Mikell v. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT NO. 33

As a general rule, negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie because the act of suicide is considered to be a deliberate, intentional and intervening act, which precludes a finding that a given defendant is, in fact, responsible for the harm. This is because the act of suicide breaks the causal connection between the wrongful or negligent act and the death. A number of jurisdictions, however, have recognized two exceptions to that general rule. Under one exception, liability exists because the defendant actually caused the suicide; under the other, liability exists because the defendant had a duty to prevent it.

An exception to the general rule that negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie involves cases where an intentionally tortious act is found to have caused a mental condition in the decedent that proximately resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, or prevented the decedent from realizing the nature of his act. These cases typically involve the infliction of severe physical injury, or, in rare cases, the intentional infliction of severe mental or emotional injury through wrongful accusation, false arrest or torture.

For a cause of action for wrongful death by suicide to lie for intentional torts, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the tortfeasor, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally wronged a victim and that this intentional conduct caused severe emotional distress in his victim which was a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide of the victim.

An exception to the general rule that negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie recognizes a cause of action when the defendant has a specific duty of care to prevent suicide, arising from the defendant's special relationship with the suicidal individual. The typical defendant in such cases is someone who has a duty of custodial care, is in a position to know about suicide potential, and fails to take measures to prevent suicide from occurring. Specifically, this duty has been imposed on: (1) institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools, having actual physical custody of and control over persons; and (2) persons or institutions such as mental hospitals, psychiatrists and other mental-health trained professionals, deemed to have a special training and expertise enabling them to detect mental illness and/or the potential for suicide, and which have the power or control necessary to prevent that suicide.

In determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, it is not enough that a person has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d at 73 (1965).

False accusations may be grounds for liability under an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e at 74.

A teacher's alleged false accusation against a student who committed suicide the next day, even coupled with the teacher's position of authority, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The actual substance of the alleged false accusation, that the student had characterized mints as medicine, was relatively innocuous, and plaintiff did not allege any further actions that might have exacerbated the situation to an extreme and outrageous level, such as publicly reprimanding the student in front of his class or threatening him with additional abuse of her authoritative power. Even though the teacher's alleged conduct of winking at the student as an acknowledgment of the falsity of her accusation was, at the very least, unprofessional and confrontational, it was insufficient to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.

The existence of a duty in a particular case is a question of law, which the court reviewsde novo.In general, the concept of duty arises out of the relationship between the parties and protection against reasonably foreseeable harm. The existence and extent of that duty depends upon the nature of the relationship between the parties.

Schools share a special relationship with students entrusted to their care, which imposes upon them certain duties of reasonable supervision. School attendance impairs both the ability of students to protect themselves and the ability of their parents to protect them. It is this impairment of protection from which the special relationship between school and student arises and from which the duty of supervision flows. The court limited the duty, however, to only those periods of time when parental protection is compromised, and only to those risks that are reasonably foreseeable.

Plaintiff had not shown that a school unit and a guidance counselor had a duty to prevent her son's suicide. She had not alleged, that the primary purpose of the school, or the counselor in her capacity as such, was to "care for" its students. Further, although a school no doubt possessed some amount of custody and control over its students during school hours, such control was a far cry from that held by jails, juvenile detention facilities or similar institutions where the duty to prevent another's suicide had been imposed. Moreover, plaintiff was made aware of the student's suicide threat on the day the threat occurred, and thus had the opportunity to exert some control over the situation.

Absent a showing that the school affirmatively caused a suicide, the primary responsibility for safeguarding children from this danger, as from most others, is that of their parents; and even they, with direct control and intimate knowledge, are often helpless. Indeed, many courts have declined to extend liability to a school for the suicide of a student under a variety of circumstances.

A party who does not otherwise have a duty, but who voluntarily renders services for another, may be held to a duty of reasonable care in acting. The fact that an actor starts to aid another does not necessarily require him to continue his services. An actor may abandon his services at any time unless, by giving the aid, he has put the other in a worse position than he was in before. A person is put in a worse position if the actual danger to him has been increased by the partial performance, or if in reliance he has been induced to forego other opportunities of obtaining assistance.

Plaintiff had not shown that a guidance counselor voluntarily assumed a duty to act reasonably to prevent her son's suicide when, two months before his suicide, she advised plaintiff not to remove the son from school after his suicide threat, sent him back to class, stated that the threat was a result of a learning disability, and did not advise her to have him examined by an outside professional.