State ex rel Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys.

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

95 Ohio St.3d 327

.]




  THE STATE EX REL. PIPOLY, APPELLANT, v. STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT
                                   SYSTEM, APPELLEE.
          [Cite as State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys.,
                                    

2002-Ohio-2219

.]
Schools—Mandamus sought to compel State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio
        to award relator disability retirement benefits based on claim of multiple
        chemical sensitivity syndrome—Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed
        when relator fails to establish a clear legal right to disability retirement
        benefits or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of STRS to provide
        them.
      (No. 2001-1797—Submitted March 12, 2002—Decided May 22, 2002.)
     APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-1081.
                                  __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶1}     Appellant, Pamela J. Pipoly, worked as a swim instructor for the
Mahoning County Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities at
the Leonard Kirtz School in Austintown, Ohio. After being exposed to certain
chemicals in the enclosed pool area at which she worked, she took an employer-
approved unpaid disability leave of absence from September 13, 1994, to
September 1, 1997. Pipoly worked half days on September 2 and 3, 1997, and
stopped after she again experienced difficulty with her work environment. Her
employer advised her to apply for disability retirement benefits. Pipoly had
previously been allowed workers’ compensation benefits for hypersensitivity
reaction to chlorine and possible trichloramine, disorders related to chemical
bronchitis, tachycardia, allergic rhinitis, maxillary sinusitis, chemical sensitivity,
and major depression.
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       {¶2}    In October 1997, Pipoly applied for disability retirement benefits
with appellee, State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio (“STRS”).             Pipoly
claimed that she was incapacitated for the performance of her duties as a teacher
because of multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, which she acquired while
working as a swim instructor.       Pipoly also submitted the reports of Stoyan
Daskalov, M.D., one of her attending physicians, and Frank J. Agresta, Ph.D., a
psychologist who had examined her in 1995 in conjunction with her workers’
compensation claim. Dr. Daskalov diagnosed Pipoly as suffering from allergic
rhinitis and chemical sensitivity, but at one point in his report opined that she was
not permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty as a teacher, because she
could teach in an appropriate environment. Agresta concluded that Pipoly suffered
from depression and that this condition was permanently incapacitating.
       {¶3}    Psychiatrist Ralph G. Walton, M.D., conducted an examination of
Pipoly on behalf of STRS in February 1998, and he determined that he could not
find any psychiatric reasons for disability.
       {¶4}    In March 1998, a STRS medical review board, which consisted of
three physicians, reviewed the application and evidence and determined that Pipoly
was not disabled for purposes of disability retirement benefits. After Pipoly
submitted further information, including records relating to her workers’
compensation claim, the medical review board requested additional medical
evaluations of her.
       {¶5}    Richard A. Katzman, M.D., a specialist in pulmonary diseases,
examined Pipoly and determined that although her symptoms were consistent with
those of persons who claimed to have multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, he
could not find objective evidence of any disease. Dr. Katzman concluded that
Pipoly was not incapacitated for the performance of duty as a teacher. Jeffrey C.
Hutzler, M.D., a psychiatrist, examined Pipoly and diagnosed panic disorder but
found no signs of psychosis or other major psychiatric disorder. Dr. Hutzler




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                                January Term, 2002




concluded that Pipoly is “not incapacitated in her ability to teach from a psychiatric
standpoint.”
       {¶6}    Pipoly again submitted additional reports, including several by one
of her treating physicians, Donald S. Nelson, M.D. Dr. Nelson diagnosed Pipoly
as having multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome and stated that she was
completely disabled by this condition.
       {¶7}    In February 1999, upon request by STRS, Pipoly was examined by
Roger A. Friedman, M.D. Dr. Friedman noted that the diagnosis of multiple
chemical sensitivity syndrome was questionable because of doubts regarding its
existence, and he determined that Pipoly suffered from routine allergies. Dr.
Friedman concluded that there was no evidence of any permanent disability.
       {¶8}    In May 1999, the medical review board recommended that Pipoly’s
application for disability retirement benefits be denied.
       {¶9}    Pipoly then submitted additional records from Dr. Nelson, and
STRS ordered further evaluation. Richard L. Green, M.D., examined her in August
1999 and stated that there is a “tremendous controversy in the medical community
about labeling this disorder [i.e., multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome] a
disease,” but that he believed that multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome is
“primarily a psychiatric disorder and is not founded on any medical
pathophysiologic abnormalities.” Dr. Green stated that there were “no objective
physical findings and no objective reproducible and scientifically reliable
laboratory studies to confirm any disease and the ongoing disease process.”
       {¶10} Dr. Friedman received the additional evidence submitted by Pipoly
and again concluded that she was not permanently incapacitated for the
performance of her duty as a teacher.
       {¶11} On September 2, 1999, the disability committee of STRS voted to
sustain the recommendation of the medical review board to deny Pipoly’s
application for disability retirement benefits. In March 2000, Pipoly submitted two




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additional evaluations to STRS, including an evaluation by Scott E. Singer, M.D.,
M.P.H., in which he stated that he was unable to verify with objective evidence any
of Pipoly’s concerns regarding her claim of multiple chemical sensitivity
syndrome. On April 14, 2000, following an adjudicatory hearing, the retirement
board of STRS unanimously denied Pipoly’s application for disability retirement
benefits. The board did not specify its reasons for denying benefits.
       {¶12} In September 2000, Pipoly filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals
for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel STRS to award her disability
retirement benefits. Following the submission of evidence and briefs, a court of
appeals magistrate issued a detailed decision recommending denial of the writ. In
August 2001, the court of appeals approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision
and denied the requested writ of mandamus. This cause is now before the court
upon Pipoly’s appeal as of right.
       {¶13} The General Assembly established STRS to pay retirement
allowances and other benefits of Ohio public school teachers. R.C. 3307.03; see,
generally, Buchter, Hastings, Sheeran & Stype, Ohio School Law (2001) 264,
Section T 11.1. The State Teachers Retirement Board (“STRB”) manages the
STRS funds. R.C. 3307.03. The determination of whether a STRS member is
entitled to disability retirement is solely within the province of the STRB. See R.C.
3307.62(F); cf. Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1978), 

53 Ohio St.2d 118

, 

7 O.O.3d 192

, 

372 N.E.2d 814

, syllabus, holding similarly regarding the disability
retirement determination by the School Employees Retirement Board for members
of the School Employees Retirement System.
       {¶14} Pipoly asserts that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel
STRS to award her disability retirement benefits. The determination by STRS and
its retirement board, STRB, of whether a person is entitled to disability retirement
benefits is reviewable by mandamus because R.C. 3307.62 does not provide any
appeal from the administrative determination. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ryan v. State




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                                January Term, 2002




Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 

71 Ohio St.3d 362, 364

, 

643 N.E.2d 1122

; State
ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 

69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133

,

630 N.E.2d 701

; State ex rel. Ruby v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio (Dec.
6, 1989), Summit App. No. 13844, 

1989 WL 147983

 (“Since R.C. 3307.42 [now
R.C. 3307.62] does not provide an adequate remedy at law, a cause of action in
mandamus is available” to challenge the decision of the STRS retirement board to
terminate disability retirement benefits); cf. R.C. 119.12 and 2506.01, which are
inapplicable here. Consequently, mandamus is an appropriate remedy where no
statutory right of appeal is available to correct an abuse of discretion by an
administrative body. See State ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 

76 Ohio St.3d 133, 135

, 

666 N.E.2d 1119

. The term “abuse of discretion” means an
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision. State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 

92 Ohio St.3d 529, 533

, 

751 N.E.2d 1032

.
           Duty to Explain Decision on Disability Retirement Benefits
       {¶15} Pipoly initially asserts that she is entitled to the requested writ of
mandamus because STRS did not identify or explain its reasons for denying her
application for disability retirement benefits pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus.
Comm. (1991), 

57 Ohio St.3d 203

, 

567 N.E.2d 245

. In Noll, we held, “In any order
of the Industrial Commission granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the
commission must specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly
explain the reasoning for its decision.” (Emphasis added.) 

Id.

 at syllabus.
       {¶16} Upon consideration, we decline Pipoly’s request to extend Noll to
orders of the STRS and STRB granting or denying disability retirement benefits.
By the plain language of its syllabus, Noll is limited to Industrial Commission
orders involving workers’ compensation claims. “ ‘The syllabus of a Supreme
Court opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and
necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for
adjudication.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Agee v. Russell (2001), 

92 Ohio St.3d 540, 546

,




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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

751 N.E.2d 1043

, quoting former S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 1(B). Noll did not specify its
application to all administrative proceedings and it did not involve any matters
other than workers’ compensation.
          {¶17} Moreover, Noll relied heavily on State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc. (1983), 

6 Ohio St.3d 481, 484

, 6 OBR 531, 

453 N.E.2d 721

, where we
granted a writ of mandamus directing the commission to specify the basis for its
decision, “first and foremost, because the duty to so specify the basis for its
decisions is imposed upon the [Industrial] [C]ommission by statute.” (Emphasis
added.)
          {¶18} It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the
legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative
branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty
enforceable in mandamus. State ex rel. Woods v. Oak Hill Community Med. Ctr.,
Inc. (2001), 

91 Ohio St.3d 459, 461

, 

746 N.E.2d 1108

; Davis v. State ex rel. Pecsok
(1936), 

130 Ohio St. 411

, 

5 O.O. 20

, 

200 N.E. 181

, paragraph one of the syllabus;
State ex rel. Stanley v. Cook (1946), 

146 Ohio St. 348

, 

32 O.O. 419

, 

66 N.E.2d 207

,
paragraph eight of the syllabus. Accepting Pipoly’s request to extend Noll and
Mitchell to require that STRS and STRB state what evidence they relied upon and
specify their reasoning in denying her application for disability retirement benefits
would contravene the foregoing precedent because neither R.C. 3307.62 nor any
administrative rule adopted thereunder imposes any duty on STRS or STRB to do
so. Woods, Davis, and Stanley; see, also, State ex rel. Leonard v. White (1996), 

75 Ohio St.3d 516, 517

, 

664 N.E.2d 527

 (“R.C. 149.43 does not impose any duty on
public officials to provide written reasons for withholding requested records”); but,
cf., State ex rel. Ochs v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 

85 Ohio St.3d 674

, 

710 N.E.2d 1126

,
where we extended Noll in a mandamus proceeding to apply to a decision of the
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation disapproving a settlement agreement despite the
absence of any statutory duty imposing these requirements on the bureau.




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                                January Term, 2002




       {¶19} The Court of Appeals for Franklin County similarly rejected a
request to extend Noll to disability determinations of the School Employees
Retirement System by ordering it to explain its decisions:
       {¶20} “Thus, while this court has recently extended the requirements of
Noll in the context of disability determinations under the Public Employees
Retirement System (‘PERS’) * * * we did so in part because the regulations at issue
there specified that the PERS board shall state the basis for its denial. Here, nothing
in the statute or regulations suggests that the SERS retirement board or the members
of its medical advisory board must issue a decision [consistent with Noll].”
(Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Copeland v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (Aug. 5,
1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1173, 

1999 WL 569279

, appeal dismissed based
on mootness (2000), 

88 Ohio St.3d 1507

, 

728 N.E.2d 1

.
       {¶21} Furthermore, in Noll, 

57 Ohio St.3d at 206

, 

567 N.E.2d 245

, the lead
opinion emphasized that our “docket has been inundated with * * * cases” in which
the commission failed to comply with Mitchell and its progeny. There has been no
comparable flood of cases involving disability determinations by STRS and STRB.
And the administrative record in this case, as submitted in the mandamus
proceeding, is not so voluminous that a review of the record is overly burdensome.
In fact, our review in a mandamus proceeding challenging an administrative
determination on an application for disability retirement benefits is not any more
burdensome than reviewing a summary judgment entered by a trial court without a
detailed opinion. See Civ.R. 52.
       {¶22} Therefore, while extending Noll to STRS and STRB determinations
may be tempting based on policy considerations, see Ochs, 85 Ohio St.3d at 675-
676, 

710 N.E.2d 1126

, we will not impose the Noll requirements in the absence of
a statutory duty or a comparable need for these requirements in cases other than
workers’ compensation cases. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schwaben v. School Emp.
Retirement Sys. (1996), 

76 Ohio St.3d 280, 285

, 

667 N.E.2d 398

 (“However, while




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it may be tempting to decide this case on subjective principles of equity and
fundamental fairness, this court has a greater obligation to follow the law”).
Accordingly, STRS had no clear legal duty cognizable in mandamus to specify
what evidence it relied upon and explain the reasoning for its retirement board’s
decision denying Pipoly’s application for disability retirement benefits.
                     Denial of Disability Retirement Benefits
       {¶23} Pipoly next asserts that STRS abused its discretion in denying
disability retirement benefits. Pipoly contends that overwhelming evidence from
her treating physician, Dr. Nelson, as well as other examiners, demonstrated that
her multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome precludes her from returning to her job
as a swim instructor. In order to be entitled to disability retirement benefits, an
STRS member must be mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of
duty by a disabling condition, either permanent or presumed to be permanent for
twelve continuous months following the filing of an application. R.C. 3307.62(C).
       {¶24} As noted previously, pursuant to R.C. 3307.62, the determination
whether a member of STRS is entitled to disability retirement benefits is vested
solely in STRS. See Schwaben, 

76 Ohio St.3d at 284

, 

667 N.E.2d 398

, and 

Fair, supra,

 at syllabus, construing analogous statutes. STRS and its retirement board
were not required to accept the views of those physicians, including Dr. Nelson,
concerning multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, as stated by the same court of
appeals recently in a separate case involving STRB:
       {¶25} “Given the apparent controversy in the medical community (as
reflected in the record) concerning appellant’s medical condition, it was well within
the discretion of STRB to appoint additional examining physicians whose views on
multiple chemical sensitivity might differ from the views of appellant’s treating
physicians. Much of the concern on the part of STRB as reflected in the record
relates to appellant’s desire not to be examined by an appointed examiner, but,
rather, for STRB to make its determination on the basis of opinions rendered by her




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                               January Term, 2002




treating physicians.” State ex rel. Peaspanen v. Ohio State Teachers Retirement
Bd. (2001), 

143 Ohio App.3d 164, 170

, 

757 N.E.2d 826

.
       {¶26} STRS did not abuse its discretion here in refusing to credit the
opinions of Dr. Nelson and other examining physicians who determined that Pipoly
suffered from multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome and that it was disabling for
purposes of STRS disability retirement benefits. Dr. Katzman, Dr. Friedman, and
Dr. Singer examined Pipoly and concluded that there was no objective evidence of
a disabling physical disorder referred to as multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome.
Dr. Hutzler and Dr. Walton examined Pipoly and found no evidence of any
disabling mental disorder. R.C. 3307.62 did not require STRS or its retirement
board to consider only the findings of Pipoly’s treating physicians. Cf., e.g.,
Schwaben, 

76 Ohio St.3d at 282

, 

667 N.E.2d 398

, and McMaster, construing an
analogous disability retirement provision. Dr. Katzman, Dr. Hutzler, Dr. Friedman,
Dr. Walton, and the three physicians on the STRS medical review board all agreed
that based on the objective medical evidence, including medical examinations of
Pipoly, she was not permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty as a
teacher.
       {¶27} The decision of the STRS retirement board to deny Pipoly’s
application for disability retirement benefits was neither unreasonable, arbitrary,
nor unconscionable; instead, it was based on substantial and significant medical
evidence. See, also, Theresa Canavan’s Case (2000), 

432 Mass. 304, 314-315

, 

733 N.E.2d 1042

 (trial court erroneously permitted evidence about multiple chemical
sensitivities where there was insufficient evidence that diagnosis was based on
reliable methodology); Rakowski v. McCall (1998), 

246 A.D.2d 734

, 

667 N.Y.S. 512

 (administrator of public employees’ retirement system had exclusive authority
to evaluate and resolve conflicts in medical testimony concerning certain medical
experts’ diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity allegedly triggered by unknown
substances in disability retirement claimant’s workplace).      Pipoly is also not




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entitled to relief under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 

68 Ohio St.3d 315

, 

626 N.E.2d 666

, because this is not a workers’ compensation case involving permanent
total disability and STRB did not abuse its discretion in denying disability benefits.
        {¶28} Based on the foregoing, Pipoly has not established a clear legal right
to disability retirement benefits or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of
STRS to provide them. Accordingly, we affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the
court of appeals.
                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
        MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON,
JJ., concur.
        RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only.
                               __________________
        Brown & Margolius, L.P.A., James Mitchell Brown and Rachel C. Wilson,
for appellant.
        Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Christopher S. Cook,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
                               __________________




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