Opinion · New York Court of Appeals
Quimbo Appo v. . the People
Quimbo Appo v. . the People, 20 N.Y. 531 (New York Court of Appeals 1860)
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- New York Court of Appeals
- Jurisdiction
- New York
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- 1860-03-05
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QUIMBO APPOv. THE PEOPLE,20 N.Y. 531(1860)
QUIMBO APPO, plaintiff in error,v. THE PEOPLE, defendants in error.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
March Term, 1860
Page 532
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The office of this writ is, to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals of every kind from exceeding their jurisdiction. It is an ancient and valuable writ, and one thePage 541use of which in all proper cases should be upheld and encouraged, as it is important to the due and regular administration of justice that each tribunal should confine itself to the exercise of those powers with which, under the Constitution and laws of the State, it has been intrusted.
But it is said, that when the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the action, or of the subject matter before it, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction can neither be corrected nor prevented by a writ of prohibition.
It is true that the most frequent occasions for the use of the writ are where a subordinate tribunal assumes to entertain some cause or proceeding over which it has no control. But the necessity for the writ is the same where, in a matter of which such tribunal has jurisdiction, it goes beyond its legitimate powers; and the authorities show that the writ is equally applicable to such a case. Mr. Jacob, in treating of this writ, after saying that it may issue to inferior courts of every description, whether ecclesiastical, temporal, military or maritime, whenever they attempt to take cognizance of causes over which they have no jurisdiction, adds: "or if, in handling of matters clearly within their cognizance, theytransgress theboundsprescribed to them by the laws of England, as where they require two witnesses to prove the payment of a legacy." (Jac.Law Dic., title Prohibition.)
In the case ofDarbyv.Cosens(1Term R.,552), the defendant, who was vicar of the parish of Long Burton, had sued Darby in an Ecclesiastical Court for tithes, that being an action appropriate to the jurisdiction of that court; but the defendant having set up a modus by way of defence, an issue was presented which the Ecclesiastical Court had no authority to try — still, as it assumed to proceed with the case, upon application to the Court of King's Bench a writ of prohibition was issued.
The precise objection made here was taken in the case ofLemanv.Goulty(3Term R.,3), where certain church wardens were cited in the Bishops' Court to exhibit on oath an account of the moneys received and paid by them. Objections beingPage 542made to one or two items of the account, the Bishop required them to pay a certain amount, and upon their refusing was proceeding still further with the case when a rule was obtained in the Court of King's Bench to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue; and the counsel in showing cause insisted that as the Bishops' Court had original jurisdiction of the cause, the error should be corrected upon appeal, and was not a ground for a writ of prohibition; but the court allowed the writ, and Lord KENYON, after admitting that for a mere error in giving a judgment which the court had power to render, the writ would not lie, said: "Now, in this case, with respect to the compelling of a production of the church warden's accounts, the Spiritual Court had exclusive jurisdiction; but there their authority ceases, and everything which they did afterwards was an excess of jurisdiction for which a prohibition ought to be granted."
These cases prove that the writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power, in a cause or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than when the entire cause is without its jurisdiction. The broad remedial nature of this writ is shown by the brief statement of a case by Fitzherbert. In stating the various cases in which the writ will lie, he says: "And if a man be sued in the Spiritual Court, and the judges there will not grant unto the defendant the copy of the libel, then he shall have a prohibition, directed unto them for a surcease," c., until they have delivered the copy of the libel, according to the statute made Anno 2 H., 5. (F.N.B.,title Prohibition.)
This shows that the writ was never governed by any narrow technical rules, but was resorted to as a convenient mode of exercising a wholesome control over inferior tribunals. The scope of this remedy ought not, I think, to be abridged, as it is far better to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power than to be driven to the necessity of correcting the error after it is committed. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that this was a proper case for the use of the writ, if thePage 543Supreme Court was right in the conclusion to which it arrived at general term.
Had, then, the Court of Oyer and Terminer authority to make the order granting to the defendant, Quimbo Appo, a new trial? One position taken by the counsel for The People upon this question is, that the power, conceding it to exist, before judgment, cannot be exercised after judgment has been pronounced and the prisoner sentenced. I have not, however, been able to discover any solid basis for this distinction. There is no general principle upon which it can rest — nor am I aware of any analogies to support it. If the ends of justice require that this power should be vested in Courts of Oyer and Terminer, that demand is just as imperious where judgment happens to have been pronounced before the grounds for the interposition of the court are made known as in other cases. If the judgment stands in the way, it may be vacated. The court does not become, as claimed by the counsel,functus officioas to the particular case whenever sentence is pronounced. Suppose, for instance, the court through inadvertence should sentence the prisoner without inquiring of him whether he had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced. If the position is sound, this error, although immediately discovered, could not be corrected by the court which committed it. It would be not only unsupported by authority, but unsafe, I think, to hold, as we must if we sustain the doctrine contended for, that a Court of Oyer and Terminer loses all control over the cases before it as soon as the judgment is recorded.
Another position of the counsel is, that if it be admitted that the court before which the prisoner was tried could grant a new trial, yet another Court of Oyer and Terminer subsequently organized, being a distinct court, had no jurisdiction of the case, and could not exercise that power.
This involves an inquiry into the nature of Courts of Oyer and Terminer in this State, and how far they resemble the English courts of that name. In England, although Courts of Oyer and Terminer are annually held in every county ofPage 544the kingdom at least once, and in most of the counties twice, yet each court is held by virtue of a special commission, authorizing any two of the persons to whom it is addressed to hold the court. The commission usually embraces two of the judges of the Courts of Westminster, one of whom, or a serjeant at law, when such a one is named in place of a judge, must always be present or the court cannot be held. The operative words of the commission are, "to inquire, hear and determine," and the commissioners have no power except such as is conferred by these words.
Hence, as they must inquire before they can hear and determine, they can try no indictments except such as are found at the same court. This difficulty, however, is overcome by a second commission of Gaol Delivery, as it is called, which authorizes them to deliver the gaol of all prisoners found therein upon their arrival at the place where the court is held, and by virtue of this power they try all indictments, whatever the offence or wherever found.
This commission may be to different persons, but for convenience is usually to the same persons who compose the Court of Oyer and Terminer. Besides these more general commissions, special commissions may be issued by the King at any time to try either specific offences, or the individuals named. Of course, upon the final adjournment of any of these courts in any county its powers are ended. It no longer has any existence so far as that county is concerned, and there is no longer any Court of Oyer and Terminer or of Gaol Delivery, as the case may be, in and for such county, until a new commission issues.
Hence it is plain that no subsequent Court of Oyer and Terminer, as such, could interfere in any way with any case commenced at a previous court, because it must first inquire, then hear and determine. How far its powers as a Court of Gaol Delivery might extend, I am not prepared to say; but no court in England has, I think, ever assumed to take cognizance under this power of a motion for a new trial, even for irregularity, in a case tried at a previous court. It has been held there that thePage 545judges of the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery may, after the adjournment of the courts, and after their commissions have expired, grant a reprieve in a case of a prisoner previously convicted and sentenced, in order to afford time to apply to the crown for a pardon. But Blackstone says that even this is "rather by common usage than of strict right." (4Blackstone Com.,394.)
If, therefore, no substantial difference were found to exist between our Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery and those of England, I should think it a sufficient objection to the order granting a new trial in the present case, that it was not made by the same court in which the case was tried.
But our Courts of Oyer and Terminer, although they have the same name and a similar jurisdiction with those of England, are nevertheless in some respects differently organized. I do not think it necessary to inquire whether the "act to settle Courts of Justice," published in the appendix to volume 2 of the Revised Laws of 1813, and bearing date in 1683, was ever in force in this State or not. It will sufficiently exhibit the present structure of the court to refer to a few of the more modern enactments on the subject.
Section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1821, provides as follows: "The Clerk oftheCourt of Oyer and Terminer and General Sessions of the Peace, in and for the city and county of New York, shall be appointed by the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in said city, and hold his office during the pleasure of the said court." This language necessarily implies that the Court of Oyer and Terminer was regarded as a permanent and continuing court. Under the English system there was no Court of Oyer and Terminer in existence, except while a particular set of commissioners were in session. There could be no clerk of such a court during the interval between the expiration of one commission and the issuing of another, nor could the definite articlethebe appropriately used in such a connection as in the clause quoted, except in reference to some particular session of the court.Page 546
The phraseology applied to the English court seems to have been continued in this State until after the Constitution of 1821 was adopted. Thus, section 8 of the article concerning Circuit Courts and Courts of Oyer and Terminer, passed in 1813 (1R.L.,337), uses this language: "A quorum of the commissioners," when speaking of the Court of Oyer and Terminer. I presume, however, that no commission was in fact issued at that day, if ever, in this State, and in the act concerning the Supreme and Circuit Courts and Courts of Oyer and Terminer, passed in 1823 (Laws1823, 211, § 9), it was expressly provided that the judges of the County Courts, together with one of the circuit judges or a justice of the Supreme Court, might, "by virtue of their respective offices" and that act, and "without any othercommission," hold the Circuit Courts and Courts of Oyer and Terminer, c., of the respective counties. From that time the English system of organizing these courts by special commission was no longer adhered to, either in form or language.
By section 40 of the title of the Revised Statutes concerning Circuit Courts and Courts of Oyer and Terminer (2R.S.,207), it is declared that the seals previously adopted by the several Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery "shall continue to be the seals of these courts respectively;" and section 42 of the same act provides that process issued out of a Court of Oyer and Terminer when such court is not in session "may be tested on any day in the last precedingtermof the said court." This section treats the court as in existence, although not in session, and as having a succession of terms.
Again, the Code enacts, section 20, that "there must be twotermsoftheCircuit Court and Court of Oyer and Terminer held annually in each of the counties of this State, and as many more terms thereof, and as many special terms, as the judges of each judicial district shall appoint therein."
These provisions leave no doubt that the English Court of Oyer and Terminer has been so far modified under our judicial system as to become a permanent and continuous court in each of the counties of the State, so that each session of such aPage 547court in any county, instead of being a distinct and independent court, the existence of which commences with the first and terminates with the last day of the session, is a mere term of the Court of Oyer and Terminer for that county. Hence the writ of prohibition in this case cannot be sustained upon the ground that the court which has assumed to take cognizance of the motion for a new trial is not the same court in which the prisoner was convicted.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to pass upon the question whether Courts of Oyer and Terminer in this State have authority to grant a new trial upon the merits, after conviction in a capital case. This question has been somewhat agitated in our courts, and there are conflicting decisions upon it, the result of which it will be well in the outset to ascertain; because, however it might have been originally, if the question has been settled by the courts of this State, we should not feel at liberty to disturb it.
In referring to the cases I will begin with the more recent. There are, then, two decisions of our present Supreme Court upon the subject: One made at the general term in the second district in the case ofThe Peoplev.The Dutchess Oyer and Terminer(2Barb. S.C.R.,282), the other at the general term in the third district in the case ofThe Peoplev.Morrison(1Park. C.R.,625). In the first of these cases the power, after an elaborate examination, was denied; and in the last, after an examination equally elaborate, it was affirmed. As these were coördinate courts of equal jurisdiction and grade, they may properly be considered as balancing each other. I speak of their weight as decisions merely, irrespective of the reasoning in the two cases. The fact that one was a few years later than the other, considering the nature of the question and the position of the courts, does not materially affect their relative force. The question, therefore, may fairly be considered as standing, so far as authority is concerned, substantially where it was left by the previous cases.
We have next two decisions of the former Supreme Court similarly situated: First, that in the case ofThe Peoplev.StonePage 548(5Wend.,39), where the power was asserted: and next, that inThe Peoplev.Comstock(8Wend.,549), in which it was denied. It is suggested inThe Peoplev.Morrisonthat the remarks of SUTHERLAND, J., in the last of these cases, were made through mere inadvertence, without reflecting that the same court had, two years before, decided the other way. I find it difficult to adopt this explanation. It supposes that Judge SUTHERLAND and Judge SAVAGE had both entirely forgotten the case ofThe Peoplev.Stone,and not only so, but that Mr. Wendell also, who had but just reported the former decision, neglected to call the attention of the judges to the obvious discrepancy. The point was one calculated to awaken attention, especially when elaborately discussed, as it was by MARCY, J., in his opinion; and the case ofThe Peoplev.Comstockcould hardly, I think, have found its way into the books if the pointed and emphatic remarks of SUTHERLAND, J., in that case had been inadvertently made. From the tone of those remarks I think it much more likely that the latter justice, although not entirely satisfied with the opinion of MARCY, J., inThe Peoplev.Stone,had not chosen to dissent, and that he availed himself of the case ofThe Peoplev.Comstock— MARCY, J., having in the meantime left the bench and NELSON, J., having taken his place — to express his own views upon the question, the latter justice probably concurring with him.
The case ofThe Peoplev.Comstockmay therefore fairly be considered as a counterpoise to that ofThe Peoplev.Stone,because, although the precise point was not involved in the last of the two cases, yet what was then said must, I think, have been said upon full consideration of the reasoning in the previous case. Taking the two cases together, therefore, and construing them by such light as we have, they show the opinions of SAVAGE, Ch. J., and MARCY, J., in favor of, and of SUTHERLAND and NELSON, Js., against the power.
Besides the cases already referred to, there are two of an older date to which I will briefly advert. The first is the case ofThe Peoplev.Townsend(1John. Ca.,104), where the prisoner having been convicted at the Oyer and Terminer forPage 549perjury, the judge before whom he was tried reported to the Supreme Court that the verdict was against evidence, and the latter court directed a new trial. Judge RADCLIFFE, who was on the bench at that time, is reported to have said in the case of Noah (3City Hall Recorder,24), that the Supreme Court virtually decided in the case of Townsend that Courts of Oyer and Terminer had power to grant new trials. But if so there was no argument or even counsel in the case, and the whole seems to have been very hastily and informally done. From what appears upon the face of the report, the case cannot be considered as of any considerable weight.
The other case referred to is that ofThe Peoplev.TheJustices of Chenango(1John. Ca.,179). The Supreme Court in that case denied the right of a Court of General Sessions to grant new trials upon the merits, and issued amandamusto compel them to proceed to judgment in a case where they had exercised that power, after conviction for a felony. This case has ever been considered as settling the question as to the power of Courts of General Sessions in this State to grant new trials; and much of its reasoning applies as well to Courts of Oyer and Terminer as to Courts of General Sessions, if the former are to be regarded as inferior courts.
The term `inferior,' as applied to courts, has no very definite meaning. It is used in different senses. In the sense of being courts of very narrow and restricted jurisdiction, Courts of Oyer and Terminer are not inferior; but in the sense of being subordinate to the Supreme Court, and subject in common with all other minor tribunals to its supervisory control, they certainly are. Courts which are subject to be put in motion bymandamusor restrained by prohibition, and to have their causes taken away before judgment bycertiorari,are subordinate courts; and this is all that is necessary to give to the reasoning of the court in the case ofThe Peoplev.The Justices of Chenango,its full force when applied to Courts of Oyer and Terminer. The court in that case, speaking of the Courts of General Sessions, say: "Writs of error, certiorari, mandamus, and attachment issue to it from this court. Those writs conclusivelyPage 550show it to besubordinate,and prove the authority which has always been exercised over it. * * * * These courts are wholly independent of each other, and if their proceedings were not subject to be here reviewed, we might find different rules of law and of justice in almost every county. This would introduce disorder and confusion, and be inconsistent with a regular and uniform administration of justice. The power of granting new trials can only be applied in a mannerwhich precludes thepossibility of its exercise being reviewed in this or any othercourt. * * * * If this power did exist, therefore, in an inferior court, it would existwithout regulation or control." Substitute the wordsubordinatefor that of "inferior," in the last sentence, and every idea contained in this extract applies with the same force to Courts of Oyer and Terminer as to Courts of General Sessions. The courts of the several counties have the same independence of each other; their proceedings in granting new trials would not be subject to review, and would be wholly without regulation or control. This case, therefore, cannot but be considered as greatly preponderating over any weight which can by possibility be given to the case ofThe Peoplev.Townsend.
From this brief review of the cases in this State, it is difficult to say in what direction, when the authorities are fairly weighed, the scales would incline. I assume that they are evenly balanced; but whether this assumption is just, or whether the preponderance should be considered as in favor of the power, does not in the least affect my view of the present case; for it cannot be contended that there exists that clear and settled course of decision which should preclude any further examination of the subject.
It is to be looked at, then, substantially as an original question, and as if it had now arisen for the first time. It is not controlled by any statute, and hence what we are called upon to decide is whether, by the common law, Courts of Oyer and Terminer have the power to grant new trials upon the merits, after conviction in a capital case.Page 551
It is settled beyond dispute, in England, that no new trial can be granted upon the merits in such a case, even by the highest courts. This is conceded inThe Peoplev.StoneandThePeoplev.Morrison. The authorities on the subject are referred to in the cases ofThe Peoplev.ComstockandThePeoplev.The Dutchess Oyer and Terminer(supra,) and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. If, then, new trials are to be granted in such cases by our courts, a new rule must be introduced, and the question is upon what ground of principle this can be done. New rules may be adopted when new cases arise. It is considered one of the chief merits of the common law, that it is plastic and flexible, and accommodates itself readily to the new phases which the affairs of the world are constantly assuming. But in the case under consideration there is nothing new, and the courts are asked not simply to apply a rule which, although in harmony with the general and fundamental principles of the common law, has never been before adopted, but to go in direct opposition to what is acknowledged to have been the settled rule of the common law for centuries.
This court and the Supreme Court have the power, if not the right, to legislate and to amend the common law, and no doubt their legislation would be as wise as much that proceeds from more legitimate sources; but the better opinion I think is, that each department of the government should confine itself to the exercise of its appropriate functions, and not encroach upon those of any other. It is shown in the case ofThe Peoplev.Morrisonthat in most of the States of the Union the courts have assumed the powers contended for here, and this is urged as authority by which our courts should be governed. But it is the common law of England, and not that of Pennsylvania or Alabama, which we have adopted. Upon all questions upon which there is any doubt, we pay high respect to the decisions of the courts of other States, but when the law is known and conceded, the fact that other States have confessedly disregarded and departed from it, is entitled to very little weight.
Judge MARCY, inThe Peoplev.Stone,devotes most of his argument to proving that Courts of Oyer and Terminer in thisPage 552State are not inferior courts. But this, if established, is in no manner decisive of the question, as by the common law no court, high or low, could grant new trials upon the merits, after conviction in a criminal court in cases of felony. The principal reason he gives for departing from what he admits to be the settled rule of the English common law is, that notwithstanding the pardon of a criminal who has once been convicted, "the foul blot remains upon his reputation." It may, I think, be safely assumed that in most cases the criminal so situated, if allowed to choose, would prefer to take the pardon rather than to avail himself of the privilege of a second trial.
But it matters not, in my view, how strong may be the reasons given in the cases ofThe Peoplev.StoneandThe Peoplev.Morrisonfor a change in the law. The question we are called upon to consider is not whether the admitted rule of the common law was, or is, wrong, and ought to be changed, but whether that change should be wrought by the courts or left to the action of the Legislature.
The whole course of judicial as well as legislative action in this State, until the decision inThe Peoplev.Stone,indicates very clearly, I think, a general understanding that Courts of Oyer and Terminer could not grant new trials in such cases. In the case ofThe Peoplev.McKay(18John.,212), where it became necessary to move in arrest of judgment, on the ground that no venire had been issued, the cause was removed into the Supreme Court bycertiorari,and the prisoner brought up byhabeas corpusin order that the motion might be made there. In the case of Douglass (4Cow.,26), convicted of murder in the county of Steuben, where a motion was made to set aside the verdict for certain irregularities on the part of the jury, the same course was taken; and in the case ofThe Peoplev.Ransom(7 Wend., 417), who was found guilty of murder in the city of New York, judgment was suspended in order that the question of regularity might be presented to the Supreme Court.
The bearing of the proceedings in these cases will be seen, when it is considered that even the subordinate and interior common law courts in England have power to set aside verdictsPage 553in cases tried before them for irregularity. Our Courts of Oyer and Terminer, it seems, have always hesitated to exercise even this minor power.
The Legislature also, in providing for the correction of errors in law by means of bills of exception, and making no provision as to new trials for mistakes in regard to matters of fact, has, I think, indicated its opinion not only that new trials could not be granted in cases of that kind, but that they had better be left, as by the common law they are left, to the action of the pardoning power.
It is by no means certain that such would not be the better course, even if we had power to determine the question upon grounds of expediency alone. Certainly it would, I think, unless at the same time some rules could be adopted by which the exercise of the power should be in some degree regulated.
The Legislature, in permitting motions for new trials to be made upon the minutes of the judge in civil cases, has imperatively required that they should be made at the same term at which the cause is tried. (Code,§ 264.) There is every reason why this rule should be applied to motions for a new trial upon the facts in cases of felony, if such motions are to be permitted, unless some provision is made for embodying the facts in an authenticated form.
The suffering of such motions to be made before another judge at a subsequent term, without any provision as to the manner in which he should become possessed of the facts of the case, would, I apprehend, be attended with very serious inconvenience. There is great danger, too, that the privilege, if allowed without being subjected to some precautionary restrictions, will be used to delay and embarrass the administration of criminal justice, already sufficiently difficult.
The subject, taken as a whole, can only be adequately dealt with by the Legislature, to which it appropriately belongs, and I am entirely opposed to so obvious a stretch of judicial power as would be involved in holding that our Courts of Oyer and Terminer, without the aid of any statute, possess a control overPage 554convictions for crime, which it is conceded was never possessed by the highest common law courts in England.
The judgment should, I think, be affirmed.
The cases in our reports on this subject are not numerous, and are far from being unanimous. The first which I find is that ofThe Peoplev.Townsend(1J.C.,104), where it was held by the Supreme Court, in April, 1799, that a Court of Oyer and Terminer may award a new trial; but the crime for which the defendant was indicted was perjury, at that time considered in this State — as at common law — to be merely a misdemeanor. It was made felony only by the Revised Statutes. InThe Peoplev.The Sessions of Chenango(2Caines' Cases in Error,319), the court decided, to be sure, only that the Court of Sessions being an inferior court, could not grant a new trial; but KENT, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says, "The Sessions cannot grant a new trial upon the merits. It is a power not exercised by this (the Supreme) Court, after verdict in cases of felony; and, perhaps, it is expedient it should not be." InThe Peoplev.Stone(5Wend.,39), the court, indeed, held that Courts of Oyer and Terminer had authority to grant new trials on the merits in all cases, and entirely ignored the rule of the common law. But this decision was expressly overruled by the same court inThe Peoplev.Comstock,where it is declaredPage 555that for offences greater than misdemeanor, a new trial cannot be granted on the merits, whether the accused be convicted or acquitted; and Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND, who delivered the opinion of the court, quotes the language of Garrow,arguendo,inTheKingv.Mawbey and others(6Term R.,625) that: "If a defendant be convicted of felony or treason, though against the weight of evidence, there is no instance of a motion for a new trial in such a case; but the judge passes sentence and respites execution, till application be made to the mercy of the Crown." Lord KENYON, who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, speaks to the same effect. Judge SUTHERLAND also quotes fromChitty's Criminal Law(532) the following language: "In cases of felony or treason, it seems to be completely settled, that no new trial can in any case be granted; but if the conviction is improper, the prisoner must be respited until a pardon be applied for." The same rule is very ably maintained by Judge STRONG inThe Peoplev.The Judges of the Dutchess Oyer and Terminer(2Barb.,282). The cases ofThe Peoplev.Morrison(1Park.C.R.,625);The Peoplev.Goodrich(3id. 519), andThePeoplev.Hartung(17How. Pr. R.,86), were all decided in the Court of Oyer and Terminer; in which that court held it had the power to grant new trials in the very face of the decision by the Supreme Court inThe Peoplev.Comstock. It is not pretended that the rule of the common law has been altered by statute. Our statutes say nothing of this power, except in cases where exceptions on legal questions have been taken on the trial on behalf of the defendant. In such cases where the Supreme Court reverse the judgment, they provide that the court shall either direct a new trial, or that the defendant be absolutely discharged, according to the circumstances of the case.
It is stated, in the points of the plaintiff in error, that in England the old rule has been condemned by her wisest lawyers and judges, and is now abandoned. This is a mistake. It is only about three weeks ago, during the present session of Parliament, that Mr. McMahon introduced a bill in the House of Commons to allow new trials to be granted in all criminalPage 556cases. It gave rise to a very interesting debate, which is contained in the London Times, I think, of 19th of last January. The members opposed to the bill proved, satisfactorily to my mind, that the repeal of the present rule would most seriously, if it did not altogether, jeopardize the administration of criminal justice in England. A large majority voted against the bill.
The right to a new trial in cases of felony would work still greater detriment in this State. The witnesses on whose testimony defendants are convicted, are apt to be more migratory than in England; and the law has provided no means of perpetuating their testimony, or of preserving any authentic memorial of their evidence. In every case there would be repeated applications for a new trial; so that in the city of New York, where the district attorney is unable, from the multitude of cases, to bring all to trial, a fearful obstruction to the administration of justice would be the consequence. The only judicious and practicable remedy for erroneous verdicts in criminal cases, is that of the pardoning power. No stigma, as has been supposed, necessarily adheres to a defendant who has been unjustly found guilty of a crime, when he receives the pardon on the express ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of evidence. I place my opinion, therefore, on the ground no merely that a Court of Oyer and Terminer has no power to grant a new trial, where the verdict has been rendered at a previous Oyer and Terminer, but that no court has power, in cases of felony, to grant a new trial on the merits, under any circumstances.
The power to issue a writ of prohibition clearly still resides in the Supreme Court; it is expressly recognized in the Revised Statutes. (2R.S.,587, § 61.)
The order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
I concur entirely in the opinion that the writ of prohibition was a proper mode to be adopted by the district attorney to stay the action of the Oyer and Terminer, provided that court had not power to give the relief asked for by the prisoner, and grant the application for a new trial. It may be a very ancient remedy, and has undoubtedly been rarely resorted to in our recent practice. It is, however, expressly provided for in the Revised Statutes of 1830, and the practice under it regulated in various respects; and in 1838 there is an instance reported of its having been issued to a Court of General Sessions by the Supreme Court. (ThePeoplev.The Tompkins General Sessions,19Wend.,154.) Probably many other cases have occurred where it has issued as a matter of course, without any question being made as to the propriety of the practice, or the power of the court. The case ofThe Peoplev.The Supervisors of Queens(1Hill,195), where it is said to have been disapproved, did not proceed upon any doubt or denial of the propriety of the writ in a case to which it was applicable. It was attempted to be used in that case to restrain the proceedings of a ministerial officer in the execution of process in his hands, but while refusing this the court expressly conceded the propriety of issuing the writ to restrain a court in which some judicial proceeding is pending. This writ is also among those the practice in respect to which is saved by § 471 of the Code; its continuance and operation being thus expressly recognized.
The only question, then, in this case is, whether a Court of Oyer and Terminer, at a term subsequent to that at which a prisoner has been tried and convicted, and judgment rendered upon the conviction, has power to grant a new trial. The question is an important one, and if it were whollyres integra,and for the first time to be discussed and passed upon, I should esteem it one of no small difficulty. At any rate it falls within that category where much may be said, and pertinently and plausibly said, too, upon both sides. I do not go into the question of the original constitution of Courts of Oyer and Terminer in England, nor the various modifications and enlargements of their powers by statutes enacted from time to time. On thisPage 558point our own Constitution and laws afford also a field for considerable discussion and remark, into which I shall not enter. My conclusion, without at this time indicating the grounds upon which it rests, is that the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, as organized and acting within this State, are superior courts of general criminal jurisdiction, continuous in their character and operation, and not a merely temporary organization, expiring at the close of each session or term thereof. This being conceded or established, it necessarily follows that a motion founded upon a proceeding trial or judgment at a preceding term, can be entertained and decided at any subsequent term of the same court, whether held by the same judges or by others of equal authority and coordinate jurisdiction.
Without, then, going into the argument, I consider the power of Courts of Oyer and Terminer to grant new trials as established by a most controlling weight of authority, and that this power may be exercised at a term subsequent to that at which a conviction has taken place and judgment rendered. In the case ofThePeoplev.Townsend(1John. Ca.,104), the defendant had been convicted of perjury, but before sentence was pronounced he absconded. He afterwards surrendered himself, and the presiding justice reported to the Supreme Court that the verdict was against evidence. The opinion of the Supreme Court was asked, and they answered that there should be a new trial, and directed that opinion to be communicated to the judges at the next Oyer and Terminer to be held in the county where the trial took place. The case, in effect, is an adjudication of the Supreme Court, given by way of advice, that the Oyer and Terminer had power to grant a new trial where the verdict was against evidence, and in that case the application and a decision thereon would necessarily be made at a subsequent session of the court. In the case ofThePeoplev.Stone(5Wend.,39) the same question arose. The defendant had been convicted in Rensselaer county, and an application was made to that court for a new trial, whether at the same or a subsequent term does not appear from the statement of the case. The court, doubting its power, suspended sentencePage 559in order that an application might be made to the Supreme Court for its opinion on this point. That opinion was given by MARCY, J., and after discussing the question with fullness and ability he concludes by saying, "upon principle and authority I have no doubt but that the power to grant new trials upon the merits resides in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery;" and that was the judgment of the court.
It is true that in the case ofThe Peoplev.Comstock(8Wend.,549), Judge SUTHERLAND was, probably by an inadvertence, betrayed into the expression of an opinion that in a case of felony no new trial could be granted, whether the defendant was acquitted or convicted. He seems to have lost sight of the case ofThe Peoplev.Stone,in the decision of which he took part, and of the fact that Comstock having been acquitted, he was secured by the constitutional immunity from the jeopardy of another trial. The case has never been considered as an authority in denial of the power of the court to grant a new trial in a proper case.
The case ofThe Peoplev.Stonehas been followed by several subsequent cases. InThe Peoplev.Morrison(1Park.C.R.,625), in a very able and elaborate opinion Judge HARRIS vindicates the power of a Court of Oyer and Terminer to grant a new trial, and places it, in my judgment, on impregnable grounds, both of principle and authority. He takes occasion to show, also, that this power is in full exercise in at least eighteen of the States of the Union, and that the English rule which denies new trials in criminal cases, but turns over the subject to the royal clemency, has never been adopted or recognized by the courts of this county.
In the case ofThe Peoplev.The Court of Sessions of WayneCounty(1Park. C.R.,369), at general term in the seventh district, a decided opinion was expressed that the power resides in Courts of Oyer and Terminer, although its existence in Courts of Sessions, which are of limited and inferior jurisdiction, was denied. "Courts of Oyer and Terminer," says Mr. Justice JOHNSON, "have full criminal jurisdiction, and are the only courts in the State having such powers."Page 560
InThe Peoplev.McMahon(2Park. C.R.,673), Mr. Justice PARKER concurs fully in the conclusion of Judge HARRIS in the case of Morrison, and says he has conclusively demonstrated the power of Courts of Oyer and Terminer to grant new trials. In this opinion Judge BALCOM (Peoplev.Goodrich,3Park. C.R.,518) also unites; and inThe Peoplev.Hartung(17How.,86), the motion for a new trial in a capital case was entertained at an adjourned circuit without any question as to the power of the court being suggested by the counsel or alluded to in the opinion of Judge HARRIS. In truth, I have no doubt this practice has been well understood and acted upon throughout the State for a long series of years, and I am not aware that it was ever seriously called in question until the opinion of Mr. Justice STRONG was given in the case ofThe Peoplev.The Judges ofDutchess Oyer and Terminer(2Barb.,282). This case undertook to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court inThe Peoplev.Stone,which had been accepted as the law by which all the tribunals of the State had been governed for seventeen years. If such a thing is to be done it should be either from a conviction that the elder decision was hasty and not well considered, or the course of reasoning by which the old doctrine is to be subverted and the new installed in its place should be so clear and convincing that the mind unhesitatingly yields to it. The decision in the case of Stone is not by any means an unadvised one, for the opinion is by MARCY, and the course of reasoning by which it is upheld extends over some half dozen pages — more, indeed, than Judge STRONG employs to overcome it — and I am quite unable to detect the superior force of the reasons by which it is encountered and sought to be overthrown. If anything were needed to re-instate the authority ofThe Peoplev.Stoneit will be found amply supplied in the full and exhaustive opinion of Judge HARRIS in the case of Morrison, and the assent which has been yielded to that case by all succeeding authority.
The power, then, to grant new trials, I think, beyond question, exists in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, and for reasons that make that authority plenary for all the purposes of aPage 561motion at the same or any succeeding term. Nor is it any greater objection to its exercise that judgment has been pronounced, than can be urged in a civil case where the same fact exists. If the court has the power, the mere fact that judgment has been formally rendered cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction. And so, in effect, it is decided inThe Peoplev.Stone(9Wend.,182), where the Court of Oyer and Terminer, after rendering judgment quashing an indictment at a subsequent term gave leave to the public prosecutor to make up a record as if judgment had been rendered for the defendant on demurrer, for the purpose of enabling him to sue out a writ of error. So inMillerv.Finkle(1Park. C.R.,374), where a conviction was had and a sentence actually passed, the court at the same term vacated the sentence and pronounced a new sentence for a different term of imprisonment. It is not, then, the fact that a judgment has been rendered that makes the courtfunctus officioand deprives it of any power of ulterior action. Possessing the right, I suppose it can be exercised at any time before final execution.
It is said by the counsel of The People, in opposition to the assertion and exercise of this power in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, that the scheme of our government and the distribution of powers under the Constitution are at war with the right thus claimed. It is insisted that the pardoning power was conferred upon the Executive for the very purpose of correcting any errors of fact that might occur in the prosecution and conviction of a supposed culprit, and that pardon does not imply guilt. I do not coincide in this view. On the contrary I think with us, in the administration of the criminal law and in dealing with offenders who have been subjected to its action, the normal and necessary association with the word pardon is the idea of guilt. The office of the Governor is not to reverse unjust or illegal decisions, but to remit the punishment due to the guilty. If innocence is claimed, or an improper conviction has been obtained, then justice requires a new trial. The mercy which is thus invoked is but a poor palliative for the injury that may have been inflicted. I agree with Judge MARCY that "it isPage 562mockery to tell a man who has been unjustly condemned that his redress is a pardon. He feels, and ever will feel, that he has received an incurable wound from that sword which he, in common with his fellow citizens, had put into the hands of the magistracy for their protection."
The case made in the court below was one appealing very strongly to the reason of that tribunal to grant a new trial. It was certainly from no fault of the court before which the defendant was tried that the trial resulted in a conviction. A number of unfortunate circumstances concurred in presenting him before the jury substantially without defence, and yet standing thus unaided and unshielded before them, there was evident hesitation with the jury in convicting him of the crime of murder. There is every reason to believe that on another trial the crime laid to his charge will, if not excused, be greatly mitigated. I think it is eminently due to this comparative stranger to us and our institutions — this "waif," as he has been appropriately called, cast upon our shores from "the central flowery kingdom" — that he should have one more opportunity to show the extenuations of his offence, even if he cannot succeed in wholly purging himself of crime.
I think the order of the general term granting the writ of prohibition should be reversed, and the order of the Oyer and Terminer granting a new trial affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.