Opinion · New York Court of Appeals
Magee v. . Badger
34 N.Y. 247
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- New York Court of Appeals
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Date
- 1866-01-05
- Topic
- bankruptcy
At the close of the evidence, nine propositions were submitted to the judge, and an exception was taken to his refusal to adopt them in gross in his charge to the jury. The refusal was right, as several of them were plainly erroneous. The question whether the remaining propositions were correct, is one we are not at liberty to consider under a mere general exception, applicable in common to all. (Hunt v. Maybee, 3 Seld., 266, 273; 20 Barb., 343; Haggart v.
Citator
- Cited by
- 34 opinions
MAGEEv. BADGER ET AL.,34 N.Y. 247(1866)
JOHN MAGEE, Respondent,v. HARVEY P. BADGER and HIRAM POTTER,
Appellants.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
January Term, 1866
Page 248
There was no error prejudicial to the defendant in the instructions of the judge to the jury. He charged, at the request of the appellant, that the note in suit was invalid as between the original parties; and, on this assumption, the question whether the previous note was good or void was plainly immaterial. The fact that the plaintiff purchased the note in question for value before maturity, was provedPage 249and undisputed. The instructions under which the judge submitted to the jury the issue as to the good faith of the plaintiff in making the purchase, were more liberal to the defendant than he was entitled to ask. He charged, in substance, that the plaintiff was not abona fideholder, if he had notice, either of the facts which invalidated the note, or of circumstances of suspicion, which, upon due inquiry, might have led him to a knowledge of those facts. The instruction was not warranted by the evidence, and was based on a misconception of the existing rule of law. One who purchases commercial paper for full value before maturity, without notice of any equities between the original parties, or of any defect of title, is to be deemed abona fideholder. He is not bound, at his peril, to be upon the alert for circumstances which might possibly excite the suspicions of wary vigilance. He does not owe to the party who puts negotiable paper afloat, the duty of active inquiry, to avert the imputation of bad faith. The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as to his diligence or negligence. The authority mainly relied on in support of the opposite theory is the case ofGillv.Cubitt,reported in 3 Barnwell Cresswell, 466. The doctrine of that case has been repeatedly overruled, as well in the English as in the American courts; and it cannot be recognized as authority without an innovation in our system of commercial law, fraught with infinite mischief and uncertainty. (Crookv.Jadis,5 Barn. Adol., 909;Backhousev.Harrison,id., 1098;Goodmanv.Harvey,4 Adol. Ell., 870;Raphaelv.Bank of England,33 Eng. L. Eq., 276;Steinhartv.Boker,34 Barb., 436;Goodmanv.Simonds,20 How. U.S., 343;Bank of Pittsburghv.Neal,22 id., 96;Murrayv.Lardner,2 Wall. U.S., 110.) The error, however, was against the respondent, and neither party was prejudiced, as the jury, under instructions so favorable to the defendant, found that the plaintiff received the note in good faith.
The judgment should be affirmed.Page 250
It seems to me very clear that this was a legal and valid note in the hands of the company, and was so in the hands of Davis, who owned it, and caused suit to be brought to enforce its collection. The note in controversy was given on the settlement of that suit, and, embracing interest, was simply and virtually a renewal of that first note. It might be added, in this connection, that the settlement of that suit formed a good consideration for the present note, even if there were doubts as to the validity of the first note. But, in my opinion, the first note was perfectly good, and, therefore, the second note was given for a full and perfect consideration, and good in the hands of Davis, to whom it was given. But it is said that the second note was rendered illegal, even if the first was good, because the secretary converted into preferred stock a much larger proportion of Badger's old stock than he was entitled to by his original subscription, and that this illegal act formed a part of the consideration of the new note. But this was not so. If the first note was a legal and valid note, then Badger was indebted on it dollar for dollar of the new note, and Davis got no more than he was legally entitled to receive, and which was justly his due. The suggestion as to the issue of the excess of preferred stock seems to have come from Bergen. The stock, at that time, it seems, was worthless. If Davis was inclined to issue this worthless stock in order to get his debt secured, while the act may not be commendable, it is difficult to see how it could destroy a good and valid claim then subsisting.Page 252
Upon the admitted and uncontradicted facts of this case, and without considering the exceptions, it seems to me very clear that this judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.Page 253