Trustees Of The New York City District Council Of Carpenters Pension Fund, Welfare Fund, Annuity Fund, and Apprenticeship, Journeyman Retraining, Educational and Industry Fund v. Win Belleville, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                             
TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK CITY DISTRICT                                    
COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS PENSION FUND,                                       
WELFARE FUND, ANNUITY FUND, AND                                           
APPRENTICESHIP, JOURNEYMAN RETRAINING,                                    
EDUCATIONAL, AND INDUSTRY FUND; THE                                       
TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK CITY CARPENTERS                                  
RELIEF AND CHARITY FUND; THE NEW YORK CITY                                
AND VICINITY CARPENTERS LABOR-              OPINION AND ORDER             
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; and THE NEW YORK       18 Civ. 5376 (ER)          
CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,                                      
               Petitioners,                                          
            –against –                                               
WIN BELLEVILLE, LLC a/k/a WIN DEVELOPMENT                                 
INC.,                                                                     
               Respondents.                                          
Ramos, D.J.:                                                              
Two union benefit funds, Trustees of the New York City District Council of Carpenters 
Pension Fund, Welfare Fund, Annuity Fund, and Apprenticeship, Journeyman Retraining, 
Educational, and Industry Fund (the “ERISA Funds”) and the Trustees of the New York City 
Carpenters Relief and Charity Fund (the “Charity Fund”), along with the associated labor-
management organizations, the New York City and Vicinity Carpenters Labor-Management 
Corporation and the New York City District Council of Carpenters, a union, petition the Court to 
confirm an arbitration award against Win Belleville, LLC a/k/a Win Development Inc, invoking 
the Court’s jurisdiction under 

29 U.S.C. § 185

.  For the reasons stated below, the petitioners’ 
motion is GRANTED.                                                        
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
�e petitioners are all labor-related organizations that function for the benefit of
carpenters in the New York City area.  �e ERISA Funds are trustees of several labor-
management trust funds organized and operated in accordance with the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974, 

29 U.S.C. § 1001

 et seq., based in New York City.  Pet. to Confirm 
Arbitration Award (“Pet.”) ¶ 4, Doc. 1.   �e Charity Fund is a 501(c)(3) charitable organization 
based in New York City.  

Id. ¶ 5

.  �e Labor-Management Corporation and the Council of 
Carpenters are labor-management organizations based in New York, as well.  

Id. ¶¶ 6, 7

. 
�e respondent, Win Belleville, is a New Jersey limited liability corporation that has 
employed carpenters affiliated with the petitioners.  

Id. ¶ 8

.  Its principal place of business is in 
Belleaire Beach, Florida.  

Id.

                                            
In June 2017, Win Belleville recognized the Council of Carpenters as the exclusive 
bargaining agent for carpenters associated with the construction of a Walgreens in Belleville, 
New Jersey.  

Id. ¶ 9

.  �e agreement between Win Belleville and the Council of Carpenters 

includes a requirement that Win Belleville remit contributions to both the ERISA and Charity 
Funds for each hour worked by covered employees.  

Id. ¶ 12

.  It also includes requirements 
concerning the inspection of Win Belleville’s records, and it prescribes specific procedures for 
collecting any delinquent fees owed to the Funds.  

Id. ¶¶ 13, 14

.         
�e agreement includes two arbitration provisions, as well.  �e first is paragraph 3 of the 
project agreement, which indicates that Win Belleville “agrees to arbitrate any and all disputes 
arising out of the attached Agreement as provided in the attached Agreement, regardless of 
termination of this project.”  Pet. Ex. A.  �e second is article XV, section 7 of an attached 
collective bargaining agreement, which allows that any dispute “concerning any claim arising 
from payments to the Fund of principal and/or interest which is allegedly due” may be heard 
before an arbitrator.  Pet. Ex. C.  �e collective bargaining agreement also provides for the 
following specified damages:                                              
  (1) the unpaid contributions; plus                                 
  (2) interest on the unpaid contributions determined at the prime rate of Citi-
     bank plus 2%; plus                                              
  (3) an amount equal to the greater of —                            
     (a) the amount of the interest charges on the unpaid contributions as
       determined in (2) above, or                                   
     (b) liquidated damages of 20% of the amount of the unpaid contribtoins;
       plus                                                          
  (4) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action; and        
  (5) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

Id.

 art. XV § 6(a).                                                       
In late 2017 or early 2018, the petitioners audited Win Belleville’s records and 
determined that Win Belleville had failed to make the proper payments to the Funds between 
June and September 2017.  Pet. ¶ 18.  �e petitioners then initiated arbitration proceedings before 
Roger Maher, one of the arbitrators identified in article XV, section 7 of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id. ¶ 20.  �e arbitrator gave Win Belleville notice of an arbitration hearing in 
Manhattan on May 9, 2018 via regular and certified mail.  Id.             
Win Belleville did not appear at the arbitration hearing, and the arbitrator found it to be in 
default.  Id. Ex. F.  At the hearing, the petitioners submitted the collective bargaining agreement 
and presented testimony from their auditors, which established that Win Belleville was 
delinquent in its payments to the Funds.  Id. at 2.  �ose auditors described their accounting 
method and the way in which they computed the delinquency.  Id.  �e petitioners also presented 
testimony establishing the amount of damages they were owed under the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id.                                                           
On May 10, 2018, the arbitrator awarded the following damages to the petitioners per the 
collective bargaining agreement:                                          
             Principal  ..................................$  28,333.80 
             Total Interest  ...........................$  956.98    
             Liquidated Damages ................$  5,666.76          
             Late Payment Interest ..............$  25.03            
             Promo Fund .............................$  37.77        
             Court Costs ..............................$  400.00     
             Attorney’s Fee .........................$  1,500.00     
             Arbitrator’s Fee .......................$  500.00       
             TOTAL ...................................$  37,420.34   
Id. at 3.  �e arbitrator ordered that interest was to accrue at 5.75% from the date of the award. 
Win Belleville has not paid any of the award, nor has it moved to vacate or modify the 
award.  Pet. ¶¶ 24, 25.  Accordingly, the petitioners asked this Court in June 2018 to confirm the 
arbitrator’s award and enter judgment in their favor for the amount awarded, plus interest and 
attorneys’ fees.  Pet. at 7.  Although Win Belleville was served in this action, it has not made an 
appearance before this Court.  �e Court held a hearing on September 14, 2018 to show cause for 
why the petitioner’s motion should not be treated as an unopposed motion for summary 
judgment.  Win Belleville did not appear at that hearing and the Court thus converted the petition 
into an unopposed motion for summary judgment.  See D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 

462 F.3d 95

, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[G]enerally a district court should treat an unanswered . . . petition 
to confirm/vacate as an unopposed motion for summary judgment.”).         
II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                       
A. Standard for Confirming Arbitrations                              
Confirmation of an arbitral award normally takes the form of a summary proceeding that 
converts a final arbitration award into a judgment of the court.  D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. 
Gottdiener, 

462 F.3d 95, 110

 (2d Cir. 2006).  �e court is required to grant the award unless it is 
vacated, modified, or corrected.  

Id.

 (quoting 

9 U.S.C. § 9

).  An application for a judicial decree 
confirming an award receives “streamlined treatment as a motion, obviating the separate contract 
action that would usually be necessary to enforce or tinker with an arbitral award in court.”  Hall 
St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 

552 U.S. 576, 582

 (2008).            

In order to promote the goals of arbitration, which consist of “settling disputes efficiently 
and avoiding long and expensive litigation,” arbitration awards “are subject to very limited 
review.”  Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 

103 F.3d 9, 12

 
(2d Cir. 1997) (internal punctuation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Folkways Music 
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 

989 F.2d 108, 111

 (2d Cir. 1993)).  It is not necessary that the arbitrator 
explain the rationale for the award; the award “should be confirmed if a ground for the 
arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the case.”  D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 
110 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 

948 F.2d 117, 121

 (2d Cir. 1991)).  In short, as long as there is “a barely colorable justification for the
outcome reached,” a court should enforce an arbitration award ‒‒ even if it disagrees with it on 

the merits.  Landy Michaels Realty Corp. v. Local 32B–32J, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 

954 F.2d 794, 797

 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. Summary Judgment Standard                                         
An unanswered petition to confirm an arbitration award is to be treated “as an unopposed 
motion for summary judgment.”  D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 110; see also Trs. for The Mason 
Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund & Training Program Fund v. 
Earth Constr. Corp., No. 15 Civ. 3967 (RA), 

2016 WL 1064625

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2016) 
(internal quotation and alterations omitted) (“A district court should treat an unanswered petition 
to confirm or vacate as an unopposed motion for summary judgment and base its judgment on 
the record.”).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if 
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”  
Senno v. Elmsford Union Free Sch. Dist., 

812 F. Supp. 2d 454, 467

 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing SCR 

Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 

559 F.3d 133, 137

 (2d Cir. 2009)).  A fact is “material” if it 
might affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law.  

Id.

  
Even if a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, courts are required to “review the 
motion . . . and determine from what it has before it whether the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.”  Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 

373 F.3d 241, 246

 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Custer v. Pan Am. 
Life Ins. Co., 

12 F.3d 410, 416

 (4th Cir. 1993)).  “[W]hen a nonmoving party chooses the 
perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary judgment motion, the district court 
may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party’s submission to determine if 
it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial.”  Amaker v. 

Foley, 

274 F.3d 677, 681

 (2d Cir. 2001).                                  
If the burden of proof at trial would fall on the movant, that party’s “own submissions in 
support of the motion must entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.”  Albee Tomato, Inc. v. A.B. 
Shalom Produce Corp., 

155 F.3d 612, 618

 (2d Cir. 1998).  �e Court must “construe the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all 
reasonable inferences against the movant.”  Brod v. Omya, Inc., 

653 F.3d 156, 164

 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 

368 F.3d 123, 126

 
(2d Cir. 2004)).                                                          
III. DISCUSSION                                                           
A. Jurisdiction                                                      
�e Court must first begin by assuring itself of its jurisdiction.  See Sinoying Logistics Pte 
Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 

619 F.3d 207, 213

 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[B]efore a court grants a 
motion for default judgment, it may first assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant . . . .”).  �e Court ordered the petitioners on October 18, 2019 to show cause why the 
petition should not be dismissed due to a lack of personal jurisdiction over Win Belleville.  
Doc. 17.  �ey filed a memorandum in response on November 1, 2019.  Doc. 20.  For the reasons 
set forth below, the Court is convinced that it has personal jurisdiction over Win Belleville. 
“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state 
where the district court is located.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).  In New York, this determination 
involves a two-step analysis.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 

84 F.3d 560, 567

 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  �e Court must first determine whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant 

to the state’s general jurisdiction statute, C.P.L.R. § 301, or its long-arm jurisdiction statute, 
C.P.L.R. § 302.1  If and only if the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is deemed
appropriate according to New York law, the second step is an evaluation of whether the Court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 

616 F.3d 158

, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2010). 



1 C.P.L.R. § 302(a) allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant who:  (1) 
“transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state;” (2) “commits 
a tortious act within the state . . .;” (3) “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property 
within the state . . . ;” or (4) “owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.” 
�e Court finds that Win Belleville is within the reach of C.P.L.R. § 302 and that the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable under the U.S. Constitution. 
First, the petitioners properly served Win Belleville via hand delivery of a summons on 
Win Belleville’s registered agent.  Aff. of Service, Doc. 8.              

Second, Win Belleville purposefully availed itself of the privileges of New York law, 
even though it is a non-domicile.  See Chloe, 

616 F.3d at 169

.  In particular, Win Belleville has a 
contractual relationship with the petitioners, all New York entities, and it sent payments into New 
York pursuant to that contract.  See Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 

362 F.3d 17, 22

 (2d Cir. 
2004) (listing factors to be considered in determining personal jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary).  �is dispute arises from that contractual relationship and Win Belleville’s failure to 
fully make its payments into New York.  See Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 

673 F.3d 50, 66

 (2d Cir. 2012).  For these same reasons, the Court finds that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction comports with due process.  See D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 

462 F.3d 95, 105

 
(2d Cir. 2006).                                                           

Furthermore, Win Belleville has likely consented to this Court’s jurisdiction through its 
agreement to a forum-selection clause allowing for awards to be entered in New York state court, 
which is itself consent to the jurisdiction of the New York state courts.  Pet. Ex. C., art. XII § 2 
(“�e decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding . . . and may be entered as a final decree 
or judgment in the Supreme Court of the State of New York or in a court of appropriate 
jurisdiction . . . .”).                                                   
For these reasons, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Win Belleville and 
proceed to the merits of this petition.                                   
B. Confirmation of the Arbitration Award                             
�e Court has conducted a limited review of the arbitration agreement entered into by the 
parties and the ensuing arbitration award.  �e agreement between the parties required them “to 
arbitrate any and all disputes arising out of the [collective bargaining agreement] as provided in 

the [collective bargaining agreement], regardless of the termination of this project.” Pet. Ex. A 
¶ 3.  �e collective bargaining agreement specified that any arbitration was to take place before 
one of three arbitrators, one of whom was the arbitrator assigned here, Maher.  Pet. Ex. C art. 
XIII § 2.  �e agreement further states:                                   
  �e arbitrator shall have the right to conduct an ex-parte hearing in the event 
  of the failure of either party to be present at the time and place designated 
  for the arbitration, and shall have the power to render a decision based on 
  the testimony before him at such hearing. �e decision of the arbitrator shall 
  be final and binding upon both parties and may be entered as a final decree 
  or judgment in the Supreme Court of the State of New York or in a court of 
  appropriate jurisdiction in any state where such decision shall be rendered. 
Id.                                                                       
After providing notice via certified mail to Win Belleville, the arbitrator found that Win 
Belleville was in default.  Despite the default, the arbitrator heard evidence from the petitioners 
detailing the operative agreement, the deficiencies in Win Belleville’s records, and the 
calculations of damages.  �ere is no indication that this decision was made arbitrarily, that it 
exceeded the arbitrator’s jurisdiction under the agreement, or that it was contrary to law.  See Trs. 
of New York City Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Dejil Sys., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 005 
(JMF), 

2012 WL 3744802

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (“Where, as here, there is no 
indication that the arbitration decision was made arbitrarily, exceeded the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction, or otherwise was contrary to law, a court must confirm the award upon the timely 
application of any party.”).                                              
Accordingly, the Court finds that based on the record provided, together with the 
appropriate narrow level of review, there is no disputed material issue of fact and the arbitration 
award should be CONFIRMED.  See Landy, 

954 F.2d at 797

 (“[A]n arbitration award should be 
enforced . . . if there is ‘a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached.’” (quoting 

Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 

579 F.2d 691, 704

 (2d Cir. 1978))). 
C. Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Post-Judgment Interest                
�e petitioners also seek to recover an award of attorney’s fees and costs for the instant 
motion to confirm, as well as post-judgment interest.                     
�e Court agrees that the award of attorney’s fees in connection with this motion is 
merited.  “[C]ourts have routinely awarded attorney[’]s fees in cases where a party merely 
refuses to abide by an arbitrator’s award without challenging or seeking to vacate it through a 
motion to the court.”  Trs. of New York City Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. 
Alliance Workroom Corp., No. 13 Civ. 5096 (KPF), 

2013 WL 6498165

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 
2013) (quoting Abondolo v. H. & M.S. Meat Corp., No. 07 Civ. 3870 (RJS), 

2008 WL 2047612

, 

at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2008)) (collecting cases).  Win Belleville did not abide by the 
arbitration award and failed to timely participate in this action.  �e Court has reviewed the 
records supporting the 2.1 hours of attorney work at a rate of $275.00 per hour and the 0.2 hours 
of attorney work at a rate of $70.00 per hour; it finds those fees reasonable.  It finds the $75 in 
costs incurred for this action reasonable, as well.                       
And the Court grants post-judgment interest on the full judgment amount pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1961

(a).  See Lewis v. Whelan, 

99 F.3d 542, 545

 (2d Cir. 1996) (“�e award of post-
judgment interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the date judgment is entered.”). 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, petitioners’ motion is GRANTED.  The arbitration award is 
confirmed, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the petitioners in 
the amount of $37,420.34 against Win Belleville, LLC d/b/a Win Development Inc. plus interest 
at arate of 5.75% per annum accruing from May 10, 2018  until the date of entry of judgment. 
The Clerk is also directed to add $647.50 in attorneys’ fees and $75 in costs to that amount.  This 
judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest as mandated in 

28 U.S.C. § 1961

.  The Clerk of the 
Court is respectfully directed to close the case. 

It is SO ORDERED. 

Dated:   November 12, 2019                                          |  | 
   New York, New York                           so A   | 
                                                Edgardo Ramos, U.S.D.J. 

                                  1]