State v. Edmonson

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

86 Ohio St.3d 324

.]




           THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EDMONSON, APPELLEE.
                    [Cite as State v. Edmonson, 

1999-Ohio-110

.]
Criminal law—Penalties and sentencing—R.C. 2929.14(B), construed and applied.
R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons for its finding
        that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct will be demeaned or that the
        public will not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can
        lawfully impose more than the minimum authorized sentence.
      (No. 98-2603—Submitted June 9, 1999—Decided September 8, 1999.)
      CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 97-P-0067.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} Antione T. Edmonson was convicted in 1997 on one count of
aggravated robbery for violating R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).                    Though this was
Edmonson’s first prison sentence, the trial court sentenced him to the maximum
term of imprisonment. Edmonson appealed, arguing that the trial court disregarded
the mandates of R.C. 2929.14 when sentencing him to the maximum term of
imprisonment and, therefore, his sentence was contrary to law. He contended that
R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) require a trial court to make certain findings on the record
(1) when it sentences a defendant who has never served a prison term to a sentence
other than the minimum sentence, and (2) when it sentences a defendant to a
maximum prison term.
        {¶ 2} The Court of Appeals for Portage County agreed that, based on the
language of R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C), certain findings are to be made on the record
by the trial court and that a “finding” implies a recitation of the operative facts on
which the finding is based. The court of appeals determined that the sentence was
contrary to law because the trial court failed to make explicit findings that
“demonstrate why the minimum term of imprisonment should not have been
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granted under R.C. 2929.14(B)” and why the maximum sentence should be
imposed under R.C. 2929.14(C).         The court of appeals, therefore, vacated
Edmonson’s sentence and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
       {¶ 3} The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the
decisions of the Ninth Appellate District in State v. Crangle (Aug. 6, 1997), Summit
App. No. 18268, unreported, 

1997 WL 460161

; State v. Miller (Apr. 29, 1998),
Summit App. No. 18645, unreported, 

1998 WL 208830

; and State v. Blondheim
(May 27, 1998), Summit App. No. 18594, unreported, 

1998 WL 281917

, certified
the issue to this court for review and final determination. In accordance with
S.Ct.Prac.R. IV(2)(C) and Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (1993), 

66 Ohio St.3d 594

, 

613 N.E.2d 1032

, paragraph one of the syllabus, we agreed to accept the case.
                              __________________
       Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K.
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
       Hirt & Hirt and David S. Hirt, for appellee.
       David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and John Fenlon, Assistant Public
Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender.
                              __________________
       COOK, J.
       {¶ 4} Based on the recent changes to the sentencing law in Ohio, minimum
sentences are favored for first-time imprisonment and maximum sentences are
disfavored generally. For instance, R.C. 2929.14(B) requires a trial court to impose
a minimum sentence for first-time imprisonment unless it specifies on the record
that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the conduct or will not
adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender.          And R.C.
2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d) prevent a court from imposing a maximum
sentence for a single offense unless the court records findings that give its reasons
for selecting the maximum. Edmonson’s sentencing raises both of these issues




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because Edmonson was convicted of a single offense, was faced with imprisonment
for the first time, and was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment.
                                          I
                                         A
                                  R.C. 2929.14(B)
       {¶ 5} R.C. 2929.14(B) reads as follows:
       “[I]f the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or
is required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously
has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term
authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section, unless the court
finds on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by
the offender or others.”
       {¶ 6} The appellate districts in this state currently hold differing opinions
about what information a trial court must include in a sentencing hearing record
when imposing a sentence that is longer than the minimum upon an offender
expected to receive the minimum sentence according to the presumption in R.C.
2929.14(B). The appellate debate in this state centers on the scope of the statutory
phrase “finds on the record.”
       {¶ 7} We construe this statute to mean that unless a court imposes the
shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term,
the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or
both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term
warranted the longer sentence.
       {¶ 8} R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons
for its finding that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct will be demeaned or
that the public will not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can
lawfully impose more than the minimum authorized sentence. By contrasting this




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statute with other related sentencing statutes, we deduce that the verb “finds” as
used in this statute means that the court must note that it engaged in the analysis
and that it varied from the minimum for at least one of the two sanctioned reasons.
With other sentencing statutes, the General Assembly explicitly demands that
courts give reasons. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) requires a trial court to “make a finding
that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed.” (Emphasis added.) In
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(b), the General Assembly requires a court to provide a finding
and an explanation by stating that the court shall set forth “the basis of the findings
it made.” We discern from the difference in the language of these sections within
the same chapter and on the same subject—sentencing—that had the General
Assembly intended the R.C. 2929.14(B) finding to include reasons, it would have
explicitly expressed that intent as it did in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2).
       {¶ 9} Our deduction is buttressed by other language in the sentencing
statutes. The phraseology in R.C. 2953.08(A)(2), for example, supports the view
that the statutory purpose is fulfilled when a court notes that it has considered the
statutory criteria and specifies which of the given bases warrants its decision to vary
from the preferred minimum sentence. It reads that a defendant may appeal as a
matter of right if “the court did not specify at sentencing that it found one or more
factors.” (Emphasis added.) And likewise, the text of R.C. 2953.08(G)(1)(b)
ratifies the view that in enacting the new sentencing laws, the General Assembly
only sought to confirm that courts considered the statutory requirements by stating
that a defendant may obtain certain relief if “the court did not specify in the finding
it makes at sentencing that it found one or more of the factors specified.” (Emphasis
added.) The structure of the various sentencing statutes suggests that the General
Assembly approached felony sentencing by mandating a record reflecting that
judges considered certain factors and presumptions to confirm that the court’s
decision-making process included all of the statutorily required sentencing
considerations.




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                                     January Term, 1999




        {¶ 10} Edmonson contends that construing the statute to require findings
without also requiring the court to articulate its reasoning will hamper appellate
review, and that the appellate courts will be unnecessarily forced to review the
entire record. But because R.C. 2953.08(F) explicitly obligates the appellate courts
to review the record, we discount this argument.
                                                B
        {¶ 11} Having determined that a trial court sentencing an offender to his
first imprisonment must specify on the record that one or both reasons allowed by
R.C. 2929.14(B) justify a sentence longer than the minimum, we next assess
whether the trial court did so in this case. The record shows that prior to imposing
the maximum sentence, the court noted the following:
        “I read the record that [sic] you have had problems, been locked down in a
lock-down facility on two different occasions.[1]
        “I find you to be a very dangerous offender and you to commit a crime again
[sic]. This was a terrible incident with a person who has [sic] a gun, robbing people.
        “Therefore, it is the sentence of this Court, that you be confined * * * [for]
the sentence of ten years.”
        {¶ 12} In the judgment entry, the trial court stated:
        “The Court has considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact
statement and presentence report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes
of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11, and has balanced the
seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.12.
        “***
        “The Court further finds that [Edmonson] is a dangerous offender, that
recidivism is likely, and that a gun was used during this incident.”



1. The lock-down facility was a jail, not a prison. See R.C. 2929.01(CC) (defining “prison”); R.C.
2929.01(V) (defining “jail”).




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        {¶ 13} Although one or more of the remarks by the trial court might be
argued to support a finding that the three-year minimum sentence would demean
the seriousness of Edmonson’s conduct or that the public would not be adequately
protected from his future crime, the trial court did not specify either of these reasons
listed in R.C. 2929.14(B) as supporting its deviation from the minimum sentence
of three years. With this record, there is no confirmation that the court first
considered imposing the minimum three-year sentence and then decided to depart
from the statutorily mandated minimum based on one or both of the permitted
reasons. Accordingly, we agree with the judgment of the court of appeals vacating
the trial court’s sentence and remanding this cause to the trial court for
resentencing.
                                           II
                                           A
                       R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d)
        {¶ 14} In Part I of this opinion, we considered the challenge to the
sentencing decision that denied Edmonson the statutorily mandated minimum
sentence without the record finding necessary to impose a longer one. In Part II,
we consider Edmonson’s claim on appeal that the sentencing decision also fails to
meet the statutory requirements for imposing a maximum sentence.
        {¶ 15} The statutes to be construed are R.C. 2929.14(C) and
2929.19(B)(2)(d). The first establishes the public policy disfavoring maximum
sentences except for the most deserving offenders and reads as follows:
        “[T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose
the longest prison term authorized for the offense * * * only upon offenders who
committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest
likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders * * *,
and upon certain repeat violent offenders * * *.”          (Emphasis added.)       R.C.
2929.14(C).




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                                January Term, 1999




        {¶ 16} The other statute at issue, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d), sets the procedure
that a trial court must follow when imposing the maximum sentence on an offender
for a single offense. As applicable to Edmonson, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) requires a
trial court to “make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence
imposed” if the sentence is for one offense and is the maximum term allowed for
that offense, and requires a trial court to set forth its “reasons for imposing the
maximum prison term.” (Emphasis added.)
                                             B
        {¶ 17} Considering, then, whether the record in Edmonson’s case fulfills
the statutory requirements outlined in Part II, subpart A above, we hold that it does
not. As recounted above, the Edmonson sentencing fails to record a finding that
Edmonson fits within one of the categories of offenders in R.C. 2929.14(C).
Obviously, without the finding itself, the court also fails to provide the necessary
“finding that gives its reasons.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d). With this record, we
cannot confirm that the trial court heeded the enacted policy of the General
Assembly meant for curtailing the imposition of maximum terms. In order to
lawfully impose the maximum term for a single offense, the record must reflect that
the trial court imposed the maximum sentence based on the offender satisfying one
of the listed criteria in R.C. 2929.14(C).
        {¶ 18} We agree with the court of appeals that this cause should be
remanded for resentencing.
                                                                Judgment affirmed.
        MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON,
JJ., concur.
        RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only.
                               __________________




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