Opinion · Ohio Supreme Court
City of Xenia v. Wallace
37 Ohio St. 3d 216
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Ohio Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Ohio
- Date
- 1988-06-22
- Topic
- general
defendant must give “notice of the specific legal and factual grounds upon which the validity of the search and seizure is challenged” | “Failure on the part of the defendant to adequately raise the basis of his challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal” | defendant must make clear the basis of his challenge in his motion to suppress in order to preserve the challenge for appeal | "if a motion is not filed raising a particular suppression issue, that issue is waived" | “Failure on the part of the defendant to adequately raise the basis of his [suppression] challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal.” | “To suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must 9. (1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2 | defendant may stipulate to, or narrow, the issues that trial court reviewing suppression motion must resolve and that “[a]rguments not made by the defendant at the suppression hearing are, therefore, deemed to have been waived” | Ohio Supreme Court found defendant met the requirement that he place the prosecution on notice as to the grounds upon which he challenged the administration of the breathalyzer test at the evidentiary hearing itself | Ohio Supreme Court found defendant met the requirement that he place the prosecution on notice as to the grounds upon which he challenged the administration of the breathalyzer test at the evidentiary hearing itself | “The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.” | “The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits”
Citator
- Cited by
- 253 opinions
O.Jur 3d Criminal Law §§ 503, 843.
1. To suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must (1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2) raise the grounds upon which the validity of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor notice of the basis for the challenge.
2. Once a defendant has demonstrated a warrantless search or seizure and adequately clarified that the ground upon which he challenges its legality is lack of probable cause, the prosecutor bears the burden of proof, including the burden of going forward with evidence, on the issue of whether probable cause existed for the search or seizure.
Defendant-appellee, LaMar E. Wallace, was driving his car in the city of Xenia, Ohio, in the early morning of February 2, 1986, when he was stopped for speeding by Patrolman Daniel Savage. According to the arrest report attached to the traffic citation, Wallace had a strong odor of alcohol on his person and failed a field sobriety test. Wallace was asked to submit to a BAC verifier breath test, which resulted in a reading of .124.
Wallace was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a concentration of ten hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath in violation of Xenia Revised Code Section333.01(A) (3).1Wallace moved to suppress evidence relating to any chemical testing on the grounds that the test was illegally obtained and was not performed in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the state of Ohio.
At a hearing on the motion, Wallace subpoenaed Officer Savage and Officer David Helling. Defense counsel questioned the officers as to the circumstances surrounding the initial stop of Wallace. Other than the speed and noise of Wallace's car, the officers did not testify that they noticed anything unusual or erratic about Wallace's driving. The prosecutor waived his opportunity to cross-examine and did not present testimony or other evidence at the hearing. As a result, the events recorded in the arrest report — strong odor of alcohol and failed sobriety test — were not put into evidence at the hearing.
During closing arguments at the hearing, defense counsel argued that "from the Officer's own testimony there was no probable cause to have Mr. Wallace submit to a breath test." The prosecutor did not respond and turned down the court's offer of time in which to file a memorandum. The court then denied the motion to suppress.
Wallace entered a no contest plea and was found guilty. Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that, once the defendant demonstrates that the search was conducted withoutPage 218a warrant, the state must go forward and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was conducted in compliance with theFourthandFourteenthAmendments to the United States Constitution. The court further held that in the absence of evidence of probable cause to administer the breathalyzer test, the state failed to meet its burden.
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the court of appeals inStatev.Banks(Jan. 20, 1980), Hamilton App. No. C-790217, unreported, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
However, the prosecutor cannot be expected to anticipate the specific legal and factual grounds upon which the defendant challenges the legality of a warrantless search.
The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.Statev.Johnson(1974),16 Ore. App. 560,567-570,519 P.2d 1053,1057. Therefore, the defendant must make clear the grounds upon which he challenges the submission of evidence pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure.Id. United Statesv.Culotta(C.A. 2, 1969),413 F.2d 1343,1345;Duddlesv.United States(D.C.App. 1979),399 A.2d 59,61-62. Failure on the part of the defendant to adequately raise the basis of his challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal.Statev.Carter(Utah 1985),707 P.2d 656; see, also,United Statesv.Di Stefano(C.A. 2, 1977),555 F.2d 1094;United Statesv.Arboleda(C.A. 2,Page 2191980),633 F.2d 985;United Statesv.Hensel(C.A. 1, 1983),699 F.2d 18,41;Statev.Kremer(1976),307 Minn. 309,239 N.W.2d 476;Peoplev.Lyles(1985),106 Ill.2d 373,478 N.E.2d 291.
Moreover, Crim. R. 47 provides in part:
"An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion, other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by a memorandum containing citations of authority, and may also be supported by an affidavit."
This provision, in the context of the ruling case law and when applied to a motion to suppress evidence obtained by search and seizure, requires that the prosecution be given notice of the specific legal and factual grounds upon which the validity of the search and seizure is challenged.
Therefore, we hold that, to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must (1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2) raise the grounds upon which the validity of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor notice of the basis for the challenge.
The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, without stating its reasoning, placed the burden of going forward with evidence of whether probable cause existed for a warrantless search on the defendant.3SeeStatev.Banks(Jan. 20, 1980), Hamilton App. No. C-790217, unreported;Statev.Halko(July 16, 1986), Hamilton App. No. C-850656, unreported;Statev.Kalejs(Jan. 8, 1986), Hamilton App. No. C-850272, unreported. The court of appeals below placed the burden on the prosecutor, but likewise failed to state its reasoning.
There are at least three arguments for putting the burden of production on the state on the issue of whether there existed probable cause for a search or seizure: (1) a party charged from the outset with the burden of persuasion with respect to a particular issue ordinarily has the subsidiary burden of going forward with evidence regarding such issue,Statev.Rand(Me. 1981),430 A.2d 808,818; (2) the state has primary access to persons with the relevant information (i.e., the law enforcement officers); and (3) it is less burdensome for a party to produce evidence on theexistenceof probablePage 220cause than thelackof probable cause. See, generally, 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1987) 227-228, Section 11.2 (b). On the other hand, the reasons for placing the burden of production on the defendant include: (1) the presumption of regularity of the actions of law enforcement officials, see LaFave,supra, at 219; (2) the usual requirement that the moving party go forward with evidence in support of his motion,Fitzgeraldv.Commonwealth(1982),223 Va. 615,627,292 S.E.2d 798,804; and (3) the need for the prosecutor and the court to be put on notice as to what the defendant is challenging.
We are persuaded that the burden of going forward with evidence of probable cause for a search or seizure should be on the prosecution. Law enforcement searches and seizures without the authority of a warrant are not entitled to a presumption of legality. Such searches are, as previously mentioned,per seunreasonable. Further, the theory that the moving party should go forward with evidence, and the need for the prosecutor and court to be put on notice as to what the defendant is challenging, are accounted for in our holding that the movant is required to establish a warrantless search or seizure and specify the grounds of his challenge before the burden of production falls upon the prosecution.
Therefore, we hold that, once a defendant has demonstrated a warrantless search or seizure and adequately clarified that the ground upon which he challenges its legality is lack of probable cause, the prosecutor bears the burden of proof, including the burden of going forward with evidence, on the issue of whether probable cause existed for the search or seizure.
However, the prosecutor did not object to the defendant's motion and the court allowed the parties to proceed. Defense ounsel's questions to the officers established that there was no warrant authorizing the test. Though defense counsel's questions to the officers can be interpreted as going to the issue of whether they had a reasonable basis for stopping and arresting the defendantfor speeding, defense counsel did, on the record, state that his questioning of the officers was intended to show that Wallace was not driving in a manner which indicated he might be intoxicated and, therefore, that there was no probable cause to have Wallace submit to a breath test. Defense counsel cited authority to support his argument and offered to provide the prosecution with copies of the cited cases. Therefore, we find that the defendant met the requirement that he place the prosecution on notice as to the grounds upon which he challenged the administration of the breathalyzer test.
The prosecutor waived argument, did not present evidence, and declined the court's offer of additional time in which to respond. Therefore, we find that the state failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue of whether there was probable cause to administer that test.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
HOLMES and DOUGLAS, JJ., dissent.Page 222
- Wallace was also charged with violating Xenia Revised Code Sections333.03(D) (speeding) and333.01(A)(1) (operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol). Upon request of the prosecutor, both charges were subsequently dropped. ↩
- The overwhelming majority of state and federal courts are in agreement on this point. See the cases cited in Hall, Search and Seizure (1982 and 1987 Cum. Supp.) 707, fn. 18, Section 26:28. ↩
- The court citesAldermanv.United States(1969),394 U.S. 165, where the Supreme Court held at 183 that, once an illegal search has been proven, the burden of persuasion as to whether certain evidence was tainted by the search rests with the state, but the burden of going forward with specific evidence of taint was on the defendant.Aldermanis distinguishable in that it deals with the "fruit of the poison tree doctrine," whereas we are dealing with the legality of the search in the first instance. ↩
- The motion stated:
"Now comes the Defendant, LAMAR EUGENE WALLACE, through counsel, and moves the Court for an Order excluding from consideration in the above-captioned matter.
"Any evidence the City will present relating to any chemical test on the grounds that said test does not conform to the laws in that it was illegally obtained.
"Defendant further moves that said test be excluded from consideration in the above-captioned matter on the grounds that the test that is alleged to have been administered to the Defendant was not performed according to the procedures prescribed by the State of Ohio." ↩