Pond v. Leslein

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

72 Ohio St.3d 50

.]




                      POND, APPELLANT v. LESLEIN, APPELLEE.
                      [Cite as Pond v. Leslein, 

1995-Ohio-193

.]
Civil procedure—Civ.R. 50—Motion for directed verdict—Trial court errs in
         denying plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict and allowing the jury to
         decide the issue of defendant's negligence, when.
       (No. 93-2584—Submitted February 21, 1995—Decided April 19, 1995.)
       APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93AP-617.
                                  __________________
         {¶ 1} While driving his car on the afternoon of April 20, 1989, defendant-
appellee Robert C. Leslein collided into the rear of plaintiff-appellant Robert Pond's
car on the entrance ramp from Route 161 to southbound Route 315 in Columbus,
Ohio. Before the accident, Leslein had seen Pond traveling on the entrance ramp
in the same direction as Leslein.
         {¶ 2} After seeing Pond's vehicle a fair distance in front of him, Leslein
accelerated down the entrance ramp, glanced into his rearview mirror, and looked
to his left to check the traffic flow on Route 315. When he turned to look in front
of his car, Leslein noticed the brake lights of Pond's car, which had stopped
allegedly because Pond had heard an automobile horn. Leslein applied his brakes
but was unable to stop before colliding into the rear of Pond's stationary vehicle.
When the accident occurred, it was sunny, and the surface of the entrance ramp was
dry.
         {¶ 3} A few seconds after both vehicles came to a full stop after the collision
and while Leslein was preparing to disembark his vehicle, Pond's car turned to the
right, went down an embankment, and hit some trees on the other side of the ditch.
Pond alleged that he sustained personal injuries as a result of the initial collision
with Leslein's car and the subsequent collision into the trees.
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 4} Pond sued Leslein in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,
asserting that Leslein had negligently failed to maintain an assured clear distance
ahead. After opening statements and at the close of all the evidence during the trial,
plaintiff's counsel moved for a directed verdict in Pond's favor on the "issue of who
negligently caused the rear-end collision." Determining that the jury must decide
the issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence, the trial court denied
both motions and submitted all issues to the jury, including the issue of the
defendant's negligence.
       {¶ 5} During its instructions to the jury, the court defined negligence as "a
failure to use ordinary care" and stated, "If you find the assured clear distance rule
applies and was violated, then you must find that the driver, Robert Leslein, was
negligent." Responding to the first jury interrogatory, the jury found that Leslein
was not negligent and rendered a general verdict in favor of the defendant. Because
it found that Leslein was not negligent, the jury followed the court's instructions
and left unanswered the remaining jury interrogatories relating to the issues of
proximate cause, comparative negligence, and damages. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the defendant.
       {¶ 6} Upon appeal, even though the court of appeals determined that
defendant Leslein was negligent as a matter of law with regard to the "initial"
collision, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court that was consistent with the
jury's general verdict. The appellate court ruled that the trial court did not err in
denying plaintiff Pond's motions for a directed verdict, because a jury question
remained concerning the issue of proximate cause.
       {¶ 7} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
motion to certify the record.
                                 __________________
       Wolske & Blue, Michael S. Miller and William Mann, for appellant.




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                                 January Term, 1995




        Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt and Robert C. Buchbinder, for
appellee.
                                __________________
        WRIGHT, J.
        {¶ 8} The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying
the plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict and allowing the jury to decide the issue
of the defendant's negligence. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the trial
court erred to the detriment of the appellant.
        {¶ 9} R.C. 4511.21(A) states that "no person shall drive any motor vehicle
*** in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will permit him to
bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead." Ohio case law has
consistently held that a person violates the assured clear distance ahead statute if
"there is evidence that the driver collided with an object which (1) was ahead of
him in his path of travel, (2) was stationary or moving in the same direction as the
driver, (3) did not suddenly appear in the driver's path, and (4) was reasonably
discernible." Blair v. Goff-Kirby Co. (1976), 

49 Ohio St.2d 5

, 7, 

3 O.O.3d 4, 5

, 

358 N.E.2d 634

, 636 (citing McFadden v. Elmer C. Breuer Transp. Co. [1952], 

156 Ohio St. 430

, 

46 O.O. 354

, 

103 N.E.2d 385

). See, also, Tomlinson v. Cincinnati
(1983), 

4 Ohio St.3d 66, 69

, 4 OBR 155, 157, 

446 N.E.2d 454, 456

. Thus, a driver
violates the statute as a matter of law if the party invoking the statute presents
uncontroverted evidence establishing all of the elements necessary to constitute a
statutory violation.
        {¶ 10} Where there is conflicting evidence and reasonable minds could
differ concerning any one of the elements necessary to constitute a violation of the
statute, a jury question exists with regard to that element. For instance, in numerous
cases in which a collision occurred at night or during extraordinary weather
conditions that reduced visibility, we have held that a jury question existed as to
whether the object that the driver hit was "reasonably discernible." See, e.g., Blair,




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




supra; 

Tomlinson, supra;

 Junge v. Brothers (1985), 

16 Ohio St.3d 1

, 16 OBR 254,

475 N.E.2d 477

; Sharp v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1988), 

36 Ohio St.3d 172

, 

522 N.E.2d 528

, syllabus; and Ziegler v. Wendel Poultry Serv., Inc. (1993), 

67 Ohio St.3d 10, 13

, 

615 N.E.2d 1022, 1026-1027

. However, we also have made clear
that "[a]n automobile, van, or truck stopped on a highway in a driver's path during
daylight hours is, in the absence of extraordinary weather conditions, a reasonably
discernible object as a matter of law." Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987),

30 Ohio St.3d 35

, 30 OBR 78, 

506 N.E.2d 212

, paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 11} Based upon the undisputed facts of this case, defendant Leslein
violated R.C. 4511.21(A) as a matter of law. It is undisputed that Pond was ahead
of Leslein in the latter's path of travel, that Pond was stationary or moving in the
same direction as Leslein, that Pond did not suddenly appear in Leslein's path of
travel, and that Leslein actually saw Pond's car a fair distance ahead of him before
the collision. It also is undisputed that the accident occurred on a clear, sunny
afternoon.
       {¶ 12} Violation of the assured clear distance ahead statute constitutes
negligence per se. See Skinner v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1933), 

127 Ohio St. 69

,

186 N.E. 722

, syllabus; Transp. Corp. of Indiana v. Lenox Trucking, Inc. (1968),

15 Ohio St.2d 1

, 

44 O.O.2d 1

, 

238 N.E.2d 539

, paragraph one of the syllabus; and
Blair, supra, at 7, 

3 O.O.3d at 5

, 

358 N.E.2d at 636

. In this case, defendant Leslein
was negligent per se—i.e., as a matter of law, Leslein breached a duty that he owed
to Pond.
       {¶ 13} Reasonable minds could only conclude that Leslein violated R.C.
4511.21(A), which constitutes negligence per se. Therefore, we hold that the trial
court erred by failing to grant plaintiff Pond's Civ.R. 50 motions for a directed




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                                      January Term, 1995




verdict concerning Leslein's negligence and by allowing the jury to decide whether
Leslein was negligent. See Civ.R. 50(A)(4).1
          {¶ 14} Our holding that Leslein was negligent per se is determinative of
only two of the essential elements of Pond's negligence claim, i.e., duty and breach
of duty; it does not wholly dispose of the negligence claim against Leslein. Jury
questions still remain concerning the issues of comparative negligence, proximate
cause, and damages.
          {¶ 15} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
                                                                              Judgment reversed
                                                                           and cause remanded.
          MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ.,
concur.
                                     __________________




1. Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides: "When a motion for directed verdict has been properly made, and the
trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one
conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall
sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue."




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