Bachelder v. Heagan

The opinion of the Court was by

Weston C. J.

By the ancient common law, or custom of the realm, if a house took fire, the owner was held answerable for any injury thereby occasioned to others. This was probably founded upon some presumed negligence or carelessness, not susceptible of proof. The hardship of this rule was corrected by the statute of 6 Anne, c. 31, which exempted the owner from liability, where the fire was occasioned by accident. The rule does not appear to have been applied to the owner of a field, where a fire may have been kindled. It may frequently be necessary to burn stubble or other matter, which incumbers the ground. It is a lawful act, unless kindled at an improper time, or carelessly managed. *34 Baron Comyns states, that an action of the case lies, at common law, against the owner of a house, which takes fire, by which another is injured, and adds, “ so if a fire be kindled in a yard or close, to burn stubble, and by negligence it burns corn in an adjoining close.” Com. Dig. action of the case for negligence, A. 6.

In Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. R. 421, it was held, that if A. sets fire to his own fallow ground, as he máy lawfully do, which communicates to and fires the woodland of B., his neighbor, no action lies against A., unless there was some negligence or misconduct in him or his servants. And this is a fair illustration of the common law, upon which the action depends. Negligence or misconduct is the gist of the action. And this must be proved. In certain cases, as in actions against innkeepers and common carriers, it is presumed, by the policy of the law, where property is lost which is confided to their care. But in ordinary cases, of which the one before us is not an exception, where the action depends on negligence, the burthen of proof is upon the plaintiff. This is common learning, and applies to all affirmative averments, necessary to maintain an action. The defendant’s five was lawfully kindled on his own land. It is an element, appropriated to many valuable and useful purposes; but which may become destructive from causes, not subject to human control. Hence the fact, that an injury has been done to others, is not in itself evidence of negligence. The party, who avers the fact, is bound to satisfy the jury upon this point, before he can be entitled to a verdict. In our opinion, the direction of the presiding Judge was correct, as to the burthen of proof.

Judgment on the verdict.