Opinion · Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Rodgers v. Higgins

Rodgers v. Higgins, 871 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1994)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Jurisdiction
Oklahoma
Date
1994-04-15
Topic
general

first citing 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 32.1; and then citing Pettis v. Johnston, 1920 OK 224, 78 Okla. 277, 190 P. 681, 700 | "Oklahoma jurisprudence utilizes the transactional approach for its definition of a 'cause of action.' Although different theories of liability may be pressed in support of each claim, only a single cause of action can ordinarily be predicated upon one occurrence or transaction." | "Oklahoma jurisprudence utilizes the transactional approach for its definition of a 'cause of action.' Although different theories of liability may be pressed in support of each claim, only a single cause of action can ordinarily be predicated upon one occurrence or transaction.” | adopting amendment signifies "legislative intent to change the law"

Citator

Cited by
34 opinions
RODGERS v. HIGGINS,1993 OK 45
871 P.2d 398
JAMES G. RODGERS AND BETTY J. RODGERS, APPELLANTS, v. JAMES R. HIGGINS,
M.D.; CARDIOLOGY OF TULSA, INC.; JOHN R. HOOD, M.D.; GASTROENTEROLOGY
SPECIALISTS, INC., AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION, APPELLEES, and SAINT FRANCIS
HOSPITAL, AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION, DEFENDANT.
No. 79,454.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
April 14, 1993.
As Corrected April 28, 1993.
Rehearing Dismissed April 15, 1994.
Page 399
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]Page 400

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]Page 401
On Appeal from the District Court, Tulsa County; Daniel J. Boudreau, Judge.

Within the framework of asinglemedical malpractice action husband pressed a common-law claim for bodily injury and wife for her loss of consortium. This appeal is fromjudgmenton a verdict for the defendants on both claims.Defendants seek theappeal's dismissal for untimeliness.APPEAL DISMISSED.
W.C. Sellers, Jr., W.C. "Bill" Sellers, Inc., Sapulpa, for appellants.

Joseph M. Best, Joseph A. Sharp, John H.T. Sullivan, Daniel S. Sullivan, Kevin L. Ward, Karen M. Grundy, Best, Sharp, Holden, Sheridan Stritzke, Tulsa, for appellees.
OPALA, Justice.
[1] The single issue for our decision is whether the general unreserved jury verdict in this common-law action became the "filed judgment" in the § 990 [12-990]A [12 O.S. 1991] sense by operation of 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1]1[§ 696.1].We answer in theaffirmative and dismiss the appeal as untimely.
[2]THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
[3] James G. Rodgers [Rodgers] brought a common-law claim against two physicians and their employers [doctors or defendants]2for bodily injury caused by a tainted blood transfusion, from which he contracted "Type C" hepatitis,3a fatal disease. Although in support of hissingleclaim4Rodgers urgedseveralalternative theories of recovery, the trial court confined the case on submission to but one of them — that of negligence. Rodgers' wife sued for loss of consortium. Her claim was derivative of that pressed by the husband.5Both claims went to the same jury concurrently. Its verdict in favor ofallthe defendants6— accepted below without judicial reservation7— was received by thePage 402clerk on March 6, 1992 and became the "filed judgment" by operation of § 696.1.8Amemorializationof proceedings that led to the verdict, including the trial court's presubmission ruling which confined the plaintiffs' claims to the single theory of negligence, was incorporated in a journal entry filed March 26, 1992.9The Rodgers' petition in error came here on April 17, 1992,lessthan thirty daysafterthe March 26journal entry'sfiling, butmorethan thirty daysafterthe clerk's March 6 record entry of judgment in conformity with the verdict.The appeal ishence fraught with a fatal jurisdictional infirmity.
I

[4]THE GENERAL UNRESERVED JURY VERDICT, RATHER THAN THE TRIALCOURT'S PRESUBMISSION RULING ON THE APPLICABLE THEORY OFRECOVERY, DISPOSED OF THE RODGERS' CLAIMS

[5] The doctors seek this appeal's dismissal for untimeliness. They urge us to apply the teachings ofJaco Production Company v.Luca,10which holds that a judicially unreserved general verdict —enteredby the clerk in a common-law action — becomes transmuted intoa filedjudgmenteo instanteby force of 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1].11

[6] The Rodgers argue the verdict did notresolve all the issuesbecause the district court had"sustained defendants' demurrerto the evidence"on some of the"claims."They would have us treat each of their multiple alternativetheories of recoveryas adistinct cause of action(or as aseparableclaim).12According to the Rodgers, no judgment was entered until the trial court memorialized both the jury's verdict and its presubmission ruling in the single journal entry of March 26, 1992.13

[7] Oklahoma jurisprudence utilizes the transactional approach for its definition of a "cause of action."14Although different theoriesPage 403of liability may be pressed in support of each claim, only a single cause of action can ordinarily be predicated upon one occurrence or transaction.15The single offending eventthat Rodgers (husband) complains of is the pathogenic bloodtransfusion.His evidence shows that when he was hospitalized for a colonoscopy, Dr. Hood recommended a preprocedure blood transfusion. According to Rodgers, when he objected and questioned its necessity, Dr. Hood told him the physicians would try to do without it. Later, a nurse brought the blood and told him Dr. Higgins had ordered it. Rodgers told Dr. Higgins that (1) he was concerned about the blood and (2) his brother in Arkansas, who had the same blood type, could be summoned at once to donate the needed quantity. Rodgers testified that Dr. Higgins (1) assured him it was not necessary for his brother to donate blood, (2) repeated the "just-don't-worry-about-it" phrase three or four times and (3) told him "everything will be fine." Although Rodgers' signature appears on a consent form for authorizing the transfusion, he does not remember signing it. A few months after the procedure he began to exhibit symptoms of a liver disease later diagnosed as hepatitis.

[8] At pretrial Rodgers identifiedwhat he calledhis "claims" or "causes of action" as: (1) fraud and misrepresentation, (2) breach of warranty and (3) execution of a blood transfusion without his informed consent.16In lawall of his assertedgrounds constitute nothing more than three distinct andalternative theories of recovery.17Defendants "demurred" to the evidence at the close of the case; they contended the proof was insufficient to supportany claim against them,especially one founded on breach of warranty or on fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court ruled the facts warranted the claim's submission on a want-of-due-care theory of the plaintiffs' allegations that (a) the doctors did not completely and accurately inform Rodgers about the risks from the blood transfusion, (b) as a result of theiromissionhewithdrew hisobjectionto the procedure's execution and (c) later suffered bodily injury. In short, thecritical nisi priusmid-trial rulingwithheld from submissiontwo of thethree theoriestenderedby the plaintiffs: (1) breach of warranty and (2) fraud and misrepresentation.18

[9] A plaintiff who states a claim and proves its facts is entitled to any relief affordable by law;19the pleader need not correctly identify any applicable theory of recovery.20The trial court must charge the jury on all the legalissues theevidence tenders.21In this case, the trial court ruled the evidence called for instructions on the theory of negligence and on the wife's loss of consortium.Plaintiffs'-pressed submissionof the claim on other theories was rejected as unwarranted bytheir proof.Page 404

[10]Nisi prius refusalto instruct the jury onalternativetheories of recoveryis distinguishable froman order thatsustains a demurrer to the evidence in support of a cause ofaction or of a claim.If the trial court's presubmission ruling had (1) withheld either Rodgers' or his wife's claim in its entirety or (2) severed from jury trial claims against some of the four defendants, the general verdict mightnothave been dispositive ofallthe issues in this common-law action.22An adjudication ofall multiple claimsand the settlement ofthe rights and liabilities of all the parties to those claimsis asine qua nonof anappealable eventunless there be "an [earlier] express [judicial] determination that there is no just reason for delay [of an appeal]" and "an express direction for the [immediate] filing of judgment."23The verdict in thiscase did not leave any issue or claim undecided.

[11] When the trial of this case began (1) Rodgers had butoneclaim ex delictofor damages against four defendants, all answerable jointly and severally and (2) his wife had a single claim against the same four parties for her loss of consortium. Both of the Rodgers' claims went to the jury against all of the four defendants in the case.24Its verdict favors all the defendants. In short, the only demands the Rodgers ever had — one claim by each of them — werefinallydisposed of by thesingle jury verdict.

[12] The district court's mid-trial ruling doesnotrepresent an order appealablebefore judgment; nordoes it leavepost-verdict issuesto be resolved.Had this case been timelyappealed, any error in withholding from the jury's considerationthe rejected plaintiffs' theories of fraud and breach ofwarranty, if properly preserved, clearly would have beenreviewable on appeal from the judgment entered by force of §696.1 upon the general unreserved jury verdict.25
II
A

[13]APPEAL TIME IN A COMMON-LAW ACTION IS TRIGGERED BY THE TRIALCOURT'S UNRESERVED ACCEPTANCE26OF A GENERAL JURY VERDICTAND THE CLERK'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT INTO THE RECORD PROPER, WHICHTASK IS NECESSARILY PRECEDED BY FILING

[14] "A judgment is thefinal determinationof the rights of the parties in an action."27Page 405Specific statutory provisionscontrol the process of transforming a general unreserved juryverdict in a common-law action into a judgment.The terms of § 696.1 provide:
"When atrial by juryhas been had,judgment mustbe entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict,unless it isspecial,or the court order the case to bereservedfor future argument or consideration." [Emphasis provided.]


[15] Recent case law28unequivocally teaches thatunder theprovisions of 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A][12-990A]29[§ 990A], read together with the specific terms of § 696.1, appeal time in common-law30actions decided by a general verdict is triggered by (1) the judge's failure to "reserve" (withhold) judgment and (2) the clerk's entry of judgment into the record proper31— an entry which is necessarily preceded by the verdict's filing. These acts transmute the verdict by force of § 696.1 into the legal equivalent of a filed judgment in the § 990A sense.32The prevailing party is hence entitled to entry of judgment in his favor the day the jury verdict is returned and accepted without reservation.33

[16] The dissenters must concedenot onlythatthe judgmenton a general unreserved jury verdict isrendered by operation oflaw,but also thatunder § 696.1the judgment must beat onceentered by the clerk without judicial imprimatur.Yet, after a vain search for uniformity that would supplyPage 406an identical time trigger for three distinct case-deciding mechanisms, the dissents succeedonlyin abandoningfidelity to the legislative historyof § 696.1 and to that statute's textby making the clerk's entry of judgment (which presupposes its filing)ineffective totrigger appeal time until a judge-signed journal entry is placedof record. By sheer judicial fiat the dissents would resurrect ascheme the legislature threw out when it repealed the Judgmentsand Appeals Act passed in 1990 (effective January 1,1991).34The provisions of therepealed§ 1001A35required a separate document for every judgment and those of § 1001C36mandated the trial court to prepare and sign thejudgment after a general verdict and then deliver it to the courtclerk for filing.The legislature clearlyeliminatedthose two requirements when it reenacted the then-defunct § 696 as § 696.1.37It is this very reenactment that revived the pre-1991 procedural regime for entry of judgments in common-law actions decided by a general unreserved jury verdict.Thatregime unequivocally commanded, as it does today, that judgmenton these verdicts be entered without judicialintervention.38The resurrected § 696 makes judges powerless tochange a general unreserved verdict39except by vacation40and new trial process.41
B

[17]WHEN THE LEGISLATUREREENACTED § 696 as § 696.1AND ADOPTED §990A,42IT KNEW THE JUDICIAL GLOSS THAT HAD BEEN CAST UPONUNRESERVED ACCEPTANCE OF A GENERAL JURY VERDICT AND UPON ACLERK'S MANDATORY DUTY TO ENTER MATTERS OF RECORD WITHOUTJUDICIAL IMPRIMATUR

[18] When the legislature restores verbatim previously enacted statutes, it is presumedPage 407to be familiar with and to adopt their extant case-law construction.43The judicial gloss that had been cast upon unreserved acceptance of a general verdict is thatjudgment must follow the verdict by force of law, even though itmight not have been memorialized and entered on the court'sjournal.44That lore was well known to the § 696 revivers.

[19] The adoption of an amendatory act indicates legislative intent to change the law then in force.45The legislature could easily have retained the § 1001 requirements that every judgment be contained in a separate document46and thatajudge-signed memorializationbe filed after a general jury verdict,47if this procedure was indeed meant to be essential for triggering appeal time. If a journal entry was to be asinequa non,the legislature would not haverepealedthose requirements norreenacted § 696's command for the clerk's entryof judgment.48Jaco,decided after § 696'srestorationas § 696.1, remains true to our extant jurisprudence declaring that a filed general unreserved jury verdict becomes the court's judgmentwithout judicial intervention. Section 696.1 representsa restored right of the prevailing party. It is too valuable tosuffer abrogation by judicial fiat.

[20]Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.49does not hold, as one dissent seems to counsel, that judicial action is required to effect judgment after a general unreserved jury verdict has been accepted.Rather, Walkerteaches that a judge has authority toadd prejudgment interest to a jury verdictwhere applicable.50Walkerisnotinconsistent withJaco'steachingthatappeal time in a common-law action runs from theclerk's entry of judgment upon the general unreserved verdict.

[21] The legislature must be charged with knowledge that matterstobe "entered by the clerk"are to beincorporated into the"record proper" in the § 32.1 sense51and that filingmustprecede entry.52Before 1969, when notice of appeal was a prerequisite for appellate review,53the court clerk had amandatory duty to "enter notice of appeal"and there was no requirement that notice of intention to appeal be contained in any journal entry.54The clerk's "duty of entry" was held accomplished by incorporating the notice into the record proper55— i.e.,Page 408by making it a part of the judgment roll.56Contrary to a dissent's suggestion, record entry of judgment is never effected by a clerk's minute posted on the appearance docket.57Entry is accomplished by the clerk's incorporation of the verdict into the judgment roll58— a purely ministerial act which by force of § 696.1 transmutes the verdict into a filed judgment.

[22] Although "filing" and "entry" arenot synonymous,the two concepts are closely interwoven.59The clerk may "enter" only that which is already "on file."60Filing of the judgment simply refers to itsdelivery to the clerkforentryand preservation.61Every document's entry ispreceded by its filing— whether the entry be made (1) on a docket,62(2) on the court's journal,63or (3) into thePage 409judgment roll.64In short, each "entry" presupposes anearlier "filing."

[23] In sum, § 696.1 commands that, upon a general verdict's acceptance without reservation, the clerk mustfile the verdictin the caseandenter itin the judgment roll.This the clerkdid in the case before us.The law does not require that a verdict meeting § 696.1 standards be contained in a judge-signed journal entrybeforeits transmutation into judgment.65Weshould not read into the law that which is not there.
C

[24]THE MEANINGJACOPLACES ON § 696.1 GIVES FORCE AND EFFECT TORELATED STATUTES AS WELL; IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLETHAT THE LEGISLATURE IS NEVER PRESUMED TO DO A VAIN ANDUSELESS ACT

[25] The relevant portions of § 696.1 as well as all enactments on related matters must be considered together to give force and effect toall of them.66The legislature is never presumed to do a vain and useless act.67The meaning placed byJacoon § 696.1 is consistent with theirrefutable legal veritythat today's procedural regime treats general jury verdicts68differently from those that are special or advisory69(or those which are ordered "reserved" by the court).70For the former class, judgmentde cursu71(one entered by the clerk without judicial intervention) is the prescribed norm, while antecedentjudicialactionviaa journal entry is required to effect a judgment in the latter instance.72

[26] If we were to require a judge-signed journal entry for transformation of a general unreserved verdict into a "filed judgment," effect could not be given to the clear commands inboth§ 696.1 and § 697.1.73Rather, a general unreserved jury verdict would be treated exactlythe sameas special verdicts and those that have been reserved. In other words, the court would have to "order [the] judgment [to] be entered"74by a signed journal entry. As the dissents would have it, the legislature's return to the time-tested command of § 696 (now § 696.1) would be in vain and ignored.Jaco must standif we are to give full forcebothto §§ 696.1 and 697.1 and to the legislature's most recent procedural design for triggering appeal time.75Page 410
D

[27]THERE CAN BEONLY ONE JUDGMENTUPON A SINGLE CAUSE OFACTION;76TO AVOID AN ABSURD RESULT, THE JUDGMENT THECLERK MUST ENTER WITHOUT JUDICIAL IMPRIMATUR UNDER THE COMMANDOF THE RESTORED § 696.1 MUST BE THE JUDGMENTFOR ALLPURPOSES

[28] Section 696.1 must be construed in a reasonable and sensible manner that avoids an absurd result.77When, as here, a general unreserved jury verdict is returned on March 6,judgmentthat is both executable and appealablemust be entered by the clerk at the same time. The winner at once becomes judgment creditor entitled to issue execution. If the loser — now judgment debtor — wants to appeal immediately, he must start counting tothirty.If the loser wants to stay execution or to postpone the appeal time's trigger, he must start counting toten.This is so because a motion for new trial,78which suspends the running of appeal time, must be filed within ten days after the verdict is rendered.79Counting from the verdict is clearly not a novel nor a unique concept in our law.

[29] The dissents' fears thatJaco'steachings will result in wholesale dismissal of appeals is unfounded.Jaco's authorityapplies only in a narrow subclass of cases, where the litigant defeated by a general unreserved jury verdict appeals directly from the judgmentwithoutfirst bringing a timely new trial motion.80

[30] Absurdity would doubtless flow from the dissents' suggestion that only a judge-signedmemorializationof the proceedings can trigger appeal time in this common-law action. Although there might be a tempting allure in theillusion of uniformitythe dissents hope to bring about, we would berobbed of the presentlaw's conceptual symmetrythat makesappeal time'scommencementcoincide with thetime a judgment becomesexecutableand also with thetemporal point at whichpostjudgment interest begins to run. A general unreserved verdictthat is transmuted into judgment by the command of § 696.1becomes an executable judgment when the verdict is filed. It willsupport entry upon the judgment docket once a § 25.1affidavit81is also filed.Were we to yield to the dissents and to their counsel, only lip service would be paid to the notion that there can beonly one judgment upon a singlecause of action.The dissents wouldcreate several paralleltracks, each resulting in a judgmentPage 411for some but not for allpurposes.82

[31] The symmetry we preserve today, which concededly falls short of perfection, isessential— not simply for its own sake — but also because the legislature doubtless intended that a general unreserved verdict becomesefficacious qua judgment for allpurposes at the same time,whether it be for computing postjudgment interest,83for issuing execution,84for bringing an appeal, or for suspending a judgment's effectiveness pending its appellate review. After all, appeals are but a continuation of the same case after judgment.85
E

[32]THIS COURT MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THE WILL OF THELEGISLATURE THAT IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN A STATUTE86

[33] The title of an act isan additional guideto ascertaining legislative intent.87The words"restoring prior law"appear in the title of the act we construe today.Had thelegislature intended that the clerk-entered general unreservedverdict be anything other than a judgment for all purposes, itwould not have fully restored the provisions of § 696 norrepealed those in § 1001.

[34] The dissents propose to run a rescue mission for dilatory lawyers. They hope to bring about the well-nigh unattainable goal of dismissal-proof appeals,88but nonetheless fall short of achieving complete uniformity. Under the provisions of § 993A, which prescribe appeal time for interlocutory decisions, the time would still run from thepronouncementrather than from thefiled entry's date.89Our adoption of the dissents' approach would hence bring about uniformity for onlysomeappeals,leaving to sheer conjecture the point in time when interest would begin to accrue, execution may issue, vacation quests be brought, or dormancy occur.90The dissents hope to save this appeal from dismissal but cannot accomplish their goal without judicial disregard of plain legislative intent.

[35] Once transmuted into judgment by force of § 696.1 upon its unreserved acceptance and entry into the judgment roll, a general jury verdict becomes a judgment that isenforceable, appealableand subject to superseders as well as to accrual of post-judgmentPage 412judgment interest. Recognizing the same temporal points for allincidents of a judgment fulfills the legislature's intent torestore the prior law, preserves the needed symmetry of thepresent procedural regime91and protects both litigantsand courts from a veritable nightmare.92
F

[36]IN THE ABSENCE OFANY COMPELLING REASONTO OVERRULEJACO,WEMUST FOLLOW ITS TEACHINGS AND APPLY THEM TODAY TO THIS APPEAL

[37] Simply stated,stare decisismeans to abide by decided cases.93This time-honored rule "serves to take the capricious element out of law"94and give it stability.Jacohas settled the outcome of today's quest for dismissal; its teachings must govern here. Unless precedents are "palpably bad," judicial surgery in upsetting them must be avoided.95The dissents suggestno cogent reasonto discardJaco;96they merely press for adoption of an alternative analysis of the applicable statutes.Their counsel, if accepted, would reinstatea procedural design that the legislature has already tried andexpressly eliminated from the body of our statutory law.

[38] When the justices of the United States Supreme Court are called upon to reassess their commitment to a prior holding as binding precedent under the doctrine ofstare decisis,they must appraise (1) whether the rule has proved to be intolerable by defying practical workability, (2) whether the rule is subject to the sort of reliance that would add special hardship to the consequences of overruling and inequity to the cost of repudiation, (3) whether related principles of law have developed so far that the old rule remains no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine and (4) whether facts have so changed or come to be viewed so differently that the old rule has been robbed of significant application or justification.97

[39] We must be mindful of these factors as we revisitJacotoday.Jaco'sauthority does not suffer fromunworkability. Jaco'steachings have been applied at least ten times since it became effective in February 1992; onlyone other dismissalprecipitated byJacohas come to our attention.98Jaco'sapproach is more practical by far than that counseled by the dissents. Under the latter, once the triers have spoken, entry of judgment could lag while the journal entry is being crafted. A time-honored rule of practice casts on the victorious party the responsibility of preparing a journal entry. The appealing party — nearly always the defeated litigant — has no firm control over the process.Jaco'smore workable solution eliminates judicial and party control over the judgment's entry;99purePage 413legalprocess effects the judgment. Above all, Jaco's teachingrepresents fidelity to the recent legislative reaffirmation ofits will to repudiate the common-law practice that made verdictsdepend on judicial imprimatur, and gives full effect to therepeal of yesterday's requirement for a judge-signed journalentry after a general unreserved jury verdict.

[40] The consequences of overrulingJacocould indeed cause (a) hardship to present and future litigants who might encounter delay in obtaining a judge-signed journal entry, (b) inequities to those whose cases have been decided underJaco,(c) disservice to lawyers, courts, and litigants alike by making them subject to yetanotherchange in procedure and (d) subversion of the court's legitimacy and erosion of public confidence in the court's decisions. No recent development has robbedJacoof its soundness; its controlling rule has been expressly reaffirmed at least ten times since February 1992.100In sum, the arguments advanced by the dissents for Jaco's demise offer no compelling reason to depart from settled law in favor of judicial abrogation of a freshly reenacted legislative mandate.
III
[41]ORDERLY PROCESS MANDATES THAT WE APPLYJACOTO TODAY'S APPEAL
[42]This court's reviewing cognizance is invocableonly "in the manner provided by law." Art. 7, § 4, Okla. Const.101We arepowerlessto entertain a plea for corrective relief lodgedafterthe expiration of maximum statutory time. Failure to bring a timely appeal constitutes ajurisdictionaldefect.102By operation of 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A],103viewed in conjunction with § 696.1,104the appealable event for common-law actions resolved by a general unreserved verdict arises upon the clerk'sfiling of the jury verdict, quathe court's judgment,preparatory toitsentryupon the judgment roll.105Appeal must be lodged withinthirty daysof such verdict'sfiling.106

[43] Judgment in this case wasfiledon March 6, 1992. This was accomplished in the following sequential stages: (1) after the jury returned from deliberation, the verdicts were read aloud; (2) the court examined the verdict forms and showed them to the lawyer; (3) the judge announced he would "accept the verdict forms as rendered" and enter "these verdicts as a judgment in the case;" (4) the verdicts were filed to await their entry on the judgment roll and on the court's judgment docket.By operationof § 696.1 these verdicts ripened eo instante into a "filedjudgment" in the case.Nothing remained to be done after March 6. TheMarch 26 journal entry, although perhaps critical forsecuring the court's review,107did not trigger appealtime.Page 414

[44]Jaco'seffective date isFebruary 4, 1992;108the general unreserved verdict in this case came onMarch 6, 1992.Jaco's109teaching clearly requires that this appeal be dismissed as untimely. Today's dismissal mayappearharsh;yetfundamental fairness in litigation process cannot be affordedexcept within a framework of orderly procedure.110We cannot provide a dismissal-proof environment for lawyers. No area of the law may lay claim to exemption from the range of orderly procedure's basic strictures — not even the process by which a general unreserved jury verdict is transmuted into judgment by operation of § 696.1. Chaos, caprice andad hocpronouncements would inevitably follow from the slightest departure.Proceduralrules must be applied mechanically to avoid the uncertaintiesthat arise when exceptions are created.111Evenhandedfairness calls for undeviating enforcement of conformity toorderly process.112
[45]SUMMARY
[46] Rodgers' claim for bodily injury and his wife's derivative claim for loss of consortium arose from Rodgers'singlepathogenic blood transfusion.Each plaintiff had but asingleclaim.113Both were decided by the general unreserved verdict for all four defendants.Any preserved error in theproceedings which culminated in the claim's submission would havebeen reviewable in a timely appeal from the judgment entered byforce of § 696.1 upon the general unreserved jury verdict.

[47] If allowed to carry the day, the dissents would(a) defer theverdict's effectiveness,(b) make its legal forcedependentupon judicial interventionand (c) substitute this court's will for that of the legislature by lawlesslyabandoning fidelity tothe legislative history and to the text of § 696 that standsrestored verbatim as § 696.1Recent jurisprudence which effectuates the legislature'sunmistakable recommitment to § 696and its intent to dispense with affirmative judicial action as aprerequisite for "entry" of a judgment — Jaco and itsprogeny114— would have to standoverruled. This scheme, ifadopted, would cause us to (1) sacrifice the law's conceptualsymmetry for the illusion of simplicity and uniformity, (2)ignore settled principles of statutory construction and (3) throwsettled law to the winds without any semblance of a compellingreason. The court would be open to criticism that "justifiablereexamination of principles had given way to drives forparticular results in the short term."115

[48]The only judgment in this case was that "filed" and "entered"upon the judgment roll on March 6, 1992 in obedience to thecommand of § 696.1. The appeal must be dismissed as untimely.

[49]APPEAL DISMISSED.Page 415

[50] LAVENDER, V.C.J. and SIMMS and WATT, JJ., concur.

[51] HARGRAVE, J., concurs by reason of stare decisis.

[52] HODGES, C.J., ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., and CHAPEL, S.J., sitting by designation in lieu of KAUGER, J., who recused, dissent.Page 416

[53] [EDITORS' NOTE: APPENDIX IS ELECTRONICALLY NON-TRANSFERRABLE.]Page 417
[54] ALMA WILSON, Justice, dissenting:
[55] In resolving the jurisdictional question — when did the appeal time in this case begin to run — the majority classifies "common law actions" for special appellate treatment. Under today's opinion, an unreserved general verdict in a "common law action" tried to a jury becomes the appealable judgment of the court when it isentered bythe court clerk. That is, the appeal time will run from the rendering of the jury verdict. Further, under today's opinion, appeal from an unreserved jury verdict in a "common law action" is restricted to those issues submitted to the jury. That is, the parties are denied a right to appeal issues not submitted to the jury. Classification of "common law actions" separate and distinct from other civil actions for limitation of appeal time and restriction of appealable issues is untenable.1It is inconsistent with 12 O.S. 1991 § 2002[12-2002], which provides that "[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as `civil action.'" It has a chilling affect on the right to a trial by jury2and access to the courts.3

[56] In this medical malpractice case, the trial court sustained several of defendants' demurrers to the evidence. The general verdict returned by the jury did not dispose of the warranty, fraud and misrepresentation issues which were withheld from the jury. The petition in error seeks review of errors committed by the trial court in sustaining the mid-trial demurrers to the evidence. In deciding the untimeliness of this appeal, the majority finds that under our transitional approach to "causes of action" appellants are not entitled to an appeal from the trial court's mid-trial rulings on the demurrers to the evidence — that the only appealable issues are those determined by general jury verdict. I disagree.

[57] The appellants have a right to appeal the sustaining of appellees' mid-trial demurrers to the evidence. The appeal must be perfected within thirty days of the recording of the judgment that disposes of all the issues.4The petition in error herein was filed within thirty days of the recording of the trial court's judgment.5

[58] Trial was had in this case approximately one month before publication of our order inJaco Production Company v. Luca,823 P.2d 364(Okla. 1991), holding that the appeal timePage 418runs from the record entry of the unreserved general jury verdict. The majority writes that we cannot "flippantly ignore the doctrineof stare decisisand overruleJacomerely because an unwary litigant missed the deadline for filing an appeal." Refusal to adhere toJacoin this case does not ignore the doctrine ofstare decisis.Jacowas not an appeal from mid-trial orders sustaining demurrers to the evidence.Jacois inapposite.Jacois not authority for denying a party the right to an appeal from the mid-trial sustaining of demurrers to the evidence; nor does it intimate that the appeal time shall be calculated from the entry of a jury verdict on the appearance docket.6

[59] TheJacoholding rests upon 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1].7Section 696.1 provides:
When a trial by jury has been had,judgment must beentered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict,unless it is special, or the court order the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration. [Emphasis added.]


[60] The only sensible and reasonable reading of the plain words of § 696.1 is that it specifies a duty of the various court clerks — when entering a judgment, the court clerk must ascertain that the judgment conforms to the verdict. This reading is consistent with 12 O.S. 1991 § 32.3[12-32.3] which provides:
A. It is the duty of the court to write out, sign and record its orders, judgments and decreeswithina reasonable time after rendition.. . . .
B. A recorded written order, judgment or decreesigned by the court is a jurisdictional prerequisiteto appellate review.[Emphasis added.]


[61] Nothing in § 696.1 indicates a legislative intent to dispense with the appellate jurisdictional prerequisite plainly set out in § 32.3.8Nothing in § 696.1 indicates a legislative intent to "transform" an "unreserved general jury verdict" in a "common law action" into the appealable judgment of the court.

[62] Under today's ruling, the appeal time in those "not common law actions" will run from the filing of the written journal entry signed by the trial judge in accordance with the latest statutory changes and the parties will be entitled to appeal all issues raised before the trial court, including issues withheld from the jury. But, the appeal time in "common law actions" tried to a jury will continue under the old appellate regime — the appeal time will be triggered by the pronouncementPage 419or when the trial court accepts the general jury verdict and discharges the jury. I find no reason to transform an unreserved jury verdict inanyaction into the appealable judgment of the court.

[63] In this case, judgment was rendered on March 6, 1992, when the trial court accepted the verdict and discharged the jury. The judgment signed by the trial judge and entered in the record on March 26, 1992 is the appealable judgment. Accordingly, this appeal is timely. I dissent to dismissal of this appeal and join the dissent by Justice Summers.
[64] SUMMERS, Justice, dissenting.
[65] My analysis of the relevant statutes is that when a judgment is pronounced on a jury verdict the thirty-day time to appeal begins to run from the date the journal entry of judgment isfiledin the case. This analysis is contrary to the court's recent opinion inJaco Production Co. v. Luca,823 P.2d 364(Okla. 1991), and, of course, to today's case.

[66] Prior to January 1, 1991 an appeal was commenced in this Court by filing a petition in error within thirty days of the date of the final order or judgment. 12 O.S. 1981 § 990[12-990].1InWarehouse Market, Inc. v. Berry,459 P.2d 853(Okla. 1969) we decided that "the date of the . . . . judgment" was the date the judgment was pronounced and became effective. This view followed long standing precedent.2InWarehouse Marketwe also contrasted the date a judgment was pronounced with the date the journal entry of judgment was filed.Id.459 P.2d at 854.

[67] Beginning on January 1, 1991 prior law was repealed3and the thirty-day appeal time began to run only when the judgment was "filed" with the district court clerk. 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1004[12-1004].4The judgment was not the pronouncement from the bench, but an instrument whose form was prescribed by statute. 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1001[12-1001]. Sections 1001 and 1004 were in effect for only five months.5

[68] Starting June 1, 1991, and continuing to the present, the thirty-day appeal time begins to run on the date"judgment isfiled."12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A].6While documents and exhibits can be filed, an oral declaration or "pronouncement" cannot. Thus, this new statutory scheme retained the concept of a judgment, for the purposes of computing time to appeal, as being some instrument filed in the case, and rejected the idea that time to appeal would run from the date the judgment was pronounced. Section 990A does not specify the form or nature of the instrument to be filed, and that is part of the problem in this case.

[69] The majority's analysis on calculating the time to appeal this judgment based on a jury's verdict can be expressed by this syllogism:
1. The verdict is a judgment.
2. The verdict was filed on the day it was returned.
Page 420
3. Therefore, the judgment was filed on the day the verdict was returned.


[70] My departure from this analysis begins with its first premise. A verdict is not a judgment. Not under the common law, and not under 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1].

[71] The majority recognizes that at common law a verdict is not a judgment. It concludes, however, that § 696.17transforms a verdict"eo instante"into a judgment. I disagree with this theory of transmogrification. When a jury trial has occurred a "judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity with the verdict". 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1]. The judgment pronounced (or accepted) by the court upon the verdict is "entered" on the appearance docket by the clerk. Title 12 O.S. 1991 § 23[12-23] provides that the clerk has the duty to "enter" on the appearance docket "an abstract of all judgments and orders of the court".8

[72] Section 696.1 simply requires a clerk to enter a judgment on the proper court record conforming to a verdict. The judgment is deemed to have been "rendered" by operation of law; i.e., "the judgment is, by operation of law, rendered when the verdict of the jury is returned and accepted."Peoples Electric Co-Op. v.Broughton,191 Okla. 229,127 P.2d 850, 853 (1942). But neither the verdict nor the entry amounts to the judgment. As we explained inWalker v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry.,671 P.2d 672, 673 (Okla. 1983), it is the judge, not the clerk by its entry, nor the jury by its verdict, who renders judgment in a case tried to the jury. See alsoAshinger v. White,106 Okla. 19,232 P. 850(1924), where after a verdict was returned no judgment was pronounced on the verdict by the court, nor entered on the journal, though the verdict was entered on the appearance docket.

[73] Entering a judgment deemed to have been pronounced by the court is not a judicial act, but a ministerial one. "Entry of judgment" is defined as "a ministerial act performed by the clerk of the court by means of which permanent evidence of [a] judicial act in rendering judgment is made a record of the court."Black's LawDictionary,625 (4th ed. 1951). Our case-law is in agreement; "The entry of judgment ordinarily consists of the ministerial act of spreading the same upon the proper judgment record or writing it at large in the book of judgments."De Watteville v. Sims,44 Okla. 708,146 P. 224, 227 (1915).See also Abernathy v.Huston,166 Okla. 184,26 P.2d 939, 944 (1933);City of Clintonv. Cornell,191 Okla. 600,132 P.2d 340, 342 (1942);Miller v.Miller,664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Okla. 1983). The entry is not the judgment, but a record or evidence of a judgment.Abernathy v.Huston,166 Okla. 184,26 P.2d 939, 944 (1933);Boynton v.Crockett,12 Okla. 57, 61,69 P. 869, 871 (1902).

[74] And, of course, entry of a judgment is not synonymous with rendering or pronouncing a judgment.Peoples Electric Co-Op. v.Broughton,127 P.2d at 853.See St. Louis S.F.R. Co. v.Taliaferro,58 Okla. 585,160 P. 610, 612 (1916), (we explained that at that time, an appeal must have been brought within six months of therenditionof the judgment, and not within six months from the "entry" of the judgment);Jaqua v. Harkins,40 Ind. App. 639, 82 N.E. 920, 922 (1907);Beetchenow v. Bartholet,162 Wn. 119,298 P. 335, 336 (1931). Thus, the act of entering a judgment is a ministerial act, distinct from the judicial act of pronouncing a judgment.

[75] Likewise, the "entry" of judgment cannot be equated with "filing" of a judgment. "Filing" is defined as "[t]o deliver an instrument or other paper to the proper officer for the purpose of being kept by him in the proper place."Black's LawDictionary,755 (4th ed. 1951). Filing a document, and entry of an order or judgment refer to two differentPage 421procedures. InStateex rel. Morgan v. Lamm,9 S.D. 418, 69 N.W. 592 (1896) the Supreme Court of South Dakota explained the difference between the terms "entry" and "filed", noting that an "entry" is "[r]ecording in due form and order a thing done in court" and to "file" is "receiving a paper into custody, and giving it a place among other papers".Id.69 N.W. at 592. The court said:"Theterms `entered' and `filed' frequently occur in the statute, butthey are never used as synonymous terms." Id.(Emphasis mine). This court subsequently defined the term "filed" and in doing so relied upon the South Dakota decision.Aaron v. Farrow,113 Okla. 27,238 P. 202, 204 (1925).

[76] These opinions make perfect sense, because a clerk has a dual duty (1) to make the proper "entry" on a docket, 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1], and (2) to "file together and carefully preserve in his office, all papers delivered to him for that purpose in every action or special proceeding." 12 O.S. 1991 § 29[12-29]. The clerk does not "enter" together papers delivered to him or her in a case, and neither does the clerk "file" an entry on a docket. The term "filed" cannot be equated with "entry", and when a judgment is "entered" upon the proper court record the same act is not properly described as a "filing". Thus, when the clerk enters an abstract of judgment pronounced on a jury verdict that "entry" does not constitute thefilingof a judgment so as to start the thirty-day time to appeal.

[77] I conclude that a clerk's "entry" on a docket is a distinct and separate act from when an instrument is "filed" in a case, that both of these are distinct from the act of pronouncement or rendition of a judgment, and all may occur on different dates. It is true that the clerk will often fulfill his or her duty by entering a judgment on the proper docket upon the date the verdict is returned, i.e., upon rendition. That was done in this case. But we are concerned here withthe nature of theinstrument required by § 990A to be "filed" as a judgment for thepurpose of appeal.

[78] While a verdict may be filed in the case and used to enter a judgment on the proper docket, it cannot be "filed"asa "judgment", since the verdict itself is not a judgment. The majority appears to hold that a verdictisthe judgment for the purpose of an appeal when the verdict is filed in the case. I must respectfully disagree.

[79] In my view, it is the journal entry of judgment that satisfies the descriptive statutory phrase in our present § 990A. This maintains the recognized legal distinctions in the terms used by the legislature commencing January 1, 1991 and continuing to date, as well as the long recognized distinctions between a "verdict" and a "judgment". The Legislature could have started appeal time from the date the judgment becomes effective, or is rendered, or entered, or when a verdict is returned or filed, but it chose not to do so. It said "from the date thefinal order orjudgment is filed," (emphasis mine) It made no attempt to distinguish between judgments based on common law jury verdicts, judgments based on non common-law jury verdicts, or judgments rendered by the court without a jury. My analysis of these statutes would require the time to appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict to begin when the journal entry of judgment is filed in the case. 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A]. Such a viewtreats all trialcourt judgments the samefor calculating time to appeal, and avoids the majority's result of unnecessarily creating a subclass of judgments that may escape appellate review because of unwary litigants. Here I believe judgment was rendered, and entered, on March 6, but not filed until March 26, which would make timely the Petition In Error filed April 17, 1992.

[80] The majority misreads this writing. Of course there is only one judgment upon a single cause of action. That judgment occurs when it is rendered, or pronounced. In this case judgment was rendered when the court accepted the verdict of the jury, on March 6th. The Legislature, in a commendable attempt to bring clarity and uniformity to appeals, has gone out of its way to declare that the time for appeal no longer starts when the judgment is rendered, but rather when it is filed. It is only on what constitutes the filing of a judgment that I differ from the majority — I maintain that the verdict itself is not a judgment, and that the judgment, though in existence and even "entered", is not "filed"Page 422for purposes of starting appeal time until the journal entry reaches the clerk's hands.

[81] The majority yearns for symmetry in the appeals process, but does not, and in fact cannot, extend it.Jacoitself creates great unevenness, but whetherJacois retained or rejected, there will still remain the fact that in a bench-tried case the judgment will be rendered and effective the moment it is pronounced, but the time to appeal it will not commence until filing of the journal entry. The legislature has so spoken. I believe the law should be, and, in fact, is, the same for jury-based judgments. Section 696.1 does not mandate otherwise. I respectfully submit that if symmetry in the appellate process is a goal,Jacois not a solution.

[82] The principle ofstare decisisis that courts often uphold principles from prior opinions even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one, and consider the importance of the law's stability and the effect of judicial holdings upon property, contracts, and titles.OklahomaPreferred Finance Loan Corp. v. Morrow,497 P.2d 221, 223-224 (Okla. 1972);Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197,I.O.O.F.,195 Okla. 131,156 P.2d 340, 345 (1945);Webb v.Semans,110 Okla. 72,235 P. 1074(1925), (Syllabus by the Court). But the court will not follow prior opinions when they are manifestly erroneous and there are cogent reasons for overruling them.Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197,I.O.O.F., supra.More recently we have said that a substantial departure from precedent should be based upon either unsatisfactory experience with the application of the precedent, or in light of an altered historic environment.Phillips v.Oklahoma Tax Commission,577 P.2d 1278, 1285-1286 (Okla. 1978). This rule applies to matters of procedure.Harris v. Hudson,122 Okla. 171,250 P. 532, 533 (1926),cert. denied,273 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 336, 71 L.Ed. 869 andcert. denied sub nom. Owensv. Harris,273 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 336, 71 L.Ed. 869 (1927), (the supremacy of the law can be maintained only by and through the orderly procedure prescribed by the law itself).

[83] I believeJacowas erroneous when it was decided and is still erroneous. As to its "experience in application", one only has to look to the majority opinion, which cites several very recent cases invoking the rule ofJaco,although it has had but a short lifetime. If only two, as the opinion states, have resulted in dismissals, that low number may be attributed to the prospective application given the doctrine. It is safe to predict there are others in the same pipeline as today's appellant, and that more will follow.Jacoestablished a continuing trap for the unwary litigant who relies on the statutory language only to have his or her right to appeal lopped off. The case should be overruled and this appeal held timely.
  1. See Part II for the text explaining that the clerk'sentryof judgment in a common-law action on a general unreserved juryverdict transmutes the verdict by operation of law into the"filed judgment"in the § 990 [12-990]A [12 O.S. 1991] sense. 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1];Jaco Production Company v. Luca,Okla.,823 P.2d 364(1992). The pertinent text of § 990A is set outinfranote 29. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1] provide:

    "When atrial by juryhas been had,judgment must beentered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict,unless it isspecial,or the court order the case to bereservedfor future argument or consideration." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  2. The Rodgers also sued Saint Francis Hospital, which was dismissed from the case before trial and is not a party to this appeal. ↩
  3. "Type C" hepatitis is also called "non-A/non-B hepatitis." ↩
  4. The February 26, 1992 pretrial order lists plaintiff'sgrounds for recoveryas:

    "a. Warranty

    b. Fraud and Misrepresentation

    c. Failure to obtain informed consent

    d. Corporate liability." ↩
  5. "Loss of consortium" means loss of society, affection, assistance and conjugal fellowship. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (5th ed. 1979). ↩
  6. The trial court instructed the jury that a verdict against Dr. Higgins or against Dr. Hood would be a decision against their respective employers, Cardiology of Tulsa, Inc. or Gastroenterology Specialists, Inc. ↩
  7. "Unreserved acceptance"followsthe trial court'sfailure to reserve judgmenton a general jury verdict. It is thefirst stepin the statutory process by which a jury verdict is transmuted into a judgment by force of § 696.1. The process stands completed when the clerkfiles the verdict as the court'sjudgmentandenters it in the record proper.For a full explanation,seePart II and Appendix showing the succeeding steps. ↩
  8. For the terms of § 696.1,see supranote 1. ↩
  9. TheMarch 26, 1992 entryprovides in pertinent part:

    ". . . On March 6th, Plaintiffs completed their evidence and rested and the Defendants interposeddemurrerson thewarranty claimwhich wassustained;on thefraud and misrepresentation claimwhich wassustained;on theconsortium claimwhich wasoverruled;and theinformed consent claimwhich wasoverruled.The Defendants proceeded to put on evidence and rested on March 6th. There being no rebuttal, the Court instructed the jury and closing arguments were made by both sides. After due deliberation, the jury returned into open court with their ten (10) person verdict signed by ten (10) jurors. The Court examined the verdict forms as well as the attorneys [sic] and there being no request to poll the jury, the Courtreviewed and accepted theverdict in favor of the Defendants.

    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Defendants, James R. Higgins, M.D., Cardiology of Tulsa, Inc., John R. Hood, M.D., and Gastroenterology Specialists, Inc., have judgment in their favor and against the Plaintiffs, James G. Rodgers and Betty J. Rodgers, and for the Defendants statutory taxable costs herein expended. . . ." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  10. Jaco, supranote 1 at 364. ↩
  11. For the terms of § 696.1,see supranote 1. ↩
  12. The Rodgers have cast the trial court's midtrial ruling in terms of an order sustaining a "demurrer" on the "warrantyclaim" and on the "fraud and misrepresentationclaim." They state that "the Court directed a verdict on the issue of warranty" and that appellants did not get a jury trial on"threeof their causes of action."The Rodgers not only confuse a theory of recovery with a "cause of action," they also intermix the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on an alternative liability theory with its "direction of a verdict."The recordshows that the trial court did not direct a verdict in anydefendant's favor.Rather,it let the jury decide whether thedefendants were negligent, but withheld from the triersconsideration of the theories deemed unsupported by theplaintiffs' proof. See infranote 24. ↩
  13. For the terms of the March 26, entry,see supranote 9. ↩
  14. When a claim for damages arises from one occurrence ortransaction, it affords the plaintiff but a single cause ofaction. See Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Engineering,Okla.,755 P.2d 669, 672 n. 13 (1988);Chandler v. Denton,Okla.,741 P.2d 855, 862-863 (1987);Reams v. Tulsa Cable Television, Inc.,Okla.,604 P.2d 373, 374-376 (1979);Retherford v. Halliburton Co.,Okla.,572 P.2d 966, 968-969 (1978). ↩
  15. See in this connection Silver v. Slusher,Okla.,770 P.2d 878, 882 n. 11 (1989),cert. denied,493 U.S. 817, 110 S.Ct. 70, 107 L.Ed.2d 37 (1989).See supranote 4 for Rodgers' theories of recovery. ↩
  16. For the Rodgers' arguments,see supranote 12. ↩
  17. See Holbert v. Echeverria,Okla.,744 P.2d 960, 962 (1987), where the plaintiff separately pleaded"claims"for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud and misrepresentation and (3) violation of the Consumer Protection Act. We there recognized these"claims"asbut three distinct and alternative theoriesof recovery rather than as separate causes of action. Thismischaracterization of theories as claims is also true here. Seealso Chandler, supranote 14, 741 P.2d at 862-863, where, in applying the savings statute, 12 O.S. 1991 § 100[12-100], we distinguished a "cause of action" from a "theory of recovery." ↩
  18. In his presubmission ruling thenisi priusjudge recognized that he was dealing withtheories of recovery ratherthan with separate claims;he initially stated, "[a]s to thelegal theory of recoverybased on informed consent [negligence], I think there's an issue of fact . . ." and then lapsed into the parties' terminology by saying that he would "sustain the demurrers" with respect to a "cause of action" for breach of warranty, fraud and misrepresentation. [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  19. Chandler, supranote 14, 741 P.2d at 862 n. 13;DossOil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co.,192 Okla. 359,137 P.2d 934, 939 (1943). ↩
  20. Silver, supranote 15, 770 P.2d at 881;Doss, supranote 19, 137 P.2d at 939. ↩
  21. Bradley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Goodson,Okla.,450 P.2d 500, 502 (1969);Vogel v. Rushing,202 Okla. 277,212 P.2d 665, 667 (1949). ↩
  22. Issues pressed inmultiple interrelated claimsorinvolving multiple partiescannot be deemed"finally"decided untilallof the issues stand resolved. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 1006[12-1006] provide:

    "Whenmore than one claim for reliefis presented in an action . . . orwhen multiple parties areinvolved,the court may direct the preparation and filing of a final judgment as to one or more butfewer than all of the claims or parties only upon anexpress determination that there is no just reasonfor delayand upon an express direction for the filing of judgment. In theabsenceof suchdeterminationand direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision issubject to revision at any time before the judgmentadjudicating all the claims and the rights andliabilities of all the parties is filed with thecourt clerk." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  23. See12 O.S. 1991 § 1006[12-1006],supranote 22. ↩
  24. Rodgers urges that "the court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Defendants James R. Higgins, M.D. and Cardiology of Tulsa, Inc., at the close of Plaintiff's evidence, on the issue of express warranty." Although the breach of warranty theory may have been asserted only against Dr. Higgins and his employer,the case went to the jury on a negligence theory against allfour defendants — i.e., the trial judge did not direct a verdictagainst any of the defendants. He merely ruled that the proofadduced in the case did not warrant its submission to the jury onthe two withheld theories of recovery. ↩
  25. A trial court's ruling that withholds from submission grounds of recovery deemed legally inapplicable or unsupported by the proof is not appealable as "final," butif preserved aserror, may be reviewedin an appeal from the judgment in the case or from postjudgment denial of a timely new trial motion.Schepp v. Hess,Okla.,770 P.2d 34, 36 n. 2 (1989). ↩
  26. For the definition of"unreserved acceptance," see supranote 7. ↩
  27. See12 O.S. 1991 § 681[12-681]. ↩
  28. Jaco, supranote 1;McGinnis v. Republic-UnderwritersInsurance Company,Okla.,830 P.2d 191(1992);Peabody v. GemHomes, Inc.,No. 79,358 (unpublished order of June 9, 1992);The Bank of Woodward v. Johnston,No. 79,120 (unpublished order of June 22, 1992);Moss v. Davis,No. 79,503 (unpublished order of July 13, 1992);Manning v. Coats,No. 80,055 (unpublished order of Oct. 12, 1992);The Antiquary v. Grady Kelley,No. 79,220 (unpublished order of Oct. 26, 1992);Lee v. Knight,No. 79,781 (unpublished order of December 14, 1992);Brown v. TheFirestone Tire Rubber Co.,No. 79,598 (unpublished order of January 11, 1993);Day v. Muetzel d/b/a C G Laundry,No. 80,088 (unpublished order of Jan. 25, 1993);Shade v. Chanie,No. 80,408 (unpublished order of Feb. 1, 1993). ↩
  29. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A] provide in pertinent part:

    "A. An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Courtwithin thirty (30) days from the datethe final order or judgment is filed.. . ." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  30. Art. 2, § 19, Okla. Const.,preserves inviolatethe right to trial by jury, according tothe course of common law.The dichotomous division of our decision-making regime into "law" and "equity" process is constitutionally mandated rather than artificially spawned by this case. One of the dissents is simply incorrect in suggesting that the law/equity dichotomy is not sanctioned by our fundamental law. ↩
  31. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 32.1[12-32.1] provide in pertinent part:

    "The record shall be made up fromthe petition, the process, return, the pleadings subsequent thereto, reports,verdicts,orders, judgments, and all material acts and proceedings of the court. . . ." [Emphasis provided.]

    Within the meaning of § 32.1 entry of judgment in the § 696.1 sense meansinclusion of the general unreserved jury verdict inthe court's "record proper," a term which is synonymous with"common-law record" and "judgment roll." See Messenger v.Messenger,Okla.,827 P.2d 865, 870 n. 20 (1992);Veiser v.Armstrong,Okla.,688 P.2d 796, 800 n. 10 (1984);Mid-ContinentPipe Line Co. v. Seminole County Excise Bd.,194 Okla. 40,146 P.2d 996, 1000 (1944).

    The judgment roll'sstatutorydefinition has remained the same for over 100 years. For an extensive discussion of the judgment roll, its history, and its elements,seeA. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS §§ 175-193 (5th ed. 1925). ↩
  32. Section 696.1 provides amechanism to keep the generalverdict from becoming a judgmentif there be unresolved legal questions.Transmutation of verdict into judgment cannot beprevented by judicial silence; it can be done only by anaffirmative act of the judge who explicitly reserves (withholds)the verdict's immediate entry as a judgment.For the terms of § 696.1,see supranote 1. ↩
  33. This meaning of § 696.1 is in complete accord with federal jurisprudence that construes Fed.R.Civ.P.58.See Burney v.Intermare K.G.,717 F. Supp. 793, 798 (M.D.Fla. 1988),aff'd.,886 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1989). With the enactment of Rule 58, Congress chose an approachsimilar tothat adopted in § 696.1to enable the clerk to enter judgment upon a general juryverdict without specific direction from the court.Under federal procedure the judgment must be set forth on a separate document which is prepared by theclerkrather than by thecourtor by theparties. Federal law — much like our § 696.1 — is "designedto encourage all reasonable speed in formulating and entering thejudgment when the case has been decided." Seethe Advisory Committee's Note to the 1963 Amendment of Rule 58, 31 F.R.D. 649, 650 (1962). ↩
  34. A "new" Judgments and Appeals Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1991, was repealed on June 1, 1991. Okla. Sess. Laws 1991, c. 251, § 22, eff. June 1, 1991. The short-lived Act had repealed,inter alia,§§ 696 and 697.SeeOkla. Sess. Laws 1990, c. 251, § 20, eff. Jan. 1, 1991. In 1991 the cited sections were reinstated in their entirety as §§ 696.1 and 697.1. Okla. Sess.Laws 1991, c. 251, §§ 6 and 7, eff. June 1, 1991. ↩
  35. The terms of 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1001[12-1001] A (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1991, c. 251, § 22, eff. June 1, 1991) were:

    "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. * * *" ↩
  36. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1001[12-1001] C (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1991, c. 251, § 22, eff. June 1, 1991) were:

    "The trial court shall promptly prepare and sign thejudgment and deliver it to the court clerk for filingafter a general verdict of a jury.. . . The forms in subsection E of this section shall be used in preparing the judgment." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  37. Section 696 is atime-tested ruleadopted at statehood from the New York Field Code of 1848. ↩
  38. At common law judgment did not immediately followrendition of a verdict.A central court sittingen bancat Westminster [King's Bench, Common Pleas or the Exchequer] wouldorderjudgment to be entered on a verdict. J. Koffler and A. Reppy, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING § 303, 565-566 (1969). For an explanation of thenisi priussystem,seeSir Matthew Hale, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 166 (the University of Chicago Press 1971) and Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278, 282 (7th ed. 1966);see alsoL.B. Curzon, English Legal History 172 (1968).

    Our legislatureabrogatedat statehood the pre-existing common law by allowing general unreservedverdictsto becometransmuted into judgments by force of lawandwithout judicialintervention.Oklahoma's earlyrepudiationof the common-law practice that required judicial imprimatur for verdicts is in full force today. The § 696.1 command was recently applied inJaco, supranote 1. For other extant jurisprudence,see supranote 28. ↩
  39. "There is no principle of law more firmly establishedthan that the judgment must follow and conform to the [general]verdict [in a common-law action]." Smith v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,25 Okla. 404,108 P. 626, 627 (1910). ↩
  40. See12 O.S. 1991 § 1031.1[12-1031.1],infranote 82; 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 1031[12-1031]et seq. ↩
  41. See12 O.S. 1991 § 651[12-651];see also12 O.S. 1991 § 698[12-698],infranote 79. ↩
  42. The terms of §§ 696.1 and 990A both became effective June 1, 1991. The provisions of § 696.1 followverbatimthose in former § 696.The section's language is exactly the same todayas it was at statehood. ↩
  43. Horath v. Pierce,Okla.,506 P.2d 548, 553-554 (1973). Our canons of statutory construction are in accord with national jurisprudence. IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.33 (1985 Revision, 4th ed.), citingIn re Swartz's Estate,162 Misc. 46,294 N.Y.S. 896, 902 (1937). ↩
  44. See Austin v. King,Okla.,404 P.2d 1009, 1014 (1965);Peoples Electric Co-Op. v. Broughton,191 Okla. 229,127 P.2d 850, 853 (1942);Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company v. McBroom,526 P.2d 509, 512 (Okla.App. 1974) (approved for publication Sept. 12, 1974);Grzys v. Connecticut Co.,123 Conn. 605,198 A. 259, 261 (1938). ↩
  45. Letteer v. Conservancy District No. 30,Okla.,385 P.2d 796, 800-801 (1963);Tom P. McDemott, Inc. v. Bennett,Okla.,395 P.2d 566, 569-70 (1964). National jurisprudence is in accord.SeeSUTHERLAND,supranote 43 at § 22.30, citingCity ofStamford v. Town of Stamford,107 Conn. 596,141 A. 891, 894-95 (1928). ↩
  46. For the pertinent terms of the repealed § 1001A,seesupranote 35. ↩
  47. For the pertinent terms of the repealed § 1001C,seesupranote 36. ↩
  48. See§ 696.1,supranote 1. ↩
  49. Okla.,671 P.2d 672, 673-74 (1983). ↩
  50. A verdict that leaves nothing for the judge to do but simple arithmetic is a general verdict governed by § 696.1.Gizzi, infranote 69, 564 P.2d at 1013. ↩
  51. Austin, supranote 44, 404 P.2d at 1014;Little v.Employer's Casualty Co.,180 Okla. 628,71 P.2d 687, 688 (1937);Callander v. Hopkins,97 Okla. 41,222 P. 672, 673 (1924). ↩
  52. For the explanation thatentry presupposes filing, seeinfrathis part. ↩
  53. Notice of intent to appeal could be given in open courtafterrendition of judgment or in writing within ten days of that event.See12 O.S. 1961 § 954[12-954] (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1968, c. 290, § 4, eff. Jan. 13, 1969). ↩
  54. Little, supranote 51, 71 P.2d at 688. ↩
  55. See12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1];Jaco, supranote 1, 823 P.2d at 364. ↩
  56. Callander, supra,222 P. at 673 note 51;Little,supra,71 P.2d at 688 note 51. ↩
  57. McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,Okla.,626 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1981). The appearance docket is not a part of the court'sjudgment roll.The latter is the court's onlyofficialmemorialand the only medium through which it speaks.Elliottv. City of Guthrie,Okla.,725 P.2d 861, 863 (1986). The appearance docket is nothing more or less than achronologicalindexof filings and an abstract of significant courtroom events in a case.See12 O.S. 1991 § 23[12-23], the terms of which provide in pertinent part:

    "On the appearance docket [the clerk] shall enter all actions in the order in which they are brought . . . [including] anabstract of all judgments and ordersof the court. An abstract shall contain a very briefdescription of the order or judgment rendered.. . ." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  58. At common law the "judgment roll" was a roll of parchment upon which the critical stages of court proceedings would be entered. On an action's termination the roll was depositedinperpetuam rei memoriam(in perpetual memory). After paper replaced parchment as a universal writing medium, the roll fell into disuse, but the term was carried over to describe the content of thecourt's permanent record required to be kept bythe clerk. 12 O.S. 1991 § 32.1[12-32.1]; Pettis v. Johnston,78 Okla. 277,190 P. 681, 700 (1920). ↩
  59. Noneof the cases cited in thedissentsteach that"filing"and"entering"aremutually exclusive andinconsistent acts. ↩
  60. The terms of 25 O.S. 1991 § 2[25-2] provide in pertinent part that "[w]henever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any statute,such definition is applicable to the same word orphrase wherever it occurs.. . ." [Emphasis provided.] We must hence give the word"entry"in § 696.1 the same meaning as that which it has been given in 12 O.S. 1991 § 24[12-24],infranote 63. The latter requires that certain instrumentsalready "on file"be"entered." ↩
  61. See Nat. Bank v. Lowenstein,52 Okla. 259,155 P. 1127, 1129 (1915), citingCovington v. Fisher,22 Okla. 207,97 P. 615, 617 (1908). ↩
  62. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 22[12-22] provide that"the clerk ofthe district court shall keepanappearance docket,atrialdocket,ajournal,ajudgment docketand suchotherrecordsas may be ordered by the courtor required by law."[Emphasis provided.]

    The court clerk isno longer requiredto keep anexecutiondocket and a lien journal. See12 O.S. 1981 § 26[12-26] (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1988, c. 102, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1988) and 42 O.S. 1971 § 142[42-142], which was amended in 1977. The clerk's § 142 duty to keep a mechanic's lien journal was transferred to the county clerk by 42 O.S.Supp. 1977 § 141.1[42-141.1] (added by Okla. Sess. Laws 1977, c. 207, § 3, eff. Oct. 1, 1977). ↩
  63. At one time failure to enter a judgment upon the court'sjournalaffected its validity. The terms of 12 O.S. 1961 § 701[12-701] (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1971, c. 245 § 3, eff. Oct. 1, 1971) and its predecessorsthenprovided that "[a]ll judgments and orders must be entered on the journal of the court. . . ."Ajudgment signed by the judge and contained in the files of theclerk, but not entered on the journal, as required by § 701, wasnot a valid judgment except between the parties. Cockrell v.Schmitt,20 Okla. 207,94 P. 521, 523 (1908);Ex parteStevenson,20 Okla. 549,94 P. 1071, 1072 (1908).Justice Jackson, writing in 1970, freed us from therequirement of proving a judgment by its entry on the journal.Cumby v. State Ex Rel. Vinzant,Okla.,468 P.2d 490, 493 (1970). Later, § 701's requirements were incorporated into 12 O.S. 1971 § 24[12-24], the terms of which are identical to those presently in 12 O.S. 1991 § 24[12-24]. The terms of § 24 provide in pertinent part:

    "Upon the journal recordrequired to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases. . . . shall beenteredcopies of the following documentson file:

    * * * *

    2. All instrumentsfiled in the casethatbear thesignature of the judgeand specify clearly the relief granted or order made." [Emphasis provided.]Implicit in Vinzant and in § 24 is the notion that no judgmentcan be entered on the journal unless it has first been filed inthe case.The same reasoning firmly supports the conclusion that a judgment may be neither incorporated into the judgment roll nor posted on the appearance docket until it hasfirst been filed inthe case. ↩
  64. For the explanation of judgment roll,see supranotes 31 and 62. ↩
  65. Austin, supranote 44, 404 P.2d at 1014;Callander,supranote 51, 222 P. at 673;Little, supranote 51, 71 P.2d at 688. ↩
  66. Clifton v. Clifton,Okla.,801 P.2d 693, 696 (1990);Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Laws Enforcement,Okla.,764 P.2d 172, 179 (1988). ↩
  67. Farris v. Cannon,Okla.,649 P.2d 529, 531 n. 4 (1982). ↩
  68. By the command of Art. 7, § 15, Okla. Const., "[i]n all jury trials the jury shall return ageneral verdict," but the court may in its discretion direct the jury to makespecialfindings.[Emphasis provided.] ↩
  69. If the verdict is not wholly determinative of the recovery right, it isspecial. An addition of special findings of factwill not rob a verdict of its attribute as a general verdict ifthe jury finds either in favor of the plaintiff or thedefendant.Art. 7 § 15, Okla. Const.;Smith v. Gizzi,Okla.,564 P.2d 1009, 1013 (1977). ↩
  70. Compare12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1] with 12 O.S. 1991 § 697.1[12-697.1]. ↩
  71. A literal translation of the Latin wordsde cursuis "of course."See Chamberlin v. Chamberlin,Okla.,720 P.2d 721, 726 n. 25 (1986).In the context of § 696.1 "of course" means thatin a common-law action judgment on a general unreserved juryverdict is entered summarily by the ministerial act of a clerkand without any antecedent judicial action or a party's request. ↩
  72. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 697.1[12-697.1] provide:

    "Where the verdict isspecial,or where there has beena special finding on particular questions offact,or wherethe court has ordered the case to bereserved,it shallorder what judgment shall beentered." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  73. For the terms of § 697.1,see supranote 72. ↩
  74. See§ 697.1,supranote 72. ↩
  75. See§ 990A,supranote 29. ↩
  76. F.D.I.C. v. Tidwell,Okla.,820 P.2d 1338, 1341 (1991). ↩
  77. Grand River Dam Authority v. State,Okla.,645 P.2d 1011, 1019 (1982);AMF Tubescope Company v. Hatchel,Okla.,547 P.2d 374, 379 (1976). ↩
  78. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 653[12-653] are:

    ". . . [T]he application for a new trial,if made,must be filedwithin ten (10) days after the verdict. . . is rendered.. . ." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  79. Schepp, supranote 25, 770 P.2d at 37 n. 9;Salyer v.National Trailer Convoy, Inc.,Okla.,727 P.2d 1361, 1363 n. 5 (1986). ↩
  80. The filing of a motion for new trialextends appealtime.The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 991[12-991] are:

    "The right of a party to perfect an appeal from a judgment . . . of the trial court to the Supreme Court shallnotbe conditioned upon his having filed in the trial court a motion for a new trial, butinthe event a motion for a new trial is filedin the trial court by a party adversely affected by the judgment . . .no appeal to the Supreme Court may betaken until subsequent to the ruling by the trialcourt on the motion for a new trial.* * *" [Emphasis provided.]Seeauthoritiessupranote 79. ↩
  81. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 25.1[12-25.1] are:

    "A. The judgment docket shall be kept in the form of an index . . . and it shall be the duty of the clerkimmediately after the rendition of a judgment andthe filing, by a party for whom judgment wasrendered, of an affidavit of judgment. . . to enter on said judgment docket a statement containing the names of the parties, the amount and nature of the judgment and costs, and the date of its rendition and the date on which said judgment is entered on said judgment docket. . . ." [Emphasis provided.]

    Until flat fees for the clerk's services were introduced by the provisions of 28 O.S. 1971 § 154[28-154], the clerk collected aper-item fee for each service it performed,including docketing the judgment and recording any instrument.See28 O.S. 1961 § 31[28-31] (repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1967, c. 122, § 13, eff. April 27, 1967). Today the clerk chargesa separate $5.00 feeforentering the judgment upon the judgment docket. See12 O.S. 1991 § 1771.1[12-1771.1]. ↩
  82. If the dissents' views were to be adopted today, the trigger for the thirty-day period forvacation of judgmentswould become clouded. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 1031.1[12-1031.1] are:

    "Within thirty (30) days after the rendition of ajudgment,the court, of its own initiative or on motion of a party, may correct, open, modify orvacate a judgment.[Emphasis provided.] ↩
  83. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 727[12-727] are:

    "Alljudgmentsof courts of recordshall bearinterestat a rate prescribed pursuant to subsection B of this section . . . from the date ofrendition.* * *" [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  84. Undertakings to stay execution under 12 O.S. 1991 § 968.1[12-968.1] and other statutory provisions that govern a judgment's enforcement are linked to those for perfecting an appeal. ↩
  85. Mabee Oil Gas Co. v. Price,198 Okla. 510,179 P.2d 916, 918 (1947). ↩
  86. Ind. School Dist. v. Okla. City Fed. of Tchrs.,Okla.,612 P.2d 719, 724 (1980). ↩
  87. Ind. School Dist., supranote 86, 612 P.2d at 722. ↩
  88. Even where uniformity appears to carry the day, there will always be room for lawyers to make mistakes.See,e.g.,Allenv. Horinek,827 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1987), where an appeal was dismissed because it was filedtoo early. Premature appealsare not unknown to our own jurisprudence.See Matter of Estateof Nation,Okla.,834 P.2d 442, 443 (1992). ↩
  89. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 993A[12-993A] provide that an appeal of certain interlocutory orders may be brought "within thirty (30) days after the order is issued." ↩
  90. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 735[12-735] are:

    "If execution is not issued and filed as provided in Section 759 of this title or a garnishment summons is not issued by the court clerkwithin five (5) yearsafter the date of any judgmentthat now is or may hereafter be rendered in any court of record in this state . . . such judgment shall become unenforceable and of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor. . . ."

    Under one dissent's analysis, the five yearsmightstart to run on the date judgment was given by operation of § 696.1,oritcouldrun from the date a judge-signed memorialization was filed. ↩
  91. For the statutory symmetry of an executable judgment's entry for three different classes of deciding mechanism under 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 22[12-22]et seq., seethe Appendix to this opinion. ↩
  92. If the dissents' legislatively rejected approach were adopted today, judges would have the power to alter the incidence of a general unreserved jury verdict by postponing the filing of its memorialized entry. The judgment debtor might be subjected to successive executions before appeal time starts to run. Uncertainty over when the judge might sign a memorialized entry could create confusion in setting the penal sum for superseders or stay bonds and foster additional litigation over whether the judgment debtor received due notice that a judge-signed entry had been filed. For additional explanation,see infranote 99. ↩
  93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979). ↩
  94. William O. Douglas, STARE DECISIS, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 735, 736 (1949). ↩
  95. Edge v. Smith,Okla.,284 P.2d 711, 715 (1955);Jacksonv. Twin State Oil Co.,95 Okla. 96,218 P. 324, 328 (1923);Webbv. Semans,110 Okla. 72,235 P. 1074, 1077 (1925). ↩
  96. One dissent hints thatJaco'steachings have resulted in a large number of dismissals; we know of only one.See infrathe text at note designation 98 andDay, supranote 28. ↩
  97. Planned Parenthood, infranote 115, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 112 S.Ct. at 2809-2816. ↩
  98. See Day, supranote 28. ↩
  99. We have long refused to permit a trial court to extend the time for taking an appeal byvacating the judgment from whichappeal is sought and reentering it at a later date. Starr v.Woods,162 Okla. 242,19 P.2d 561, 562 (1933). ↩
  100. See supranote 28. ↩
  101. The pertinent terms of Art. 7, § 4, Okla. Const., provide:

    "The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; * * *Theappellate and the original jurisdiction of theSupreme Court and all other appellate courts shall beinvoked in the manner provided by law." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  102. 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 990A[12-990A] and 992 [12-992];PresbyterianHosp. v. Bd. of Tax-Roll Corr.,Okla.,693 P.2d 611, 615 (1984);Western Okla. Chapter Etc. v. State Etc.,Okla.,616 P.2d 1143, 1147 (1980). For the pertinent terms of § 990A,see supranote 29. The terms of § 992 provide in pertinent part:

    "The parties may waive any defect or error in perfecting an appealexcept the timely filing of apetition in error.. . ." [Emphasis provided.] ↩
  103. For the terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A],see supranote 29. ↩
  104. For the terms of § 696.1,see supranote 1. ↩
  105. See12 O.S. 1981 § 696.1[12-696.1],supranote 1;Jaco, supranote 1, 823 P.2d at 364. ↩
  106. See12 O.S. 1991 § 990A[12-990A],supranote 28;Jaco, supranote 1, 823 P.2d at 364. ↩
  107. The dissent's statement that because the terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 32.3[12-32.3] require a signed journal entry, appeal time must commence with its filing is incorrect.Compare§ 990A, the statute that sets thetime for appealing from a judgmentor final order with § 32.3 that regulates thecontent of theappellate record. See Johnson v. Johnson,Okla.,674 P.2d 539, 542 (1983). ↩
  108. Jacohas governed ever since its effective date.Seethe casessupranote 28. ↩
  109. See Jaco, supranote 1, 823 P.2d at 364. ↩
  110. "* * *It is procedure that spells much of thedifference between, rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law. * * *" [Emphasis provided.]Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.McGrath,341 U.S. 123, 179, 71 S.Ct. 624, 652, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring). ↩
  111. United States v. Indrelunas,411 U.S. 216, 222, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973). ↩
  112. Snyder v. Smith Welding Fabrication,Okla.,746 P.2d 168, 171 n. 1 (1986) (supplemental opinion on rehearing);PryseMonument Co. v. District Court Etc.,Okla.,595 P.2d 435, 438 (1979). ↩
  113. A single delictual occurrence gives rise to but one cause of action or to one legal claim.Retherford, supranote 14, 572 P.2d at 968-969. ↩
  114. Jaco, supranote 1, 823 P.2d at 364-365 and the casessupranote 28. ↩
  115. In an opinion which holds that the doctrine ofstaredecisisrequires reaffirmance ofRoe v. Wade'score holding, Justice O'Conner explains that overruling precedentwithout themost compelling of reasonswouldovertax the country's beliefin the judiciary's good faithand causethe Court's legitimacyto fade with the frequency of its vacillation. Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). ↩
  116. Serious procedural confusion is certain under today's opinion. Case by case, the appellate courts will have to classify actions as "common law" or "not common law." This civil action, based on medical malpractice or medical negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, consent and warranty theories, is classified as a "common law action," even though those theories are recognized in our statutes. In our order inMcGinnis v.Republic-Underwriters Insurance Company,830 P.2d 191(Okla. 1992), this Court refused to applyJaco Production Company v.Luca,823 P.2d 364(Okla. 1991). We said that a special statutory postjudgment garnishment proceeding is not a "common-law action." However, 12 O.S. 1991 § 1177[12-1177] provides that the issues in a postjudgment garnishment "shall stand for trial as a civil action." ↩
  117. Okla. Const., art. 2, § 19. In deciding to exercise their constitutional right to trial by jury, litigants must consider the risk that appeal may be restricted to the issues given to the jury. ↩
  118. Okla. Const., art. 2, § 6. The denial of an appeal of issues withheld from a jury closes the courts to those issues. ↩
  119. 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 681[12-681] and 990 [12-990]A;Federal DepositInsurance Corporation v. Tidwell,820 P.2d 1338(Okla. 1991);DBL Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission,805 P.2d 657(Okla. 1991);Reeves v. Agee,769 P.2d 745(Okla. 1989);EasonOil Company v. Howard Engineering, Inc.,755 P.2d 669(Okla. 1988);Methvin v. Methvin,191 Okla. 177,127 P.2d 186(1942); andHurley v. Hurley,191 Okla. 194,127 P.2d 147(1942). ↩
  120. The journal entry, memorializing the mid-trial rulings and granting judgment on the jury verdict, was filed on March 26, 1992, and provides:

    On March 6th, Plaintiffs completed their evidence and rested and the Defendants interposed demurrers on the warranty claim which was sustained; on the fraud and misrepresentation claim which was sustained; on the consortium claim which was overruled; and the informed consent claim which was overruled. The Defendants proceeded to put on evidence and rested on March 6th. There being no rebuttal, the Court instructed the jury and closing arguments were made by both sides. After due deliberation, the jury returned into open court with their ten (10) person verdict signed by ten (10) jurors. The Court examined the verdict forms as well as the attorneys and there being no request to poll the jury, the Court received and accepted the verdict in favor of the Defendants.

    The petition in error was filed with this Court on April 17, 1992. ↩
  121. InMartin v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Company ofOklahoma City, Oklahoma,839 P.2d 179, 180 (Okla. 1992), we said that "an appealable judgment is entered when a record entry was signed" by the judge. Consistent withMartin,the majority opinion correctly says that "(r)ecord entry is never effected by a clerk's minute posted on the appearance docket; the appearance docket is nothing more or less than a chronological index of filings and an abstract of significant courtroom events." Yet, it is the appearance docket entry that is before this Court. It is the mereentryof the jury verdict in the appearance docket which the majority finds triggered the appeal time.

    Attached to appellant's response to the dismissal request is a copy of the Daily Minutes for March 6, 1992 filed in the office of the Tulsa County Court Clerk on March 11, 1992, which is substantially the same as the entry on the appearance docket attached to appellees' dismissal request. The appearance docket is labeled "Civil Action Docket, Clerk of Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, Judge, DIV-D-7-Hon. D.J. BOUDREAU, File Date, 05/25/90, Case ID CJ-TU-90-002558-07, Medical Mal-Practice." The entry under the date of March 6, 1992, is an abstract of the trial proceeding, including the verdict returned turned by the jury and accepted and recorded by the trial court. ↩
  122. Prior to 1990, the thirty day time in which an appeal could be perfected was triggered by the pronouncement of judgment.Martin v. Liberty National Band and Trust Company of OklahomaCity, Oklahoma,839 P.2d 179(Okla. 1992). In 1990. the statutes were amended providing the appeal time be calculated from the filing of the judgment. 1990 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 251, § 4, The filing of the judgment is the event which begins the appeal time limitation under the latest amendments. 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 251. ↩
  123. Strictly adhering to § 32.3, inMartin v. Liberty NationalBank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,839 P.2d 179(Okla. 1992), we rejected a minute order initiated by the judge as an appealable judgment, finding that the legislature clearly and explicitly required the signature of the judge as a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. Section 696.1, as well as §§ 32.3 and 990A were amended and/or reenacted in 1991. 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 251. Our construction of § 696.1 should be consistent with the other provisions of the 1991 law. ↩
  124. Section 990 stated in part: "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced from an appealable decision of a court or tribunal by filing with the Clerk of the Supreme Court a petition in error, within thirty (30) days from the date of the final order or judgment sought to be reviewed." ↩
  125. Historically, a judgment was considered an act of a court and was thus dated from the rendition or pronouncement by the court and not its entry. SeeMooney, v. First State Bank,48 Okla. 676,149 P. 1173, 1175 (1915) where the court discussed Revised Laws 1910 § 5138 (now 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1]) andIn reMcQuown,19 Okla. 347,91 P. 689(1907). ↩
  126. 12 O.S. 1981 § 990[12-990] repealed by Laws 1990, c. 251, § 20, eff. Jan. 1, 1991. ↩
  127. 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1004[12-1004] stated in part: "An appeal from a judgment or appealable order of a court or tribunal may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days after the date of the judgment or appealable order sought to be reviewed. For the purpose of an appeal, the date of judgment shall be the date it was filed with the court clerk." ↩
  128. 12 O.S.Supp. 1990 §§ 1001[12-1001] and 1004 [12-1004] were repealed by Laws 1991, c. 251, § 22 eff. June 1, 1991. ↩
  129. Section 990A states in part: "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from the date the final order or judgment is filed." ↩
  130. "When a trial by jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, unless it is special, or the court order the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration." 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1[12-696.1]. This statute is not new, as its former codification at 12 O.S. 1981 § 696[12-696] dates back to Territorial days. See Statutes of Oklahoma Territory, 1893 § 4300. ↩
  131. At one time a clerk was required to enter a judgment on the judgment docket upon rendition of the judgment.See, e.g.,12 O.S. 1941 § 25[12-25]. Now a judgment need not be entered on the judgment docket until after the rendition of the judgment and the filing of an affidavit of judgment. 12 O.S. 1991 § 25[12-25]. ↩