Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc.

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

91 Ohio St.3d 38

.]




       BAILEY, APPELLEE, v. REPUBLIC ENGINEERED STEELS, INC. ET AL.,
                                       APPELLANTS.
      [Cite as Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 

2001-Ohio-236

.]
Workers’ compensation—Psychiatric condition of an employee arising from a
        compensable injury or occupational disease suffered by a third party is
        compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).
(Nos. 99-2174 and 99-2296—Submitted October 11, 2000—Decided February 7,
                                           2001.)
   APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No.
                                      1999CA00084.
                                  __________________
                                SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
A psychiatric condition of an employee arising from a compensable injury or an
        occupational disease suffered by a third party is compensable under R.C.
        4123.01(C)(1).
                                  __________________
        FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
        {¶ 1} According to the complaint, on May 15, 1996, Leonard J. Bailey,
appellee, an employee of appellant Republic Engineered Steels, Inc. (“Republic”),
was operating a tow motor when he accidentally ran over and killed a coworker.
As a result of the accident, appellee received treatment for severe depression.
Appellee filed an application with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation,
appellant, seeking compensation for his depression. The claim was denied at all
administrative levels by the Industrial Commission based upon a determination that
Bailey had not sustained an injury as defined in R.C. 4123.01(C). Pursuant to R.C.
                                    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




4123.512, appellee appealed the denial of his claim to the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas.
         {¶ 2} Republic filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the action, arguing
that Bailey had not suffered a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). The
trial court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.
         {¶ 3} Appellee appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The court
of appeals reversed the trial court. In doing so, the appellate court construed R.C.
4123.01(C)(1) as including psychiatric conditions that arise from a third party’s
compensable injury or occupational disease.1
         {¶ 4} Upon motion, the court of appeals certified a conflict to this court,
finding that its interpretation of R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) conflicts with a decision from
the Second District in Neil v. Mayfield (July 22, 1988), Montgomery App. No.
10881, unreported, 

1988 WL 76179

.
         {¶ 5} This case is now before this court upon our determination that a
conflict exists (case No. 99-2296, 

88 Ohio St.3d 1435

, 

724 N.E.2d 811

) and upon
the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 99-2174, 

88 Ohio St.3d 1437

, 

724 N.E.2d 812

).
         {¶ 6} The question certified by the court of appeals is “[w]hether a
psychiatric condition arising from a compensable injury or occupational disease
suffered by a third party is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).” For the


1. Although the court of appeals held that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1)’s definition of injury embraced
psychiatric conditions resulting from injuries to others, the court arrived at its holding in a
roundabout fashion. In reaching its holding, the appellate court first considered whether the statute
was constitutional under the equal protection provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
In doing so, the appellate court ignored basic principles of statutory construction. State ex rel.
Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 

164 Ohio St. 142

, 

57 O.O. 134

, 

128 N.E.2d 59

, paragraph one of
the syllabus (courts shall presume statute is constitutional); Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 

73 Ohio St.3d 260, 269

, 

652 N.E.2d 952, 960

 (where more than one
construction of a statute is possible, court shall adopt the one that preserves its constitutional
validity). Since there is a constitutional interpretation of the statute, as explained infra, the appellate
court should have refrained from addressing the constitutional question.




                                                    2
                                     January Term, 2001




reasons that follow, we find that a psychiatric condition of an employee arising
from a compensable injury or occupational disease suffered by a third person is
compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). We affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
         {¶ 7} The statute at issue is R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). This statute defines the
term “injury,” as that word is used in Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws, as:
         “ ‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means
or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of,
the injured employee’s employment. ‘Injury’ does not include:
         “(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an
injury or occupational disease.”2
         {¶ 8} The primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. (2000), 

88 Ohio St.3d 376, 377

, 

726 N.E.2d 497

, 499. In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to
the language of the statute. Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 

36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105

, 

65 O.O.2d 296, 298

, 

304 N.E.2d 378, 381

. In considering the statutory
language, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in a statute, not
to delete words used or to insert words not used. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v.
Cleveland (1988), 

37 Ohio St.3d 50

, 

524 N.E.2d 441

, paragraph three of the
syllabus. If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be
applied as written. State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
(1996), 

74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545

, 

660 N.E.2d 463

, 465.



2. Before its amendment in 1986, the statute had defined a compensable injury as “any injury,
whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the
course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 340, 140
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3481, 3485. The 1986 legislation amended R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) to provide that
the definition of injury did not include psychiatric conditions, except those that had arisen from a
physical injury or occupational disease. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 718.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 9} The plain reading of the statute reveals that the intent of the General
Assembly is to limit claims for psychiatric conditions to situations where the
conditions arise from an injury or occupational disease. However, R.C.
4123.01(C)(1) does not specify who must be injured or who must sustain an
occupational disease. If we were to construe the statute as requiring that the
compensable injury must be suffered by the claimant, we would be inserting words
into the statute. Thus, whether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) includes psychiatric conditions
arising from physical injuries sustained by third parties is not a question that can be
answered from the plain language of the statute.
       {¶ 10} Where the words of a statute are ambiguous, interpretation is
necessary. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1987), 

32 Ohio St.3d 24, 27

, 

512 N.E.2d 332, 335

. Ambiguity exists if the language of the statute
is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. State ex rel. Toledo
Edison Co. v. Clyde (1996), 

76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513-514

, 

668 N.E.2d 498, 504

.
       {¶ 11} In determining legislative intent when faced with an ambiguous
statute, the court may consider several factors, including the object sought to be
obtained, circumstances under which the statute was enacted, the legislative
history, and the consequences of a particular construction. R.C. 1.49; State v.
Jordan (2000), 

89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492

, 

733 N.E.2d 601, 605

. Along with these
statutory construction principles, we must also apply the directive found in R.C.
4123.95 to liberally construe the workers’ compensation laws in favor of
employees. A liberal construction has been defined as giving “generously all that
the statute authorizes,” and “adopting the most comprehensive meaning of the
statutory terms in order to accomplish the aims of the Act and to advance its
purpose, with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the applicability of the
statute to the particular case. Interpretation and construction should not result in a
decision so technical or narrow as to defeat the compensatory objective of the Act.”




                                          4
                                January Term, 2001




Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law (2 Ed.1998) 9, Section 1.7. We now
turn to a discussion of those relevant factors.
       {¶ 12} The foundation for Ohio’s workers’ compensation system is the
Ohio Constitution. In 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to adopt an
enabling provision authorizing the enactment of legislation for the compensation of
workers injured in the workplace.        See Section 35, Article II of the Ohio
Constitution. “[L]aws may be passed * * * determining the terms and conditions
upon which payment shall be made therefrom.” In accordance with this mandate,
the General Assembly promulgated the Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act, R.C.
Chapter 4123. “ ‘[F]ounded upon wise, beneficent and humanitarian principles,’
workers’ compensation provides in the interests of justice a salutary measure
designed for the protection of those unfortunate enough to suffer work-related
injuries. The polestar of the system is the welfare of the workers.” Fulton, supra,
at 2, Section 1.1, quoting Suez v. Young (1963), 

118 Ohio App. 415, 418

, 

25 O.O.2d 315

, 316, 

195 N.E.2d 117, 120

. Thus, it has succinctly been said that the purpose
of the Act is to protect employees against risks and hazards incident to the
performance of their work. Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co. (1986), 

26 Ohio St.3d 142, 144

, 26 OBR 122, 123, 

497 N.E.2d 969, 971

.
       {¶ 13} The workers’ compensation system was enacted to replace the
unsatisfactory common-law remedies available to those injured in the workplace.
Indus. Comm. v. Weigandt (1921), 

102 Ohio St. 1

, 7, 

130 N.E. 38

, 39-40. The Act
reflected a growing public sentiment that employees should receive compensation
for work-related injuries and that compensation should be regarded as a charge
upon the business in which the employee worked. Fulton, supra, at 3, Section 1.2.
The cost of the system was and is taxed to the employer as an expense involved in
carrying on a business. Village v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1984), 

15 Ohio St.3d 129, 131

, 15 OBR 279, 280, 

472 N.E.2d 1079, 1081

. The Workers’ Compensation Act
is a product of compromise between employers and employees. The compromise




                                          5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




is that if there is an event arising out of workplace requirements, which event is the
proximate cause of a worker’s injury, that worker should be afforded the protections
of a compensable claim. In exchange, the employer is granted immunity from civil
suit. The Act provides the statutory mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits
and medical care to victims of work-connected injuries and for allocating the
ultimate cost of such injuries to consumers by augmenting the cost of goods or
services that are a product of that work in order to reimburse employers for a
prescribed insurance premium. Fulton, supra, Section 1.2.
       {¶ 14} After a consideration of the above, we conclude that the legislature’s
intent was to allow compensation in cases where an employee suffers a mental
injury caused by a coworker’s physical injury. This construction of the statute
fulfills the compensatory objective and humanitarian nature of the Act. In fact, to
deny coverage to a claimant who has suffered a psychiatric injury as a result of a
physical injury to a coworker would frustrate the very purpose of the Act, which is
to compensate workers who are injured as a result of the requirements of their
employment. In addition, a contrary reading of the statute would eviscerate the
“benefit of the bargain” compromise component of the workers’ compensation
system.
       {¶ 15} We also reject Republic’s arguments that other provisions of the Act
support its position that Bailey’s injury is not compensable. Republic points to the
noncompensability of self-inflicted injuries, injuries caused by intoxication or
controlled substances, and suicide claims, among others. See R.C. 4123.54(A) and
(B). However, these injuries are clearly outside the scope of an employee’s duties
in the workplace and are obviously not compensable. In contrast, where an
employee witnesses or accidentally causes a coworker’s injury and develops a
psychiatric condition as a result, the injury is sustained within the scope of
employment.     Under these circumstances, it would be nonsensical to deny
compensation for this type of injury.




                                          6
                                   January Term, 2001




        {¶ 16} Accordingly, we hold that a psychiatric condition of an employee
arising from a compensable injury or occupational disease suffered by a third party
is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). Applying our holding to the facts of this
case, which we accept as true according to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Taylor v. London
(2000), 

88 Ohio St.3d 137, 139

, 

723 N.E.2d 1089, 1091

, we find that Bailey
presents an arguable claim for compensation under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). Thus, the
trial court erred in granting Republic’s motion to dismiss Bailey’s complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The judgment of the court
of appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the common pleas court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3
                                                                       Judgment affirmed.
        DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
        MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
                                  __________________
        COOK, J., dissenting.
        {¶ 17} The majority concludes that R.C. 4123.01(C) permits compensation
to an employee for a psychiatric condition where the psychiatric condition does not
arise from a physical injury or occupational disease suffered by that employee. In
reaching this result, the majority finds the statutory scheme ambiguous, asserting
that “R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) does not specify who must be injured or who must sustain
an occupational disease.”
        {¶ 18} But R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) must be read in conjunction with R.C.
4123.01(C). When this is done, the statutory scheme provides that an “[i]njury does
not include * * * [p]sychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen
from an injury,” which “includes any injury * * * received in the course of, and


3. We dismiss, as improvidently allowed, the discretionary appeal in case No. 99-2174, 

88 Ohio St.3d 1437

, 

724 N.E.2d 812

.




                                              7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




arising out of, the injured employee’s employment,” or from an occupational
disease. The statute therefore mandates (1) that a condition can constitute an injury
for purposes of workers’ compensation only if it is received in the course of and
arises out of “the” injured employee’s employment, R.C. 4123.01(C); and (2) that
a psychiatric condition constitutes an injury only if it arises from a predicate injury
as defined in R.C. 4123.01(C). R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). The General Assembly’s use
of “the” in R.C. 4123.01(C) should be read in light of the statutory directive that
“[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules
of grammar and common usage.” R.C. 1.42. Here, the word “the” in R.C.
4123.01(C) is a definite rather than an indefinite article. As such, “the” limits
“employee” so as to indicate the singular, distinguishing the sole, specific injured
employee from any injured employee. Therefore, the General Assembly’s use of
“the” in R.C. 4123.01(C) is restrictive. That is, the article confines the focus of
inquiry to a specific, sole employee: the claimant alleging the psychiatric condition.
It is not any employee whose injury can render a psychiatric condition
compensable; rather, it is a physical injury or occupational disease suffered by a
specific, single employee in the course of that individual’s employment that could
permit compensation for a related psychiatric condition.
       {¶ 19} Even assuming arguendo that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) is ambiguous, the
context and intent surrounding the statute indicate that one specific employee is the
focus of the inquiry — the employee claiming the psychiatric condition must have
sustained the physical injury. When a statute is ambiguous and the court must
determine the intent of the legislature, R.C. 1.49 permits the court to consider, in
addition to other matters:
       “(A) The object sought to be attained;
       “(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
       “(C) The legislative history;




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                                   January Term, 2001




           “(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon
the same or similar subjects;
           “(E) The consequences of a particular construction;
           “(F) The administrative construction of the statute.”
           {¶ 20} The context in which R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) was enacted and the
administrative construction of that statute may therefore inform my interpretation
of that section. This court has emphasized the importance of these two factors,
stating:
           “The court must consider the context of the 1986 amendments [to R.C.
4123.01] because ‘a legislative body in enacting amendments is presumed to have
in mind prior judicial constructions of the section.’ State ex rel. Huron Cty. Bd. of
Edn. v. Howard (1957), 

167 Ohio St. 93

, 96, 

4 O.O.2d 83

, 84, 

146 N.E.2d 604

, 607.
We also presume that the General Assembly had in mind prior administrative
constructions of the statutory sections.” (Emphasis added.) Rambaldo v. Accurate
Die Casting (1992), 

65 Ohio St.3d 281, 286

, 

603 N.E.2d 975, 979

.
           {¶ 21} Review of the context surrounding the 1986 addition of R.C.
4123.01(C)(1) to the statutory scheme reveals that the purpose behind the
amendment was merely to clarify the intent of the General Assembly. Prior to the
1986 amendments, there existed a long history of judicial constructions of “injury”
evincing an understanding that compensable injuries under the workers’
compensation system had to include a physical component suffered by the claimant.
For example, psychiatric conditions arising from a physical injury were allowed.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 

62 Ohio St.2d 166

, 

16 O.O.3d 199

, 

404 N.E.2d 153

. But “[d]isabilities occasioned solely by emotional
stress without contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma [were] not
compensable injuries within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(C).” Szymanski v.
Halle’s Dept. Store (1980), 

63 Ohio St.2d 195

, 

17 O.O.3d 120

, 

407 N.E.2d 502

,
syllabus. Accordingly, an employee whose job-related emotional stress caused a




                                            9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




heart attack failed to present a compensable injury. 

Id.

 In reaching this result, this
court interpreted that version of R.C. 4123.01(C) in place from 1959 until the 1986
amendments. See 128 Ohio Laws 744-745; 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 739. The
Szymanski court explained that this version of the statute codified existing case law
that defined an injury as requiring contemporaneous physical injury or physical
trauma. 

Id. at 198

, 

17 O.O.3d at 122

, 

407 N.E.2d at 505

.
        {¶ 22} The 1986 amendment resulting in R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) explicitly
codified that “mental-mental” claims — psychiatric conditions arising solely from
job-related emotional stress — were not compensable under the system. And the
relevant 1986 amendments to R.C. 4123.01(C) were aimed at clarifying that while
“mental-mental” claims are not allowed, “mental-physical” claims are permitted.
Nothing in the 1986 amendments, however, suggests that they were meant to
introduce a previously unrecognized category of psychiatric claims arising from
injuries to third parties.
        {¶ 23} Further, the administrative construction of both current R.C.
4123.01(C) and its precursor support interpreting R.C. 4123.01(C) as denying
psychiatric conditions related to physical injuries to third parties. The Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation not only denied compensation to Bailey in the instant case,
but also has required a physical injury to the claimant before granting compensation
for a psychiatric condition, both prior to and following the 1986 amendments. See,
e.g., Andolsek v. Kirtland (1994), 

99 Ohio App.3d 333

, 

650 N.E.2d 911

; Connors
v. Sterling Milk Co. (1993), 

98 Ohio App.3d 711

, 

649 N.E.2d 856

; Fields v.
Youngstown (May 30, 1989), Mahoning App. No. 88 CA 89, unreported, 

1989 WL 59014

; Neil v. Mayfield (July 22, 1988), Montgomery App. No. 10881, unreported,

1988 WL 76179

.
        {¶ 24} Finally, today’s holding is at odds with the construction of the
statutory scheme set forth by the majority in Bunger v. Lawson Co. (1998), 

82 Ohio St.3d 463, 465-466

, 

696 N.E.2d 1029, 1032

 (rejecting “mental-mental” claim). In




                                         10
                                     January Term, 2001




Bunger, this court acknowledged that the limited scope of the workers’
compensation system requires the existence of a physical injury to the claimant,
stating:
           “The workers’ compensation system was not designed to resolve every
dispute that arises between employers and employees. It was designed to manage
the compensation of individuals who suffer physical injuries or contract
occupational diseases on the job.
           “***
           “A majority of states allow compensation to workers for some purely
psychological injuries suffered in the workplace. * * * Ohio’s General Assembly
has yet to make such injuries compensable under workers’ compensation statutes.
* * * [P]sychological injuries are removed from the coverage of the Act * * *.”
(Citation omitted.) 

Id. at 465-466

, 

696 N.E.2d at 1032

. Today’s majority decision
does not even acknowledge Bunger.
           {¶ 25} Bailey is not entitled to compensation for his depression since he has
not suffered a predicate “injury” as that term is defined under R.C. 4123.01(C).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.4
           MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing
dissenting opinion.
                                   __________________

           Brian & Brian, Steven J. Brian, Richard F. Brian and Brian R. Mertes, for
appellee.
           Black, McCuskey, Souers & Arbaugh, Mary E. Randall, Edward C. Redder
and John L. Juergensen, for appellant Republic Engineered Steels, Inc.

4. As in Bunger, the parties here argue the constitutionality of the statutory scheme defining what
constitutes an injury. The majority’s reasoning, however, avoids the issue. Accordingly, similar to
Bunger, I respond only to the majority’s statutory analysis. See Bunger, 

82 Ohio St.3d 463

, 469-
470, 

696 N.E.2d 1029, 1035

 (Cook, J., dissenting).




                                                11
                           SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Administrator, Bureau of Workers’
Compensation.
       Paulette M. Ivan, Ronald A. Fresco and William R. Thomas, urging reversal
for amici curiae Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., Landair/Forward Air Services, and
Johnson Controls, Inc.
       Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert A. Minor and Robin R. Obetz,
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association and Ohio Self-
Insurers’ Association.
       Philip J. Fulton & Associates, Philip J. Fulton, William A. Thorman III and
Jonathan H. Goodman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers.
       Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy,
urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio AFL-CIO and Ohio Psychological
Association.
                             __________________




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