Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School District

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

73 Ohio St.3d 360

.]




  ADAMSKY, APPELLANT, v. BUCKEYE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLEE.
        [Cite as Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist., 

1995-Ohio-298

.]
Schools—Tort        liability—Statute       of    limitations—R.C.        2744.04(A)      is
        unconstitutional as applied to minors.
R.C. 2744.04(A) is unconstitutional as applied to minors as it violates Section
        2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
        (No. 94-811—Submitted May 9, 1995—Decided August 30, 1995.)
       APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 2258-M.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Jennifer Adamsky, filed this personal injury action against
appellee, Buckeye Local School District, two days before her twentieth birthday.
Her complaint alleged that when she was fourteen, a volleyball base fell on her right
foot during a clean-up activity in gym class and injured her toes.
        {¶ 2} Appellee moved to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred by
the two-year statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2744.04(A).                  Appellant
opposed the motion, asserting that the savings statute of R.C. 2305.16 applied, and
she had until two years after she reached eighteen to file suit. Appellant also argued
that to limit her action to a shorter time period would deny her due process of law
under Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution pursuant to Mominee v.
Scherbarth (1986), 

28 Ohio St.3d 270

, 28 OBR 346, 

503 N.E.2d 717

. The trial
court found the action was time-barred and dismissed the suit. The court of appeals
affirmed.
        {¶ 3} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
                                  __________________
        Jeffrey W. Largent, for appellant.
                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         Michael J. Spetrino, for appellee.
         Casper & Casper and Michael R. Thomas, urging reversal for amicus
curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
         Reinhart Law Office and Harry R. Reinhart, urging reversal for amicus
curiae, Keith N. Frazier.
                                     __________________
         FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
         {¶ 4} The sole issue before this court is whether R.C. 2744.04(A) is
unconstitutional as applied to minors. For the following reasons, we hold that it is
and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
         {¶ 5} The Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 2744.04 in 1985 as part of
the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act.                141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1699.
Appellee, a school board, is a political subdivision included within this Act. R.C.
2744.01(F). The provision of the Act in question, R.C. 2744.04(A),1 provides that
an action against a political subdivision to recover damages for personal injury shall
be brought within two years after the cause of action arose. It makes no mention
of a tolling period for minors.
         {¶ 6} Appellant challenges2 this statutory provision on due process grounds,
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.3 Amici curiae make the additional

1. R.C. 2744.04(A) reads as follows:
          “An action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to
persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function, whether brought as an original action, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party
claim, or claim for subrogation, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action arose, or
within any applicable shorter period of time for bringing the action provided by the Revised Code.
This division applies to actions brought against political subdivisions by all persons, governmental
entities, and the state.”

2. Below, appellant argued that the disabilities statute contained within R.C. 2305.16 tolled the
limitations period until the age of majority was reached. However, the lower courts correctly found
that by its very terms, R.C. 2305.16 did not apply. R.C. 2305.16 makes specific mention of the
statutes to which it applies, and R.C. 2744.04 is not one of them.




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                                     January Term, 1995




argument that the statute violates equal protection, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.4 While appellant’s argument may have some merit, we find amici’s
equal protection challenge dispositive of the case.
         {¶ 7} We begin, of course, with the premise that legislative enactments are
presumed constitutional. R.C. 1.47(A). However, this presumption is rebuttable.
State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St.142, 

57 O.O. 134

, 

128 N.E.2d 59

, paragraph one of the syllabus; Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp.
(1983), 

6 Ohio St.3d 300

, 6 OBR 361, 

452 N.E.2d 1337

. While the General
Assembly also has the power to define the contours of the state’s liability, it must
operate within the confines of equal protection and due process.                       Fabrey v.
McDonald Police Dept. (1994), 

70 Ohio St.3d 351, 355

, 

639 N.E.2d 31, 35

.
         {¶ 8} “[D]iscrimination against individuals or groups is sometimes an
inevitable result of the operation of a statute.” Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen’s
Death Benefit Fund (1993), 

66 Ohio St.3d 443, 446

, 

613 N.E.2d 574, 577

. “The
mere fact that a statute discriminates does not mean that the statute must be
unconstitutional.” 

Id. at 446-447

, 

613 N.E.2d at 577

.
         {¶ 9} In determining whether a statute violates equal protection, we
examine the class distinction drawn to decide if a suspect class or fundamental right
is involved in order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. 

Id. at 447

, 

613 N.E.2d at 577

. The right to sue a political subdivision has been held not to be a



3. Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
         “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered
without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner,
as may be provided by law.”

4. Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
         “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they
may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not
be altered, revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.”




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fundamental right. 

Fabrey, supra,

70 Ohio St.3d at 353

, 

639 N.E.2d at 33

.
Moreover, this case does not involve a suspect class which has been traditionally
defined as one involving race, national origin, religion, or sex. 

Id.

 Therefore, rather
than apply heightened scrutiny, we review the statute according to the “rational
basis” test.   Consequently, the statute must be upheld if it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 

Roseman, supra,

66 Ohio St.3d at 447

, 

613 N.E.2d at 577

. However, a statutory classification will be found to
violate equal protection if it treats similarly situated people in a different manner
based upon an illogical and arbitrary basis. Morris v. Savoy (1991), 

61 Ohio St.3d 684, 711

, 

576 N.E.2d 765, 785

, citing State v. Buckley (1968), 

16 Ohio St.2d 128

,

45 O.O.2d 469

, 

243 N.E.2d 66

 (A.W. Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
        {¶ 10} One purpose of R.C. 2744.04(A) is to preserve the fiscal resources
of the political subdivision.     We recognize that preserving state money can
sometimes be a rational reason for creating a particular classification. However,
when preserving state money is accomplished by treating an individual in an
arbitrary manner, it is not a rational reason to classify. 

Roseman, supra,

66 Ohio St.3d at 450

, 

613 N.E.2d at 579

.
        {¶ 11} In addition, R.C. 2744.04(A) is a statute of limitations. The goal of
any general statute of limitations is to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their legal
rights to the detriment of defendants. On its face, R.C. 2744.04(A) bears a real and
substantial relationship to this goal. However, once applied to minors, it may
satisfy this objective, but may also produce unfair results. “R.C. 2744.04(A) does
not just limit stale claims brought by minors; it precludes most minors from
bringing any claims against political subdivisions once they reach the age of
majority.” Foster v. Cleveland Hts./University Hts. Bd. of Edn. (Oct. 13, 1994),
Cuyahoga App. No. 66852, unreported, 

1994 WL 568325

.




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                                      January Term, 1995




         {¶ 12} Thus, R.C. 2744.04(A), as a provision of the Political Subdivision
Tort Liability Act, creates a classification of all persons injured by torts committed
by the state or a political subdivision and gives them a two-year period to bring suit.
However, R.C. 2744.04(A) treats members of this class differently. Adults have
the full two years after the cause of action accrued to bring suit, whereas some
minors, by virtue of their lack of standing to bring suit before they reach majority,
are barred from pursuing their claims.5 We recognize, of course, that in the vast
majority of cases, parents, guardians or a next friend, following the dictates of
Civ.R. 17(B), will commence suit against a political subdivision on behalf of the
minor before the statute of limitations has run. However, we can discern no rational
reason to deny due process or the right to redress to those few children who, for
whatever reason, did not have an action brought on their behalf within the two-year
limitations period. This small group of minors has been selected for this disparate
and more severe treatment more so than others who are within the same class. This
disparity is irrational and violates equal protection principles, which demand that
those situated in the same class receive equal treatment. While the General
Assembly may provide for suits against political subdivisions and define the
limitations, it may not arbitrarily and irrationally decide who the plaintiffs will be.
         {¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, we hold that R.C. 2744.04(A) is
unconstitutional as applied to minors as it violates Section 2, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
                                                                              Judgment reversed
                                                                           and cause remanded.
         MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and HADLEY, JJ., CONCUR.


5. The law has traditionally recognized that minors lack the maturity to act intelligently with regard
to their legal rights. Thus, we promulgated Civ.R. 17(B), which sets out how a suit may be brought
on behalf of a minor.




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                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         WRIGHT, J., DISSENTS.
         RONALD E. HADLEY, J., the Third Appellate District, sitting for Cook, J.
                                     __________________
         WRIGHT, J., dissenting.
         {¶ 14} After the trial court held that her lawsuit was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations in R.C. 2744.04(A), Jennifer Adamsky appealed, arguing
exclusively that R.C. 2744.04(A) violates the Due Process Clause under Section
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed. Adamsky
appealed to this court, again arguing exclusively that R.C. 2744.04(A) is
unconstitutional as a violation of Ohio’s Due Process Clause. For whatever reason,
the majority does not even address appellant’s due process arguments. Instead, the
majority decides the case on the grounds that R.C. 2744.04(A), as applied, violates
Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause!
         {¶ 15} There is no reference to Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution
in any of the briefs in this case. The parties in this case never made an equal
protection challenge to R.C. 2744.04(A). Even the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
and Keith Frazier, as amici, do not argue R.C. 2744.04(A) is unconstitutional under
Section 2, Article I. Instead, they make an argument, raised for the first time in
their combined amici brief, that R.C. 2744.04(A) violates the Equal Protection
Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6



6. The asserted reason for the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and Keith Frazier joining as amici
curiae in this case was to advance the constitutional argument raised in Frazier’s case. The Frazier
case also concerned an action against a school district that, although the minor’s parents sued on his
behalf, was determined to be time-barred under R.C. 2744.04(A). Unlike Adamsky, Frazier
challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 2744.04(A) under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
          Although Frazier’s analysis is partially vindicated by the majority’s opinion, his is a
Pyrrhic victory. That is because judgment for the school district in Frazier’s case is res judicata.
Although Frazier appealed his case to this court, case No. 94-1892, after he filed his amicus brief in
this case, we dismissed his case because Frazier failed to timely file his merit brief. See 

71 Ohio St.3d 1441

, 

643 N.E.2d 1152

. We similarly denied his request to have his case held and the




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                                    January Term, 1995




        {¶ 16} Putting aside the disturbing fact that an equal protection argument
was never raised in this case, I am completely satisfied that the majority is incorrect
in concluding that R.C. 2744.04(A) violates Section 2, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.
        {¶ 17} The majority adopts amici’s argument that, as applied, R.C.
2744.04(A) discriminates between adults and persons under the age of eighteen.
Specifically, the majority finds that, unlike adults who have two years in which to
file their claim, children from the age of sixteen to eighteen have less than two years
in which to file a claim and children under the age of sixteen have no opportunity
to file a claim. This proposition has some facial attraction. However, on even this
preliminary matter, the majority and I disagree. R.C. 2744.04(A) does not create a
classification between minors and adults.7                 Instead, the only significant
classification created by R.C. 2744.04(A) is a classification based on the nature of
the defendant, i.e., whether the defendant is a political subdivision or a private
entity. Where a private entity is the defendant, minors may take advantage of R.C.
2305.16 to toll their statute of limitations during their minority. However, where a
political subdivision is the defendant, the tolling provision is simply not available.
Therefore, stated more accurately, the equal protection argument against R.C.
2744.04(A) is that the statute is unconstitutional because, unlike minors who sue




dismissal stayed pending the resolution of the case before us. See 

71 Ohio St.3d 1451

, 

644 N.E.2d 656

.
         Consequently, the majority reaches the extraordinary result of ignoring the arguments
advanced by Adamsky, adopting the arguments pressed by Frazier, as amicus, and then rendering
judgment for Adamsky, while at the same time judgment in the Frazier case remains in favor of the
school board.

7. The actual classification is created by Civ.R. 17(B), which courts have read as providing that
minors may not sue on their own behalf. See, e.g., Day v. Mac Donald (1990), 

67 Ohio App.3d 240

, 

586 N.E.2d 1135

. See, also, R.C. 3109.01. Taken literally, the majority’s focus on the
classification between adults and minors would actually be an equal protection challenge to the
classification created by Civ.R. 17(B).




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




private parties, minors who sue political subdivisions do not have their statute of
limitations tolled during their minority.
       {¶ 18} The majority correctly notes that this case involves neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect class. As a result, the statute may be declared
invalid on equal protection grounds only if the classifications it creates “bear no
relation to the state’s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them.”
(Emphasis added.) Fabrey v. McDonald Police Dept. (1994), 

70 Ohio St.3d 351, 353

, 

639 N.E.2d 31, 33

, citing Clements v. Fashing (1982), 

457 U.S. 957, 963

, 

102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843

, 

73 L.E.2d 508, 515

. See, also, Lyle Constr., Inc. v. Div. of
Reclamation (1987), 

34 Ohio St.3d 22, 27

, 

516 N.E.2d 209, 213

. The challenger
must negate every conceivable basis that might support the statute in order for it to
be held invalid. Lyons v. Limbach (1988), 

40 Ohio St.3d 92, 94

, 

532 N.E.2d 106, 109

.
       {¶ 19} Applying this “rational basis” test, it is surely and abundantly clear
that the legislature’s decision not to provide a tolling provision for R.C. 2744.04
bears a rational relation to a proper governmental objective. As we have noted: “A
primary purpose of R.C. Chapter 2744 is to preserve the fiscal resources of political
subdivisions. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 

49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29

, 

550 N.E.2d 181, 182

. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that the
preservation of fiscal integrity is a valid state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson (1969),

394 U.S. 618, 633

, 

89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330

, 

22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614

.” 

Fabrey, supra,

70 Ohio St.3d at 353

, 

639 N.E.2d at 33-34

. There are at least two viable bases on
which the legislature could have concluded that the lack of a tolling provision for
R.C. 2744.04(A) furthers the legitimate goal of preserving the financial resources
of political subdivisions. First, the legislature could have been concerned that there
may be more claims against political subdivisions than private entities, given the
size of political subdivisions and their oftentimes far-flung operations. Thus, with
respect to political subdivisions, there would be both an increase in the burden of




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                                      January Term, 1995




investigating potential claims and the danger of stale claims. Second, the lack of a
tolling provision advances the interest of preserving the financial resources of
political subdivisions by allowing them to predict and to control their potential
liabilities from year to year. Both of these are legitimate, rational reasons that are
directly related to the absence of a tolling provision.8
         {¶ 20} Further, the legislature’s decision not to provide a tolling provision
for R.C. 2744.04 also is hardly arbitrary or unreasonable in light of the fact that,
although minors may not bring a lawsuit on their own behalf, a cause of action may
be brought for them by their appointed representative, guardian ad litem or next
friend. Civ.R. 17(B). In fact, the majority recognizes that “in the vast majority of
cases” the claims of minors will be capably prosecuted through their
representatives. Specifically, that is exactly the situation of Keith Frazier, an
amicus in this case, whose parents sued on his behalf.
         {¶ 21} As stated above, providing a tolling provision for R.C. 2744.04(A)
would actually run contrary to the important governmental objective of protecting
the fiscal resources of political subdivisions. Because a minor’s claim may be
prosecuted by a guardian before the minor reaches the age of majority, under R.C.
2744.04(A) minors already have two full years within which to assert their claims.
If a tolling provision were applied, as the majority finds constitutionally required,
minors would have more than two years within which to assert their claims. For
example, under the majority opinion, a seven year old who is injured as a result of
an act or omission by a political subdivision would have eleven years within which
her guardian could prosecute a claim on her behalf. Then she would have two more
years after she reached majority within which to prosecute her claim. In total, that


8. I am not alone in my belief that not providing a tolling provision in this context has a reasonable
basis. The Supreme Court of Iowa in Harden v. Iowa (Iowa 1989), 

434 N.W.2d 881

, certiorari
denied (1989), 

493 U.S. 869

, 

110 S.Ct. 194

, 

107 L.Ed.2d 149

, reached an identical result with
respect to its statute of limitations governing actions against the state. The Harden court upheld its
provision under a similar equal protection, as well as a due process, attack.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




minor would now have thirteen years within which to bring suit. Such a result is
surely contrary to the legislature’s valid attempt to set reasonable limits on the
amount of time within which a political subdivision is vulnerable to suit.
       {¶ 22} As the above analysis makes clear, the General Assembly acted
rationally and in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest when it relied
upon the integrity and vigilance of parents, guardians and next friends in declining
to provide a tolling provision for R.C. 2744.04(A). The majority’s adoption of an
argument raised for the first time to this court by amici to strike down R.C.
2744.04(A) as unconstitutional strikes a blow against the legislature’s legitimate
attempt to set reasonable time limits on the liability of political subdivisions.
However, the effect of the majority opinion does not stop there. Indeed, by
declaring a statute of limitations unconstitutional because it does not include a
tolling provision, the court has taken a significant step towards making tolling
provisions constitutionally mandated for all statutes of limitations.
       {¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
                               __________________




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