Opinion · Supreme Court of New Jersey

Lorraine Gormley v. Latanya Wood-El (069717)

218 N.J. 72

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Date: 2014-06-30
Topic: employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation

holding that a Fourteenth Amendment analysis under § 1983 and NJCRA is the same | stating that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned and could not properly be raised in a reply brief | noting that a party's failure to present any argument relating to a cross-appeal constituted an abandonment of that claim | noting that claims not addressed in a party's merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that "[t]he decisional law of the Appellate Division is not only binding on our trial courts, but is an expression of the law of our State unless the New Jersey Supreme Court says otherwise" | holding an issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal | noting that claims not address in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | noting that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned | explaining that the NJCRA "is not a source of rights itself" | applying the "conscious shocking" test to a state- created danger claim asserted by plaintiff alleging a substantive due process violation | noting that the NJCRA shares Section 1983’s state action requirement | recognizing an issue not briefed is deemed waived | delineating four factors for imposing liability upon the State for creating such a danger: (1) foreseeable, direct harm; (2) culpable, conscience- shocking state action; (3) a special relationship identifying foreseeable victims; and (4 | “Most federal circuit courts now recognize the state- created-danger doctrine as a basis for a substantive-due- process violation.” (citing Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2006)) | claims not addressed in merits brief deemed abandoned, and could not properly be raised in a reply brief | “Section 1983 is a means of vindicating rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution and federal statutes.” | claims not addressed in merits brief deemed abandoned and could not properly be raised in a reply brief | claims not addressed in merits brief deemed abandoned, and could not properly be raised in a reply brief | claims not addressed in merits brief deemed abandoned and could not properly be raised in a reply brief | The NJCRA “is a means of vindicating substantive rights and is not a source of rights itself.” | “The decisional law of the Appellate Division is not only binding on our trial courts, but is an expression of the law of our State unless the New Jersey Supreme Court says otherwise.” | “Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of federal rights, whereas [the NJCRA] applies not only to federal rights but also to substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.” | “Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of federal rights, whereas [the NJCRA] applies not only to federal rights but also to substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.” | “Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of federal rights, whereas [the NJCRA] applies not only to federal rights but also to substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.” | “Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of federal rights, whereas [the NJCRA] applies not only to federal rights but also to substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.”

Citator

Cited by: 69 opinions

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Lorraine Gormley v. LaTanya Wood-El (A-101/106-11) (069717)

Argued November 4, 2013 -- Decided June 30, 2014

ALBIN, J., writing for a majority of the Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether injuries suffered by an attorney while interviewing a client at a
state psychiatric hospital resulted from a state-created danger that violated her substantive-due-process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and whether defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.

Plaintiff Lorraine Gormley was an attorney employed by the Department of the Public Advocate, Division
of Mental Health Advocacy, providing legal representation to clients involuntarily committed in state psychiatric
facilities, including Ancora Psychiatric Hospital (Ancora). Each ward at Ancora contained a day room in which up
to forty patients, including those who were involuntarily committed and classified as a danger to themselves or
others, could congregate. Visiting attorneys and psychiatrists also were required to use the day rooms for
professional interviews. Although frequent violence occurred in the day rooms, no security guards or cameras were
posted there. From October 2003 through December 2005, Ancora reported almost 4,000 assaults, including 810
assaults against staff members and visitors, 200 of which resulted in injuries.

In September 2005, Gormley arrived at Ancora to interview clients. She sat in a day room with her back
against the wall to prevent attacks from behind. One of her clients was B.R., who was suffering from a psychotic
disorder with hallucinations and who had been assigned Continuous Visual Observation (CVO) status because she
posed a safety risk to herself and others. Gormley, who was not informed that B.R. was on CVO status, sat near her
in order to hear over the noise in the day room. As Gormley turned her head, B.R. hit her several times. Gormley
tried to flee, but B.R. grabbed her by the hair, causing her to fall and strike her head on the concrete floor. When
Gormley regained consciousness, B.R. was still attacking her. Gormley was out of work for about four months due
to her physical and mental injuries.

Gormley filed a civil action against Ancora’s CEO, LaTanya Wood-El, and other government officials, in
their individual capacities, under both the Federal Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

, and the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c), alleging that her constitutional right to be free from state-created danger was
violated. On defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Gormley had presented
sufficient evidence to proceed on the civil-rights claims under the state-created-danger doctrine. The court deferred
deciding whether she was entitled to injunctive relief.

          The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the federal civil-rights
claims on qualified-immunity grounds. Gormley v. Wood-El,

422 N.J. Super. 426

 (App. Div. 2011). Although the
panel determined that defendants violated Gormley’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights under
the state-created-danger theory, it found that defendants had qualified immunity because these rights were not
clearly established at the time she was attacked. The panel did not address Gormley’s claim for relief under the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act or her claim for injunctive relief. Gormley moved for leave to appeal the dismissal of her
claims based on qualified immunity, and defendants moved for leave to appeal the upholding of the civil-rights
claims under the state-created-danger theory. The Court granted the motions filed by Gormley,

210 N.J. 25

 (2012),
and defendants,

216 N.J. 337

 (2012).

HELD: Under the facts of this case, a lawyer assigned to represent a client civilly committed to a state psychiatric
hospital had a substantive-due-process right to be free from state-created dangers. Because that right was clearly
established at the time the lawyer was attacked, the state official defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.




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1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gormley, the Court first considers whether a jury could find
that defendants violated Gormley’s federal substantive-due-process right to be free from state-created danger. The


analysis of this right is the same under both the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts. Although the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of a liberty
interest, it does not generally confer an affirmative right to governmental aid to secure a liberty interest or confer
governmental protection to individuals from violence by private actors. Rather, the constitutional threshold is only
met if the State either creates the danger that proximately causes the injury or renders the victim more vulnerable to
danger. (pp. 22-29)

2. In Bright v. Westmoreland County,

443 F.3d 276

 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,

549 U.S. 1264

(2007), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit developed a standard for application of the state-created-danger
doctrine, requiring a plaintiff to satisfy a four-prong test: (1) the ultimate harm must be foreseeable and direct; (2)
the conduct of the state actor must shock the conscience; (3) the plaintiff must be a specifically foreseeable victim or
part of a discrete class of foreseeable victims; and (4) the state actor must affirmatively use his authority either to
create a danger or render a person substantially more vulnerable to injury. Conscience-shocking conduct occurs if
the state actor intentionally causes unjustifiable harm, but not if the harm arises from negligence. For scenarios
between these two extremes, courts must conduct a fact-sensitive analysis since deliberate indifference that shocks
the conscience in one environment may not in another. Status as a state employee is not dispositive of the right to
pursue a Section 1983 claim. (pp. 29-37)

3. Adopting and applying the Bright state-created danger test, the Court concludes that Gormley was a member of a
discrete class of victims subject to the foreseeable harms set in motion by defendants. Defendants controlled the
movements of residents and visitors within Ancora, where assaults in day rooms were common and fairly
foreseeable. Defendants affirmatively used their authority to create the danger that rendered Gormley vulnerable to
the assault by establishing the regulations and environment to which Gormley had to submit while at Ancora.
Sufficient evidence exists to support Gormley’s claim that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the
foreseeable dangers threatening attorneys assigned to represent committed patients. Thus, a rational jury could find
that all four Bright factors are met and that defendants violated Gormley’s substantive-due-process right to be free
from state-created dangers under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Responding to the
dissent, the Court explains that it looked to the totality of the circumstances, rather than individual factors, to discern
the conscience-shocking conduct because no single brushstroke reveals the whole picture. In light of the unique
level of violence at Ancora, its conclusion will not open a floodgate of litigation against public entities. (pp. 37-47)

4. The application of qualified immunity is a matter of law for a court to decide. Under this doctrine, government
officials are shielded from a suit for civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. This balances the need to hold public
officials accountable when their conduct is irresponsible against the need to shield them when they perform their
duties reasonably. In order for a right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear so that a
reasonable official would know that his conduct is violating that right. In the present case, the Court concludes that
Gormley’s right to be free from state-created danger was clearly established at the time of the assault. In light of the
history of violence at Ancora and the requirement that attorneys meet with clients in the chaotic day rooms,
reasonable hospital administrators knew or should have known that the conditions they created breached the
substantive-due-process guarantee of the United States Constitution. Thus, the Court reverses the Appellate
Division’s dismissal of the federal civil rights claim on qualified-immunity grounds. Finally, even if qualified
immunity were granted to defendants, Gormley would still have the right to pursue injunctive relief. (pp. 47-52)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART and the
matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the Court’s opinion.

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, DISSENTING, joined by JUSTICE PATTERSON, expresses the view that a
substantive state-created-danger claim was not presented in this matter, and the majority’s holding to the contrary
will impact numerous governmental operations in settings such as schools and prisons, while the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach leaves government officials uncertain as to their risk of personal liability. Moreover, even
if a claim were presented, it was not clearly established at the time Gormley suffered her injuries, thereby rendering

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defendants qualifiedly immune from suit.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE
ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE
PATTERSON joins. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not participate.

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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-101/106 September Term 2011
069717

LORRAINE GORMLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellate
and Cross-Respondent,

LATANYA WOOD-EL, Chief
Executive Officer, Ancora
Psychiatric Hospital;
JENNIFER VELEZ, Current
Commissioner and WILLIAM
WALDMAN, Former Commissioner,
New Jersey Department of
Human Services; KEVIN
MARTONE, Current Assistant
Commissioner; and ALAN G.
KAUFMAN, Former Director,
Division of Mental Health
Services, Department of Human
Services,