Opinion · District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper
Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper, No. 4:19-cv-00243, UP10744298 (District Court, N.D. Oklahoma Nov. 19, 2024)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- Jurisdiction
- Oklahoma
- Date
- 2024-11-19
- Topic
- litigation
Qnuited States District Court for the S2Qorthern District of Oklahoma Case No. 19-cv-243-JDR-CDL DOUBLE EAGLE ALLOYS, INC., Plaintiff, versus MICHAEL Hooper; AcE ALLoys, LLC, Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER Following the entry of an order granting summary judgment in their favor, Defendants Ace Alloys, LLC and Michael Hooper filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- cedure. Dkt. 346. Defendants argue that, as the prevailing parties in this case, they are entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees they incurred in defense of Double Eagle’s federal and state trade-secret misappropriation claims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) and Okla.
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Qnuited States District Court
for the S2Qorthern District of Oklahoma
Case No. 19-cv-243-JDR-CDL
DOUBLE EAGLE ALLOYS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
versus
MICHAEL Hooper; AcE ALLoys, LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Following the entry of an order granting summary judgment in their
favor, Defendants Ace Alloys, LLC and Michael Hooper filed a motion for an
award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Dkt. 346. Defendants argue that, as the prevailing parties in this case,
they are entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees they incurred in defense of
Double Eagle’s federal and state trade-secret misappropriation claims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836
(b)(3)(D) andOkla. Stat. Ann. tit. 78, § 89
. The Court DENIES
the motion.
Section 1836(b)(3)(D) provides that a court may award reasonable at-
torneys’ fees to a prevailing party where a trade-secret misappropriation is
made in bad faith. 18 U.S.C. § 1836
(b)(3)(D). The standard for an award of fees under Oklahoma law is the same.Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 78, § 89
. There is no question that Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case. E.g., API Americas Inc. v. Miller,380 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1150
(D. Kan. 2019) (concluding
that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on its misappropriation
claims but reserving for a jury the question of whether the defendant’s
Case No. 19-cv-243
conduct justified an award of fees). The only question disputed by the parties
is whether Plaintiff’s misappropriation claims were made in bad faith. See
Dkt. 346 at 3, 9-13; Dkt. 352 at 13-25.'
Defendants suggest that the only purpose of this action was to intimi-
date Defendants and stifle competition. Dkt. 346 at 2-3, 7. The evidence
shows that Double Eagle had a good faith belief that Defendant Michael
Hooper had stolen information that, in Double Eagle’s estimation, consti-
tuted trade secrets. Double Eagle has consistently claimed that Mr. Hooper
downloaded confidential files to a personal storage device prior to leaving his
employment to work for Ace Alloys. Dkt. 2 at 912. It had a factual basis for
making this claim, as Defendants acknowledge. Dkt. 346 at 4-5. Double Ea-
gle’s claim gained momentum as the case progressed; discovery and expert
evidence confirmed Double Eagle’s suspicion that Mr. Hooper had taken
Double Eagle’s information and accessed it while employed by Ace. See Dkt.
352 at 10-11. Although the Court ultimately found that Double Eagle failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish that the misappropriated files contained
or constituted trade secrets, it did not find that Double Eagle could not have
presented such evidence. Dkt. 343. In fact, the Court found the opposite. See
id. at 9-10 (acknowledging the possibility that the misappropriated files con-
tained trade secrets but granting summary judgment because Double Eagle
had “done nothing to distinguish the wheat from the chaff”).
Defendants argue that Double Eagle’s failure to articulate a trade se-
cret is proof of bad faith, and cites Cherokee Chemical Co. v. Frazier, No. CV
20-1757-MWF (ASX), 2022 WL 2036305
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2022), in sup-
port. It is true that, in Cherokee Chemical, the plaintiff’s misappropriation
claim was deemed “objectively specious” because the plaintiff had failed to
identify a potential trade secret with “reasonable particularity.” Jd. at *4. But
the court’s determination of bad faith did not rest on that fact alone: The
‘ All citations utilize CMECF pagination.
Case No. 19-cv-243
court also considered other circumstantial evidence suggesting the suit was
brought to suppress competition, including the timing of the litigation; the
history of litigation between the parties; the plaintiff’s failure to produce doc-
uments, meet and confer regarding discovery motions, or provide its portion
of a joint stipulation; and the fact that a settlement was reached the day before
the plaintiff was required to supplement its discovery. Jd. at *5. The evidence
that supported a finding of bad faith in Cherokee Chemical is not present here.’
Although Double Eagle’s misappropriation claims ultimately failed as
a matter of law, they were not objectively baseless. See Fed. Trade Comm’n pv.
Freecom Comme’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1201
(10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “a claim that fails as a matter of law is not necessarily lacking any basis at all”). It was not unreasonable for Double Eagle to believe that it could have made out a trade-secret claim, even if it ultimately failed to do so. The Court cannot say, based on the evidence provided in parties’ briefing in connection with both this motion and their motions for summary judgment, that Double Eagle’s claims were “entirely without color” or were “asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons.” Sterling En- ergy, Ltd. v. Friendly Nat’! Bank,744 F.2d 1433, 1435
(10th Cir. 1984) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that the
evidence is not sufficient to support an award of attorneys’ fees, and Defend-
ants’ motion [Dkt. 346] is DENIED. Defendants’ corresponding motion to
* The other cases relied upon by Defendants are likewise distinguishable. There is
no evidence that the allegations in Double Eagle’s complaint were “intentionally mislead-
ing.” Cf Magnum Mach., LLC v. Terves, LLC, No. 20-3779, 2021 WL 5772533
, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021) (affirming finding of bad faith where a document “didn’t actually contain the elaborate trade secrets presented in [the] complaint”). Nor is there any indication that the claims lacked factual support by the close of discovery. Cf Zoppas Indus. de Mexico, S_A. de C.V. ». Backer EHP Inc., No. CV 18-01693-GBW-C]B,2023 WL 7530247
, at *2 (D. Del.
Nov. 13, 2023) (awarding attorneys’ fees where the parties “agree[d] that there [was] no
evidence” in support of the plaintiff’s allegations by the time summary judgment was en-
tered).
Case No. 19-cv-243
bifurcate the issue of entitlement to fees from the issue of the amount of fees
is DENIED as MOOT.
DATED this 19th day of November 2024.
Joun D. RUSSELL
United States District Judge
aA