State v. Szefcyk

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

77 Ohio St.3d 93

.]




            THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SZEFCYK, APPELLEE.
                      [Cite as State v. Szefcyk, 

1996-Ohio-337

.]
Criminal law—Res judicata—Doctrine bars convicted defendant from raising and
        litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any
        defnese that was raised or could have been raised by defendant at trial.
                                  __________________
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted
        defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any
        proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any
        claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the
        defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on
        an appeal from that judgment. (State v. Perry [1967], 

10 Ohio St.2d 175

,
        

39 O.O.2d 189

, 

226 N.E.2d 104

, paragraph nine of the syllabus, approved
        and followed; State v. Westfall [1995], 

71 Ohio St.3d 565

, 

645 N.E.2d 730

,
        disapproved.)
                                  __________________
 (No. 95-1134—Submitted September 24, 1996—Decided November 13, 1996.)
     APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 94CA005928.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} On March 15, 1991, appellee, Walter F. Szefcyk, while operating a
truck, struck and killed Philip Lichtcsien, who was riding a bicycle. A jury
convicted Szefcyk of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(B), an
aggravated third-degree felony; vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.07, a
first-degree misdemeanor; leaving the scene of an accident, in violation of R.C.
4549.02, a first-degree misdemeanor; reckless operation, in violation of R.C.
4511.20, a minor misdemeanor; failure to drive within assured clear distance, in
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




violation of R.C. 4511.21(A), a minor misdemeanor; and improper passing, in
violation of R.C. 4511.27(A), a minor misdemeanor.                The involuntary
manslaughter conviction was predicated upon the minor misdemeanor traffic
violations. Szefcyk was sentenced to four to ten years’ imprisonment.
       {¶ 2} Appellee timely appealed his involuntary manslaughter conviction,
alleging, inter alia, that a minor misdemeanor cannot serve as the underlying
predicate offense to support a conviction under R.C. 2903.04(B). The Ninth
District Court of Appeals affirmed appellee’s conviction. State v. Szefcyk (Jan. 6,
1993), Lorain App. No. 92CA005340, unreported.
       {¶ 3} Appellee appealed to this court and jurisdiction was denied. State v.
Szefcyk (1993), 

66 Ohio St.3d 1489

, 

612 N.E.2d 1245

.
       {¶ 4} Subsequently, appellee filed a petition for postconviction relief in the
trial court, which was denied. Appellee appealed the denial of the postconviction
relief petition to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside
the involuntary manslaughter conviction (State v. Szefcyk [1995], 

104 Ohio App.3d 118

, 

661 N.E.2d 233

), relying on this court’s decisions in State v. Collins (1993),

67 Ohio St.3d 115

, 

616 N.E.2d 224

, and State v. Westfall (1995), 

71 Ohio St.3d 565

, 

645 N.E.2d 730

.
       {¶ 5} The cause is now before the court upon the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
                              __________________
       Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jonathan E.
Rosenbaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
       Bradley & Giardini Co., L.P.A., and Jack W. Bradley, for appellee.
                              __________________




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                                     January Term, 1996




         ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
         {¶ 6} This case provides us with an opportunity to revisit our recent
summary decision in State v. Westfall (1995), 

71 Ohio St.3d 565

, 

645 N.E.2d 730

.
         {¶ 7} The facts of that case, as set forth in the court of appeals’ opinion,
indicate that Westfall pled no contest and was found guilty of two counts of
involuntary manslaughter, two counts of negligent assault, one count of driving
under a suspended license, and one count of failure to operate his vehicle within
marked lanes. The latter offense, a minor misdemeanor, was the predicate offense
to the involuntary manslaughter counts. Westfall timely appealed his conviction,
contending that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter pursuant to R.C.
2903.04(B) cannot be predicated upon a minor misdemeanor. The Ninth District
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. State v. Westfall (July 31, 1991), Summit
App. No. 14930, unreported. Westfall appealed that decision to this court and
jurisdiction was denied. State v. Westfall (1991), 

62 Ohio St. 3d 1475

, 

581 N.E.2d 1097

.
         {¶ 8} Subsequent to our decision denying jurisdiction in Westfall, the Court
of Appeals for Miami County certified the identical issue for review by this court,
that is, whether pursuant to R.C. 2903.04(B) a minor misdemeanor can be the
predicate offense to a charge of involuntary manslaughter. This court, in affirming
the court of appeals, held at the syllabus:
         “A minor misdemeanor may not serve as the underlying predicate offense
for purposes of the involuntary manslaughter statute, R.C. 2903.04(B).” State v.
Collins (1993), 

67 Ohio St.3d 115

, 

616 N.E.2d 224

.1




1. After this court decided Collins, the Ohio General Assembly, effective September 29, 1994,
amended R.C. 2903.04(B) to read as follows:
        “No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s
committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of the first, second, third, or fourth degree or a
minor misdemeanor.” (145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5117.)




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶ 9} After Collins was announced, Westfall filed a petition for
postconviction relief, which was granted by the trial court. The state appealed that
decision to the court of appeals. The Ninth District Court of Appeals, in State v.
Westfall (Sept. 28, 1994), Summit App. No. 16663, unreported, reversed the trial
court, relying upon State v. Perry (1967), 

10 Ohio St.2d 175

, 

39 O.O.2d 189

, 

226 N.E.2d 104

, paragraph nine of the syllabus:
        “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in
any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed
lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at
the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that
judgment.” (Emphasis sic.)
        {¶ 10} This court, in State v. Westfall (1995), 

71 Ohio St.3d 565

, 

645 N.E.2d 730

, allowed the discretionary appeal, summarily reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court on authority of
State v. Collins.
        {¶ 11} In the case sub judice, the appellee filed a direct appeal, urging
reversal of his involuntary manslaughter conviction, arguing that the trial court
erred in allowing a minor misdemeanor to support a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. This court denied
jurisdiction. The appellee in this case fully litigated that issue. He cannot now
come before this court and relitigate it simply because of a subsequent decision of
this court. There is no merit to appellee’s claim that res judicata has no application
where there is a change in the law due to a judicial decision of this court. Res
judicata is applicable in all postconviction relief proceedings. Our holding today
underscores the importance of finality of judgments of conviction. “‘[P]ublic
policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an
issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be




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                                January Term, 1996




considered forever settled as between the parties.’ [Citation omitted.] We have
stressed that ‘[the] doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or
procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental
and substantial justice, “of public policy and of private peace,” which should be
cordially regarded and enforced by the courts. ***’ [Citation omitted.]” Federated
Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie (1981), 

452 U.S. 394, 401

, 

101 S.Ct. 2424, 2429

, 

69 L.Ed.2d 103, 110-111

.
        {¶ 12} We, therefore, reaffirm our holding in Perry that a convicted
defendant is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata from raising and litigating
in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed
lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at
the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on appeal from that
judgment. We approve of and follow paragraph nine of the syllabus of State v.

Perry, supra.

 To the extent that State v. 

Westfall, supra,

71 Ohio St.3d 565

, 

645 N.E.2d 730

, implies that Perry is no longer good law, we disapprove of that result.
        {¶ 13} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
                                                                Judgment reversed.
        MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, YOUNG and STRATTON,
JJ., concur.
        JOHN C. YOUNG, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J.
                              __________________




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