Opinion · District Court, S.D. Mississippi
Netchoice, LLC v. Fitch
Netchoice, LLC v. Fitch, No. 1:24-cv-00170, UP11079891 (District Court, S.D. Mississippi June 18, 2025)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- District Court, S.D. Mississippi
- Jurisdiction
- Mississippi
- Date
- 2025-06-18
- Topic
- bankruptcy
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION NETCHOICE, LLC § PLAINTIFF § § v. § Civil No. 1:24-cv-170-HSO-BWR § § LYNN FITCH, § in her official capacity as § Attorney General of Mississippi § DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF NETCHOICE, LLC’S MOTION [49] FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC seeks to enjoin Sections 1 through 8 of Mississippi House Bill 1126 (“H.B. 1126” or the “Act”), which was signed into law on April 30, 2024, and originally set to take effect on July 1, 2024. See Mot. [49]. NetChoice asks this Court to preliminarily enjoin Defendant Lynn Fitch, in her official capacity as Mississippi Attorney General, from taking any action to enforce the challenged portions of H.B. 1126. See id.; Mem. [50]. The Attorney General opposes the Motion [49].
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NETCHOICE, LLC § PLAINTIFF
§
§
v. § Civil No. 1:24-cv-170-HSO-BWR
§
§
LYNN FITCH, §
in her official capacity as §
Attorney General of Mississippi § DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF NETCHOICE, LLC’S
MOTION [49] FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC seeks to enjoin Sections 1 through 8 of Mississippi
House Bill 1126 (“H.B. 1126” or the “Act”), which was signed into law on April 30,
2024, and originally set to take effect on July 1, 2024. See Mot. [49]. NetChoice
asks this Court to preliminarily enjoin Defendant Lynn Fitch, in her official
capacity as Mississippi Attorney General, from taking any action to enforce the
challenged portions of H.B. 1126. See id.; Mem. [50]. The Attorney General
opposes the Motion [49]. See Resp. [54].
After consideration of the record and relevant legal authority, including the
Fifth Circuit’s prior opinion in this case and the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707
(2024), and because the Court
finds the Act unconstitutional as applied to certain of Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC’s
members, a preliminary injunction should issue pending final disposition of this
case on the merits. Mississippi Attorney General Lynn Fitch and her agents,
employees, and all persons acting under her direction or control, will be
preliminarily enjoined from enforcing Sections 1-8 of Mississippi House Bill 1126
against Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC’s eight covered members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2)
Meta, which owns and operates Facebook and Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4)
Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap Inc., which owns and operates Snapchat; (7) X; and
(8) YouTube.
I. BACKGROUND
A. NetChoice
Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC (“NetChoice” or “Plaintiff”) is a nonprofit trade
association for internet companies. Am. Compl. [48] at 5. Its Amended
Complaint [48] asserts that H.B. 1126 regulates some services offered by the
following of its members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2) Meta, which owns and operates
Facebook and Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4) Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap Inc.,
which owns and operates Snapchat; (7) X; and (8) YouTube. Id.
According to
NetChoice’s General Counsel and Director of Strategic Initiatives Bartlett Cleland
(“Cleland”), its members’ websites “publish, disseminate, display, compile, create,
curate, and distribute a wide range of valuable and protected expression to their
users,” and “disseminate content (text, audio, graphics, and video) that facilitates
their users’ ability to practice their religious beliefs, engage in political discourse,
seek cross-cultural dialogue, supplement their education, learn new skills, and
simply interact socially.” Ex. [49-1] at 3.
Cleland’s Declaration states that the Act covers at least eight of NetChoice’s
members which are known as “social media” websites whose “interactive
functionality is the point of the service.” Id. at 23. Each allows its account
holders to upload and publicly post content, which other account holders may then
view and react to, comment on, or share with others. Id. at 22. According to
Cleland, users of these social media websites “engage in protected speech activities,
including speaking to others and viewing content created by others.” Id. He
opines that the Act’s burdensome requirements “will make it more difficult for
NetChoice members to provide their websites to minors and adults, and will burden
minors and adults’ access to highly valuable and protected speech.” Id. at 24.
B. Mississippi H.B. 1126
Sections 1-8 of H.B. 1126 provide in relevant part as follows:
SECTION 3. (1) This act applies only to a digital service provider who
provides a digital service that:
(a) Connects users in a manner that allows users to socially interact
with other users on the digital service;
(b) Allows a user to create a public, semi-public or private profile for
purposes of signing into and using the digital service; and
(c) Allows a user to create or post content that can be viewed by other
users of the digital service, including sharing content on:
(i) A message board;
(ii) A chat room; or
(iii) A landing page, video channel or main feed that presents
to a user content created and posted by other users.
Ex. [1-1] at 3-4 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 3(1)).
The Act does not apply to a digital service provider that “processes or
maintains user data in connection with the employment, promotion, reassignment
or retention of the user as an employee or independent contractor, to the extent that
the user’s data is processed or maintained for that purpose.” Id. at 4 (Miss. H.B.
1126, § 3(2)(a)). Nor does the Act apply to a provider’s service that “facilitates e-
mail or direct messaging services, if the digital service facilitates only those
services,” primarily functions to provide a user with access to certain career
development opportunities, or primarily functions “to provide a user with access to
news, sports, commerce, online video games or content primarily generated or
selected by the digital service provider” and “[a]llows chat, comment or other
interactive functionality that is incidental to the digital service.” Id. at 4-5 (Miss.
H.B. 1126, § 3(2)(b)-(c)).
Under Section 4,
(1) A digital service provider may not enter into an agreement with a
person to create an account with a digital service unless the person has
registered the person’s age with the digital service provider. A digital
service provider shall make commercially reasonable efforts to verify the
age of the person creating an account . . . .
(2) A digital service provider shall not permit an account holder who
is a known minor to be an account holder unless the known minor has
the express consent from a parent or guardian . . . .
Id. at 5-7 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 4).
Section 6 states that for a “known minor’s use of a digital service, a digital
service provider shall make commercially reasonable efforts to develop and
implement a strategy to prevent or mitigate the known minor’s exposure to harmful
material and other content that promotes or facilitates” certain specified harms.
Id. at 8 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 6(1)). These harms are identified in subsection (1) and
include self-harm, eating disorders, substance use disorders, suicidal behaviors,
stalking, grooming, incitement of violence, and any other illegal activities. Id.
But
[n]othing in subsection (1) shall be construed to require a digital service
provider to prevent or preclude:
(a) Any minor from deliberately and independently searching for, or
specifically requesting, content . . . .
Id. at 8-9 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 6(2)(a)).
In sum, Section 4(1) of H.B. 1126 requires all users, adults and minors alike,
to verify their age before they may open an account with a covered digital service
provider (the “age-verification requirement”), while Section 4(2) requires consent
from a parent before a known minor may create an account (the “parental-consent
requirement”). Id. Section 5 imposes a limitation on the collection of data by
covered digital service providers that enter into an agreement with a known minor
for access to a digital service (the “data-collection limitation”), and Section 6
requires those digital service providers to make commercially reasonable efforts to
develop and implement a strategy to prevent or mitigate the known minor’s
exposure to harmful material and other content that promotes or facilitates certain
harms to minors (the “prevention-or-mitigation requirement”).1 See id. But
Section 6(2) does not require digital service providers to prevent or preclude minors
with accounts from “deliberately and independently searching for, or specifically
requesting, content.” Id.
Section 7 of the Act sets forth civil remedies permitting a parent or guardian
of a known minor affected by a violation of the Act to bring a cause of action for a
1 Plaintiff refers to this as a monitoring-and-censorship requirement, see Am. Compl. [48]
at 19, while Defendant refers to it as the strategy provision, see Resp. [54] at 19-20.
declaratory judgment or an injunction, and Section 8 classifies violations of the Act
as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices or acts
under Mississippi Code § 75-24-5, for which an action for injunctive relief may be
brought by the Mississippi Attorney General. See id. at 9-12; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-5
, 75-24-9. Finally, a knowing and willful violation of Section 75-24-5, including a violation of H.B. 1126, can subject a person to criminal penalties. SeeMiss. Code Ann. § 75-24-20
.
C. Procedural History
NetChoice initiated this lawsuit on June 7, 2024, by filing a Complaint [1] for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, which raised First Amendment facial challenges
to the Act’s central coverage definition (Count I), age-verification requirement
(Count III), parental-consent requirement (Count IV), and prevention-or-mitigation
requirement (Count V). Alternatively, the Complaint alleged that the Act is
overbroad, see Compl. [1] at 18-22, 25-33 (Counts I, III, IV, V), and that its central
coverage definition of a digital service provider is unconstitutionally vague and
violates principles of free speech and due process, id. at 23-24, 33-34
(Count II, VI). The Complaint [1] further claimed that47 U.S.C. § 230
preempts the monitoring-
and-censorship requirements in Section 6. Compl. [1] at 35-36 (Count VII).
NetChoice sought a preliminary injunction, see Mot. [3], which the Court
granted after a hearing on grounds that NetChoice had shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the Act was facially
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, see Order [30]. The Court
preliminarily enjoined Defendant from enforcing H.B. 1126 against NetChoice and
its members, pending final disposition of the case. Id. at 39-40
.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that NetChoice had satisfied
constitutional and prudential standing requirements. See Op. [51] at 4-9;
NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Fitch, 134 F.4th 799
, 804-807 (5th Cir. 2025). On the merits, it noted that this Court had not been able to apply the framework recently announced by the Supreme Court in Moody to NetChoice’s First Amendment facial challenge because of the timing of that opinion. See Fitch, 134 F.4th at 807-09. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction and remanded for this Court to determine “to whom the Act applies [and] the activities it regulates, and then weigh violative applications of the Act against non-violative applications,” as required by Moody and a recent Fifth Circuit decision, NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton,121 F.4th 494
(5th Cir. 2024). Fitch, 134 F.4th at 809.
D. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [48]
On remand, NetChoice opted to file an Amended Complaint [48], which
reurges its First Amendment facial challenge to Sections 1 through 8 of the Act and
adds a challenge to these provisions as applied to its regulated members and their
services. See Am. Compl. [48] at 5, 23-30, 32-42 (challenging all speech regulations
relying on central coverage definition (Count I), the age-verification requirement
(Count III), the parental-consent requirement (Count IV), and the prevention-or-
mitigation requirement (Count V)). Alternatively, the Amended Complaint [48]
asserts that the Act’s central coverage definition of a digital service provider and its
prevention-or-mitigation requirement are unconstitutionally vague and violate
principles of free speech and due process. See id. at 30-32, 42-43 (Counts II and
VI). The Amended Complaint [48] further alleges that 47 U.S.C. § 230
preempts the monitoring-and-censorship requirements in Section 6. See Am. Compl. [48] at 43-45 (Count VII). Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant from enforcing the Act, seeid. at 45
(Count VIII), and a declaration that each of its challenged provisions is unconstitutional, seeid. at 45-46
(Count IX).
E. Plaintiff’s Motion [49] for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction
NetChoice’s renewed Motion [49] for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction contends that “[u]nder either (1) the Moody-informed facial
challenge analysis or (2) the added as-applied claims, NetChoice is entitled to
immediate relief,” Mot. [49] at 1, and that nothing has changed since the Court’s
earlier ruling to undermine its previous merits conclusions, id. at 2
. NetChoice supports its Motion [49] with the newly submitted Cleland Declaration [49-1] and previously-submitted Declarations from Alexandra Veitch [3-3], Gautham Pai, [3-4], and Denise Paolucci, [3-5].Id. at 3
.
The Attorney General responds that NetChoice has not made the required
showing to obtain injunctive relief as to any claim. Resp. [54] at 14. First, she
insists that NetChoice is likely to lose on the merits of its facial and as-applied First
Amendment claims, as well as on its vagueness and preemption claims. See id. at 14-33
. And the Attorney General contends that the remaining factors strongly disfavor injunctive relief. Seeid. at 34-35
.
NetChoice replies that the Attorney General misconstrues what the facial-
challenge analysis requires, and that her suggested analysis would make facial
challenges virtually impossible. See Reply [56] at 3-5. It contends that the Court
can determine to whom the Act applies and which activities it regulates based on
the face of the law and the facts in the record, and it attempts to distinguish the
text of the Act from the laws at issue in Moody and prior Fifth Circuit caselaw. Id. at 5-6
. NetChoice maintains that the challenged provisions discriminate based on content, triggering strict scrutiny, and that the Act has a substantial number of applications that abridge free speech when judged in relation to any hypothetical constitutional applications.Id. at 7
. NetChoice also argues that the Act’s speech regulations are unconstitutional as applied to its covered members, that its central coverage definition is unconstitutionally vague, and that Section 6 is preempted by47 U.S.C. § 230
. Seeid. at 9-10
. Finally, NetChoice states that the other relevant factors under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) also favor injunctive relief.Id. at 10
.2
II. DISCUSSION
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1343.
A preliminary injunction under Rule 65(a) requires the moving party to establish
four factors:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial
threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the
threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that
2 The Court conferred with the parties, and all concurred that another hearing was
unnecessary. See Min. Entry, May 13, 2025.
will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an
injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563
, 577 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). When the government is the opposing party, the last two factors merge.Id.
(citing Nken v. Holder,556 U.S. 418, 435
(2009)).
The movant bears the burden of persuasion on all requirements. Id. at 587.
The Supreme Court has noted that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972
(1997) (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).
A. NetChoice’s Standing
The first question is whether NetChoice has standing to maintain its current
claims. As this Court originally determined, and the Fifth Circuit confirmed,
NetChoice satisfied the requirements of associational and prudential standing to
pursue the claims in its original Complaint [1]. See Fitch, 134 F.4th at 804-07.
The Court finds that the filing of the Amended Complaint [48] has not changed this
result. See id.
As for the new, as-applied First Amendment claims, see Am. Compl. [48],
“there must be some evidence that a rule would be applied to the plaintiff in order
for that plaintiff to bring an as-applied challenge,” Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319
, 335 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Oct. 30, 2020) (quotation and alterations
omitted). NetChoice meets this requirement by presenting evidence that the Act
covers at least eight of its members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2) Meta, which owns and
operates Facebook and Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4) Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap
Inc., which owns and operates Snapchat; (7) X; and (8) YouTube. Decl. [49-1] at 22.
NetChoice has also submitted member declarations from YouTube (which is owned
and operated by Google Inc.), Nextdoor, and Dreamwidth discussing how the Act
applies to their respective services. See Ex. [3-3]; Ex. [3-4]; Ex. [3-5].
NetChoice has therefore presented some evidence that the Act would apply to
its members; this is sufficient to support its standing to pursue an as-applied
challenge. See Speech First, Inc., 979 F.3d at 335.
B. Relevant First Amendment Principles
“[T]he First Amendment provides in relevant part that ‘Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,’” and “the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause applicable against the States.”
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802
, 808 (2019). The First Amendment protects both freedom of speech as well as the “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.” Stanley v. Georgia,394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969). “[T]he right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them” and “is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.” Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,457 U.S. 853, 867
(1982) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).3 “As a general matter, 3 H.B. 1126’s primary focus is minors. But “minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,422 U.S. 205, 212-13
(1975) (citation omitted). “No doubt the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” United States v. Stevens,559 U.S. 460, 468
(2010) (quotation and alteration omitted).
“The distinction between a facial and as applied challenge goes to the breadth
of the remedy employed by the Court.” Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. v. Strain, 65 F.4th 211
, 218-19 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation and alterations omitted). Because a facial challenge is “really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is unconstitutional in all its applications,” the Supreme Court has stated that “classifying a lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which the invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the corresponding breadth of the remedy.” Bucklew v. Precythe,587 U.S. 119
, 138 (2019) (quotation omitted). But “it does not speak at all to the substantive rule of law necessary to establish a constitutional violation.”Id.
“When a litigant brings both as-applied and facial challenges, [courts] generally decide the as-applied challenge first because it is the narrower consideration.” Buchanan v. Alexander,919 F.3d 847, 852
(5th Cir. 2019). “Although as-applied challenges are generally favored as a matter of judicial restraint because they result in a narrow remedy, a developed factual record is essential.” Justice v. Hosemann,771 F.3d 285, 292
(5th Cir. a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n,564 U.S. 786, 794
(2011) (citations omitted). “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”Id.
at 795 (quoting Erznoznik,422 U.S. at 213-14
). 2014). “Particularized facts are what allow a court to issue a narrowly tailored and circumscribed remedy.”Id.
Accordingly, the Court turns first to NetChoice’s challenge to Sections 1
through 8 of the Act, as applied to its eight covered members and their services.
See Am. Compl. [48] at 5, 23-30, 32-42 (challenging all speech regulations relying on
central coverage definition in Count I, the age-verification requirement in Count III,
the parental-consent requirement in Count IV, and the prevention-or-mitigation
requirement in Count V).
C. NetChoice’s As-Applied Challenge
1. The Parties’ Arguments
A threshold issue is whether the challenged provisions are subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. NetChoice maintains that “[t]he Act is unconstitutional as
applied to covered members’ services: Dreamwidth, Facebook, Instagram, Nextdoor,
Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, X, and YouTube.” Mem. [50] at 32. The Attorney
General responds that “[t]he basic problem with this argument is the same as with
its facial argument: NetChoice has not made a factual showing of how any provision
applies to even one platform—let alone a showing that any application in fact
intrudes on speech rights.” Mem. [54] at 28 (emphasis in original). NetChoice
replies that it “has provided three member declarations from Google, Nextdoor, and
Dreamwidth discussing how the Act applies to their respective services” and “has
also explained how the Act applies to its covered members, both in its own
declaration, ECF 49-1, and its pleadings.” Reply [56] at 9. The Court concurs
with NetChoice that, based on its evidentiary submissions at this stage of the case,
it has made a sufficient factual showing that the Act applies to the aforementioned
members.
2. Analysis
a. Whether the Act is Subject to First Amendment Scrutiny
“Laws that directly regulate expressive conduct can, but do not necessarily,
trigger” First Amendment scrutiny. TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57
, 65 (2025). The Supreme Court has also applied First Amendment scrutiny in cases involving governmental regulation of conduct that carries an expressive element, and to “some statutes which, although directed at activity with no expressive component, impose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First Amendment activities.”Id.
(quotation omitted).
If a challenged provision is subject to the First Amendment, the Court must
then determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. See id. at 66-67
. Content-based laws, meaning those that target speech based on its communicative content, are subject to strict scrutiny, and “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”Id. at 67
(quotation omitted). “[T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C.,512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994).
Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase “content based”
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech on its face
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated
speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle,
defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are
distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and,
therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155
, 163-64 (2015) (citations and quotations
omitted).
“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus
toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech.” Id. at 165
(quotation omitted). Moreover, “[b]ecause speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content, [the Supreme Court has] insisted that laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content preference.”Id. at 170
(quotations omitted); see also TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 67 (discussing the two forms
of content-based speech regulation: (1) a law that is content-based on its face
because it applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed, and (2) a facially content-neutral law that is nonetheless
treated as a content-based regulation of speech because it cannot be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech or was adopted by the
government because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys).
“Content-neutral laws, in contrast, are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 67
(quotation omitted). Under this standard, a court will sustain a content-neutral
law “if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression
of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, at least some provisions of the Act, particularly Sections 4 and 5, limit
access to the websites of NetChoice’s covered members and directly regulate
expressive conduct, implicating the First Amendment as to those covered members.
See id.; Ex. [1-1] (Miss. H.B. 1126).4
H.B. 1126 applies to any service offered by the covered digital service
provider that:
(a) Connects users in a manner that allows users to socially interact
with other users on the digital service;
(b) Allows a user to create a public, semi-public or private profile for
purposes of signing into and using the digital service; and
(c) Allows a user to create or post content that can be viewed by other
users of the digital service, including sharing content on:
(i) A message board;
(ii) A chat room; or
(iii) A landing page, video channel or main feed that presents
to a user content created and posted by other users.
Ex. [1-1] at 3-4 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 3). But the Act does not apply to certain things,
including a digital service that “[p]rimarily functions to provide a user with access
4 The Court recognizes that some sections of the Act may not be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. For instance, Section 1 simply sets forth the title of the Act, and
Section 2 defines certain terms. But the parties have not addressed whether, for an as-
applied challenge, the Court must consider each provision separately. But see, e.g., Space
Expl. Techs. Corp. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 741 F. Supp. 3d 630
, 638 (W.D. Tex. 2024) (holding that it was premature at preliminary injunction stage to consider whether severance of unconstitutional portions of the statute was possible). to news, sports, commerce, online video games or content primarily generated or selected by the digital service provider.”Id. at 4
(Miss. H.B. 1126, § 3(2)(c)(i)).
In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court considered statutory provisions
that required all cable television systems to devote some of their channels to the
transmission of local broadcast television stations, and found that because the
provisions were “based only upon the manner in which speakers transmit their
messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry,” they were not content-
based and were subject only to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 512 U.S. at 645
; seeid. at 626, 661-62
. But H.B. 1126 does not apply to all digital service providers,
and specifically excludes from its reach certain providers based upon the primary
purpose or subject matter of their service. See Ex. [1-1] at 3-5 (Miss. H.B. 1126,
§§ 3(1), 3(2)(c)).
“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163, which is precisely what H.B. 1126 does, see Ex. [1-1] at 3-5
(Miss. H.B. 1126, §§ 3(1), 3(2)(c)). The Act’s content-based distinction is inherent
in its definition of “digital service provider,” which outlines the scope of the Act’s
coverage. See id. The Act covers some digital service providers based upon their
primary function or the content they convey, while specifically excluding others
based upon the nature of the speech they communicate. See id. Essentially, H.B.
1126 treats or classifies digital service providers differently based upon the nature
of the material they disseminate, whether it is “social interaction,” id. at 3 (Miss.
H.B. 1126, § 3(1)(a)), as opposed to “news, sports, commerce, [or] online video
games,” id. at 4 (Sec. 3(2)(c)(i)). Even if this could be considered a speaker-based
distinction, the Supreme Court has held that “laws favoring some speakers over
others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a
content preference.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 170.
Section 3(2)(c)(i) can thus be viewed as either drawing a facial distinction
based on the message the digital service provider conveys (i.e., news and sports
versus social interaction), or a more subtle content-based restriction defining
regulated speech by its function or purpose (i.e., providing news and sports as
opposed to facilitating social interaction). See Ex. [1-1] at 3 (Sec. 3(2)(c)(i)); Reed,
576 U.S. at 163. Either way, “[b]oth are distinctions drawn based on the message a
speaker conveys.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163-64. And it is of no moment that there is
no express restriction on a particular viewpoint, as “[t]he First Amendment’s
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” Id. at
169 (quotation omitted). Nor is the State’s motive relevant, as “[a] law that is
content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s
benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas
contained in the regulated speech.” Id. at 165 (quotation omitted). The facial
distinctions H.B. 1126 draws based on the message a particular digital service
provider conveys, or the more subtle content-based restrictions based upon the
speech’s function or purpose, render the Act content-based, and therefore subject to
strict scrutiny. See id.
The Attorney General argues that H.B. 1126 regulates not speech but non-
expressive conduct, which the State may regulate if it has a rational basis for doing
so. See Resp. [54] at 15, 17-20, 26 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25
(1989)). The Court is not persuaded that H.B. 1126 merely regulates non- expressive conduct, and Stanglin, upon which the Attorney General relies, is distinguishable. Seeid.
In Stanglin, the “city of Dallas adopted an ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18,” Stanglin,490 U.S. at 20
, and limiting their operating hours to 1 p.m. to midnight, when school was not in session,id. at 22
. “[T]he owner of one of these ‘teenage’ dance halls, sued to contest the constitutional validity of the ordinance.”Id. at 20
. “The Texas Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment right of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 to associate with persons outside that age group.”Id. at 20-21
.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 21
. It reasoned that the ordinance restricted attendance at teenage dance halls “to minors between the ages of 14 and 18 and certain excepted adults. It thus limits the minors’ ability to dance with adults who may not attend, and it limits the opportunity of such adults to dance with minors.”Id. at 24
. The Supreme Court recognized that such opportunities for dance-hall patrons “might be described as ‘associational’ in common parlance, but they simply [did] not involve the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to protect.”Id. at 24
. “There [was] no suggestion that these patrons ‘[took] positions on public questions’ or perform[ed] any of the other similar activities described in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,481 U.S. 537, 548
,107 S.Ct. 1940, 1947
,95 L.Ed.2d 474
(1987),” id. at 25, including the “right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends,” Duarte,481 U.S. at 548
.
Unlike Stanglin, at this stage of the proceeding there is competent evidence
in this case that NetChoice’s covered members’ websites include users who take
positions on, and engage with others in pursuit of, the type of “political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural” activities described in Duarte. Id.;
see also, e.g., Ex. [49-1] at 3 (“NetChoice members’ websites publish, disseminate,
display, compile, create, curate, and distribute a wide range of valuable and
protected expression to their users. They disseminate content (text, audio,
graphics, and video) that facilitates their users’ ability to practice their religious
beliefs, engage in political discourse, seek cross-cultural dialogue, supplement their
education, learn new skills, and simply interact socially.”). The argument that the
Act is conduct-based or that Stanglin somehow controls is not persuasive. Because
H.B. 1126 regulates content, strict scrutiny applies. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163-64.
b. Whether NetChoice Has Shown a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
The Attorney General contends that the State has a compelling interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors online, and that
the Act is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest given “how easily” the age
verification requirement can be satisfied. Resp. [54] at 27. The Court accepts as
true the Attorney General’s position that safeguarding the physical and
psychological wellbeing of minors online is a compelling interest. See id.; see also,
e.g., Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)
(recognizing that “there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors”).
The State “may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.”
Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc., 492 U.S. at 126
(quotation omitted). “It is not enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.”Id.
When the ends “affect First Amendment rights they must be pursued by means that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.” Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n,564 U.S. 786, 805
(2011). “If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc.,529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000).
So, the question here is whether, as applied to NetChoice’s covered members,
the Act is sufficiently narrowly tailored to promote the State’s compelling interest.
See id.; Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc., 492 U.S. at 126
; TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct.
at 70. NetChoice has carried its burden of showing that the Act, as applied to at
least eight of its members, is likely not narrowly tailored to achieve the interests
identified by the Attorney General. Based upon the definitions in Sections 2 and 3,
including the definition of a covered digital service provider, Section 4 precludes
such digital service providers which do not primarily provide certain content (career
development opportunities, news, sports, commerce, and online video games) from
allowing a user to create an account without registering his or her age, and it
requires covered digital service providers to “make commercially reasonable efforts
to verify the age of the person creating an account with a level of certainty
appropriate to the risks that arise from the information management practices of
the digital service provider.” Ex. [1-1] at 6 (Miss. H.B. 1126, § 4). Any known
minors must then obtain parental consent to open an account with a covered
member. Id. at 6-7.
NetChoice has presented evidence that minors’ parents and guardians
already have many tools at their disposal to monitor and control their children’s
online access, including network-, device-, browser-, and app-level restrictions. See
Decl. [49-1] at 5-8. And Cleland’s Declaration [49-1] reflects that NetChoice’s
members take measures to protect minors, including by prohibiting minors younger
than 13 from accessing their main services, and by having minor-specific policies or
practices. Id. at 8-9.
The Southern District of Ohio has addressed a similar law and found that
NetChoice had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that
foreclosing minors under 18 years old from accessing all content on social media
websites, like the ones H.B. 1126 purports to cover, absent affirmative parental
consent was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. NetChoice, LLC v. Yost,
716 F. Supp. 3d 539
, 559 (S.D. Ohio 2024). The district court there determined that such an approach was also “an untargeted one, as parents must only give one- time approval for the creation of an account . . . .”Id.
In addressing legislation prohibiting minors from purchasing violent video
games, the Supreme Court in Brown held that is doubtful that “punishing third
parties for conveying protected speech to children just in case their parents
disapprove of that speech is a proper governmental means of aiding parental
authority.” Brown, 564 U.S. at 802
. In Brown, as here, there were already a series of preexisting protections offered by the plaintiffs to assist parents.Id. at 803
; see also, e.g., Ex. [49-1] at 5-6 (averring that “there is much publicly accessible information about the many wireless routers that offer parental control settings parents can use to block specific online services, limit the time that their children spend on the Internet, set individualized content filters, and monitor the online services their children visit”). The Supreme Court concluded that the legislation at issue in Brown was “seriously underinclusive,” not only because it excluded portrayals of violence other than video games, but also because it permitted a parental veto. Brown,564 U.S. at 805
. It further held the legislation was overinclusive because it enforced a governmental speech restriction, subject to parental veto.Id. at 804
. “And the overbreadth in achieving one goal [was] not cured by the underbreadth in achieving the other.”Id. at 805
.
Here, the Attorney General has not shown that the alternative suggested by
NetChoice, the private tools currently available for parents to monitor their
children online, see Mem. [50] at 25, would be insufficient to secure the State’s
objective of protecting children, see, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 804-05
; see also United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc.,529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (for content-based
regulations subject to strict scrutiny, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve
the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative”); Ex. [49-1] at
5-19 (discussing existing tools parents can use to oversee and control their minor
children’s online access and some NetChoice members’ current policies that block or
limit the publication to minors of content that the Act regulates).
In short, NetChoice has carried its burden of demonstrating that there are a
number of supervisory technologies available for parents to monitor their children
that the State could publicize. See Ex. [49-1] at 5-7. Yet, the Act requires all
users (both adults and minors) to verify their ages before creating an account to
access a broad range of protected speech on a broad range of covered websites.
This burdens the First Amendment rights of adults using the websites of
Netchoice’s covered members, which makes it seriously overinclusive.5 But
NetChoice has also presented persuasive evidence that “[u]ncertainty about how
broadly the Act extends—and how Defendant will interpret the Act—may spur
5 Minors also have a “significant measure of First Amendment protection,” and the State
may bar public dissemination of protected materials to minors “only in relatively narrow
and well-defined circumstances.” Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212-13
. The State does not have a “free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” Brown,564 U.S. at 794
.
members to engage in over-inclusive moderation that would block valuable content
from all users,” and that not all covered websites have the ability to “age-gate,”
meaning that “they are unable to separate the content available on adults’ accounts
from content available on minors’ accounts.” Ex. [49-1] at 26. This likewise
renders H.B. 1126 overinclusive.
The Act also requires all minors under the age of eighteen, regardless of age
and level of maturity, to secure parental consent to engage in protected speech
activities on a broad range of covered websites, which represents a one-size-fits-all
approach to all children from birth to age 17 years and 364-days old. H.B. 1126 is
thus overinclusive as to Netchoice’s covered members to the extent it is intended as
an aid to parental authority beyond the resources for monitoring children’s internet
activity NetChoice has already identified, because not all children forbidden by the
Act to create accounts on their own have parents who will care whether they create
such accounts. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 789, 804
(holding the state act purporting
to aid parental authority by prohibiting the sale or rental of “violent video games” to
minors “vastly overinclusive” because “[n]ot all of the children who are forbidden to
purchase violent video games on their own have parents who care whether they
purchase violent video games” (emphasis in original)).
Brown found that the statute in that case was also underinclusive:
[t]he Act is also seriously underinclusive in another respect . . . leav[ing]
this dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of children so long
as one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK. And there are
not even any requirements as to how this parental or avuncular
relationship is to be verified; apparently the child’s or putative parent’s,
aunt’s, or uncle’s say-so suffices.
Brown, 564 U.S. at 802
.
H.B. 1126 similarly requires only one parent or guardian’s consent to create
an account with a covered member’s website, and it does not explain how the parent
or guardian relationship is to be verified. See Ex. [1-1] at 5-7 (Miss. H.B. 1126,
§ 4). Section 4(2) states that “[a]cceptable methods of obtaining express consent of
a parent or guardian include any of the following” and references examples
contained in subsections (a) through (f). See Sec. 4(2) (“A digital service provider
shall not permit an account holder who is a known minor to be an account holder
unless the known minor has the express consent from a parent or guardian.”).
Only options (d) and (e) mention confirming the identity of the purported parent or
guardian, but none of the options, not even options (d) and (e), require verifying that
the person who represents himself or herself as the minor’s parent or guardian is in
fact the parent or guardian. See Sec. 4(2)(d)-(e) (discussing collecting information
and confirming the identity of the parent or guardian, but not how to verify
parental relationship or guardian status). This makes H.B. 1126 underinclusive as
applied to NetChoice’s covered members. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 802
.
Finally, Section 6 of H.B. 1126 requires covered Netchoice members “to
develop and implement a strategy to prevent or mitigate the known minor’s
exposure to harmful material and other content that promotes or facilitates” certain
harms to minors, Sec. 6(1), but then states that it shall not be construed to require a
provider to prevent or preclude “[a]ny minor from deliberately and independently
searching for, or specifically requesting, content,” Sec. 6(2)(a). Permitting minors
who have presumably obtained parental consent to view otherwise-proscribed
content on covered websites, simply because they initiated it by “searching for” or
“requesting” it, would not seem to serve the State’s compelling interest in protecting
minors from the predatory behavior online. H.B. 1126 is underinclusive in this
respect as well.
In summary, the record as a whole supports the conclusion that NetChoice
has shown that the Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s desired result.
NetChoice has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that, as
applied to its covered members, H.B. 1126 is either overinclusive or underinclusive,
or both, for achieving the State’s asserted interest in protecting minors from
predatory behavior online. See Americans for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 615;
Brown, 564 U.S. at 805
; Moody,2024 WL 3237685
, at *8. As such, the Act is likely
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny as applied to at least
eight of NetChoice’s members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2) Meta, which owns and operates
Facebook and Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4) Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap Inc.,
which owns and operates Snapchat; (7) X; and (8) YouTube.
Even if, as the Attorney General asserts, the Act were deemed content
neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny, the result would not change. A court
will sustain a content-neutral law “if it advances important governmental interests
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests.” TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 67
(quotation omitted). To be sufficiently tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny, “a
regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the
Government’s interests.” Id. at 70 (quotation omitted). “Rather, the standard is
satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation and does not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.” Id.
(quotations omitted); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98
, 105-06 (2017) (holding that “to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” (quotation omitted)). “While not as exacting as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is no gimme for the government: Intermediate scrutiny is still tough scrutiny, not a judicial rubber stamp.” Hines v. Pardue,117 F.4th 769
, 779 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotations and
alteration omitted).
Again accepting as true the Attorney General’s position that safeguarding the
physical and psychological wellbeing of minors online is an important governmental
interest, it does not appear that the chosen method for advancing this interest can
be said to be unrelated to the suppression of speech, at least as it applies to
NetChoice’s covered members. See id.; Moody, 603 U.S. at 740
. But even if it
were found to be unrelated to suppression of speech, for the reasons the Court has
already discussed, the Act nevertheless burdens substantially more speech than is
necessary for the State to accomplish its goals. See TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 70.
For example, Section 4 precludes minors under 18 years old from accessing
all content on social media websites, absent affirmative parental consent, regardless
of whether the content concerns or negatively affects minors’ physical and
psychological wellbeing. See Sec. 4(2). Section 6 states that “a digital service
provider shall make commercially reasonable efforts to develop and implement a
strategy to prevent or mitigate the known minor’s exposure to harmful material and
other content that promotes or facilitates” certain specified harms. Sec. 6(1). But
NetChoice has presented evidence, including Cleland’s Declaration [49-1], that the
plain terms of the Act seem to require prevention of exposure “not only to protected
speech, but also to valuable works of art, literature, and pop culture that are
suitable for at least some minors,” Ex. [49-1] at 26, as those works may be construed
as promoting or facilitating some of the specified harms, such as self-harm, eating
disorders, substance use disorders, suicidal behaviors, stalking, grooming,
incitement of violence, and any other illegal activities, see id.; Sec. 6(1). And
Cleland opines that uncertainty about how broadly the Act extends and how the
Attorney General will interpret and enforce it “may spur members to engage in
over-inclusive moderation.” Ex. [49-1] at 26. Thus, as applied to NetChoice’s
covered members, the Act likely burdens substantially more speech than is
necessary for the State to safeguard the physical and psychological wellbeing of
minors online. See id.; TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 70.
Simply put, the Act is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the State’s
interests even under intermediate scrutiny. See Packingham, 582 U.S. at 105-06.
NetChoice has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its as-
applied claim. See id.; TikTok Inc., 145 S. Ct. at 70; Moody, 603 U.S. at 740
.6
c. Irreparability of Harm
The Court turns next to whether NetChoice’s covered members or their users
will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. “In general, a harm is
irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, such as monetary damages.”
Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600
(5th Cir. 2011). But the mere fact that monetary damages may be available does not always mean that a remedy is adequate. Seeid.
“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most
courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Book
People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318
, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). And the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns,427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976). Here, one potential consequence of knowingly violating the Act includes criminal liability, see Sec. 8(2)(q) (making violating the Act an unfair and deceptive trade practice under Section 75-24-5);Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-20
(a) (“Any person who, knowingly and willfully, violates any provision of Section 75-24-5, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined up to One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).”), and with respect to compliance 6 Because NetChoice has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on at least some of its claims, the Court need not consider its remaining preemption claim. See Am. Compl. [48] at 43-45. costs, covered digital service providers may suffer irreparable harm by outlaying financial resources to comply “with no guarantee of eventual recovery” from the State if the Court ultimately enters judgment in their favor, Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,594 U.S. 758
, 765 (2021). Indeed, at least one of NetChoice’s members has presented evidence that the alleged financial injury may threaten the very existence of its business. See Ex. [3-5] at 22 (averring that “the Act threatens [Dreamwidth’s] ability to continue operating”). The Fifth Circuit has found an injury to be irreparable when compliance costs were likely unrecoverable against a federal agency because it enjoyed sovereign immunity. See Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. United States Food & Drug Admin.,16 F.4th 1130
, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021). The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of
granting a preliminary injunction.
d. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
The last two factors merge where, as here, the government is the opposing
party. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435
. And “injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.” Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n,732 F.3d 535, 539
(5th Cir. 2013). Because the Court has found that
NetChoice has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims,
the Court finds that an injunction is in the public interest. See id.; see also, e.g.,
Book People, Inc., 91 F.4th at 341 (“Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of their First Amendment claim, the State and the public won’t be injured by
an injunction of a statute that likely violates the First Amendment.”). In sum,
NetChoice has shown that all four factors under Rule 65 favor the entry of a
preliminary injunction on its as-applied challenge to Sections 1 through 8 of the Act.
D. NetChoice’s Facial Challenge
Because NetChoice has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of its as-applied claim, the Court need not reach its facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Jubert, No. 24-60199, 2025 WL 1577013
, at *2 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025) (holding that a court turns to a facially overbroad challenge “only if it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied” (quoting Buchanan,919 F.3d at 854
)). The Court is certainly mindful of the Fifth Circuit’s mandate remanding this matter for this Court to address the facial challenge under the framework announced in Moody. But the procedural posture of this case changed when, following remand, NetChoice filed an Amended Complaint [48] adding, for the first time, an as-applied challenge to the Act. See Am. Compl. [48]. Earlier, before both this Court and the Fifth Circuit, and “[a]s in Moody, NetChoice chose to bring a facial challenge ‘and that decision [came] at a cost.’” Fitch, 134 F.4th at 807 (quoting Moody,603 U.S. at 723
). NetChoice
apparently heeded the Fifth Circuit’s advice and added an as-applied challenge on
remand. See Am. Compl. [48].
Given this altered procedural posture, the Fifth Circuit has been clear that a
district court should “generally decide the as-applied challenge first because it is the
narrower consideration.” Buchanan, 919 F.3d at 852
. And the Supreme Court has explained that, “although the occasional case requires us to entertain a facial challenge in order to vindicate a party’s right not to be bound by an unconstitutional statute, we neither want nor need to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully protect the litigants.” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,513 U.S. 454, 477-78
(1995). Given the foregoing guidance from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, and because the Court has determined NetChoice has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its newly-added as-applied challenge to the Act, it need not reach the facial challenge in order to fully protect the litigants, and it will refrain from doing so in order to avoid “unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues.”Id. at 478
.
E. Whether the Court Should Require Security
Rule 65(c) states that a court may issue a preliminary injunction “only if the
movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs
and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). “[T]he amount of security required pursuant to
Rule 65(c) is a matter for the discretion of the trial court,” and the district court
“may elect to require no security at all.” Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628
(5th Cir. 1996).
In this case, neither party has raised the issue of security, and Defendant
likely will not incur any significant monetary damage as a result of a preliminary
injunction, which ensures that the constitutional rights of NetChoice’s covered
members are protected. Therefore, the Court finds that security is not necessary in
this case. See id.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Thomas v. Varnado,511 F. Supp. 3d 761
, 766 (E.D. La. 2020) (holding that, because neither the school board nor superintendent was likely to incur any significant monetary damages as a result of the preliminary injunction and because the plaintiff was a minor student, it would issue an injunction without security); Gbalazeh v. City of Dallas, No. 3:18-CV-0076-N,2019 WL 2616668
, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2019) (“The Court exercises its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) to waive the bond requirement, as Plaintiffs are engaged in ‘public-interest litigation’ to protect their constitutional rights.” (quoting City of Atlanta v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,636 F.2d 1084
(5th Cir. 1981)).
III. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC, has carried its burden of demonstrating a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the Act is
unconstitutional under a First Amendment as-applied challenge as to certain of its
members, the Court will grant the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction without
requiring security.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiff
NetChoice, LLC’s Motion [49] for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent it seeks a preliminary injunction
as to its eight covered members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2) Meta, which owns and
operates Facebook and Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4) Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap
Inc., which owns and operates Snapchat; (7) X; and (8) YouTube. The Motion [49]
is DENIED IN PART as moot, to the extent it seeks a temporary restraining order.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Defendant
Mississippi Attorney General Lynn Fitch and her agents, employees, and all
persons acting under her direction or control, are PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) from enforcing Sections 1 through 8 of
Mississippi House Bill 1126 against Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC’s eight covered
members: (1) Dreamwidth; (2) Meta, which owns and operates Facebook and
Instagram; (3) Nextdoor; (4) Pinterest; (5) Reddit; (6) Snap Inc., which owns and
operates Snapchat; (7) X; and (8) YouTube, pending a final disposition of this case
on its merits.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 18th day of June, 2025.
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE