Opinion · District Court, D. Maryland
In re Retina Group of Washington Data Security Incident Litigation
In re Retina Grp. of Wash. Data Sec. Incident Litig., No. 8:24-cv-00004, UP11104890 (District Court, D. Maryland July 21, 2025)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- District Court, D. Maryland
- Jurisdiction
- Maryland
- Date
- 2025-07-21
- Topic
- litigation
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : IN RE RETINA GROUP OF WASHINGTON DATA SECURITY : Consolidated No. DKC 24-0004 INCIDENT LITIGATION : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this data breach class action are the motions for attorney fees (ECF No. 38) and for final approval of the class action settlement filed by Jennifer Boehles, Kwame Dapaah-Siakwan, Natalia Girard, Sharon Jenkins, Desiree McCormick, David Puckett, Katherine Traynham, Shalane Vance, Mary Vandenbroucke (“Named Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 42). Named Plaintiffs have also filed supplements to their motion for settlement approval. (ECF Nos. 46; 51).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
IN RE RETINA GROUP OF
WASHINGTON DATA SECURITY : Consolidated No. DKC 24-0004
INCIDENT LITIGATION
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this data breach
class action are the motions for attorney fees (ECF No. 38) and
for final approval of the class action settlement filed by Jennifer
Boehles, Kwame Dapaah-Siakwan, Natalia Girard, Sharon Jenkins,
Desiree McCormick, David Puckett, Katherine Traynham, Shalane
Vance, Mary Vandenbroucke (“Named Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 42).
Named Plaintiffs have also filed supplements to their motion for
settlement approval. (ECF Nos. 46; 51). The court held
a fairness hearing on July 15, 2025. For the following reasons,
the motions will be granted in part and the case dismissed.
I. Background
Defendant Retina Group of Washington, PLLC (“Defendant”) is
a “healthcare company that provides ophthalmology and vision care
services.” (ECF No. 35-1, at 8). On March 26, 2023, Defendant
experienced a data breach (the “Data Breach” or “Data Incident”),
potentially exposing the personally identifiable information
and/or personal health information of the Named Plaintiffs and
approximately 450,000 individuals (“Settlement Class,” and
together with Named Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”). (Id.). Multiple
lawsuits were filed against Defendant, and eventually, the
lawsuits were consolidated. (ECF Nos. 35-1, at 9; 20). On March
18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated class action
complaint (the “Complaint”). (ECF No. 21). On May 2, 2024,
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 29). On June 17, 2024,
Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 32). On July
1, 2024, Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 33).
On August 30, 2024, the case was reassigned to Judge Lisa W.
Wang, Court of International Trade, sitting in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland by
designation. Following arms-length negotiations with counsel,
(ECF No. 35-3, at 3), Plaintiffs and Defendant (the “Parties”)
reached a settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) and
notified the court on December 5, 2024. (ECF No. 34). On January
21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the class action settlement. (ECF No. 35). On February
18, 2025, Judge Wang granted the motion, concluding that “[t]he
terms of the Settlement Agreement are preliminarily approved as
fair, reasonable, and adequate.” (ECF No. 36, at 3). Judge Wang
also preliminarily certified the class; preliminarily approved the
2
settlement subject to further consideration at the final fairness
hearing; appointed Named Plaintiffs to serve as class
representatives; appointed Ben Barrow, Gary M. Klinger, and Tyler
J. Bean to serve as class counsel (“Class Counsel”); appointed
Verita Global, LLC to serve as the settlement administrator
(“Settlement Administrator”); approved the class notice, claim,
and exclusion and objection process; approved the notice
protocols; and scheduled a final fairness hearing. (ECF No. 36, at
1-11).
The preliminarily approved Settlement Agreement created a
Settlement Class of approximately 450,000 individuals consisting
of residents of the United States identified on the Settlement
Class List whose personal information may have been involved in
the data security incident on or about March 26, 2023, and who do
not meet an exclusion. (ECF Nos. 36, at 1-2; 35-2, at 7; 42-1, at
9).
The Settlement Agreement called for a settlement fund
(“Settlement Fund”) of $3,600,000 to be used for notice and claims
administration costs, any taxes owed, service awards to Named
Plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees and costs, and benefits to the
Settlement Class Members, with any remaining amount to be donated
to the Maryland Bar Foundation, Inc. (ECF No. 35-2, at 8, 14).
In exchange, the Settlement Class would agree to release all claims
3
arising out of the Data Incident. (ECF Nos. 35-2, at 36; 35-3, at
4).
The notice was mailed to 449,129 Settlement Class members.
(ECF No. 42-1, at 14). Verita estimates that the notices reached
91% of the Class. (Id.). Approximately 39,869 notices came back
as undeliverable for which a search turned up no other updated
address. (Id.). The Settlement Administrator also created a
settlement website and a toll-free call line. As of May 20, 2025,
there were 1,253 calls made to the call line. (Id. at 15).
On May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for
attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of expenses, and service awards for
the Named Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 38). On May 23, 2025, Plaintiffs
filed an unopposed motion for final approval of class action
settlement. (ECF No. 42). On June 10, 2025, the case was
reassigned to the undersigned, and a fairness hearing was scheduled
for July 15, 2025. (ECF No. 44). On June 13, 2025, after
consulting counsel, the court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
as moot in light of the Parties’ settlement. (ECF No. 45). On
June 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a supplement to their motion for
final approval of class action settlement. (ECF No. 46). The
supplement stated that twenty-three class members opted out of the
Settlement Agreement, and two class members filed a joint objection
to the Settlement Agreement. (ECF No. 46, at 2-3). No objectors
4
appeared at the July 15, 2025 fairness hearing. After the hearing,
Plaintiffs filed a Second Supplement, updating the claim
information and clarifying the expected amount of costs for notice
and administration expenses. (ECF No. 51).
II. Analysis
After considering the terms of the Settlement Agreement; the
motion for attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of expenses, service
awards for Named Plaintiffs, final approval of the settlement, and
final certification of the class; and the statements of counsel
for both Parties at the final fairness hearing held on July 15,
2025, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
demonstrated standing, the Settlement Class should receive final
certification; the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate; and Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and
expenses, as well as service awards for the Named Plaintiffs,
should be granted in part.
A. Standing
Defendant’s initial response to the Complaint was to move to
dismiss, both for lack of standing and for failure to state a
claim. (ECF No. 29, at 1). After the Parties reached a settlement,
Defendant stated that the motion was moot, and the court denied
Defendant’s motion on that ground. (ECF No. 45). Later, however,
5
the court directed the Parties to address the standing issue at
the fairness hearing.1 (ECF No. 49).
“[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he
suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the
defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423
(2021) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U.S. 555
, 560–
561 (1992)).
In evaluating a class action complaint, “we
analyze standing based on the allegations of
personal injury made by the named plaintiffs.”
See Beck [v. McDonald], 848 F.3d [262,] [] 269
[(4th Cir. 2017)] (citing Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160
(4th Cir. 2011)). And class
plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to
establish standing “[w]ithout a sufficient
allegation of harm to the named plaintiff in
particular.” Id.
(quoting Doe,631 F.3d at 160
). When a complaint is evaluated at the
pleading stage, however, “general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we presume that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support the claim.” See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
,
112 S.Ct. 2130
,119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992)
(internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Accordingly, “we accept as true” the
“allegations for which there is sufficient
1 Even if the Parties no longer dispute standing, the court
must ensure Plaintiffs have standing. See Frank v. Gaos, 586 U.S. 485, 492
(2019) (per curiam) (finding that a federal court’s
obligation to ensure standing “extends to court approval of
proposed class action settlements”).
6
‘factual matter’ to render them ‘plausible on
[their] face.’” See Beck, 848 F.3d at 270
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
,
129 S.Ct. 1937
,173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009)). Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc.,892 F.3d 613, 619-20
(4th Cir. 2018).
Additionally, “when the actions of a third
party are involved, ‘[t]he case or controversy
limitation of Art. III still requires that a
federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not injury that results
from the independent action of some third
party not before the court.’” Springmeyer v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 20-cv-867-PWG, 2021 WL 809894
, at *2 (D.Md. Mar. 3,
2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Doe
v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 161
(4th Cir. 2011)). Gordon v. Zeroed-In Technologies, LLC, No. 23-CV-3284-BAH,2025 WL 936415
, at *4 (D.Md. Mar. 26, 2025). Standing analysis differs depending on the stage of the litigation: pleading, summary judgment, or trial. Beck, 848 F.3d at 270; Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
. Ultimately, “every class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages.” TransUnion,594 U.S. at 431
. In the class action settlement context, however, “federal courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff has standing.” Frank,586 U.S. at 492
(citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,426 U.S. 26
, 40 n.20
(1976)). This case settled at the pleading stage, before the court
had addressed Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Parties assume
7
that Plaintiffs must only meet the pleading standard to secure
federal court jurisdiction necessary for approval of their
Settlement Agreement. Thus, Plaintiffs must clearly allege facts
demonstrating each element of Article III standing.
1. Injury in Fact
“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he
or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally-protected interest’ that
is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339
(2016) (quoting Lujan,504 U.S. at 560
(1991)).
[W]hile it is true that threatened rather than
actual injury can satisfy Article III standing
requirements, . . . not all threatened
injuries constitute an injury-in-fact.
Rather, as the Supreme Court has emphasized
repeatedly, an injury-in-fact must be concrete
in both a qualitative and temporal sense. The
complainant must allege an injury to himself
that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to
merely abstract.
Hutton, 892 F.3d at 621
(quoting Beck, 848 F.3d at 271). As recently discussed by Judge Hurson in Gordon,2025 WL 936415
, at *5, two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit guide the standing analysis in data breach cases. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274-75 (holding that a threat of future risk of identity theft alone is not sufficient for standing); Hutton,892 F.3d at 622
(distinguishing Beck and holding that allegations
of actual misuse such as identity theft and credit card fraud are
8
enough for injury in fact). Judge Hurson found that the
allegations in his case were more like those in Hutton, because
“all Plaintiffs except two set forth allegations of actual misuse.”
Gordon, 2025 WL 936415
, at *5. Judge Hurson detailed the various
allegations of the plaintiffs, including specific allegations of
“loss of privacy, diminished value of [personally identifying
information], fraud and identity theft, imminent threat of fraud
and identity theft, out-of-pocket expenses and lost time and
productivity spent remedying or mitigating the Data Breach’s
impacts, and emotional harm.” Id. at *4-5. Additionally, several
plaintiffs alleged that their information was found on the dark
web. Id. at *5. Accordingly, Judge Hurson found that the
plaintiffs had alleged injury in fact sufficient for standing.
Id. at *5-6.
Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that because of the Data Breach,
Plaintiffs are at increased risk of identity theft, (ECF No. 21 ¶¶
68-71), they lost time mitigating the risk of identity theft and
fraud (Id. ¶¶ 72-73), the value of their private information was
diminished (Id. ¶¶ 74-76), they will incur future costs of credit
and identity theft monitoring (Id. ¶¶ 77-78), they experienced a
loss of the benefit of the bargain of Defendant’s medical services
(Id. ¶ 79), and they suffered fear, anxiety, and stress. (Id. ¶
82).
9
Additionally, seven of the nine Named Plaintiffs have alleged
separate additional injuries. Named Plaintiff Kwame Dapaah-
Siakwan “contact[ed] financial institutions to sort out fraudulent
activity on their accounts,” “replac[ed] impacted debit cards,”
“suffered injury in the form of experiencing fraudulent charges,
for approximately $20, to his Wells Fargo debit card, in or about
November 2023, which, upon information and belief, was caused by
the Data Breach,” experienced “his credit score being damaged,
which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data Breach,”
and he “experience[ed] an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or
emails, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data
Breach.” (Id. ¶¶ 95-102).
“Soon after the Data Breach,” Named Plaintiff Jennifer
Boehles “received notices from several financial institutions with
which she has accounts, including Chase Bank, Discover, and Bank
of America, that her account information may have been tampered
with and/or otherwise compromised,” and she “received multiple
targeted phishing emails attempting to further misuse her
[p]rivate [i]nformation.” (Id. ¶¶ 107-108). Named Plaintiff
Shalane Vance “suffered injury in the form of her credit score
being damaged, which, upon information and belief, was caused by
the Data Breach,” and she “experience[ed] an increase in spam
calls, texts, and/or emails, which, upon information and belief,
10
was caused by the Data Breach.” (Id. ¶¶ 115-116). Named Plaintiff
Sharon Jenkins “experience[ed] an increase in spam calls, texts,
and/or emails, which, upon information and belief, was caused by
the Data Breach.” (Id. ¶ 122).
Named Plaintiff Natalia Girard “suffered injury in the form
of her Private Information being disseminated on the dark web,
according to CreditWise, which, upon information and belief, was
caused by the Data Breach.” (Id. ¶ 128). Named Plaintiff David
Puckett “experience[ed] an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or
emails, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data
Breach. (Id. ¶ 134). Lastly, Named Plaintiff Desiree McCormick
also “experience[ed] an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or
emails, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data
Breach.” (Id. ¶ 140). Therefore, these Named Plaintiffs have
alleged actual misuse of their personal information.
Additionally, Judge Hurson found that the two plaintiffs who
had not alleged actual misuse still “adequately pled imminent
threat of identity theft” because “[t]he allegations about the
targeting of personal information in the cyberattack and the
allegations of identity theft by other plaintiffs whose personal
information was stolen makes the threatened injury sufficiently
imminent.” Gordon, 2025 WL 936415
, at *6 (quoting In re Marriott
11
Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F.Supp.3d 447
, 460 (D.Md. 2020)). Similarly, Named Plaintiffs Katherine Traynham and Mary Vandenbroucke who have not alleged actual misuse have still alleged “imminent threat of identity theft” because the specific allegations of actual misuse by the other Named Plaintiffs make “the threatened injury sufficiently imminent.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injuries in fact sufficient for standing at the pleading stage. 2. Traceability The “fairly traceable” requirement of standing “ensures that there is a genuine nexus between a plaintiff’s injury and a defendant’s alleged illegal conduct.” Gordon,2025 WL 936415
, at *9 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,204 F.3d 149, 161
(4th Cir. 2000)). At the same time, “[t]he fairly traceable standard is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation.”Id.
at *10 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc.,204 F.3d at 161
) (citation modified). “It must simply be plausible that the [] data breach was the cause of [plaintiff’s] injury.”Id.
(quoting Bank of La. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,438 F.Supp.3d 433
, 441 (D.Md. 2020)). “In data breach cases, traceability is
satisfied where the complaint ‘contain[s] allegations
demonstrating that it is both plausible and likely that a breach
12
of the [] database resulted in the fraudulent use of the
[p]laintiffs’ personal information.’” Id.
at *9 (quoting Hutton,892 F.3d at 623
). Specifically, “Fourth Circuit courts have routine[ly] found traceability in the data breach context where plaintiffs provided defendants with [personally identifying information] and those defendants subsequently fell victim to a targeted data breach resulting in the disclosure and misuse of plaintiffs’ [personally identifying information].”Id.
(quoting Capiau v. Ascendum Mach., Inc., No. 3:24-CV-00142-MOC-SCR,2024 WL 3747191
, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2024)).
As the plaintiffs in Gordon, Plaintiffs have alleged that
they gave their personally identifying information and personal
health information to Defendant, and Defendant experienced the
Data Breach that involved Plaintiffs’ personally identifying
information and personal health information. (ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 19,
28). As discussed above, Named Plaintiffs have alleged that their
personally identifying information has been misused following the
data breach. (Id. ¶¶ 100-102, 107-108, 115-116, 122, 128, 134,
140). Therefore, accepting these allegations as true, the
Complaint alleges sufficiently that it is plausible and likely
that Defendant’s data breach “resulted in the fraudulent use of
the Plaintiffs’ personal information.”
13
3. Redressability
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive
relief. (ECF No. 21, at 38). For an injury to be redressable,
“it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
(1991) (quoting Simon,426 U.S. at 38, 43
). “[I]n a breach of data case, ‘there is no reason to believe that monetary compensation will not return plaintiffs to their original position completely.’” Hutton,892 F.3d at 621
n.8 (quoting Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 n.5). Plaintiffs seek damages, among other relief, in their Complaint. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged all three standing elements for the pleading stage; accordingly, Plaintiffs satisfy the threshold requirement to demonstrate standing. B. Rule 23 Class Certification For a class action to be certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the class must meet each of the four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and fit within one of the three categories identified in Rule 23(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. District courts must pay “undiluted, even heightened, attention” to these requirements when certifying a class for the purpose of settlement. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor,521 U.S. 591, 620
(1997); see also Grice v. PNC Mortg. Corp. of Am., No. 97-cv–3084-
14
PJM, 1998 WL 350581
, at *2 (D.Md. May 21, 1998) (“Despite the
parties’ agreement, class certification must be carefully
scrutinized.”).
1. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites
Under Rule 23(a), a group of plaintiffs may sue in a class
action if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
The Settlement Class meets the numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy requirements. First, the class contains
approximately 450,000 people, a number that far exceeds that which
has met the numerosity requirement in other cases, and joinder
would certainly be impracticable. CASA de Md., Inc. v. Arbor
Realty Tr., Inc., No. 21-CV-1778-DKC, 2024 WL 1051120
, at *3 (D.Md. Mar. 11, 2024) (“A class consisting of as few as 25 to 30 members raises the presumption that joinder would be impractical.” (quoting Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc.,595 F.Supp. 1404, 1408
(D.Md. 1984))).
Second, there are multiple questions of law and fact that are
common to all of the class members, such as:
15
1. Whether Defendant failed to implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices appropriate to the nature and scope
of the PHI/PII compromised in the Data
Incident;
2. Whether Defendant’s data security systems
prior to and during the Data Incident complied
with applicable data security laws and
regulations;
3. Whether Defendant’s data security systems
prior to and during the Data Incident were
consistent with industry standards;
4. Whether Defendant owed a duty to Settlement
Class Members to safeguard their PHI/PII;
5. Whether Defendant breached its duty to
Settlement Class Members to safeguard their
PHI/PII;
6. Whether Defendant knew or should have known
that its data security systems and monitoring
processes were deficient;
7. What damages Plaintiffs and Settlement
Class Members suffered as a result of
Defendant’s misconduct; and
8. Whether Plaintiffs and Settlement Class
Members are entitled to actual and/or
statutory damages.
(ECF No. 35-1, at 21). These questions are “capable of classwide
resolution—which means that determination of [their] truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.” See CASA de Md., Inc.,
2024 WL 1051120
, at *3 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,564 U.S. 338, 350
(2011)).
Third, the Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims
of the Settlement Class. As Plaintiffs point out, all the claims
“arise from the same Data Incident,” and Plaintiffs allege that
the private information of the Named Plaintiffs and the other
16
members of the Settlement Class was compromised in the Data
Incident. (ECF Nos. 35-1, at 22; 21, at 28). Although the Named
Plaintiffs may have suffered different impacts from the Data
Incident than every member of the Settlement Class, “a sufficient
relationship exists between the injury to the named plaintiff[s]
and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may properly
attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct.” Id.
(quoting Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int’l, Inc.,185 F.R.D. 211, 217
(D.Md. 1997)). Named Plaintiffs allege that they and all other class members were injured in the same Data Incident; therefore, they have met the typicality requirement. Lastly, Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are adequate class representatives. “Representation is adequate if: (1) the named plaintiff’s interests are not opposed to those of other class members, and (2) the plaintiff’s attorneys are qualified, experienced, and capable.”Id.
(quoting Graham v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., No. 19-cv-0486-DKC,2022 WL 17584274
, at *5 (D.Md.
Dec. 12, 2022)). Plaintiffs assert that “[n]either [Named
Plaintiffs] nor their counsel have any interests antagonistic to
the proposed Settlement Class.” (ECF No. 35-1, at 22).
Additionally, Class Counsel are “qualified, experienced, and
capable.” Class Counsel assert that they are “experienced in
leading class cases efficiently and effectively and have the
17
support of all counsel of record.” (Id.). Class Counsel declare
that they “have adequately represented the Settlement Class by
fully investigating the facts and legal claims; preparing the
complaints; researching, analyzing, and responding to Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, and negotiating and reaching a Settlement at
arm’s length, in good faith, and without collusion.” (ECF No. 35-
3, at 5). Additionally, Class Counsel has “decades of combined
experience as vigorous class action litigators.” (Id., at 7).
Accordingly, the four requirements set out in
Fed.R.Civ.P.23(a) have been met.
2. Rule 23(b) Requirements
Additionally, a class must meet the requirements of one of
the three categories in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).
This case falls into Rule 23(b)(3), which applies when “the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Under Rule
23(b)(3):
The matters pertinent to these findings
include:
(A) the class members’ interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
18
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or
against class members; [and]
(C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum[.]
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *4 (quoting Amchem,521 U.S. at 620
) (stating that district courts do not need to analyze
the fourth factor of “the likely difficulties in managing a class
action,” when deciding whether to certify a class for settlement
purposes only).
As discussed above, there are common questions of law and
fact among the class members, specifically, that the claims all
stem from the same Data Incident and whether Defendant’s security
measures were adequate. (ECF No. 35-1, at 23). Additionally,
there is no indication that any other class members are litigating
claims on their own. Further, a class action is superior to
individual litigation because litigating similar claims of around
450,000 people would be inefficient. (ECF No. 35-1, at 24).
Therefore, the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) are
met, and the court will grant final certification of the Settlement
Class.
C. Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement
Under Rule 23(e), the claims of a certified class can only be
settled with the court’s approval. The court must conduct a
hearing and make a “finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
19
adequate” prior to approving a settlement agreement that binds the
class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(2). “In doing so, the court’s ‘primary
concern . . . is the protection of class members whose rights may
not have been given adequate consideration during the settlement
negotiations.’” CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *4 (quoting In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig.,927 F.2d 155, 158
(4th Cir. 1991)). 1. Fairness and Reasonableness When evaluating the fairness and reasonableness of a proposed settlement agreement, courts consider: “(1) the presence or absence of collusion among the parties; (2) the posture of the case at the time settlement is proposed; (3) the extent of discovery that has been conducted; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the negotiations and the experience of counsel.”Id.
(quoting Graham,2022 WL 17584274
, at *7). “The purpose of this inquiry is to protect against the danger that counsel might agree to settle for an inadequate amount to secure a fee.”Id.
(quoting Graham,2022 WL 17584274
, at *7).
The fairness factors weigh in favor of final approval. There
is no indication of collusion among the Parties. Class Counsel
declared that the Settlement Agreement was reached after
“protracted and intense arm’s-length negotiations that took place
over an extended period of time.” (ECF No. 42-1, at 26).
Additionally, before discussing a settlement, the Parties
20
“completed an extensive investigation and exchanged informal
discovery.” (Id.) The Parties had also already briefed
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 29, 32, 33).2 Both
Parties were represented by “highly experienced attorneys familiar
with class action litigation-and data breach class actions, in
particular” and were familiar with the legal and factual issues of
data breach cases. (ECF No. 42-1, at 26).
2. Adequacy
When evaluating whether a proposed settlement
is adequate, courts consider: “(1) the
relative strength of the plaintiff’s case on
the merits and probability of success at
trial; (2) the anticipated duration and
expense of additional litigation; (3) the
solvency of the defendants and the likelihood
of recovery on a litigated judgment; and (4)
the degree of opposition to the
settlement.” Graham, 2022 WL 17584274
, at
*7 (quoting Singleton [v. Domino’s Pizza,
LLC], 976 F.Supp.2d [665] [] [,] 679 [(D.Md.
2013)]). “The purpose of this inquiry is to
‘weigh the likelihood of the plaintiff’s
recovery on the merits against the amount
offered in settlement.’” Id.
(quoting In re
Mid–Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F.Supp.
at 1384).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *5.
Overall, the adequacy factors weigh in favor of final
approval. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for
2 As discussed above, although that motion was denied as moot
(ECF No. 45), the court directed the Parties to address the
standing issue at the fairness hearing. (ECF No. 49).
21
standing and failure to state a claim; however, the court denied
as moot Defendant’s motion to dismiss in light of the Parties’
settlement. (ECF No. 45). Therefore, at this stage it is not
even certain Plaintiffs would have survived a motion to dismiss,
let alone succeed at trial. Plaintiffs acknowledge that “[d]ata
breach cases, in particular, face substantial hurdles in surviving
past the pleading stage and are among the riskiest and most
uncertain types of litigation.” (ECF No. 42-1, at 22). Plaintiffs
also point to “the developing nature of this area of law,” as
contributing to the uncertainty of their success on the merits.
(Id. at 23).
In contrast, Plaintiffs assert that the Settlement allows the
Settlement Class to receive benefits now, including mitigation
benefits through credit monitoring, instead of waiting for
uncertain benefits that may materialize years down the line. (ECF
No. 42-1, at 23-24). Plaintiffs also contend that continued
litigation would incur significant costs and delay from “costly
discovery involving experts regarding damages, motions for summary
judgment, a motion for class certification, and one or more
interlocutory appeals.” (Id. at 24). Instead, the Settlement
Fund of $3,600,000 would allow Settlement Class members to make a
claim for:
(1) reimbursement for ordinary documented
losses up to $300.00; (2) compensation for up
22
to four hours of lost time compensated at a
rate of $25 per hour; (3) reimbursement for
extraordinary documented losses up to
$5,000.00; (4) twenty-four months of three-
bureau credit monitoring and identity theft
monitoring services; [or] (5) a pro rata
Alternative Cash Payment estimated to be $100.
(Id.). The Settlement Agreement also benefits Settlement Class
members by creating “certain business practice changes and
remedial measures” by Defendant to protect against future data
breaches. (Id.).
According to Plaintiffs’ supplemental filing, as of the
postmarked deadline to opt out or object to the Settlement, out of
approximately 410,000 Settlement Class members who received
notice, only twenty-three members opted out, and two have filed a
joint objection. (ECF Nos. 42-1, at 25; 46, at 2). Plaintiffs
assert that “[t]he small number of opt-outs do not undercut the
conclusion that the Settlement satisfies the adequacy
requirement.” (ECF No. 42-1, at 25). In light of the large number
of people who received notice, twenty-three opt-outs does not weigh
against the adequacy of the Settlement Agreement.
Plaintiffs contend that the court should overrule the joint
objection because it does not provide a reason to deny the final
approval of the Settlement. (ECF No. 46, at 3). In relevant part,
the joint objection states that:
First, we have neither observed or do we find
any credible evidence or arguments presented
23
that [Defendant] has been or is negligible in
the secure protection of our medical and
personal records. Second, it is common
knowledge that clever teams of hackers using
today’s technology and computers can break
into almost any system. Third, this
settlement will help drive up medical costs
for us all. And fourth, the payout to any
given patient is a pittance and the primary
benefit will be to the law firms involved.
(ECF Nos. 46-1, at 19; 46-2, at 2).
As Plaintiffs note, the joint objection does not attack the
Settlement Agreement itself; rather, it objects to the lawsuit
overall. The objection does not assert that the Settlement
Agreement itself is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable.
Plaintiffs argue that the attorneys’ fees are reasonable and in
line with attorneys’ fees awarded in similar cases. (ECF No. 46,
at 4). As will be discussed below, the attorneys’ fees will be
reduced slightly. Therefore, the joint objection is not a strong
“degree of opposition,” and it does not weigh strongly against
finding that the Settlement Agreement is adequate. The objection
is, in effect, overruled.
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that there is no evidence
that Defendant is in danger of insolvency, and therefore, this
factor is neutral and does not weigh against granting approval of
the final settlement. (Id.). Overall, given the uncertainty of
Plaintiffs’ success in litigation, and the delay and expense
involved in continued litigation, the amount offered in the
24
Settlement Agreement is a positive result for the Settlement Class
members. Therefore, the Settlement Agreement will be approved.
D. Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Service Awards
Under Rule 23, a court may “award reasonable attorney’s fees
and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’
agreement.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h). Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees
of $1,200,000, which is 33.33% of the Settlement Fund, as set out
in the Settlement Agreement. (ECF No. 38, at 1, 6). Plaintiffs
also request reimbursement of litigation expenses of $2,637.20,
and service awards of $2,000 for each of the nine Named Plaintiffs.
(Id. at 1, 13).
1. Attorneys’ Fees
“In determining whether an attorney’s fee
award is reasonable, courts generally take two
approaches: (1) the ‘percentage of recovery’
or ‘percentage of the fund’ method; or (2) the
‘lodestar’ method.” Graham, 2022 WL 17584274
,
at *10 (quoting Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at
681). “Although this circuit has not decided
which approach to adopt, the ‘current trend
among the courts of appeal favors the use of
a percentage method to calculate an award of
attorneys’ fees in common fund cases.’” Id.
(quoting Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at 681).
When the percentage of the fund method is
used, it is supplemented with a lodestar
cross-check.
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *6.
a. “Percentage of the Fund” Method
“Under the percentage of the fund method, the
court awards attorneys’ fees as a percentage
25
of the common fund used to pay class members.”
Graham, 2022 WL 17584274
, at *10 (first citing
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
, 900 n.16
(1984); then citing Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d
at 681). When using the percentage of the
fund method, district courts in this circuit
typically analyze: “(1) the results obtained
for the class; (2) the quality, skill, and
efficiency of the attorneys involved; (3) the
risk of nonpayment; (4) objections by members
of the class to the settlement terms and/or
fees requested by counsel; (5) awards in
similar cases; (6) the complexity and duration
of the case; and (7) public policy.” Id.
(quoting Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at 682).
“The factors ‘need not be applied in a
formulaic way,’ and no one factor is
necessarily dispositive.” Id. (quoting
Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at 682).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *6.
i. Results Obtained for the Class
Class counsel negotiated a non-reversionary Settlement Fund
of $3.6 million, which allows for Settlement Class members to
receive either “(1) reimbursement for ordinary documented losses
up to $300.00; (2) compensation for up to four hours of lost time
compensated at a rate of $25 per hour; (3) reimbursement for
extraordinary documented losses up to $5,000.00; [and] (4) twenty-
four months of three-bureau credit monitoring and identity theft
monitoring services,” or “a pro rata Alternative Cash Payment
estimated to be $100.” (ECF No. 42-1, at 24). The claims deadline
was June 23, 2025, and it is not clear how many claims for
reimbursement for ordinary losses, lost time, or extraordinary
26
losses will receive final approval. As of Plaintiffs’ supplemental
filing on July 18, 2025, 14 out of 43 claims for ordinary losses
were approved, none of the 13 claims for extraordinary losses were
approved, all of the 764 claims for lost time were approved, all
of the 1,832 claims for credit monitoring were approved, and all
of the 12,810 claims for the pro rata cash payment were approved.
(ECF No. 51, at 2). Plaintiffs now estimate that the pro rata
cash payment will be approximately $143.16 per eligible claimant.
(Id., at 3).
Given the uncertainty of Plaintiffs’ success had they
litigated this lawsuit, this is a positive and beneficial result
for the Settlement Class.
Additionally, the Settlement Class members received a benefit
in the form of Defendant agreeing to “implement enhanced data
security measures that will protect Settlement Class Members’
personal information that is still in its possession.” (ECF No.
38, at 7).
ii. Quality, Skill, and Efficiency of the Attorneys
Involved
Settlement Class Counsel are experienced data breach and
class action litigators. Counsel briefed a motion to dismiss,
participated in informal discovery, and negotiated a favorable
deal with a motion to dismiss still pending. (ECF Nos. 38, at 8;
29; 32; 33). “Settlement Class Counsel’s collective history
27
provided them with sufficient leverage to negotiate an excellent
result for the Settlement Class.” (ECF No. 38, at 8).
iii. Risk of Nonpayment
“In determining the reasonableness of an
attorneys’ fee award, courts consider the
relative risk involved in litigating the
specific matter compared to the general risks
incurred by attorneys taking on class actions
on a contingency basis.” Boyd [v. Coventry
Health Care Inc.], 299 F.R.D. [451,] []
464 [(D.Md. 2014)] (quoting Jones v. Dominion
Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F.Supp.2d 756, 762
(S.D.W.Va. 2009)). “The risk undertaken by
class counsel is evaluated by, among other
things, the presence of government action
preceding the suit, the ease of proving claims
and damages, and, if the case resulted in
settlement, the relative speed at which the
case was settled.” Id.
(first citing Jones,
601 F.Supp.2d at 762
; then citing Strang v.
JHM Mortg. Sec. Ltd. P’ship, 890 F.Supp. 499, 503
(E.D.Va. 1995) (finding that risks to
plaintiffs’ counsel were minimized by
settlement within six-months from the filing
of the complaint and consequently reducing the
percentage award from 30% to 25% of the
Settlement Fund)).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *7 (finding that litigating
a case for over two years before settling further showed the risk
to counsel). This case posed a meaningful risk of nonpayment
because Class Counsel litigated the case on a contingency fee
basis, “risking their own time and resources in litigation in a
relatively new area of law.” (ECF No. 38, at 8). Additionally,
it was far from clear they would have been able ultimately to
prevail in litigation had they not reached a settlement. Counsel,
28
however, litigated the case for around one year before settling.
The initial complaint was filed on January 2, 2024 (ECF No. 1),
and on December 5, 2024, Class Counsel notified the court that a
settlement had been reached. (ECF No. 34). This length of time
minimizes the risk to Class Counsel, and accordingly, it is
appropriate to reduce the percentage award from 33.33% to 30%.
iv. Objections
Settlement Class members were notified by mail of the proposed
settlement, including the requested attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 38,
at 9). Only two Settlement Class members objected, and they filed
a joint objection. (ECF Nos. 46-1, at 19; 46-2, at 2). The joint
objection opposed the litigation overall, and while they mentioned
the benefit to the law firm, they did not specifically object to
the amount of attorneys’ fees requested. (Id.). Instead, they
objected in general that “the payout to any given patient is a
pittance[,] and the primary benefit will be to the law firms
involved.” (Id.). Additionally, no Settlement Class members
objected at the fairness hearing on July 15, 2025. The lack of
objections to the specific amount of attorneys’ fees “tends to
show that at least from the class members’ perspective, the
requested fee is reasonable for the services provided and the
benefits achieved by class counsel.” CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *7.
29
v. Awards in Similar Cases
In Boyd, which also involved a $3.6 million settlement fund,
this court determined that:
In considering awards in similar cases, courts
look to cases of similar size, rather than
similar subject matter. See In re Cendant
Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722
, 737
(3[]d Cir. 2001); [In re] The Mills Corp. [Sec.
Litig.], 265 F.R.D. [246,] [] 263–64 (E.D.Va.
2009) (“comparing the size of the fund and
percentage of the award in other cases to the
present case . . . provides a valuable point
of reference.”). Fees awarded under “the
percentage-of-recovery” method in settlements
under $100 million have ranged from 15% to
40%. See Stoner v. CBA Information Services,
352 F.Supp.2d 549, 553
(E.D.Pa. 2005). Cases
in this circuit involving settlement
comparable to the $3.6 million settlement fund
here have resulted in awards of attorneys’
fees in the ranges of 25% to 28% of the common
fund. See In re SPX Corp. ERISA
Litig. (W.D.N.C. 2007) (28% of the fund
awarded, where the fund was $3.6
million); Smith v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corp., 2007 WL 119157
, at *3 (M.D.N.C.
2007) (26% of the fund awarded where the fund
was $4,750,000); Mason v. Abbot
Labs. (N.D.W.Va. 2001) (25% of the fund
awarded where the fund was $1,705,200); Braun
v. Culp, Inc. (M.D.N.C. 1985) (25% of the fund
awarded where the fund was $1.5 million).
Furthermore, a recent study in the Journal of
Empirical Studies found that for class
recoveries in the range of $2.8 to $5.3
million, the mean attorneys’ fee percentage
award from 1993–2008 was approximately 26.4%,
and the median was 25.0%. See Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees
and Expenses in Class Action Settlements:
1993–2008, 7 J.Emp.L.Studies 248, 265 T.7
(June 2010).
30
Boyd, 299 F.R.D. at 465 (finding that attorneys’ fees of 28% of
the settlement fund was an appropriate balance given the range of
awards); see also CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *7 (citing Boyd more recently to compare awards in similar cases and finding that attorneys’ fees of 30% of the settlement fund is reasonable). Additionally, in CASA de Maryland, Inc., this court found it useful also to compare attorneys’ fees awards in similar class actions.2024 WL 1051120
, at *7. In two other data breach settlement cases in this district, courts have found that attorneys’ fees of 25% and 30% were appropriate. Brent v. Advanced Med. Mgmt., LLC, No. 23-CV-3254-JKB,2024 WL 5118528
, at *9 (D.Md. Dec. 16, 2024) (finding that a reduced award of 25% of the settlement fund was appropriate given the short timeline of the case and lack of complexity, as well as low risk due to an early settlement); Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., No. 16-CV-3025-JKB,2019 WL 3183651
at *7 (D.Md. July 15, 2019)
(finding that class counsel’s request of 30% of the settlement
fund was reasonable in light of all the relevant factors and
specifically the length and complexity of the case, including an
appeal to the Fourth Circuit). Accordingly, compared to attorneys’
fees approved in cases of similar fund sizes and similar litigation
subjects, the reduced fee of 30% of the $3,600,000 Settlement Fund,
or $1,080,000 is reasonable.
31
vi. Complexity and Duration of the Litigation
“In evaluating the complexity and duration of
the litigation, courts consider not only the
time between filing the complaint and reaching
settlement, but also the amount of motions
practice prior to settlement, and the amount
and nature of discovery.” Graham, 2022 WL 1758427
, at *11 (quoting Singleton, 976
F.Supp.2d at 686). “Additionally, ‘courts
consider whether negotiations were hard
fought, complex, or arduous.’” Id. (quoting
Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at 686).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *7. As noted above, there
was around one year from the time Plaintiffs filed the initial
complaint until the time they reached a settlement. (ECF Nos. 1;
34). Class Counsel acknowledge that the “case settled at a
relatively early stage[;]” nevertheless, they contend that “it did
so only after extensive briefing by the Parties on Defendant’s
[m]otion to [d]ismiss, substantive informal discussion, and a
vigorous, arms-length negotiation.” (ECF No. 38, at 10). As Class
Counsel point out elsewhere, data breach litigation is a developing
area of law, creating additional uncertainty and perhaps
complexity in the litigation and negotiations. (ECF No. 42-1, at
22-23). In light of both the relatively short duration and the
complexity of the case the slightly reduced fee award is
appropriate.
vii. Public Policy
“[I]n assessing the reasonableness of the
requested attorneys’ fees, the court must
32
strike the appropriate balance between
promoting the important public policy that
attorneys continue litigating class action
cases that vindicate rights that might
otherwise go unprotected, and perpetuating the
public perception that class action
plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for
the work that they do.” Boyd, 299 F.R.D. at
466. Here, while litigating data breach cases
is undoubtedly important, a large award in
this case could perpetuate the public
perception that plaintiffs’ lawyers are
overcompensated, given how short-lived the
litigation was.
Brent, 2024 WL 5118528
, at *8. In Brent, Judge Bredar found that a reduced fee of 25% of the settlement fund was appropriate, in part because of the short duration of the litigation.Id.
There, the complaint was filed in state court in July 2023, removed to federal court in November 2023, stayed on December 6, 2023, the parties reached a settlement in principle on December 18, 2023, and they finalized the settlement agreement in April 2024.Id.
It furthers public policy to incentivize attorneys to
litigate data breach cases and ensure that companies protect
consumers’ data. Additionally, Class Counsel worked on this case
for a year before reaching a settlement, which was longer than the
class counsel in Brent took to reach their preliminary settlement.
Therefore, the slightly reduced fee of 30% strikes the appropriate
balance.
33
b. Lodestar Cross-Check
The purpose of a lodestar cross-check is to
determine whether a proposed fee award is
excessive relative to the hours reportedly
worked by counsel, or whether the fee is
within some reasonable multiplier of the
lodestar. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.,
396 F.3d [294, 306 (3d Cir. 2005), as
amended (Feb. 25, 2005)] (“The lodestar cross-
check serves the purpose of alerting the trial
judge that when the multiplier is too great,
the court should reconsider its calculation
under the percentage-of-recovery method”);
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050
(9th Cir. 2002)(“[T]he lodestar may
provide a useful perspective on the
reasonableness of a given percentage award.”).
Importantly, “where the lodestar fee is used
‘as a mere cross-check’ to the percentage
method of determining reasonable attorneys’
fees, ‘the hours documented by counsel need
not be exhaustively scrutinized by the
district court.’” In re Royal Ahold N.V.
Securities, 461 F.Supp.2d at 385 (quoting
Goldberger [v. Integrated Res., Inc.], 209
F.3d [43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000)]).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *9 (quoting Singleton, 976 F.Supp.2d at 688). “When performing a lodestar cross-check, courts may ‘accept as reasonable counsel’s estimate of the hours they have spent working on the case.’” Id. (quoting Decohen v. Abbasi, LLC,299 F.R.D. 469, 482-83
(D.Md. 2014)).
Counsel represent that they spend a total of 627 hours on the
case, for a total of $439,568.20 in attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 38-
1, at 8). Counsel multiplied each attorney or staff member’s hours
spent by that person’s billable rates, and employed a multiplier
34
of 2.7 to reach their requested $1,200,000.00,3 or 33.33% of the
Settlement Fund. (ECF Nos. 38-1, at 8, 11-12, 38-3, at 5; 38-4, at
5; 38-5, at 2; 38-6, at 2; 38-7, at 2; 38-8, at 2). This number,
however, includes work from counsel who were not approved as Class
Counsel in the preliminary approval of the class action settlement.
(ECF No. 36, at 3-4). Judge Wang appointed Ben Barnow from Barnow
and Associates, P.C., Gary M. Klinger from Milberg Coleman Bryson
Phillips Grossman PLLC, and Tyler J. Bean from Siri & Glimstad
LLP. (Id.) Accordingly, only appointed Class Counsel and
attorneys and staff from their respective firms will be considered
for the lodestar cross-check.
Class Counsel’s firm has spent a total of 496.6 hours,4 for
a combined fee of $348,292.70.5 “Courts have generally held that
lodestar multipliers falling between 2 and 4.5 demonstrate a
reasonable attorneys’ fee.” CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *9 (quoting Boyd,299 F.R.D. at 467
). Using Plaintiffs’
3 It appears that this number is rounded up slightly, because
$439,568.20 x 2.7 is $1,186,834.10.
4 208.3 (Barnow and Associates, P.C.) + 112.7 (Siri & Glimstad
LLP) + 175.6 (Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman PLLC)
= 496.6. (ECF No. 38-1, at 8).
5 $157,312.50 (Barnow and Associates, P.C.) + $62,110.00 (Siri
& Glimstad LLP) + $128,870.20 (Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips
Grossman PLLC) = $348,292.70 (ECF No. 38-1, at 8).
35
lodestar multiplier of 2.7, the total comes to $940,390.30.6 This
amount is more consistent with the slightly reduced 30% of the
Settlement Fund, or $1,080,000, instead of the 33.33% Plaintiffs
requested. Therefore, the slightly reduced fee award is reasonable
in this case.
2. Reimbursement for Litigation Expenses
“It is well-established that plaintiffs who
are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees are
also entitled to recover reasonable
litigation-related expenses as part of their
overall award.” Boyd, 299 F.R.D. at 468
(quoting Kabore v. Anchor Staffing, Inc., No.
L–10–cv-3204-BEL, 2012 WL 5077636
, at *10
(D.Md. Oct. 17, 2012)). “The Fourth Circuit
has stated that such costs may include ‘those
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
the attorney which are normally charged to a
fee-paying client, in the course of providing
legal services.’” Id.
(quoting Spell v.
McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 771
(4th Cir.
1988) (internal quotations omitted)).
“Examples of costs that have been charged
include necessary travel, depositions and
transcripts, computer research, postage,
court costs, and photocopying.” Id.
(citing
Almendarez v. J.T.T. Enters. Corp., No. 06–
cv-68-JKS, 2010 WL 3385362
, at *7 (D.Md. Aug.
25, 2010)).
CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *9. Plaintiffs request
reimbursement of $2,637.20 for litigation expenses, for research,
travel, and filing fees. (ECF Nos. 38, at 12; 38-1, at 9; 38-3,
at 6; 38-4, at 5). This appears reasonable and on the low end
6 $348,292.70 x 2.7 = $940,390.30
36
compared to litigation expenses in similar cases. See, e.g., Brent
2024 WL 5118528
, at *10 (approving $25,273.37 in costs and
expenses, with $19,172.50 of that stemming from mediation costs).
Plaintiffs’ request, however, again includes expenses from counsel
who were not approved as Class Counsel. Accordingly, the court
will grant $2,274.227 in litigation expenses for the approved Class
Counsel.
3. Settlement Administration Expenses
After the fairness hearing, Plaintiffs filed a second
supplemental filing in support of final approval of the class
action settlement. (ECF No. 51). Plaintiffs clarified that the
Settlement Administrator’s confirmed total costs of notice and
administration to completion will be $395,000.00, assuming no
supplemental distribution is needed. (ECF No. 51, at 2).
Accordingly, the court will approve the Settlement Administrator’s
expenses.
4. Reasonableness of the Service Awards
Plaintiffs request service awards of a total of $18,000 for
the nine Named Plaintiffs, meaning $2,000 for each Named Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 38, at 13). “Incentive payments are ‘often awarded
7 $355.50 (Barnow and Associates, P.C.) + $716.37 (Siri &
Glimstad LLP) + $1,202.35 (Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips
Grossman PLLC) = $2,274.22 (ECF Nos. 38-1, at 12; 38-3, at 6; 38-
4, at 5).
37
in Rule 23 class actions.’” CASA de Md., Inc., 2024 WL 1051120
, at *9 (quoting Graham,2022 WL 17584274
, at *12). “In determining whether an incentive payment is warranted, courts consider the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefited from those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.”Id.
(quoting Graham,2022 WL 17584274
, at *12) (citation modified).
Plaintiffs assert that the average award per class
representative is around $16,000, and this is far below that
average. (ECF No. 38, at 14). Plaintiffs state that Named
Plaintiffs “took active roles in the litigation, including
reviewing pleadings, staying in regular contact with Settlement
Class Counsel about [the] status of the case, remaining informed
about settlement discussions, being available for consultation
during the negotiation period, and reviewing and approving the
settlement agreement.” (Id. at 13). In light of Named Plaintiffs’
participation and the relatively modest amount per Named
Plaintiff, the court finds that the service awards are reasonable
and approves the award of $2,000 to each Named Plaintiff.
5. Maryland Bar Foundation, Inc. as the Non-profit
Residual Recipient
Plaintiffs request that pursuant to the Settlement Agreement,
the court should approve the Maryland Bar Foundation, Inc. as the
38
non-profit residual recipient. (ECF No. 42-1, at 27). “Courts
commonly approve cy pres distributions for unclaimed funds, such
as the residue of a class settlement fund.” Curry v. Money One
Fed. Credit Union, No. 19-CV-3467-DKC, 2021 WL 5839432
, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (citing McDaniels v. Westlake Servs., LLC, No. 11-cv-1837-ELH,2014 WL 556288
, at *11 (D.Md. Feb. 7, 2014)). “The distribution is designed to put the funds ‘to their next best compensation use, e.g., for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class.’”Id.
(quoting Klier v. Elf Atochem,658 F.3d 468, 474
(5th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiffs assert that the Maryland Bar Foundation works to
“[i]mprove and facilitate the administration of justice,” and it
provides grants to non-profit organizations in Maryland. (ECF No.
42-1, at 27). Plaintiffs assert that many of the Settlement Class
members live in or near Maryland, and the potential distribution
to the Maryland Bar Foundation will benefit the Settlement Class
members. (Id. at 27-28). Accordingly, the Maryland Bar
Foundation, Inc. will be approved as the cy pres recipient.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’
fees, reimbursement of expenses, and service awards (ECF No. 38),
will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs’ motion
39
for final approval of class settlement (ECF No. 42), will be
granted. A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
40