State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

76 Ohio St.3d 287

.]




  THE STATE EX REL. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, OHIO LABOR COUNCIL,
        INC. v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF FRANKLIN COUNTY ET AL.
  [Cite as State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v.
             Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

1996-Ohio-424

.]
Prohibition to prevent common pleas court from exercising further jurisdiction in
        cause of action involving unfair labor practices charges—Writ granted,
        when.
        (No. 96-1563—Submitted July 12, 1996—Decided July 22, 1996.)
                                     In PROHIBITION.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117, relator, Fraternal Order of Police,
Ohio Labor Council, Inc. (“FOP/OLC”), is certified as the exclusive representative
of certain bargaining units of state employees, including “Unit 1” and “Unit 15,”
which are comprised of Ohio State Highway Patrol Troopers and Sergeants,
respectively. As the exclusive representative of the foregoing bargaining units,
FOP/OLC entered into collective bargaining agreements with the state of Ohio,
which are effective from 1994 to 1997, and provide that FOP/OLC may designate
three members of Unit 1 and one member of Unit 15 for release from their job
duties “at no loss of pay, seniority or other benefits.” The agreements further
provide that employees released from their regular work assignments function as
full-time representatives of FOP/OLC. In order to fund these release positions, the
parties to the collective bargaining agreements agreed that the vacation time of each
member of the Unit 1 and Unit 15 bargaining units would be reduced by five and
six hours, respectively.
        {¶ 2} On August 4, 1995, nine FOP lodges and the Ohio Troopers Coalition,
filed a complaint in respondent Franklin County Common Pleas Court alleging that
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




FOP/OLC had breached the collective bargaining agreements by unilaterally
removing one of their elected employees from a release position and threatening to
remove the remaining three persons elected by the plaintiffs to release positions in
Units 1 and 15. The plaintiffs in the underlying action requested that the court
issue, inter alia, an “injunction” directing FOP/OLC to restore the removed person
to his release position under the collective bargaining agreements, an injunction
preventing FOP/OLC from attempting any act intended or designed to remove or
interfere with the other three release persons elected to serve in those positions, an
order directing FOP/OLC to render an account and reimburse unit members for the
loss of unexpended donated hours of earned vacation credits permanently lost as a
result of FOP/OLC’s breach of the agreements, and an injunction preventing
FOP/OLC from interfering with the designation and use of other release time
provided in the collective bargaining agreements.
       {¶ 3} On August 14, 1995, respondent Judge James O’Grady issued a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining FOP/OLC from removing the three
remaining release persons and directing that the removed release person be restored
to his release position. On August 23, 1995, Judge O’Grady extended the TRO
until September 5, 1995. Subsequently, on September 7, 1995, Judge O’Grady
extended the restraining order to September 29, 1995. (But see Civ.R. 65[A]:
“Every temporary restraining order * * * shall expire by its terms within such time
after entry, not to exceed fourteen days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for one like period * * *.”
[Emphasis added.]) Judge O’Grady then held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ request
for a preliminary injunction, and that hearing has not yet been concluded.
       {¶ 4} In October 1995, the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”)
dismissed nineteen identically worded unfair labor practice charges filed by
individual members of Units 1 and 15 challenging the same conduct of FOP/OLC
which is the subject of the plaintiffs’ complaint in the underlying common pleas



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                                January Term, 1996




court action. SERB determined that FOP/OLC had not committed any unfair labor
practice because FOP/OLC possessed the “contractual and exclusive right to select
the release persons.”
       {¶ 5} FOP/OLC and the state entered into a memorandum of understanding
in which, effective July 1, 1996, the state would no longer deduct vacation hours
from members of Units 1 and 15, and unit members would no longer be released
from their regular job duties. The plaintiffs in the underlying common pleas court
action filed a motion requesting that FOP/OLC be held in contempt of the
temporary restraining order issued by Judge O’Grady, which had previously
expired. Judge O’Grady issued a show cause order and scheduled a hearing on the
contempt motion for July 9, 1996. It appears, according to relator’s memorandum
in support, that the conclusion of the trial has been scheduled for August 19, 1996.
       {¶ 6} FOP/OLC has now filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent
Judge O’Grady and the common pleas court from exercising further jurisdiction in
the underlying action. The cause is now before the court to determine if the
issuance of a writ of prohibition is warranted.
                               __________________
       Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Robert W. Sauter and Russell
E. Carnahan, for relator.
                               __________________
       DOUGLAS, J.
       {¶ 7} In order for a writ of prohibition to issue, FOP/OLC must establish
that (1) respondents are about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of judicial
power is legally unauthorized, and (3) if the writ is denied, FOP/OLC will incur
injury for which no adequate legal remedy exists. State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC
v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 

74 Ohio St.3d 536, 540

, 660




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N.E.2d 458, 461. It is evident here that respondents have and are continuing to
exercise judicial authority in the underlying action.
       {¶ 8} As to the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, prohibition
is unwarranted where relator possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. State ex rel. Newton v. Ct. of Claims (1995), 

73 Ohio St.3d 553

, 555 

653 N.E.2d 366, 369

. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court
having general subject matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a
party challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal.
State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 

71 Ohio St.3d 655

, 656 

646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112

. However, where a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction
over the cause, prohibition lies to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of
jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.
State ex rel. Smith v. Frost (1995), 

74 Ohio St.3d 107, 109

, 

656 N.E.2d 673, 676

.
       {¶ 9} FOP/OLC contends that respondents patently and unambiguously
lack jurisdiction over the underlying action for injunctive and other relief. We
agree. The State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide
matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117.            Franklin Cty. Law
Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991),

59 Ohio St.3d 167

, 

572 N.E.2d 87

, paragraph one of the syllabus. Exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve charges of unfair labor practices is vested in SERB in two
general areas: (1) where one of the parties files charges with SERB alleging an
unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11; or (2) where a complaint brought before
the common pleas court alleges conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice
specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11. E. Cleveland v. E. Cleveland Firefighters
Local 500, I.A.F.F. (1994), 

70 Ohio St.3d 125, 127-128

, 

637 N.E.2d 878

, 880.
Therefore, if a party asserts claims that arise from or are dependent on the collective
bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, the remedies provided in that




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                               January Term, 1996




chapter are exclusive. Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., at paragraph two of
the syllabus.
        {¶ 10} Here, as FOP/OLC notes, it appears that based on the common pleas
court complaint filed by plaintiffs, their claims arise from and are dependent upon
the collective bargaining agreements executed by FOP/OLC and the state. In
addition, the complaint filed by the plaintiffs in the underlying action appears to
allege conduct which would constitute unfair labor practices pursuant to R.C.
4117.11(B)(1), (2), and (6). Therefore, based on Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement
Assn. and E. Cleveland, it appears that respondents patently and unambiguously
lack jurisdiction over all of the claims in the underlying case. Further, a writ of
prohibition will issue to prevent a common pleas court from exercising jurisdiction
over a case which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Pokorny (1995), 

105 Ohio App.3d 108, 110

, 

663 N.E.2d 719, 721

. (Any claim which is independent of R.C. Chapter
4117, such as a breach of contract or enforcement, still falls solely within the
jurisdiction of SERB if the asserted claim arises from or is dependent on the
collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.).
        {¶ 11} Since FOP/OLC’s complaint is well taken, a peremptory writ of
prohibition is granted and the Franklin County Common Pleas Court is hereby
ordered to dismiss the underlying action.
                                                                     Writ granted.
        RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY,COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur.
        MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent and would grant only an alternative
writ.
                              __________________




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