Mejia v. High Brew Coffee, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                             

…………………………………………………….x                                                    
JOSE MEJIA,                                                               
                               Plaintiff,                            
                    -v-                                                                                     No. 1:22-CV-03667-LTS  
HIGH BREW COFFEE INC.,                                                    
                               Defendant.                            

…………………………………………………….x                                                    
                   MEMORANDUM ORDER                                  
     Plaintiff Jose Mejia (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action against High 
Brew Coffee, Inc. (“Defendant”) asserting violations of Title III (“Title III”) of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 

42 U.S.C. section 12101

 et seq. (the “ADA”), and the New York 
City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code sections 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”).  
(Docket entry no. 1 (the “Complaint” or “Compl.”).)  Count I of the Complaint seeks injunctive 
relief under the ADA pertaining to Defendant’s website.  Count II seeks damages under the 
NYCHRL.  Count III seeks declaratory relief with respect to the ADA and NYCHRL violations 
alleged in Counts I and II.                                               
     Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, for failure to state a claim.  The Court has jurisdiction of 
Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. section 1331

.  The Court has considered carefully 
the parties’ submissions and, for the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
Complaint is granted.                                                     
                      BACKGROUND                                     
     The following allegations are taken from the Complaint and are presumed true for 
the purposes of this motion.  Plaintiff is a legally blind individual who the parties agree is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA.  (Compl. ¶ 1.)  Defendant sells coffee solely through 

an online platform, highbrewcoffee.com (the “Website”).  (Id.)            
     On April 10 and on August 10, 2022, Plaintiff attempted to purchase a twelve-
pack of Double Espresso flavored coffee on the Website, but he was unsuccessful both times.  
(Id. ¶¶ 1-2.)  Due to Plaintiff’s disability, he uses screen-reading software to navigate online.  (Id. 
¶ 1.)  He was unable to use this software to make a purchase on the Website, however, because 
problems with the website’s coding rendered the screen-reader unusable.  (Id. ¶¶ 2-4.)  In the 
Complaint, Plaintiff lists several accessibility issues that arose when he attempted to use his 
screen-reader software with the website.  Plaintiff’s screen-reading software was unable to: read 
when an item has been added to the “shopping cart,” (id. ¶ 4(a)), indicate which products were 
added (id. ¶ 4(b)), read full details about, and descriptions of, the products (id. ¶ 4(c)), or 

accurately describe images of products on the Website (id. ¶ 4(d)).  When used with the Website, 
the screen reader also fails to read some of the Website’s text (id. ¶ 4(e)), does not highlight all 
the text it is reading (id. ¶ 4(f)), reads information that Plaintiff has not selected for reading (id. 
¶ 4(g)), reads certain text out of order (id. ¶ 4(h)), and reads text that is not visible on the Website 
(id. ¶ 4(i)).  These errors “impede Plaintiff’s ability to navigate the [W]ebsite as a sighted New 
York customer would.”  (Id.)  Plaintiff asserts that “the barriers continue to exist as of the date of 
the filing of this amended complaint.”  (Id. ¶ 5.)  Plaintiff intends to complete his purchase if and 
when the Website’s accessibility issues are resolved.  (Id. ¶ 8.)         
                       DISCUSSION                                    
     To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 663

 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570

 (2007)).  This requirement is satisfied when the factual content in the complaint 
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  

Id.

 (citation omitted).  A complaint that contains only “naked assertions” or “a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not suffice.  Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555

.  “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court assumes the truth of the facts asserted in the 
complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff.”  Sara 
Designs, Inc. v. A Classic Time Watch Co. Inc., 

234 F. Supp. 3d 548, 554

 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(citing Harris v. Mills, 

572 F.3d 66, 71

 (2d Cir. 2009)).                 
     Title III of the ADA dictates that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against 
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”  

42 U.S.C.A. § 12182

(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 118-82).  To state a claim for relief under Title III of the 
ADA, a plaintiff “must allege (1) that [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that 
defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) that defendants 
discriminated against [him] by denying [him] a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the services 
defendants provide.”  Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 

518 F.3d 153, 156

 (2d Cir. 2008).  Defendant 
does not contest the first or third elements of Plaintiff’s claim, arguing instead that the Website is 
not a place of public accommodation, and therefore is not covered by the ADA.     
     “The [ADA] does not contain a definition of the term ‘place of public 
accommodation.’”  Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 

268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388

 (E.D.N.Y. 
2017).  Instead, it provides that private entities are to be considered public accommodations if 
their operations affect commerce, and they fall within one of twelve enumerated categories, 

expressed in the statute as non-exclusive lists of different types of enterprises.  These categories 
are:                                                                      
     (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an 
     establishment located within a building that contains not more than five 
     rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
     such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;         

     (B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 

     (C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
     exhibition or entertainment;                                    

     (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public 
     gathering;                                                      

     (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping 
     center, or other sales or rental establishment;                 

     (F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel 
     service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an 
     accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a 
     health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment; 

     (G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public 
     transportation;                                                 

     (H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or 
     collection;                                                     

     (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;  

     (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate 
     private school, or other place of education;                    

     (K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, 
     adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
     (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of 
     exercise or recreation.                                         

42. U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (Westlaw through P.L. 118-82).             
     A majority of circuit courts – the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh – 
have found that a website constitutes a place of public accommodation only if it has a connection 
to a physical location (i.e., a “brick and mortar” store or establishment).  See Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 

145 F.3d 601, 614

 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The plain meaning of Title III is that a public 
accommodation is a place. . . . This is in keeping with the host of examples of public 
accommodations provided by the ADA, all of which refer to places.”), accord Peoples v. 
Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 

387 F. App’x 179, 183

 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Parker v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 

121 F.3d 1006, 1011-12

 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The clear connotation of the words in 
§ 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical place.”); Weyer v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 

198 F.3d 1104, 1114

 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The principle of noscitur a socis requires 
that the term, “place of public accommodation,” be interpreted within the context of the 
accompanying words, and this context suggests that some connection between the good or 
service complained of and an actual physical space is required.”); Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 

993 F.3d 1266, 1277

 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that the “unambiguous and clear” language of the 
statute only “describes twelve types of locations that are tangible, physical spaces” and thus 
limits public accommodations “to actual, physical places” and does not encompass websites  
(internal citations omitted)), vacated on reh’g on other grounds, 

21 F.4th 775

 (2021).  The First 
and Seventh Circuits have adopted the minority position, that no “physical nexus” is required for 
a private entity, when engaged in commerce, to fall under the ADA’s ambit.  See Carparts 
Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., 

37 F.3d 12, 19

 (1st Cir. 1994) (“By 
including ‘travel service’ among the list of services considered ‘public accommodations,’ 
Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include providers of services which 
do not require a person to physical enter an actual physical structure.”); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 

179 F.3d 557, 559

 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The core meaning of [section 302(a) of Title III of 

the ADA], plainly enough, is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s 
office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in 
electronic space) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the 
facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the non-disabled do.” (internal 
citation omitted)).                                                       
     The Second Circuit has not squarely addressed the question of whether a website, 
absent a connection to a physical location, constitutes a place of public accommodation.  It came 
closest in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 

198 F.3d 28

 (2d Cir. 1999), which held that, because 
insurance offices are listed as a place of public accommodation, the ADA “guarantee[s] . . . more 
than mere physical access” to the facility but also prohibits discrimination in the sale of related 

“goods” and “services” provided by that place of public accommodation, including insurance 
policies.  

Id.

 at 31-33 (citing 

42 U.S.C. §§ 12181

(7)(F), 12181(a)).  Plaintiff urges a broader 
reading of Pallozzi that, he contends, resolves the central question in this case.  (Pl. Mem. at 6 
(“The central holding of Pallozzi is that businesses that transact with the public are places of 
public accommodations as defined by Title III of the ADA regardless of whether they are 
conducted physically in a store or through another medium unrelated to a physical location.”).)  
Plaintiff points to other district courts in this Circuit that have applied Pallozzi in this manner and 
ruled that stand-alone websites qualify as public accommodations under the ADA.  See, e.g., 
Andrews, 

268 F. Supp. 3d at 393

 (“This district court, as it must, adopts the Second Circuit’s 
sensible approach [from Pallozzi] to the ADA.  It is unambiguous that under Title III of the 
ADA, [defendant’s website] is a place of public accommodation.”); Del-Orden v. Bonobos, No. 
17-CV-2744-PAE, 

2017 WL 6547902

, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) (finding that a 
commercial website is a public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA based in part 

upon the consensus of the “four district courts in this Circuit to address the issue” all drawing on 
Pallozzi to find that Title III extends to such platforms); Thorne v. Formula 1 Motorsports, Inc., 
No. 19-CV-1077-JPO, 

2019 WL 6916098

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019); Chalas v. Barlean’s 
Organic Oils, LLC., No. 22-CV-04178-CM, 

2022 WL 17156838

, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 
2022) (“[T]he best guess, in light of Pallozzi, is that our Circuit, were it to consider the issue, 
would come down on the side of the First and Seventh Circuits, and conclude that a website can 
be a ‘place of public accommodation[.]’”); Chalas v. Pork King Good, 

673 F. Supp. 3d 339

, 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (observing that, “[w]hile Pallozzi did not specifically decide the question of 
whether Title III applied to the goods and services of a website without a connection to a 
physical place,” most district courts in this circuit have found that commercial websites quality).  

     The Court respectfully disagrees with these courts’ broad reading of Pallozzi as 
reaching internet-only businesses as places of public accommodation.  What the Pallozzi court 
decided was not whether a standalone website constitutes a place of accommodation but, rather, 
whether, if a physical premises of a business constitutes a place of public accommodation, goods 
and services sold from those premises are subject to the equal access mandate of the ADA.  See 
198 F.3d at 32-33 (“We believe that an entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the 
statute to provide persons with physical access but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them 
its merchandise by reason of discrimination of their disability.”).  Several courts have adopted 
this narrower reading of Pallozzi.  See Martinez v. MyLife.com, Inc., No. 21-CV-4779-BMC, 

2021 WL 5052745

, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2021) (“[In Pallozi], the Second Circuit accepted as 
true that the business in question was a place of ‘public accommodation,’ but it did not decide 
the issue – the issue before it was whether the covered category of ‘insurance offices’ included 
‘insurance companies.’ . . . Therefore, [neither] Pallozzi – nor its progeny – mandate or suggest 

any conclusion as to whether a stand-alone website, such as the one at issue here, is a place of 
accommodation.”).  In Winegard v. Newsday LLC, 

556 F. Supp. 3d 173

 (E.D.N.Y. 2021), Judge 
Komitee conducted an extended analysis of Pallozzi, distinguishing the question of whether a 
website is a place of accommodation from the Pallozzi question – whether an insurance policy is 
a good or service of an entity already determined to be covered:          
     The holding did not turn on the definition of “place of public  
     accommodation” in Section 12181(7). There was no dispute that an 
     “insurance office” qualifies as such, given that it is listed explicitly among 
     the specific examples in Section 12181(7)(F).  [Pallozzi,] 198 F.3d at 32 
     (“We start with the fact that Title III specifies an ‘insurance office’ as a 
     ‘public accommodation.’”).  Having accepted that an insurance office is a 
     “public accommodation,” the Court of Appeals turned to the application of 
     Section 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the 
     basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
     facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 
     public accommodation ....”).                                    

     The Court of Appeals analysis thus focused on whether an insurance 
     policy is a “good’ or “service” of an insurance office.  Unsurprisingly, the 
     court concluded that the ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of an insurer’s ‘goods 
     and services’ extends to the consumption of insurance policies.  The panel 
     held that “Title III does regulate the sale of insurance policies in insurance 
     offices.” Id. at 33 (emphasis added).  The physical place, per Pallozzi, is a 
     condition precedent; once that condition is satisfied, the goods and 
     services sold by that place of public accommodation are swept within the 
     ADA’s remit.                                                    

     But those goods and services are not covered by the ADA unless and until 
     the “place of public accommodation” test is satisfied.          
Id. at 180-81.  “At most, therefore, Pallozzi supports the conclusion that websites are swept up in 
Title III when they offer the same ‘goods and services’ as the business’s brick-and-mortar 
operation.”  Id.  The Court concurs in this view of the limits of Pallozzi’s implications.   
     In the absence of definitive Second Circuit guidance, the Court must interpret the 

text and structure of the statute.  “Statutory analysis necessarily begins with the plain meaning of 
a law’s text and, absent ambiguity, will generally end there.”  Bustamante v. Napolitano, 

582 F.3d 403, 406

 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal alterations and citation omitted).  Courts must consider 
“the ordinary or natural meaning of the words chosen by Congress, as well as the placement and 
purpose of those words in the statutory scheme.”  United States v. Aguilar, 

585 F.3d 652, 657

 
(2d Cir. 2009).  In the antidiscrimination context, the phrase “a place of public accommodation” 
has long referred to businesses with public-facing physical facilities.  See Winegard, 556 F. 
Supp. 3d at 175-76 (explaining the historical use of “public accommodation” as describing “the 
particular subset of businesses that had heightened duties of service – often relating to lodging 
and transportation – because of the public-facing nature of their physical facilities”).  This 

context is consistent with a review of the fifty entities listed in Section 12181(7): 
     Title III provides an extensive list of “public accommodations” in 
     § 12181(7), including such a wide variety of things as an inn, a restaurant, 
     a theater, an auditorium, a bakery, a laundromat, a depot, a museum, a 
     zoo, a nursery, a day care center, and a gymnasium.  All the items on this 
     list, however, have something in common.  They are actual, physical 
     places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where 
     the public gets those services.                                 

Weyer, 

198 F.3d at 1114

.1                                                 

1    “Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) regulations issued pursuant to the ADA similarly define a 
place of public accommodation as a ‘facility,’ which is in turn defined as ‘all or any 
portion of buildings structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock . . . or other 
real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or 
     The residual clauses at the end of each list counsel towards a similar conclusion.  
Each list in the definition is characterized as being comprised of either “establishment[s],” 

42 U.S.C. §§ 12181

(7) (A, B, E, F, K), “place[s],” 

id.

 § 12181(7) (A, C, D, H, I, J, L), or 
“station[s],” id. § 12181(7)(G)).  By listing 50 terms in section 12181(7) that almost all refer to 

physical places, Congress indicated an intent to limit public accommodations to entities with 
physical locations.  Weyer, 

198 F.3d at 1114

.  Arguably, “[t]he lone exception is ‘travel service,’ 
which is included in the list of ‘service establishment[s].’”  Suvino, 

2017 WL 3834777

, at *6 
(citing 

42 U.S.C. § 12181

(7)(F)).  Courts have disagreed on whether “travel service” should be 
interpreted as being limited to a physical location.  Carparts, 

37 F.3d at 19

 (holding “travel 
service” is not limited to a physical location: “Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service 
establishments’ would include providers of services which do not require a person to physically 
enter an actual physical structure.  Many travel services conduct business by telephone or 
correspondence without requiring their customers to enter an office in order to obtain their 
services.”); cf. Parker, 

121 F.3d at 1014

 (“Rather than suggesting that Title III includes within its 

purview entities other than physical places, it is likely that Congress simply had no better term 
than ‘service’ to describe an office where travel agents provide travel services and a place where 
shoes are repaired.”).  Indeed, there are travel services which operate out of physical locations, 
and they existed in 1990 when the ADA was enacted and continue to exist today.   
     Some courts have noted that ‘travel service’ does not invariably refer to a 
     physical space, though there is no suggestion in the statute (or in logic) 
     that a travel service must be a virtual operation. Read in context, ‘travel 
     service’ appears to refer to travel agencies and to facilities – such as 
     American Express counters – offering traveler’s cheques, currency-
     exchange services and the like. These businesses commonly operated out 

equipment is located.’”  Suvino v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 16-CV-7046-LTS, 

2017 WL 3834777

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017) (quoting 

28 C.F.R. § 36.104

).   
     of physical facilities when the ADA was adopted, and still do (albeit in 
     lesser numbers.)                                                

Winegard, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 177 n.1 (citing Liberty Travel: Our Story, Liberty Travel (“Liberty 
opened its first travel agent storefront in 1951, and continues to offer locations throughout the 
United States”), https://www.libertytravel.com/about [https://perma.cc/JH7H-VMHF] (last 
visited September 30, 2024)); see also https://www.aaa.com/diamonds/$     
[https://perma.cc/58WL-ST8N] (AAA provides trip planning services and advertises that 
customers may “Call or Visit a AAA Travel Agent Today!” with physical offices in New York, 
New Jersey, and four other states) (last visited September 30, 2024).  Thus, every term in section 
12181(7) references entities that operate out of brick-and-mortar locations.2     
     Ejusdem generis likewise supports the view that the general clauses in section 
12181(7) such as “any other service establishment” should be confined to public-facing physical 
locations.  Ejusdem generis counsels that general clauses are to be limited by the specific clauses 
that precede them.  Pfizer, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 

42 F.4th 67, 76

 (2d Cir. 
2022) (“Ejusdem generis refers to the understanding that ‘[w]here general words follow specific 
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’” (quoting Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

532 U.S. 105, 114-15

 (2001))).  Applying ejusdem generis, the 


2    The statutory interpretation canon, noscitur a sociis, supports the conclusion that 
Congress intended “travel service” to be limited to a physical place.  Noscitur a sociis 
instructs that a word may be influenced by the words which surround it.  See Freeman v. 
Quicken Loans, Inc., 

566 U.S. 624, 634-35

 (2012) (“[T]hat meaning is confirmed by the 
‘commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis — which counsels that a word is given more 
precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.’” (quoting United 
States v. Williams, 

553 U.S. 285, 294

 (2008))).  The 49 other entities referenced in 
section 12181(7) are clearly physical locations and, because there are travel services that 
operate out of physical locations, this Court concludes that Congress intended to restrict 
its reference to “travel services” to such services that operate from physical locations.  
category “any other service establishment” embraces only entities similar in nature to those 
entities preceding it in section 12181(7).  These entities include, inter alia, “a laundromat,” an 
“office of an accountant or lawyer,” “a bakery,” and a “travel service.”  

42 U.S.C.A. § 12181

(7)(F) (Westlaw through P.L. 118-82).  As demonstrated above, all of these entities 

operate in physical places.  Therefore, ejusdem generis indicates that the statute was only 
intended to encompass “service establishments” tied to a physical location, and thus a standalone 
website cannot be considered a “service establishment” within the meaning of section 12181(7) 
because it lacks the necessary physical nexus.                            
     Additionally, a standalone website should not be considered a “place of public 
accommodation” because section 12181(7) does not explicitly address businesses without a 
physical location, such as mail order merchandise and television shopping channels, despite 
numerous applicable business models in existence at the time the statute was written.  See 
Winegard, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 177-78;3 see also Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, 

59 F.3d 580, 583

 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding a televised broadcast of “blacked-out” home football 

games did not involve a place of public accommodation because, “although a game is played in a 
‘place of public accommodation’ and may be viewed on television in another ‘place of public 
accommodation,’ that does not suffice.”).  Thus, it should not be inferred that Congress intended 

3    “The Sears Roebuck catalog, for example, dated to 1888.  See History of the Sears 
Catalog, Sears Archives, (“In 1888, Richard Sears first used a printed mailer to advertise 
watches and jewelry . . . . The time was right for mail order merchandise.”); see also An 
Inside Look at an Outdoor Icon, L.L. Bean (L.L.’s circulars evolved into a catalog by 
1927); How America Fell in and out of Love with J. Crew, CNN (J. Crew ‘relaunched’ as 
a catalog-only retailer in 1983); ‘8 CDs for a Penny’ Company Files for Bankruptcy, 
NPR (Columbia House started selling vinyl records via mail order in 1955); Don’t Judge 
the Book-of-the-Month Club by Its Cover, Smithsonian Magazine (Book-of-the-Month-
Club began its subscription service in 1926); QVC.com (television shopping channel's 
first broadcast was in 1986); History of As Seen on TV, As Seen on TV (first ‘As-Seen-
on-TV’ infomercial aired in the mid-1950s).”                         
“places of public accommodation” to include websites — a newly developed business model — 
when the text of the statute excludes analogous business models by imposing a physical location 
requirement for an entity to be considered a “place of public accommodation.”  
     For these reasons, the Court finds that a stand-alone website is not a place of 

public accommodation under Title III of the ADA.  Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted under the ADA.  Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA, 
Count III’s request for declaratory relief is also dismissed.             
     Remaining State Claims                                          
     Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts claims under the NYCHRL.  A district court 
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”  

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367

(c)(3) (Westlaw through P.L. 
118-82).  Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early 
stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction.”  Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 

484 U.S. 343

, 350 n.7 (1988).  Having dismissed 

the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.  See Kolari v. 
New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 

455 F.3d 118

, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 
‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances 
in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of 
Surgeons, 

522 U.S. 156, 173

 (1997))); Madison v. CVS, No. 22-CV-4221-LTS, 

2022 WL 17793254

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2022).  Because all of Plaintiff’s federal claims are 
dismissed, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s state and local 
law claims.                                                               
     Leave to Amend                                                  
     This Court denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the Complaint.  Rule 
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend should be freely 
granted when justice so requires.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).  While granting or denying such leave is 

within the discretion of the district court, see Reisner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

511 F. Supp. 1167, 1171

 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), leave to amend generally will be granted unless: (1) there is evidence of 
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed; (2) allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; 
or (3) the amendment would be futile.  See Foman v. Davis, 

371 U.S. 178, 182

 (1962).  “A 
proposed amendment to a pleading would be futile if it could not withstand a motion to dismiss” 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City 
of Sherrill, 

337 F.3d 139, 168

 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  Thus, “[l]eave to amend may be 
denied on grounds of futility if the proposed amendment fails to state a legally cognizable claim 
or fails to raise triable issues of fact.”  AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., 

N.A., 

626 F.3d 699, 726

 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Because Plaintiff fails to state a 
legally cognizable claim under the ADA, leave to amend is denied.         
                       CONCLUSION                                    
     For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint is 
granted in its entirety.  This Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves docket entry no. 25.  The 
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.  


       SO ORDERED.                                                   
Dated: New York, New York                                                 
       September 30, 2024                                            
                                                                                                  /s/ Laura Taylor Swain 
                                                                                                LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN 
                                    Chief United States District Judge