Opinion · New York Court of Appeals
Dillon v. U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc.
100 N.Y.2d 525
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- New York Court of Appeals
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Date
- 2003-05-01
- Topic
- general
holding that the voluntary payment doctrine "bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of material fact or law” | holding plaintiffs purported class action complaint barred based on voluntary payment doctrine when facts revealed that she paid defendant cable company the challenged extra fee with full knowledge of when and why the fee would be charged | finding that the voluntary payment doctrine barred recovery where plaintiff paid several late fees, even though she was unaware that the fees constituted an illegal penalty that exceeded the defendant’s actual costs attributable to the late payments | dismissing class action complaint because the named plaintiff was subject to the voluntary payment doctrine because she knew she would be charged the late fee at issue | affirming dismissal of any overpayment claim based on the voluntary payment doctrine where plaintiff “voluntarily paid the late fee on several occasions without protest despite knowledge of facts suggesting that the fee might be excessive” | cable television customers could not recover late fees they alleged were unlawful penalties because they had paid them knowingly | “Here, no fraud or mistake is alleged in that, according to the complaint, plaintiff knew she would be charged a $5 late fee if she did not make timely payment. Alleged mis-characterization of a $5 late fee as an administrative fee does not overcome application of the voluntary payment doctrine.”
Citator
- Cited by
- 36 opinions
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Plaintiff, a customer of defendant cable television company, commenced this purported class action for compensatory and punitive damages challenging the $5 late fee she paid to defendant for her late payments. The complaint alleges that, although defendant in its promotional materials characterized the late fee as an administrative fee intended to be a reasonable estimate of its costs resulting from customers’ late payments and nonpayments, it was an unlawful penalty bearing no relation to defendant’s actual costs incurred in servicing such payments, and plaintiff would not have paid the fee had she known the true facts. Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
We agree with both lower courts that the voluntary payment doctrine bars plaintiff’s complaint. That common-law doctrine bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of material fact or law (see Gimbel Bros. v Brook Shopping Ctrs., 118 AD2d 532, 535-536 [1986]). Here, no fraud or mistake is alleged in that, according to the complaint, plaintiff knew she would be charged a $5 late fee if she did not make timely payment. Alleged mischaracterization of a $5 late fee as an administrative fee does not overcome application of the voluntary payment doctrine.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt, Graffeo and Read concur.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.