Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina
Simpson v. . Sutton
Simpson v. . Sutton, 61 N.C. 112 (N.C. 1867)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- North Carolina
- Date
- 1867-01-05
- Topic
- general
Reade, J. Two questions are presented in this case: 1. The power of the court to allow the amendment asked by the plaintiff. 2. The effect of the amendment if made. It is unnecessary to decide the first question, because the decision of the second disposes of the case.
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- Cited by
- 2 opinions
SIMPSONv. SUTTON,61 N.C. 112(1867)
HENDERSON SIMPSON v. SAMUEL SUTTON.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
(January Term, 1867.)
2. Where the former execution had been issued 14 February, 1855, a second purporting to be analias, issued 3 May, 1866, was set aside as irregular.
(Boyden v. Odeneal, 1 Dev., 171 cited and approved.)
Upon this state of facts a motion was made by the defendant and the trustee to set aside the second execution, as having issued under a dormant judgment. A counter motion was at the same time submitted by the plaintiff to amend the former execution by making it returnable to Fall Term, 1865.
His Honor refused the latter motion and ordered the second execution to be set aside.
1. The power of the court to allow the amendment asked by the plaintiff.
2. The effect of the amendment if made.Page 106
It is unnecessary to decide the first question, because the decision of the second disposes of the case.
The amendment, if made, would not avail the plaintiff. The time of issuing process is the time when it leaves the office.Boyden v. Odeneal, 1 Dev., 171. The time of issuing the firstfi fa. was 14 February, 1865. The secondfi fa. issued 3 May, 1866, more than a year and a day from the issuing of the first; and, therefore, the judgment was dormant.
It was insisted in the argument that if the firstfi. fa. were amended so as to make it returnable to Fall instead of Spring Term, 1865, (114) the issuing of the second would be within a year and a day from thereturnof the first, and that "the year and a day" was to be counted from thereturnof the one to theissuingof the other. But that is not correct, for the statute (Rev. Code, ch. 31, sec. 109), admits of no doubt that "the year and a day" is to be counted, not from the return of one to the issuing of the other, but from the issuing of one to the issuing of the other. There is no error.
PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed.Cited: Jacobs v. Burgwyn,63 N.C. 195;Foard v. Alexander,64 N.C. 70.