Erie Insurance Company v. WAWGD, Inc.

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
             FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND                            

ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o    *                                         
KEVIN KNARR,                                                              
                           *                                         
Plaintiff,                                                           
                           *                                         
v.                                      Civil Action No.: EA-22-1783      
                           *                                         
WAWGD, INC. d/b/a FORESIGHT                                               
SPORTS,                         *                                         

Defendant.                 *                                         

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION                                  
This matter involves a subrogation action whereby Plaintiff Erie Insurance Company, as 
subrogee of Kevin Knarr (Erie), sought recovery of monies it paid to its insured for property 
damage allegedly caused by the negligence of Defendant WAWGD, Inc., doing business as 
Foresight Sports (WAWGD).  ECF No. 4.  Following a settlement conference before the 
Honorable J. Mark Coulson, the parties agreed to settle the case for $240,000 on May 8, 2023.  
ECF Nos. 49 and 52.  The Court dismissed the action pursuant to Local Rule 111 (D. Md. 2023) 
that same day.  ECF No. 48.  Erie subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate the Court’s May 8, 
2023 Order, Reopen the Case, and Enforce Settlement.  ECF No. 49.  The Court granted the 
portion of the motion that sought to vacate the May 8, 2023 Order and reopen the case and 
directed WAWGD to respond to the portion of the motion to that sought to enforce settlement.  
ECF Nos. 50 and 51.  The issues are fully briefed (ECF Nos. 49, 52, and 57), and no hearing is 
necessary.  Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).  For the reasons set forth below, Erie’s Motion to 
Enforce Settlement is granted and judgment in the amount of $240,000 is granted in favor of Erie 
against WAWGD.                                                            
I.   Background                                                           
It is undisputed that the parties reached an agreement to settle this action for payment of 
$240,000 from WAWGD to Erie.  ECF Nos. 49 ¶ 5 and 52 ¶ 2.  The settlement agreement is 
confirmed by emails between counsel for Erie and WAWGD, which were transmitted between 
3:55 and 4:00 p.m. on May 8, 2023.  ECF No. 49-3.  The confirmation email from Erie’s counsel 

directed WAWGD to issue the settlement draft to “Erie Insurance Company” and mail it to 
counsel’s office, which the email footer identified as located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  ECF 
No. 49-3 at 2.1  Erie’s counsel also included Erie’s W-9, which provided a specific employer 
identification number and listed a corporate address in Erie, Pennsylvania.  Id. at 3.    
On May 31, 2023, WAWGD’s insurer, The Hartford Insurance Group (The Hartford), 
issued a settlement draft in the amount of $240,000 payable to “Erie Insurance Company,” 
located at the corporate address listed on the W-9.  ECF No. 49-6.  Erie claims that sometime 
between May 31, 2023, and June 6, 2023, The Hartford and counsel for WAWGD stopped 
payment on the check.  ECF No. 49 at 3.  Thus, when the check was deposited on June 8, 2023, 

it was not honored, and Erie did not receive the funds.  Id.; ECF No. 49-6 at 2. 
According to WAWGD, after settlement was confirmed via email on May 8, 2023, 
defense counsel received an email at 5:25 p.m. that same day from someone whom he believed 
to be Erie’s counsel but later learned was an imposter.  This email responded to the earlier email 
chain that confirmed the terms of settlement, included counsel for Erie’s signature line, and 
originated from an email address that was nearly identical to that of Erie’s counsel except that 
two letters in the law firm’s name were transposed.  ECF No. 52-1 at 38-39.  The imposter asked 


1  Page numbers refer to the pagination of the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case 
Files system printed at the top of the cited document.                    
WAWGD’s counsel “if settlement can go out via wire transfer.”  Id. at 39.  Thereafter, email 
communications continued between counsel for WAWGD and the imposter regarding 
finalization of settlement, including exchanged edits to the settlement release and continuing 
discussions of the method of payment.  Id. at 31-38.  On May 19, 2023, WAWGD’s counsel 
received a Settlement Agreement and General Release of Claims purportedly signed by a senior 

subrogation specialist at Erie.  ECF Nos. 51-2 at 31-32 and 52-2.  In the email accompanying the 
document, the imposter wrote that “[t]he settlement draft should be made payable by wire to 
‘Erie Insurance Company.’”2  ECF No. 51-2 at 31.  In another email sent that same day, the 
imposter provided wiring instructions that indicated payment should be made through Capital 
One Bank at 249 East 86th St., New York, NY, 10028.  ECF No. 52-1 at 28-29.    
After repeated inquiries about the status of payment, on May 31, 2023, WAWGD’s 
counsel advised the imposter that The Hartford had sent a check to Erie via U.S. mail.  Id. at 25-
28.  The imposter then directed WAWGD’s counsel to “void check and send wire.”  Id. at 25.  
WAWGD’s counsel relayed the wiring instructions the imposter had provided to The Hartford.  

Id. at 23-24.  Following receipt of numerous emails from the imposter asking about the status of 
the wire transfer, a litigation and claims consultant at The Hartford asked WAWGD’s counsel, 
“Have you talked to this guy?”  Id. at 18.  Rather than calling Erie’s counsel, WAWGD’s 
counsel sent another email to the imposter, stating that the payment could not proceed by wire 
and asking for a mailing address.  Id. at 17.  By email dated June 5, 2023, the imposter again 
directed WAWGD’s counsel and The Hartford to void the previous check due to “a slight error 
with the the [sic] previous W-9” and to issue another check to “Erie Insurance LLC” at “P.o. box 


2  The email had mismatched quotation marks surrounding the name of the payee, using a 
single quotation mark at the beginning and a double quotation mark at the end.  ECF No. 52-1 at 
31.                                                                       
9124 houston Tx 77261 [sic].”  Id. at 16-17. The following day, WAWGD’s counsel responded 
that it would reissue the check to Erie Insurance LLC at the identified address (id. at 16), and on 
June 8, 2023, The Hartford issued a check with those specifications (ECF No. 49-7 at 3).  
Thereafter, the imposter repeatedly inquired about the status of the check and requested the 
FedEx tracking number.  ECF No. 52-1 at 3-15.  In his replies, counsel for WAWGD noted, 

among other things, that “FedEx will not deliver to a P.O. Box, as you requested.”  Id. at 11.  On 
June 26, 2023, the imposter asserted that the check had been lost and requested that it be reissued 
and sent via FedEx to a different address in Texas.  Id. at 2.  WAWGD’s counsel forwarded this 
email to Erie’s counsel and received a response from counsel’s correct email address that stated, 
“It’s not spam[.]  You can proceed[.]”  Id. at 1.  Ultimately, the check The Hartford issued on 
June 8, 2023, was negotiated by an unidentified individual, and paid out on July 7, 2023.  ECF 
Nos. 49 ¶¶ 28-29, 49-7 at 3, and 52 ¶ 8.                                  
On September 19, 2023, following an investigation into the matter, WAWGD’s counsel 
informed Erie’s counsel that an imposter had sent him and The Hartford over 50 email 

communications in June and July of 2023 regarding settlement of this action.  ECF No. 49 ¶ 25.  
WAWGD asserts that this imposter “created a rule on Plaintiff Counsel’s original email . . . to 
intercept Defense Counsel’s emails, automatically deleting them, and passing them to an account 
they created,” which, as noted previously, was the same as that of Erie’s counsel except that two 
letters were transposed.  ECF No. 52 at 2.  According to WAWGD, Erie’s counsel “confirmed 
that he did not receive any of the emails from Defense Counsel . . . after the first settlement 
confirmation email.”  Id.  The parties concur that WAWGD’s counsel did not call Erie’s counsel 
to inquire about or verify the modifications to the originally agreed upon payment instructions.  
ECF Nos. 49 ¶ 27, 52 ¶ 27, 57 at 6 and n.2.                               
Erie asserts that its counsel repeatedly requested the settlement draft throughout June, 
July, and August 2023, which counsel for WAWGD said would be forthcoming.  Id. at ¶ 24.  
However, on October 18, 2023, WAWGD’s counsel advised Erie’s counsel that The Hartford 
would not issue a new settlement draft to Erie while it pursues separate relief against the 
imposter’s bank.  Id. at ¶ 31.  Thereafter, Erie moved to enforce the settlement.  ECF No. 49. 

II.   Discussion                                                          
As the Court previously granted the portion of Erie’s motion that sought to vacate the 
May 8, 2023 Order and reopen the case (ECF Nos. 50 and 51), the only remaining matter is the 
portion of Erie’s motion that seeks to enforce the settlement agreement.  It is well established 
that “district courts have inherent authority, deriving from their equity power, to enforce 
settlement agreements.”  Hensley v. Alcon Lab’ys, Inc., 

277 F.3d 535, 540

 (4th Cir. 2002)).  A 
motion to enforce a settlement agreement may be resolved “within the context of the underlying 
litigation without the need for a new complaint.”  

Id.

  A district court cannot, however, enforce a 
settlement agreement “until it concludes that a complete agreement has been reached and 

determines the terms and conditions of that agreement.”  

Id.

  If there is no factual dispute 
concerning “the existence of an agreement, over the authority of attorneys to enter into the 
agreement,[ ] or over the agreement’s terms,” the district court may enforce a settlement 
agreement without the need for an evidentiary hearing.”  

Id. at 541

; Hewitt v. Dyck-O'Neal, Inc., 
Civil Action No. DKC 20-1322, 

2021 WL 3784867

, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2021).     
Here, the parties do not dispute that they reached an agreement on settlement of this 
action, the terms of the agreement, or counsel’s authority to enter into the agreement.  
Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is required.  Bradley v. Am. Household Inc., 

378 F.3d 373

, 
380 (4th Cir. 2004); Hensley, 

277 F.3d at 541

.  It is likewise undisputed that Erie has not 
received the agreed-upon settlement funds because an unidentified bad actor posing as Erie’s 
counsel intercepted and deposited the settlement draft.  WAWGD argues that because “Plaintiff 
Counsel’s email system was compromised and resulted in the malicious actors receiving the 
settlement proceeds duly paid pursuant to the settlement reached by the parties,” WAWGD is not 
responsible for issuing another check to Erie.  ECF No. 52 ¶¶ 9-10.  Erie, on the other hand, 

argues that the remedy for the fraud perpetrated on WAWGD is recovery against the unidentified 
bad actor, not breach of the settlement agreement in this action.  ECF No. 57 at 8.  The issue 
pending before the Court, therefore, is whether WAWGD should be excused from performance 
under the settlement agreement because of a third party’s fraudulent acts or whether the Court 
should require WAWGD to remit the settlement funds to Erie as previously agreed.  
A.   Contract Principles                                             
Enforcement of a settlement agreement is governed by “standard contract principles” 
because a “settlement agreement is nothing more nor less than a contract.”  Davis v. Wash. 
Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civil Action No. TJS-23-1171, 

2023 WL 7410855

, at *2 (D. Md. 

Nov. 8, 2023); accord Alston v. TowneBank, Civil Action No. GJH-20-690, 

2022 WL 971008

, at 
*6 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2022); Turner v. Archer W. Contractors, LLC, Civil Action No. ELH-17-
2228, 

2019 WL 2549433

, at *5 (D. Md. June 19, 2019); Copeland v. Dapkute, Civil Action No. 
PWG-17-1566, 

2018 WL 5619672

, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2018).  Indeed, this Court has 
described a motion to enforce a settlement agreement as “tantamount to an action for specific 
performance of a contract.”  Hewitt, 

2021 WL 3784867

, at *1 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Therefore, “the party seeking enforcement must show not simply that an 
agreement was reached but that a contract exists.”  Rohn Prod., Int’l, LC v. Sofitel Cap. Corp. 
USA, Civil Action No. WDQ-06-504, 

2010 WL 681304

, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2010) (emphasis 
in original).  Under Maryland law, a contract is formed when there is “mutual assent (offer and 
acceptance), an agreement definite in its terms, and sufficient consideration.”3  Spaulding v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

714 F.3d 769, 777

 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  “Mutual assent” means that there was “an actual meeting of the minds regarding 
contract formation.”  Lopez v. XTEL Const. Grp., LLC, 

796 F. Supp. 2d 693, 699

 (D. Md. 2011) 

(quoting Cochran v. Norkunas, 

398 Md. 1, 23

 (2007)).                      
Here, following the March 31, 2023 settlement conference, the parties continued to 
engage in settlement discussions with the assistance of Judge Coulson, ultimately reaching an 
agreement on May 8, 2023.  ECF Nos. 49 ¶ 5 and 52 ¶ 2.  The agreement, terms of settlement, 
and consideration are set out in a series of emails between counsel for the parties that same day.  
At 2:52 p.m., WAWGD’s counsel emailed “we are settled for $240,000.”  ECF No. 52-1 at 40.  
At 3:55 p.m., Erie’s counsel “confirm[ed] the settlement of Erie’s property damage claim for 
$240,000,” attached Erie’s W-9, and directed WAWGD’s counsel to issue a settlement draft to 
Erie mailed to counsel’s attention.  

Id.

  WAWGD’s counsel confirmed receipt at 4:00 p.m. and 

stated that he would advise the Court that the matter was resolved and closing documents were 
being prepared.  

Id. at 39

.  This exchange plainly reflects mutual assent, definite terms, and 
consideration, thus satisfying all the elements of a contract under Maryland law.  E.g., Lopez, 

796 F. Supp. 2d at 699

; Rohn Prods, Int’l, LC v. Sofitel Cap. Corp. USA, Civil Action No. 



3  Some courts in this Circuit have noted that enforcement of a settlement agreement in 
the context of pending federal court litigation may implicate federal law rather than state law.  
E.g., Turner, 

2019 WL 2549433

, at *5; Montage Furniture Servs., LLC v. Regency Furniture, 
Inc., 

966 F. Supp. 2d 519

, 524 n.4 (D. Md. 2013).  It is unnecessary to resolve this question 
because the basic contracting principles discussed herein are the same under Maryland and 
federal law.  See, e.g., Bile v. RREMC, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-51, 

2016 WL 4487864

, at *6 (E.D. 
Va. Aug. 24, 2016).                                                       
WDQ-06-504, 

2010 WL 2158883

, at *5 (D. Md. May 24, 2010) (Report & Recommendation), 
adopted, 

2010 WL 681304

, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2010).                    
WAWGD’s payment of $240,000 to the imposter does not constitute performance under 
the settlement agreement, which requires that payment be made to Erie.  Peeples v. Carolina 
Container, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-21-MLB, 

2021 WL 4224009

, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2021) 

(finding a breach of the contract where payment was unknowingly remitted to a third-party 
fraudster).  The emails exchanged between WAWGD’s counsel and the third-party imposter 
after contract formation did not alter WAWGD’s obligations under the settlement agreement.  
The reasoning of the Peeples court is sound:                              
The Agreement is clear that Defendant Carolina must pay Plaintiff.  But the 
hacker’s emails asked Defendant Carolina to pay someone else.  Faced with these 
conflicting instructions about a material obligation, Defendant Carolina was  
required to follow the Agreement.                                    
Id. at *6.  WAWGD was obligated to perform under the terms of the settlement agreement.  A 
review of the emails between counsel for WAWGD and the imposter reveal that the imposter, 
using an email different from that of Erie’s counsel, asked that payment be sent to a different 
entity (“Erie Insurance LLC”) at a different address in a different state.  Although the Court is 
sympathetic to WAWGD and its counsel because of the fraud that was perpetrated to their 
detriment, the fact remains that WAWGD did not fulfill its obligations under the terms of 
settlement agreement.                                                     
The emails between WAWGD’s counsel and the imposter also do not render the 
agreement between Erie and WAWGD void.  First, both Maryland and federal law favor the 
enforcement of settlement agreements. E.g., Jones v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. ELH-
19-1413, 

2020 WL 1675984

, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2020) (discussing Maryland and federal 
cases); Alston, 

2022 WL 971008

, at *6 (noting that “public policy considerations favor the 
enforcement of settlement agreements”).  In fact, the “policy of encouraging settlement is so 
important that, even when the parties later discover that the settlement may have been based on a 
[unilateral] mistake, settlement agreements will not be disturbed.”  McDaniels v. Westlake 
Servs., LLC, Civil Action No. ELH-11-1837, 

2013 WL 2491337

, at *9 (D. Md. June 7, 2013) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Voland, 

103 Md. App. 225, 237

 

(1995)).                                                                  
Second, there is no basis upon which to find that a third party’s fraudulent acts or 
misrepresentations after formation of the contract undermine its enforceability.  Maryland law 
provides that “[c]ontracts may be subject to rescission on a finding of fraud, duress, undue 
influence, or negligent misrepresentation in their making.”  Turner, 

2019 WL 2549433

, at *7 
(quoting Hale v. Hale, 

66 Md. App. 228, 233

 (1986)).  Such a finding, however, must be based 
on an action that occurred in the making of the contract.  This principle is in accord with the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that a contract may be voidable if “a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by one 
who is not a party to the transaction upon which the recipient is justified in relying.”4  

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(2) (1981) (emphasis added).  Here, the uncontested 
facts establish that the imposter’s actions had no impact upon the parties’ manifestation of assent 
or understanding of the terms of settlement because the imposter’s actions occurred after the 
contract had already been formed.  The third party’s fraudulent misrepresentations, which 
resulted in the diversion of the settlement draft from Erie to an unidentified bad actor, affected 
only performance under the settlement agreement, not its formation.       


4  United States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Sols., 

650 F.3d 445, 451

 (4th Cir. 2011) (“When 
applying federal common law to contract issues, courts generally look to the Restatement for 
guidance.”).                                                              
The doctrine of mistake is also unavailing because it applies only to “a mistake of one 
party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract.”  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Peeples, 

2021 WL 4224009

, at *7 (“Where, as here, the parties develop a mistaken impression about something 
after they sign the contract, the Restatement’s rule seems inapplicable on its face.”) (emphasis in 

original).  There was no mistake, mutual or otherwise, regarding the assumptions on which the 
parties here contracted to settle this action.  Simply put, WAWGD has supplied no factual or 
legal argument that supports its position that the settlement agreement should not be enforced.   
B.   Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-404                           
This result is consistent with decisions of other courts, from this Circuit and elsewhere, 
that have examined the enforceability of settlement agreements and other contracts after a third-
party fraudulently diverted payment.  Several of these decisions have looked to Article III of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which courts in this Circuit have cited as persuasive 
authority, both with respect to motions to enforcement settlement agreements and other matters.  

E.g., Old Stone Bank v. Tycon I Bldg. L.P., 

946 F.2d 271, 273

 (4th Cir. 1991); Starr v. VSL 
Pharms., Inc., 

509 F. Supp. 3d 417

, 450 (D. Md. 2020); Bile v. RREMC, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-51, 

2016 WL 4487864

, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2016).                          
Section 3-404, which applies to imposters and fictitious payees, provides that “the person 
bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care.”  UCC § 3-
404(d).  That is to say, if “a check payable to an impostor, fictitious payee, or payee not intended 
to have an interest in the check is paid,” the loss is placed on the “person failed to exercise 
ordinary care.”  UCC § 3-404 Cmt. 3; see also Beau Townsend Ford Lincoln, Inc. v. Don Hinds 
Ford, Inc., 759 Fed. App’x. 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding on similar facts that “losses 
attributable to fraud should be borne by the party in the best position to prevent the fraud”); State 
Sec. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (DE), 

409 Md. 81, 108-17

 (2009) (discussing 
Md. Code, Com. Law Art. § 3–404).                                         
WAWGD’s argument that Erie failed to exercise reasonable care because its email 
system was compromised, which “resulted in the malicious actors receiving the settlement 

proceeds” (ECF No. 52 ¶ 9) completely glosses over the many communications and actions that 
led to remittance of the settlement funds to the imposter.  Based on those intervening acts, it is 
evident that not only was WAWDG in the best position to prevent the fraud, but that it also 
failed to exercise reasonable care.  Counsel for WAWDG and The Hartford exchanged more 
than 50 emails over a two-month period with the imposter regarding issuance of the settlement 
draft.  ECF No. 49 ¶ 25.  A review of the emails submitted in connection with this motion 
reveals that the imposter’s email address was not the same as that of Erie’s counsel.  While that 
detail may have escaped scrutiny, there were other indications that, at the very least, payment 
instructions should have been verified.  Mostly notably, the communications regarding payment 

conflicted with the original instructions provided by Erie’s counsel, altering the name and 
address of the recipient, and attempting to alter the method of payment from a check to a wire 
transfer.  The emails also contained typographical errors and did not reflect a sophisticated 
understanding of how settlement payments are executed, requesting, for example, that an 
overnight carrier deliver to a P.O. Box.5  Yet, no earnest effort was made to verify the payment 
instructions before issuing the settlement draft.                         


5  See Ostrich Int’l Co., Ltd v. Michael A. Edwards Grp. Int’l Inc., No. 
221CV00639JVSASX, 

2023 WL 4025870

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2023) (observing that 
“grammatical errors and a signature block that did not identically match the actual signature” 
were “red flags” indicative of a fraudulent email).                       
This, quite simply, is not the exercise of reasonable care.  Ostrich Int’l Co., Ltd v. 
Michael A. Edwards Grp. Int’l Inc., No. 221CV00639JVSASX, 

2023 WL 4025870

, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. May 18, 2023) (holding that the party that failed to carefully evaluate email addresses and 
telephone opposing counsel to confirm wiring instructions in the face of multiple, conflicting 
instructions could have more easily avoided the loss); Jetcrete N. Am. LP v. Austin Truck & 

Equip., Ltd., 

484 F. Supp. 3d 915

, 920 (D. Nev. 2020) (finding that while the email account hack 
“created the scenario for the loss,” the buyer “was in the best position to prevent the loss by 
taking the reasonable precaution of verifying the wiring instructions by phone”); Arrow Truck 
Sales, Inc. v. Top Quality Truck & Equip., Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2052-T-30TGW, 

2015 WL 4936272

, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2015) (holding that the recipient of “e-mails containing 
conflicting wire instructions” who did not call “to confirm or verify the correct wire instructions” 
failed to exercise reasonable care).                                      
Accordingly, under either the contractual or UCC Article III analysis, WAWGD is 
obligated to pay Erie the previously agreed upon amount.  Bile, 

2016 WL 4487864

, at *10 (“[I]f 

a person has an obligation to deliver a check, and does not deliver that check due to that person’s 
own error, then that person remains liable on the underlying obligation.”).     
C.   Interest, Costs, and Fees                                       
In addition to a judgment in the amount of $240,000, Erie also seeks interest from May 
2023, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees.  ECF No. 49 at 5.  Erie has not, 
however, identified a basis upon which the Court could grant such an award.  The parties’ 
agreement to settle the case is silent regarding interest and fee-shifting in the event of a dispute.  
Erie does not cite any case law to support its position, nor has it provided any calculation of 
costs, expenses, or reasonable attorney’s fees, which “must be established by competent 
evidence.”  Rohn Prod. Int’l, LC, 

2010 WL 3943747

, at *4.  Erie’s request is therefore denied.         
II.  Conclusion                                                           
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Enforce Settlement 
(ECF No. 49) is GRANTED.  Judgment in the amount of $240,000 is granted in favor of Erie 

and against WAWGD.  A separate Order will follow.                         

Date:  April 29, 2024                                    /s/              
                              Erin Aslan                             
                              United States Magistrate Judge