Opinion · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Fuhst v. Foley
57 A.D.2d 956
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Date
- 1977-05-31
- Topic
- litigation
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to (1) annul appellants’ determination made March 25, 1976, after a hearing, which denied petitioner-respondent’s application for an area variance and (2) compel the granting of such application, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered July 1, 1976, which (1) annulled the determination and (2) directed the issuance of the variance. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, determination confirmed, and proceeding dismissed on the merits. We note that, accepting the appropriate standard for an area variance to be the standard enunciated in the dissenting memorandum, namely, "practical difficulties” rather than "unnecessary hardship”, nevertheless there was insufficient proof to demonstrate "practical difficulties” (see Van Deusen v Jackson, 35 AD2d 58, affd 28 NY2d 608). At most, personal convenience was proven. Under the circumstances, appellants’ action in denying the variance was not improper.
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- Cited by
- 1 opinion
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to (1) annul appellants’ determination made March 25, 1976, after a hearing, which denied petitioner-respondent’s application for an area variance and (2) compel the granting of such application, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered July 1, 1976, which (1) annulled the determination and (2) directed the issuance of the variance. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, determination confirmed, and proceeding dismissed on the merits. We note that, accepting the appropriate standard for an area variance to be the standard enunciated in the dissenting memorandum, namely, "practical difficulties” rather than "unnecessary hardship”, nevertheless there was insufficient proof to demonstrate "practical difficulties” (see Van Deusen v Jackson, 35 AD2d 58, affd 28 NY2d 608). At most, personal convenience was proven. Under the circumstances, appellants’ action in denying the variance was not improper. We further reverse on the authority of Matter of Midgett v Schermerhorn (24 AD2d 572). Cohalan, J. P., Suozzi and Mollen, JJ., concur. Hawkins, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: Concededly, petitioner enclosed the entrance to his home without first obtaining a building permit. At the instance of the building inspector, however, he immediately applied for an area variance, for a 25-foot front yard setback as mandated by the town’s zoning ordinance. Petitioner requires a variance of five feet, occasioned by his enclosing by masonry the raised platform entrance to his home, measuring five feet by five feet. The steps and platform-porch, together, measure 8 feet by 10 feet. Thus, there is an "area” rather than a "use” variance involved; consequently, the less onerous requirement of "practical difficulties” applies rather than does the standard of "unnecessary hardship” (see Matter of Village of Bronxville v Francis, 1 AD2d 236, affd 1 NY2d 839). As the Appellate Division held in the Bronxville case (supra, pp 238-239): "A change of area may be granted on the ground of practical difficulties alone,