Opinion · District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
Julien v. St. John the Baptist Parish School System
Julien v. St. John the Baptist Par. Sch. Sys., No. 2:21-cv-01081, UP10190312 (District Court, E.D. Louisiana. Dec. 20, 2023)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
- Jurisdiction
- Louisiana
- Date
- 2023-12-20
- Topic
- general
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA CHARLES JULIEN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 21-1081 ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL SYSTEM, ET AL. DIVISION “5” ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (rec. doc. 88) filed by Defendant St. John the Baptist Parish School Board (the “School Board”). Plaintiff Charles Julien filed an opposition to the motion (rec. doc. 97) and the School Board filed a reply.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHARLES JULIEN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 21-1081
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL SYSTEM, ET AL. DIVISION “5”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (rec. doc. 88) filed by
Defendant St. John the Baptist Parish School Board (the “School Board”). Plaintiff Charles
Julien filed an opposition to the motion (rec. doc. 97) and the School Board filed a reply.
(Rec. doc. 100). Having thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court
1
rI.u les asB faocllkogwrso.u n d
The School Board owns and operates East St. John High School in St. John the Baptist
Parish. (Rec. doc. 88-5). In August 2017 Plaintiff was hired to work as an English teacher
at East St. John High School and he also began coaching the boys’ basketball team. (Rec.
docs. 89-2 at 1, 97 at 1). Coaching the boys’ basketball team is not a full-time position but
an additional duty, and the person holding the position is paid a stipend. (Rec. doc. 89-4 at
¶ 7). The coaching position is at-will and can be discontinued for any reason or for no
reason at all, regardless of whether theI dp.erson who holds the position is also employed by
the School Board in another position. ( at ¶ 8). Id.
Plaintiff replaced Yussef Jasmine as head coach of the basketball team. ( at ¶¶ 11-
13). Jasmine, who coached the team for 10 seasons, posted an overall regular season win-
1
loss record of 98-51, won multiple district championships, and participated in the
LIodu.isiana High School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”) basketball playoffs for nine seasons.
(Id. at ¶ 111). Julien failed to maintain Jasmine’s level of success during his tenure as coach.
( at ¶¶ 13-15). IDd.uring Plaintiff’s first season as coach, the team finished with an overall
record of 15-18. ( at ¶ 13). Id.
High school athletic teams in Louisiana are bound by the rules of the LHSAA. ( at
¶ 4). In the fall of 2018, Principal Christopher Mayes investigated Plaintiff for possible
LHSAA rules violations, including violation of cash-handling protocols, requiring students
to practice on Sunday in violation of the LHSAA’s regulations, and requiring students to
practice in excess of three hours per day – the daily limit imposed by the LHSAA for
engaging in collective activity. (Rec. docs. 88-9, 88-10). Upon conclusion of his
investigation, Mayes relieved Plaintiff of his duties as basketball coach on October 26, 2018.
(Rec. doc. 88-11).
Three days after Mayes relieved him of his coaching duties, Julien sent a text
message to the School Board’s Superintendent, Kevin George, claiming that Mayes sexually
harassed him. (Rec. doc. 88-12). Superintendent George assigned the investigation of that
complaint to Serina Duke, the Human Resources Director. (Rec. Iddo. c. 88-13). Duke
requested that Julien submit a full report to enable the investigation. ( ).
Julien submitted his formal complaint on October 30, 2018. (RIde.c. doc. 88-14). The
report identified no witness to the alleged sexual harassment. ( ). As part of her
investigation, Duke obtained statements from both Mayes and Brown. (Rec. docs. 88-15,
88-16). Mayes vehemently denied Plaintiff’s allegations, noting that he was not present
with Plaintiff on many of the dates and times on which Plaintiff alleged that Mayes sexually
harassed him. (Rec. doc. 88-1Id5.). He also noted that Brown was present during many of his
interactions with Plaintiff. ( ). In his own statement, Brown corroborated his presence
during many of Mayes’ interactions with Plaintiff and attested that he had never witnessed
inappropriate behavior by Mayes vis-à-vis Plaintiff. (Rec. doc. 88-16). After a full and
complete review of the information presented, and Julien’s failure to submit the names of
any witnesses or other evidence as requested, Julien’s claims were determined to be
unsubstantiated. (Rec. doc. 88-17). Notwithstanding that Mayes believed that he had
relieved Plaintiff of his coaching duties for just cause, on November 26, 2018,
Superintendent George opted to reinstate Julien’s coaching duties to avoid the students
missing their basketball season for lack of a coach. (Rec. doc. 89-4 at ¶ 27).
Despite this second chance, circumstances did not improve for Plaintiff or the
basketball team. The team finished with a record of 9-21 during Plaintiff’s secIodn. d season
as head coach and failed to make the playoffs for the first time in a decade. ( at ¶ 14).
During the summer of 2019, Brown received verbal and written complaints from both
players andId .their parents claiming that Plaintiff was bullying and harassing student
athletes. ( at ¶ 45); (Rec. doc. 88-19). Based on these complaints, Julien’s coaching
record, and the overall culture of the basketball program, Brown decided to hire another
coach to lead the basketball program and to relieve Plaintiff of his coaching duties. (Rec.
doc. 89-4 at ¶¶ 47-48). The decision to relieve Plaintiff of his duties was based solely on
Brown’s iIndd.ependent assessment of the boys’ basketball program at East St. John High
School. ( at ¶ 48). Brown did not consult with or receive any dirIedc.tive from Mayes
before deciding that Plaintiff should be relieved of his coaching duties. ( at ¶ 49).
Brown’s decision did not affect Plaintiff’s position as an English teacher. (Rec. doc. 1
at ¶ 1). Other than a brief transfer to East St. John Preparatory School by Dr. Lynette
Hoofkin based on the uncomfortable working relationship between Plaintiff and Brown
after Plaintiff filed suit, Plaintiff has remained employed at East St. John High School as an
English teacher. (Rec. doc. 52-2).
On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the School Board, Mayes,
2
Brown, Cory Butler, and Heidi Trosclair. (Rec. doc. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
retaliation for reporting the alleged sexual hara sestm seenq.t byId M. ayes in violation of Title VII of
3
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e ( at ¶¶ 25-29). Plaintiff alleges
that the retaliation consisted of locking Plaintiff and his basketball team out of the workout
and practice facilities, requiring Plaintiff to obtain additional insurance for the boys from
other feeder schools who practiced at the School Board’s facilities, refusing to allow the
basketball team to participaItde. in Athletic Physical Education, and by ultimately relieving
him of his coaching duties. ( at ¶¶ 14-17).
On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Supplemental and Amended Complaint,
in which he alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII and Louisiana Revised Statute §
23:967 for filing this lawsuit, as well as whistleblower violations under Louisiana Revised
Statute § 42:1169. (Rec. doc. 28 Iadt. ¶ 36). He also added Hoofkin – the newly-hired
Superintendent – as a Defendant. ( ).
2
3 Butler and Trosclair were Interim Superintendents during the relevaIndt. time periods. (Rec. doc. 1 at ¶¶ 7-8).
According to the pleadings, Plaintiff Ifdi.led an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about February 11, 2020. ( at ¶ 10). On April 6, 2021, the EEOC
issued a right to sue letter to Plaintiff. ( ). The Court notes that the referenced EEOC complaint and the
On October 29, 2021, Defendants Brown, Mayes, and the School Board filed a Motion
to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(2) (rec. doc. 12), which this
Court granted. (Rec. doc. 49). On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Cory
Butler and Heidi Trosclair as Defendants (rec. doc. 34), which this Court also granted. (Rec.
doc. 36).
On April 12, 2022, Hoofkin answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and asserted a
counterclaim against Plaintiff for bad faith. (Rec. doc. 42). On November 18, 2022, the
Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Under Rule 59(e) and reinstated
Plaintiff’s claims against the School Board. (Rec. doc. 62). Hoofkin then filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (rec. doc. 52), which this Court granted on February 14, 2023.
(Rec. doc. 72). Accordingly, the School Board is the sole remaining Defendant in this
4
IlaI.w suitS.u mmary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to anyC emloatteexr iCaol rfpa. cvt. Caantdr etthtat the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” , 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element eIsds.e ntial to that party's case, and on which the party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” A party moving for summary judgment bears the
initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those
portions of the record, discovery, aIndd. any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is
no genuine issue of material fact. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, then
the nonmoving party must marshal evidenceI dc.ognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. at 324.
A genuine issue oSfe em Aantedreiraslo fna cvt. eLxiibsetrst iyf aL orbebays,o Innacb.le jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Id.
,477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a rational trier ofS feaec Mt caotusuldsh nitoat Efilnedc. fIonrd tuhse. Cnoo. nvm. Zoevniinthg Rpaadrtiyo uCporopn. a review of the record takenE qausa al wEmhopl'et . O pportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd. ,475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986); ,767 F.3d 475, 481
(5th Cir. 2014). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” andS meee Arenldye crsoolonrable factual bases areH ionpspuefrfi cvi.e Fnrta tnok defeat a motion for summary judgment. , 477 U.S. at 249-50; ,16 F.3d 92, 97
(5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on aS eseu Dmemltaar &y
Pjuidneg mLeanntd mCoot. iov.n ,N aa ctioounrwt imdea yA ngoritb ruessionlevses cIrnesd. iCboi.lity issues or weigh evidence.
, 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
(5th Cir. 2008). Further, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on tSheee eTvoildaenn cve. Ciont ttohne light most favorable to theD apnairetlys vo.p Cpiotsyi nogf sAurmlinmgtaorny judgment. ,572 U.S. 650, 656
(2014);
, 246 F.3d 500, 502
(5th Cir. 2001). A court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actual cLoitnttler ovv. eLrisqyu, itdh aAti ri sC, owrph.en both parties have submitted evidence ofL cuojanntr va.d Nicatto'lr Wy ifladcltifse.” F ed'n ,37 F.3d 1069
, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing ,497 U.S. 871, 888
(1990)).
After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant
must articulate specific facts and pointS teoe Lsuynpcpho rPtrinopgs, .,c Ionmc.p ve. tPeontto emvaidc eInncse. Ctoh. aotf mIlla.y be
presented in a form admissible at trial. , 140 F.3d 622, 625
(5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(M2)a.t s Suushchit afacts must create more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” ,475 U.S. at 586
.
When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the
moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essenStieael
eCleelmoteenxt of the nonmovant's claim in order to satisfy its summary judgment burden.
, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial
that couldSe seu Lpitptolert a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be
gIIrIa. ntedL. a w and An, 3a7ly Fs.i3sd at 1075-76.
Under Title VII, retaliation is actionable when a plaintiff engages in protected
activity, such as reporting discrimination or perceived discrimination that vRioeliactheesr tt hve.
sIntafutusitoen, Panardt nseurfsf,e Lr.sL .Ca . causally-related adverse employment consequence.
Ackel v. Nat'l Com, Nmoc. 'nCsV 22-5450, 2023 WL 4685377
, at *6 (E.D. La. July 21, 2023) (pcriitminag facie ,339 F.3d 376, 385
(5th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, to state a
case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he engaged in
an activity protected by Title VII; 2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action;
and 3) Wa iclalius sva. lC lliencko Ceoxrispt.s between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. , 749 F.3d 314, 317
(5th Cir. 2014).
“Title VII's antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate
against’ an employee (or job applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII
forbids or has ‘made a charBguer, ltinesgttiofine dN, .a &ss Sisatnetda, oFre pRayr.t Cicoip. va.t eWdh iint’e a Title VII ‘investigation,
proceeding, or hearing.’” , 548 U.S. 53, 59
(2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The opposition clause of Section 2000e-3(a) requires the employee to demonstrate Ltohnagt hve. Ehaasdt fiaetl dle Caostll .a “reasonable belief” that the practices he oPpapynoes evd. MwceLreem uonrlea'ws Wfulh. o lesale & Retail Stores ,88 F.3d 300, 304
(5th Cir. 1996) (citing Payne ,654 F.2d 1130, 1140
(5th Cir. 1981)). In , the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the position that proof of an actual unlawful employment practice is necessary to state a claim for unlawful retaliation.654 F.2d at 1137-41
. An informal complaint to a supervisor regarding an unlawful eSmeep Tlouyrmeaeundt pv.r aGcrtaicmeb mlinagy sSatatitsef yU tnhiev .opposition requirement of a Title VII retaliatioJenf fcelraiiems . v . Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass'n ,294 F. App'x 909, 914-15
(5th sCeeir .a 2ls0o0 H8e)r; tz v. Luzenac Am., Inc.
, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036
(5th CSirh. a1n9n8o0n) ;v . Bellsouth Telecommc’ns, Inc. ,370 F.3d 1014, 1015
(10th Cir. 2004) (same)G; oings v. Lopinto ,292 F.3d 712
, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); , No. CV 22-2549,2023 WL 2709826
, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2023) (same). McDonnell-Douglas
Retaliation claims are analyzed under the same burden-shifting
framework as discrimination claims: “If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision.
After the employer states its reason, the burden shifts back to theF eemistp vlo. Lyeoeu itsoia dneamonstrate
5
that the employer's reason is actLueaMllayi rae p vr. eLtoeuxits fioarn aretaliation.” , 730 F.3d
4B5a0rd, e4l5l 4v. (J5etffhe rCsiorn. 2 P0a1r3. S) c(hc.i tBindg. , 480 F.3d 383, 388-89
(5th Cir. 2007));
, No. CV 20-3245, 2023 WL 2894687
, at *11 (E.D. La. Apr. 11,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
2023). To do so, “the plaintiff must establish that ‘but Sfeoer ’U tnhive. porf oTteexc.t eSdw .a Mcteivdi.t yC,t rt.h ve.
aNdavsesarsre employment action would not have happened.”
, 570 U.S. 338, 352
(2013) (observing that a Title VII retaliation claim requires
“proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action”A). . Adverse Employment Action
prima facie
The School Board first argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a case of
6
retaliation because no adverse employment action occurred. The United States Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he antiretaliation provision protects an Binudrliivnigdtuoanl Nn.o &t Sfraonmta aFlel
Rreyt.a Clioa. tvio. Wn, hbiutet from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.”
, 548m Ua.St.e 5ri3a, l67 (2006). It extrapolated:
We speak of adversity because we believe it is iOmnpcoarleta nv.t tSou snedpoawrnaeter
sOifgfnshifoicrea nSte frrvoicme st, rIivnica.l harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a
general sceiev iFliatyra cgohdere for the American workplace.”
, 523 U.S. 75, 80
,118 S. Ct. 998
,140 L. Ed. 2d 201
(1998); , 524 U.S., at 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275
(judicial standards for
sexual harassment must “filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language,
gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’ ”). An employee's decision to
report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those
petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all
employees experience. See 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment
Discrimination Law 669 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that “courts have held that
personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy” and “‘snubbing’ by
supervisors and co-workers” are not actionable undReorb i§n s7o0n4(a)). The
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with
“unfettered access” to Title VII's remedial mechanisms. , 519 U.S., at
346, 117 S. Ct. 843
. It dIobeids. so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely
“to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,” the courts,
and their employers. And normally petty slights, minor annoyances,
and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence. See 2 EEOC
1998 Manual § 8, p. 8-13.
6
reasonable
We refer to reactions of a employee because we believe
that the provision's standard for judging harm must be objective. An
objective standard is judicially administrable. It avoids the uncertainties and
unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff's
unusual subjective ef.ege.,l iSnugdse. r sWe have emphasized the need for objective
standards in other THitlaer rVisII v c. oFnotrekxlitfst, Saynsdte tmhso,s Ien cs.ame concerns animate our
decision here. See, , 542 U.S., at 141, 124 S. Ct. 2342
(constructive
discharge doctrine); , 510 U.S. 17, 21
, 114 S. Ct. Id. 367,126 L. Ed. 2d 295
(1993) (hostile work environment doctrine).
at 68-69 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff alleges four acts that he claims qualify as retaliation:
1. On May 2, 2019, Plaintiff claims that Brown allegedly locked the boys’
basketball team out of the weight room. (Rec. docs. 1 at ¶ 14, 88-21 at
6).
2. In May 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Brown informed him that insurance
would be required in order for students from feeder schools to use the
basketball facilities at East St. John High School. (Rec. doc. 1 at ¶ 15).
Id.
3. In August 2019, Plaintiff claims Brown allegedly “refused to allow
Plaintiff’s basketball team to participate in Athletic PE.” ( at ¶ 16).
Id.
4. On September 13, 2019, Mayes and Brown relieved Plaintiff of his
coaching duties. ( at ¶ 17).
With regard to the first three acts, the School Board contends that Plaintiff failed to
aBlulerglien gtthoant they dissuaded him from engaging in protected activity as required by
. The School Board also argues that Plaintiff failed to allege that the three acts
caused him any significant harm or changed his employment with the School Board. For
his part, Plaintiff maintains that it is abundantly clear that a reasonable worker would be
dissuaded from making or supporting a charge of discrimination if that reasonable worker
could not have his team participate in athletic PE, if he were locked out of his practice
facility, if he had had to secure additional insurance for his team, or if he was not allowed to
7
have feeder school groups participate in practice.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit reversed Title VII law in this circuit by jettisoning the
requiremenHt amthialtto na nv . aDdavllearss eC tye.mployment action need be an “ultimate employment
decision.” , 79 F.4th 494, 497
(5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Instead, a
plaintiff need only show that he was discriminated against, because of a protected
characteristic, with respect Itdo. hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” at 506 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). The School Board
contends that the first three aforementioned acts are only “minor inconveniences” and do
not constitute adverse emploHyammeinltto anc tions because they did not cause significant harm to
Plaintiff’s employment. But requiresa fnfeoc stuedch stringent allegation. Plaintiff need
only maintain that the alleged discrimination a term, condition, or privilege of his
employment. For example, this Court cannot state at this time that no genuine issue of
material fact exists with regard to whether access to East St. John High School’s facilities or
whether the requirement to obtain insurance for students from feeder schools affected a
condition or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment.
In any event, the School Board wholly fails to address the fourth act – that of
relieving Plaintiff of his coaching duties. Indeed, later in its memorandum, the Schtohoel
Bonolayr adc mt tahiantt acionusl dt hcaotn ctheiev a“brelym boev caol nfsriodmer ehdis ‘ acdovaecrhsien’g duties on September 3, 2019 –
. . . .” (Rec. doc. 89-2 at 11) (emphasis
added). While this statement is certainly no admission that relieving Plaintiff of his
7
Plaintiff also maintains that his transfer from East St. John High School to East St. John Preparatory School
coaching duties was an adverse employment action, the School Board certainly recognizes
that a reasonable juror could conclude that such an act by Plaintiff’s supervisors
constituted one.
Accordingly, this Court cannot state at this stage of the litigation that relieving
Plaintiff of his duties as a coach did not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of
Plaintiff’s employment. There is no conclusive evidence presented on this point that would
render summary judgment appropriate as to this issue. The Court finds that a genuine
issue of material fact exists such that a reasonable juror could conclude that relieviin.eg.
Plaintiff of his duties as coach for a discriminatory reason affected his compensation ( ,
his stipend) or the terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment as the basketball
coach. Accordingly, the Court declines to find summary judgment appropriate on this
factor aBn.d willC caounssaidl eCro tnhnee Sccthioonol Board’s other arguments.
prima facie
The School Board also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a case of
retaliation because there is no temporal proximity between the filing of the complaint
against Mayes and the alleged adverse employment actions. Plaintiff contends that a
reasonable juror could conclude that not only did he present direct evidence of retaliation,
but that he also presented circumstantial evidence, which creates a rebuttable presumption
of retaliation through the materially-adverse employment actions that occurred while he
was the basketball coach.
As noted above, a cauWsaill lilsink must exist between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. , 749 F.3d at 317
. “To establish causality, the protected activity and the adverse action must have ‘very close’ temporal proximity, and ‘a five month lapse is not close eNneowubguhr y. . .v t. oC eitsyt aobfl isWhi tnhdec rceasuts, aTl ecxo.nnection element of a prima facie case of retaliatLioyonn.’”s v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist. ,991 F.3d 672, 679
(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting ,964 F.3d 298, 305
(5th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The United States Supreme Court has rCelnadrekr Cetdy .a S cdhe. cDisiisotrn.
hv.o Bldrienegd ethnat three months is not within the “very close” requirement. C lark
, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74
(2001). And the Fifth Circuit, citing , has concluded that two and one-half months between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision, standing a Bloenssee, ri vs . Tneoxt . Gweinth. iLna ntdh eO f“fviceery close” proximity that is necessary to establish causation. ,834 F. App’x 876
, 885 (5th Cir. 2020).
The Court finds that the same conclusion must be reached here because the
undisputed facts and evidence show that the first alleged act of retaliation,s wixh meno Jnutlhiesn was
locked out of the weight room, occurred on May 2, 2019, approximately See a, eft.ger.,
PNleawinbtuifrfy filed the sexual harassment complaint against Mayes on October 29, 2018.
, 991 F.3d at 679
(finding a five-month lapse not “close enough” to establish a
causal connection between adverse employment action and alleged retaliation). Moreover,
the subsequent alleged acts of sreevtaelnia atinodn 1oc1c murorendth isn late May 2019, August 2019, and on
September 13, 2019, between after the Plaintiff filed the complaint
against Mayes. Those alleged acts of retaliation, based on their dates of occurrence, are
beyond thep rriemqau irfaecdi emark and are insufficient evidence of the causality necessary to
establish a case of retaliation. Theprreim isa nfaoc igee nuine issue of material fact that
8
Plaintiff cannot establish causation and thus, a case of retaliation.
prima facie
8
III. Conclusion
FITo rI tSh eO fRoDreEgRoiEnDg reasons,
that the Motion for SummGarRyA JNuTdgEmDent (rec. doc. 88) filed by
Defendant St. John the Baptist Parish2 S0cthhool Board is Decem. ber
New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2023.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
McConnell-Douglas