceived throughout the process, § 1098a(a)(2). The HEROES
Act, however, permits the Secretary to bypass this onerous
process. § 1098bb(d).
   The HEROES Act also authorizes the Secretary to bypass
notice-and-comment procedures that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) would otherwise demand. The APA typi-
cally requires agencies to give the public “[g]eneral notice
of [a] proposed rule making” by publication in the Federal
558        DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                      Opinion of the Court

Register, and then to provide “interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments” regarding the pro-
posed rule. 

5 U. S. C. §§ 553

(b), (c). The agency may pro-
mulgate a fnal rule only after providing notice and opportu-
nity for comment. § 553(c). But the HEROES Act instead
permits the Secretary to implement the waivers and modif-
cations he “deems necessary to achieve the purposes of ” the
Act merely by “publish[ing]” “notice in the Federal Regis-
ter.” 20 U. S. C. § 1098bb(b)(1).

                               B
   On September 27, 2022, Secretary of Education Miguel
Cardona, invoking authority under the HEROES Act, di-
rected the issuance of waivers and modifcations that would
bring about the forgiveness of a substantial amount of
student-loan debt. In particular, he purported to effect the
Page Proof Pending Publication
discharge of (1) $10,000 of eligible, federally held student-
loan debt for any individual borrower with 2020 or 2021 in-
come under $125,000 (or household income under $250,000),
and (2) an additional $10,000 (making a total of $20,000) for
any such borrower who had ever received a Pell Grant. Pell
Grants are Government-funded grants to help defray the
cost of postsecondary education; eligibility for these grants
turns principally on the income of a student's family when
the student applies to and is enrolled in the relevant educa-
tional program (almost always undergraduate study). See
§§ 1070a(b)(2), 1087mm(a), 1091; see also 

34 CFR § 690.6

(c)
(2022) (limited eligibility for students in a qualifying “post-
baccalaureate program”). Secretary Cardona directed that
these actions be taken via a publication in the Federal Regis-
ter, see App. 262; all agree that he did not observe the gen-
erally applicable negotiated-rulemaking or notice-and-
comment processes in devising and announcing the Plan.
   Notwithstanding the Plan's scope and expense, not all
student-loan borrowers were pleased with it. Myra Brown
                   Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)           559

                      Opinion of the Court

and Alexander Taylor, plaintiffs in this case, are two such
dissatisfed borrowers, albeit for different reasons. Brown's
loans are “commercially held,” id., at 171, Complaint ¶10,
meaning that her creditor is an entity other than the Federal
Government. The Plan, however, applies only to borrowers
whose loans fall into one or more categories of loans “held
by the Department.” 

87 Fed. Reg. 61513

 (2022). Conse-
quently, Brown is not entitled to any loan forgiveness under
the Plan.
  Taylor, on the other hand, is eligible for loan forgiveness—
but only $10,000, rather than the maximum $20,000. That is
because, despite now having an annual income of less than
$25,000, he never received a Pell Grant. See App. 183, Com-
plaint ¶61. Thus, individuals with annual income up to fve
times greater than his are eligible for twice as much loan
forgiveness as he is if they ever received a Pell Grant.
  Accordingly, both Brown and Taylor object to certain ele-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ments of the Plan—Brown to its limitation to federally held
loans, and Taylor to the additional relief it doles out based
on prior Pell Grants, with no regard for current income. Be-
cause the Department did not engage in negotiated rule-
making or notice and comment, however, Brown and Taylor
had no formal opportunity to voice their views on the Plan
prior to its adoption.
  Alleging that the law entitles them to such an opportunity,
Brown and Taylor brought this action in the U. S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. Their one-count
complaint claims that the Plan is unlawful because the De-
partment promulgated it without observing the require-
ments of negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment.
As a result, they claim, we should “[v]acate and set aside
the” Plan under 

5 U. S. C. § 706

(2)(D). App. 186.
  Brown and Taylor recognize that the HEROES Act sup-
plies exemptions from these procedural requirements.
They argue, however, that an action of the Secretary falls
within these exemptions only if it is substantively authorized
560        DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                      Opinion of the Court

by the Act; the Secretary, in their view, cannot merely invoke
the “HEROES Act” to bypass negotiated rulemaking and
notice and comment. According to Brown and Taylor, the
Act does not substantively authorize the Plan, and so the
Secretary was required to follow these procedures.
   The District Court agreed with Brown and Taylor—in
part. It rebuffed their central argument that the HEROES
Act exempts from procedural requirements only those ac-
tions that the Act substantively authorizes. But the Dis-
trict Court nonetheless held that the Plan exceeds the Se-
cretary's authority under the HEROES Act and therefore
entered judgment vacating it. 

640 F. Supp. 3d 644

, 668
(2022).
   After the Fifth Circuit denied the Department's motion
for a stay pending appeal, the Department applied to this
Court for such a stay. The Department advised in the alter-
native that we could treat its application as a petition for
certiorari before judgment. We did just that, granting the
Page Proof Pending Publication
Department's petition for certiorari before judgment and
deferring consideration of its application for a stay. 598
U. S. ––– (2022). We now review the judgment in No. 22–
535 and dispose of the pending application in No. 22A489.

                              II
  We ultimately do not address Brown and Taylor's argu-
ment that the Department failed to observe proper proce-
dures in promulgating the Plan. “We have `an obligation to
assure ourselves' of litigants' standing under Article III” be-
fore proceeding to the merits of a case. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 

547 U. S. 332, 340

 (2006) (quoting Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc., 

528 U. S. 167, 180

 (2000)). And because we conclude
that Brown and Taylor lack standing, “[t]his case begins and
ends with standing.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. –––, –––
(2020). In particular, we hold that Brown and Taylor fail to
                    Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)             561

                       Opinion of the Court

establish that any injury they suffer from not having their
loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan.

                                 A
   Our authority under the Constitution is limited to resolv-
ing “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. “The doc-
trine of standing,” among others, “implements this” limit on
our authority. Carney, 592 U. S., at –––. Our jurispru-
dence has “established that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plain-
tiff must plead and—ultimately—prove. Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 

504 U. S. 555, 560

 (1992). “First, the plaintiff
must have suffered an `injury in fact' ” that is both “concrete
and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.” 

Ibid.

 (some internal quotation marks
omitted). Second, the plaintiff's injury must be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” meaning
Page Proof Pending Publication
that “there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of.” 

Ibid.

 (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted). “Third, it must be `likely,'
as opposed to merely `speculative,' that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Id., at 561

 (some inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
   We have found, however, that when a statute affords a
litigant “a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,”
the litigant may establish Article III jurisdiction without
meeting the usual “standards for redressability and immedi-
acy.” 

Id., at 572, n. 7

. For example, we hypothesized a per-
son “living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of
a federally licensed dam” and explained that this person “has
standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement, even though he
cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will
cause the license to be withheld or altered.” 

Ibid.

 In this
context, the fact that the defendant might well come to the
562       DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                     Opinion of the Court

same decision after abiding by the contested procedural re-
quirement does not deprive a plaintiff of standing.
   Regardless of the redressability showing we have toler-
ated in the procedural-rights context, we have never held a
litigant who asserts such a right is excused from demonstrat-
ing that it has a “concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation” of the claimed right. Summers v. Earth Is-
land Institute, 

555 U. S. 488

, 496–497 (2009).
   We emphasized this requirement in Summers, where we
were asked to review U. S. Forest Service regulations ex-
empting certain minor land-management decisions from the
typical notice-and-comment process. 

Id.,

 at 490–491. The
plaintiffs in that case did not have any “concrete plans to
observe nature in [a] specifc area” affected by actions the
Service took pursuant to this exemption, 

id., at 497

, and we
therefore held that they lacked standing, 

id.,

 at 494–497. As
we put it, the “deprivation of a procedural right without
some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—
Page Proof Pending Publication
a procedural right in vacuo—is insuffcient to create Arti-
cle III standing.” 

Id., at 496

.

                              B
   Before applying this framework, we pause to explain both
respondents' theory of standing and the substance of their
claim, which have not always been readily ascertainable—or
consistently described—during this litigation.
   Upon initial inspection, respondents' merits theory ap-
pears to be in tension with the possibility that the Depart-
ment could redress their injury. Respondents argue simul-
taneously (1) that the Department might have treated them
more generously if it had solicited their input in developing
the Plan and (2) that the Department lacks substantive au-
thority to promulgate broad-based loan forgiveness under
the HEROES Act. It would be quite odd for Brown and
Taylor to complain about being unable to seek an increase
in the scope of an administrative action that they think the
Department cannot lawfully take.
                   Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)             563

                      Opinion of the Court

   Respondents belatedly attempted to address this strange
feature of their argument. Their complaint does not say a
word about standing. But in their reply supporting their
motion in the District Court for an injunction against the
Plan, they ventured a brief attempt to explain their position
on this threshold issue. They insisted that the Department
cannot adopt the Plan under the HEROES Act regardless
of the procedures it follows. Reply in No. 4:22–cv–908
(ND Tex., Oct. 20, 2022), ECF Doc. 26, pp. 3–4. But they
observed that the Department has claimed it also has author-
ity to forgive loans under a different statute, the Higher Ed-
ucation Act of 1965 (HEA), which authorizes the Secretary
to “compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, lien,
or demand.” 

20 U. S. C. § 1082

(a)(6). Thus, respondents ar-
gued, there is a chance that vacating the Plan would prompt
the Department to pursue loan relief under the HEA instead.
In this Court, Brown and Taylor discuss the HEA at length
for the frst time in this litigation. See Brief for Respond-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ents 28–32.
   Having recounted this history, we now understand re-
spondents' claim and theory of standing as follows. First,
because the HEROES Act does not substantively authorize
the Plan, the Department was obligated to follow the typical
negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment require-
ments. Second, if the Department had observed those pro-
cedures, respondents might have used those opportunities
to convince the Department (1) that proceeding under the
HEROES Act is unlawful or otherwise undesirable, and
(2) that it should adopt a different loan-forgiveness plan under
the HEA instead, one that is more generous to them than the
HEROES Act plan that they allege is unlawful. They as-
sert there is at least a chance that this series of events will
come to pass now if we vacate the Plan. Id., at 19.

                                C
  Describing respondents' claim illustrates how unusual it is.
They claim they are injured because the Government has not
564         DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                         Opinion of the Court

adopted a lawful benefts program under which they would
qualify for assistance. But the same could be said of anyone
who might beneft from a benefts program that the Govern-
ment has not chosen to adopt. It is diffcult to see how such
an injury could be particular (since all people suffer it) or
concrete (since an as-yet-uncreated benefts plan is necessar-
ily “ `abstract' ” and not “ `real' ”).1 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U. S. 330, 340

 (2016); see also Allen v. Wright, 

468 U. S. 737

, 755–756 (1984) (rejecting a theory that would “extend
[standing] nationwide”). Nor have we ever accepted that an
injury is redressable when the prospect of redress turns on
the Government's wholly discretionary decision to create a
new regulatory or benefts program.
   Nonetheless, we think the defciencies of respondents'
claim are clearest with respect to traceability. They can-
not show that their purported injury of not receiving loan
relief under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department's
(allegedly unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the
Page Proof Pending Publication
HEROES Act.
                                 1
   At the outset, we reiterate what respondents' claim is not.
Respondents are not claiming that they are injured by not
being included in the Plan (or, in Taylor's case, by being
remunerated by the Plan less generously than he thinks him-
self entitled to). After all, they think the Plan is substan-
tively unlawful, a merits contention that “we accept as valid”
for purposes of analyzing standing. Federal Election
Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022).
It would be quite strange to think that a party experiences
an Article III injury by not being affected by an unlawful
action (in Brown's case) or not being more affected by such
action (in Taylor's).

  1
   In contrast, a claim of unlawful exclusion from an existing benefts
program can be ft for judicial resolution. See, e. g., Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 

582 U. S. 449, 462

 (2017).
                     Cite as: 

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                         Opinion of the Court

   Instead, respondents seek relief under a separate statu-
tory source. They name the HEA as that potential source,
but presumably they would be pleased for the Department
to invoke any other lawful source (if one exists) as grounds
for granting them loan relief. Their interest is in obtaining
loan forgiveness in general.
   The Plan, however, is independent of any student-loan re-
lief the Department might craft under the HEA (or any other
statute). A decision by this Court that the Plan is lawful
would have no effect on the Department's ability to forgive
respondents' loans under the HEA.2 Thus, the Plan poses
no legal obstacle to the Department's choosing to fnd other
ways to remedy the harm respondents experience from not
having their loans forgiven.
   Put differently, the Department's decision to give other
people relief under a different statutory scheme did not
cause respondents not to obtain the benefts they want.
The cause of their supposed injury is far more pedestrian
Page Proof Pending Publication
than that: The Department has simply chosen not to give
them the relief they want. Ordinarily, a party's recourse to
induce an agency to take a desired action is to fle not a
lawsuit, but a “petition for the issuance, amendment, or re-
peal of a rule.” 

5 U. S. C. § 553

(e). The denial of such a
petition “must be justifed by a statement of reasons,” which
in turn “can be appealed to the courts” if the litigant has
standing to maintain such a suit. Auer v. Robbins, 

519 U. S. 452, 459

 (1997). Contesting a separate benefts program
based on a theory that it crowds out the desired one, how-
ever, is an approach for which we have been unable to fnd
any precedent.
   It is true that in procedural-standing cases, we tolerate
uncertainty over whether observing certain procedures
would have led to (caused) a different substantive outcome,
  2
    We do not opine on the substantive lawfulness of any action the De-
partment might take under the HEA or add anything to our construction
of the HEROES Act as set forth in today's opinion in Nebraska.
566         DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                          Opinion of the Court

as with Lujan's example of the dam and the bypassed envi-
ronmental impact statement. See 

504 U. S., at 572, n. 7

. In
this case, however, the causal uncertainty is not merely over
whether observing certain procedures would have led to a
different substantive outcome. Instead, the uncertainty
concerns whether the substantive decisions the Department
has made regarding the Plan under the HEROES Act have
a causal relationship with other substantive decisions re-
spondents want the Department to make under the HEA.
There is no precedent for tolerating this sort of causal
uncertainty.
  Our other procedural-standing cases demonstrate the
point. In the example posited in Lujan, proceeding with
building the dam as planned and simultaneously sparing the
adjacent landowner from the negative effects of the dam are
mutually exclusive options. See 

ibid.

 While it might be
uncertain whether undertaking an environmental impact
statement would prevent the dam from being built, it is clear
Page Proof Pending Publication
that building the dam would directly injure the landowner.
  Similarly, in a case like Summers, it might be uncertain
whether public comment would alter any particular land-
management decision the Forest Service makes. There
would be no uncertainty, however, that a plaintiff with con-
crete plans to observe nature in a particular area “would
be harmed if the [land-management project] went forward
without incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested”
in his comments. 

555 U. S., at 494

.3
  Accordingly, Brown and Taylor need not allege that ob-
serving negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment
would “ `force' ” the Department to reach substantive results

  3
     Although no plaintiff in Summers had standing because none had
alleged specifc plans to observe nature in one of the areas at issue in
the case, see 

555 U. S., at 500

, the point remains that, in an equivalent
case featuring those specifc plans, environmental damage to such a plain-
tiff's esthetic interests could fairly be traced to the Service's land-
management choices.
                    Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)             567

                       Opinion of the Court

more favorable to them than those embodied in the Plan.
Lemon v. Geren, 

514 F. 3d 1312

, 1314–1315 (CADC 2008).
But they must still show—pursuant to our customary trace-
ability standards—that the Plan's substance causes their in-
jury by impairing loan relief under the HEA.
   Brown and Taylor cannot meet this standard. “It is
purely speculative whether the denia[l]” of HEA loan re-
lief—their ostensible injury—“fairly can be traced to” the
Department's decision to grant loan relief in the Plan.
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 

426 U. S. 26

, 42–43 (1976); see also Warth v. Seldin, 

422 U. S. 490

,
503–504 (1975).
   As noted above, HEROES Act loan relief and HEA loan
relief function independently of each other. If the Depart-
ment may lawfully grant loan relief under both the HEROES
Act and the HEA, it is entitled to choose to do both, neither,
or only one (provided that it suffciently explains its reason-
ing, see 

5 U. S. C. § 706

(2)(A)). There is little reason to think
Page Proof Pending Publication
that its discretionary decision to pursue one mechanism of
loan relief has anything to do with its discretionary decision
to pursue (or not pursue) another. “The line of causation
between” the Department's promulgation of the Plan and re-
spondents' lack of benefts under the HEA “is attenuated
at best,” Allen, 

468 U. S., at 757

, and all too dependent on
“ `conjecture,' ” Summers, 

555 U. S., at 496

.

                                 2
   Respondents' attempts to tie the Plan to potential HEA
relief are unavailing. They point to a handful of documents
related to the Plan that say that the Department is providing
“one-time” student-loan relief. See, e. g., App. 215, 221, 225.
Such statements, Brown and Taylor argue, show that the
decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act fore-
closed HEA relief.
   This is insuffcient. The Plan itself—the action under re-
view here—contains no reference to “one-time” relief. See
568        DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

                       Opinion of the Court

87 Fed. Reg. 61512–61514. And to the extent that the De-
partment's decision to adopt the Plan under the HEROES
Act might have some incidental effect on the likelihood that
the Department will undertake a separate loan-forgiveness
program under a different statute, the relationship is not suf-
fciently close to persuade us that the latter is fairly traceable
to the former. See, e. g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42–43 (accept-
ing that certain tax rules might “ `encourag[e]' ” or “ `discour-
age' ” particular behavior, but nonetheless holding that con-
nection to be insuffcient to establish standing where it was
“just as plausible” that actors would “forgo favorable tax
treatment”). Moreover, no one argues that the existing ref-
erences to one-time relief are legally binding. To whatever
extent the Department has determined that the Plan crowds
out other efforts to forgive student loans, that, too, is a dis-
cretionary and independent decision that respondents may
ask it to reconsider with a § 553(e) petition.
   Finally, Brown and Taylor also argue that they have dem-
Page Proof Pending Publication
onstrated causation because the Secretary's failure to ob-
serve the requisite procedural rules cost them a “ `chance' ”
to “obtain debt forgiveness.” Brief for Respondents 28.
But referring in the abstract to a “chance” of obtaining “debt
forgiveness” does not solve their problem. They do not
want debt forgiveness under the HEROES Act, which they
claim is unlawful. They want debt forgiveness under the
HEA. Nothing the Secretary has done deprives them of a
“chance” to seek that result.
   Because respondents cannot meaningfully connect the ab-
sence of loan relief under the HEA to the adoption of the
Plan, they have failed to show that their injury is fairly
traceable to the Plan.
                         *     *     *
  For these reasons, respondents lack standing, and we
therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and re-
mand the case with instructions to dismiss. By vacating the
                  Cite as: 

600 U. S. 551

 (2023)                 569

                     Opinion of the Court

District Court's judgment, we obviate the need to grant the
interim relief the Department requests in its application in
No. 22A489. We therefore deny the application as moot.
                                                  It is so ordered.




Page Proof Pending Publication
                           Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None