Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13747

        COMMONWEALTH   vs.   META PLATFORMS, INC., & another.1



         Suffolk.      December 5, 2025. - April 10, 2026.

   Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges,
                         & Wolohojian, JJ.


Social Media. Immunity from Suit. Consumer Protection Act,
     Unfair or deceptive act. Statute, Construction. Practice,
     Civil, Motion to dismiss, Interlocutory appeal.



     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 24, 2023.

    A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.


     Mark W. Mosier, of the District of Columbia (Kendall
Burchard, of the District of Columbia, & Felicia H. Ellsworth
also present) for the defendants.
     David C. Kravitz, State Solicitor (Christina Chan & Jared
Rinehimer, Assistant Attorneys General, also present) for the
Commonwealth.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     David R. Geiger for TechFreedom.
     Zac Morgan, of the District of Columbia, & Douglas S.
Brooks for Washington Legal Foundation.

    1   Instagram, LLC.
                                                               2


     Jay M. Wolman for International Center for Law & Economics.
     Rob Bonta, California Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers,
Assistant California Attorney General, Bernard A. Eskandari,
Megan M. O'Neill, & Marissa Roy, Deputy California Attorneys
General, Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General, Shannon
Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General, Krista Batchelder, Deputy
Colorado Solicitor General, Danny Rheiner, Assistant Colorado
Solicitor General, Kris Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Reagan
Healey, Assistant Arizona Attorney General, William Tong,
Connecticut Attorney General, Kathleen Jennings, Delaware
Attorney General, Marion M. Quirk, of Delaware, Ryan T. Costa,
of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb, District of Columbia Attorney
General, Anne E. Lopez, Hawai'i Attorney General, Theodore E.
Rokita, Indiana Attorney General, Russell Coleman, Kentucky
Attorney General, Aaron M. Frey, Maine Attorney General, Anthony
G. Brown, Maryland Attorney General, Philip D. Ziperman, of
Maryland, Elizabeth J. Stern, Assistant Maryland Attorney
General, Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, Evan
Romanoff, Assistant Minnesota Attorney General, Michael T.
Hilgers, Nebraska Attorney General, John M. Formella, New
Hampshire Attorney General, Brandon H. Garod, Assistant New
Hampshire Attorney General, Matthew J. Platkin, New Jersey
Attorney General, Letitia James, New York Attorney General,
David W. Sunday, Jr., Pennsylvania Attorney General, Jonathan R.
Burns, Deputy Pennsylvania Attorney General, Lourdes Gómez
Torres, Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice, Peter F. Neronha,
Rhode Island Attorney General, Alan Wilson, South Carolina
Attorney General, Jared Q. Libet, Assistant Deputy South
Carolina Attorney General, Marty J. Jackley, South Dakota
Attorney General, Amanda Miiller, Deputy South Dakota Attorney
General, Charity R. Clark, Vermont Attorney General, Nicholas W.
Brown, Washington Attorney General, John B. McCuskey, West
Virgina Attorney General, Laurel K. Lackey & Abby G. Cunningham,
Assistant West Virgina Attorneys General, & Josh Kaul, Wisconsin
Attorney General, for California Attorney General & others.
     Steven P. Lehotsky for NetChoice & another.
     Caitriona Fitzgerald for Electronic Privacy Information
Center & others.
     Ari Z. Cohn, of Illinois, & John G. Mateus for Foundation
for Individual Rights and Expression.
     Jay M. Wolman for Jane Bambauer & another.
     Blake C. Stacey, pro se.


    WENDLANDT, J.   The Commonwealth alleges that Meta

Platforms, Inc., and Instagram, LLC (collectively, Meta),
                                                                     3


engaged in unfair business practices by designing the Instagram

platform to induce compulsive use by children, engaged in

deceptive business practices by deliberately misleading the

public about the safety of the platform, and created a public

nuisance by engaging in these unfair and deceptive practices.

Meta moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that

§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 

47 U.S.C. § 230

 (§ 230), barred the claims.     A Superior Court judge denied

the motion, and Meta appealed.

    This case first presents the question whether the doctrine

of present execution permits an interlocutory appeal from a

Superior Court judge's order denying a motion to dismiss based

on a defense under § 230.    Concluding that it does, we reach the

question whether § 230 bars the Commonwealth's claims.    We

conclude that it does not.

    Section 230(c)(1) protects an interactive computer service

provider, such as Meta, against claims that "treat[] [it] as the

publisher . . . of any information provided by" someone other

than Meta.   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).   Consistent with the text of

the statute, common-law principles of publisher liability, and

legislative purpose, we determine that § 230(c)(1) protects an

interactive computer service provider against claims that seek

to hold it liable for harms stemming from user-generated content

it published.   Here, accepting as true the allegations of the
                                                                   4


complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Commonwealth's favor, the claims do not seek to impose liability

on Meta for information provided by third parties.    Instead, the

claims allege harm stemming from Meta's own conduct either by

designing a social media platform that capitalizes on the

developmental vulnerabilities of children or by affirmatively

misleading consumers about the safety of the Instagram platform.

Thus, at least at this preliminary stage of the litigation, Meta

has not shown it is entitled to the protection provided by

§ 230(c)(1).2

     1.   Background.3   Meta owns and operates the social media

platform Instagram, which is used by over 33 million young

people, including over 300,000 daily active users in the

Commonwealth from the age of thirteen to seventeen.    Instagram

enables users to post images and videos and interact with other




     2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by NetChoice
and the Chamber of Progress; twenty-five State and territorial
Attorneys General; the Foundation for Individual Rights and
Expression; the Washington Legal Foundation; Professors Jane
Bambauer and Eugene Volokh; the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Common Sense Media, Cybersecurity for Democracy, the
Tech Justice Law Project, and legal scholars; TechFreedom; the
International Center for Law & Economics; and Blake C. Stacey.

     3 We set forth the allegations in the complaint. At the
motion to dismiss stage, we take all the allegations as true,
drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff --
here, the Commonwealth. See Hornibrook v. Richard, 

488 Mass. 74

, 78 (2021).
                                                                   5


users.   Users view content through various means, including on

the "main feed," which consists of a continuous stream of posts

from accounts the user "follows,"4 suggested posts from accounts

the user does not follow, and advertisements; the "explore"

page, which consists of a continuous stream of content that Meta

predicts might be interesting to the user, including advertising

content; and the "stories" banner at the top of the home page,

which consists of time-limited images and videos posted by

accounts that the user follows mixed with advertisements.

     Meta derives substantially all its revenue from selling

advertising opportunities to third parties seeking to target

promotional material to likely consumers employing the data Meta

collects about users' preferences.   Third parties pay Meta per

"advertisement impression," which is the number of times an

advertisement is on screen for a target audience.   This revenue

model creates a financial incentive for Meta to increase users'

screen time because the more time a user spends on the platform,

the more advertisement impressions Meta can sell.

     As described in greater detail infra, the Commonwealth

alleges that in pursuit of maximizing advertising profits, Meta

has designed Instagram to induce compulsive use among young


     4 To "follow" an account on Instagram means "to subscribe to
the feed of (someone or something)." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/follow
[https://perma.cc/82LH-MKGM].
                                                                   6


users to the detriment of their health and well-being, violating

G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (count I); knowingly deceived the public about

the risks of Instagram, depriving the public of the ability to

make an informed choice about individual use of the platform in

violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (count II); unfairly and

deceptively claimed that it excludes users under the age of

thirteen who are acutely harmed by Instagram's addictive

features in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (count III); and

created a public nuisance of youth addiction to Instagram

through the unfair and deceptive business conduct alleged in

counts I to III (count IV).

     a.   Meta's unfair business practices (count I).   In count

I, the Commonwealth alleges that to increase young users' time

on Instagram, Meta unfairly employs a suite of design features

that exploit those users' neurological vulnerability to social

media addiction in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2.   These

features induce compulsive and excessive platform use by

strategically triggering dopamine5 releases, targeting young

users' uniquely sensitive "fear of missing out" (FOMO), and

exploiting teens' "novelty seeking" minds.   This addiction, in




     5 "Dopamine is a neurotransmitter made in [the] brain" that
"plays a role as a 'reward center' and in many body functions,
including memory, movement, motivation, mood, [and] attention."
Cleveland Clinic, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles
/22581-dopamine [https://perma.cc/VN2J-VMU3].
                                                                      7


turn, impairs young users' health and well-being by, inter alia,

disrupting sleep patterns, stunting socioemotional development,

and causing mental health challenges.      The complaint

specifically identifies four design features that harm young

users.

     i.    High volume of notifications.   Instagram is designed to

send a high volume of audiovisual and haptic notifications that

alert users to activity on Instagram even when they are not

using the platform.    Under the default settings, Meta enables

approximately forty types of notifications, including

notifications that a third party has "liked"6 the user's posts,

requested to follow the user, sent the user a message, added a

new "story" (a temporarily viewable post), or uploaded a "reel"

(a video post).   This barrage of notifications, according to the

Commonwealth, is designed to overwhelm young users and compel

them repeatedly to reopen Instagram to the detriment of their

health and well-being.

     ii.   Infinite scroll and autoplay.    Instagram's "infinite

scroll" feature delivers a never-ending stream of posts and

advertisements to a user's main feed and explore pages, while


     6 In the social media context, to "like" means "to
electronically register one's approval of (something, such as an
online post or comment) for others to see (as by clicking on an
icon designated for that purpose)." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/like
[https://perma.cc/33FU-U55E].
                                                                    8


the "autoplay" feature displays stories and reels in a

continuous slideshow format that automatically starts playing

the next story or reel as the previous one ends.    The

Commonwealth maintains that Meta has designed these features to

encourage excessive screen time among young users by ensuring an

endless flow of content without requiring any affirmative act on

the part of a user.

    iii.   Ephemeral features.    Meta designed certain ephemeral

features, which render some posts viewable for a limited amount

of time before vanishing, to recall users to Instagram and

extend their platform usage.   Specifically, stories are only

available to view for twenty-four hours before disappearing from

a user's feed, and Instagram "live" streaming videos are only

available to view in real time.   The Commonwealth contends that

Meta is aware that these features induce FOMO among young users

and result in problematic and habitual use, harming youth

health.

    iv.    Intermittent variable rewards.   The Commonwealth

asserts that Meta induces young users to prolong their time on

the Instagram platform and frequently reopen the platform by

deploying two intermittent variable reward (IVR) features, which

provide users with a dopamine surge at unexpected intervals.

First, Meta delivers notifications on an IVR schedule;

specifically, Meta delivers dopamine-generating notifications
                                                                   9


such as "someone 'liked' your post" (the reward) on a variable

schedule alongside neutral notifications.    Because IVRs are

unpredictable and users desire the psychologically pleasing

dopamine release of a rewarding notification, this IVR schedule

keeps young users returning to the platform habitually.      Second,

the refresh function on a user's main feed is an IVR feature

akin to a slot machine as it links a user's act -- a swipe --

with a variable reward -- a new post which the user cannot

predict.   Meta has heightened the anticipation of this type of

reward by deliberately manufacturing a delay between the moment

the user swipes to refresh his or her feed and the display of

new content.

    b.     Meta's deceptive business practices (count II).   In

count II, the Commonwealth alleges that Meta deceptively

represented to the public that its platform is safe and

nonaddictive, and that the company prioritizes users' well-

being.   At the same time that Meta was publicly assuring

lawmakers, investors, users, and families that Instagram is safe

for youth, however, it was prioritizing features that it knew

from company studies induced social media addiction and harmed

young users' health.    The complaint identifies specific public

statements by Meta executives, including Meta's chief executive

officer, Meta's global head of safety, and the head of
                                                                   10


Instagram, as deliberately misleading and belied by internal

data and communications.

     c.   Meta's deceptive and unfair business practices (count

III).   In count III, the Commonwealth raises both a deceptive

and unfair business practices claim pursuant to G. L. c. 93A,

§ 2, pertaining to users less than thirteen years old (underage

users).   First, it alleges that Meta engaged in deceptive

business practices by publicly stating that it excludes underage

users from accessing the platform (age-gating) despite knowing

that hundreds of thousands of underage users possess Instagram

accounts and that Instagram's age-gating measures are

ineffective.   Second, it alleges that Meta engaged in unfair

business practices by refusing to invest in effective age-gating

mechanisms all the while knowing that Instagram's addiction

inducing features, discussed supra in connection with count I,

cause acute harm to underage users.

     d.   Public nuisance (count IV).   Count IV alleges that by

engaging in the unfair and deceptive practices alleged in counts

I to III, Meta has "knowingly created, substantially contributed

to, and/or [was a] substantial participant[] in maintaining a

public nuisance of youth addiction" to Instagram, which has

significantly interfered with the public health and safety of

youth who spend excessive amounts of time on the platform.
                                                                  11


     e.   Motion to dismiss.   Meta moved to dismiss the complaint

under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 

365 Mass. 754

 (1974),

arguing, inter alia, that the claims are barred by § 230(c)(1).

A Superior Court judge denied Meta's motion; relevant to the

present appeal, the judge concluded that § 230(c)(1) did not bar

the claims.   The judge reasoned that the unfair business

practices claims in counts I and III seek to hold Meta liable

for its own business conduct as a product designer, not for the

information provided by third parties on the platform; the harm

alleged in the complaint flows from the design features

themselves, not from any specific third-party content or from

design choices that contributed to the development or creation

of any harmful third-party content.   The judge also determined

that § 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity because the deception

claims in counts II and III are based on Meta's own speech.     The

judge did not address directly the applicability of CDA immunity

to count IV but implicitly concluded that it did not bar the

public nuisance claim in denying Meta's motion to dismiss.     Meta

filed a timely notice of appeal, contending that its appeal was

proper under the doctrine of present execution on the ground

that § 230(c)(1) provides Meta immunity from suit.7   We accepted


     7 Meta also petitioned a single justice of the Appeals Court
for leave to bring an interlocutory appeal from the Superior
Court's ruling pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118; Meta sought
leave to appeal all the issues it raised in its motion to
                                                                  12


Meta's application for direct appellate review, limited to the

issue whether Meta's claimed protection under § 230 is

immediately appealable pursuant to the doctrine of present

execution and, if so, whether the Commonwealth's claims are

barred by § 230.

    2.   Statutory framework.   Enacted as part of broader

reforms set forth in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 

Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110

 Stat. 56 (1996), § 230 evinces Congress's

intent "to promote the free exchange of information and ideas

over the Internet."   Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 

339 F.3d 1119

, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).   Congress codified this intent in

the statute itself, setting forth a Federal policy "to promote

the continued development of the Internet and other interactive

computer services and other interactive media," 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(b)(1), and "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free

market that presently exists for the Internet and other

interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State

regulation," 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(b)(2).   As discussed in greater

detail infra, Congress was particularly concerned that

interactive computer service providers, faced with the specter



dismiss. We transferred that petition to this court pursuant to
our authority under G. L. c. 211, § 4A, consolidated it with the
pending appeal, and denied Meta's request for leave to appeal
issues other than the question whether the doctrine of present
execution permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
a motion to dismiss based on a defense under § 230.
                                                                  13


of tort liability stemming from information provided by millions

of third-party users, would limit speech on their platforms.

See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 

129 F.3d 327, 330

 (4th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 

524 U.S. 937

 (1998) ("Congress recognized

the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech"

and enacted § 230, "in part, to maintain the robust nature of

Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government

interference in the medium to a minimum").8

     Section 230 also evidences Congress's intent "to encourage

voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material."

Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122.   Congress codified this intent,

setting forth a Federal policy "to encourage the development of

technologies which maximize user control over what information

is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the

Internet and other interactive computer services" and to "remove

disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking

and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict

their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online

material."   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(b)(3)-(4).   The title of § 230 –-

"Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive




     8 See Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 331

 (Congress chose to immunize
providers in part because "[f]aced with potential liability for
each message republished by their services, interactive computer
service providers might choose to severely restrict the number
and type of messages posted").
                                                                     14


material" –- similarly alludes to the goal of encouraging

voluntary content moderation.   As discussed infra, Congress was

concerned that in the absence of such protections, service

providers would cease their own efforts to create tools to

remove inappropriate content in order to avoid liability.      Put

differently, "[i]n passing [§] 230, Congress sought to spare

interactive computer services this grim choice [between doing

nothing to curb harmful content or facing liability for their

efforts] by allowing them to perform some editing on user-

generated content without thereby becoming liable for all

defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn't edit

or delete."9   Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.

Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d 1157, 1163

 (9th Cir. 2008).

     Further, seeking to empower and protect individual users,

Congress expressly affirmed its commitment to curb "obscenity,

stalking, and harassment by means of computer" through

enforcement of criminal laws to punish directly those who engage

in such unlawful activities online.   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(b)(5).    In

short, "Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful

online speech through the separate route of imposing tort

liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other


     9 See Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 331

 ("Fearing that the specter of
liability would therefore deter service providers from blocking
and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230[]
. . .").
                                                                       15


parties' potentially injurious messages."       Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 330-331

.

    To effect these aims, § 230 protects certain conduct by

interactive computer service providers.     First, "[n]o provider

or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as

the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another

information content provider."    

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).     Second,

"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall

be held liable on account" of certain good faith efforts to

restrict access to objectionable material.      

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(2).   At the same time, § 230 imposes certain

affirmative obligations on interactive computer service

providers, including a requirement that they notify their users

about commercially available parental control protections.      See

47 U.S.C. § 230

(d).

    Section 230 also specifically addresses the effect of the

statute on State law claims.     It provides:

    "Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any
    State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with
    this section. No cause of action may be brought and no
    liability may be imposed under any State or local law that
    is inconsistent with this section."

47 U.S.C. § 230

(e)(3).   Together these provisions protect

interactive computer service providers against claims that seek

to hold them liable for certain decisions to disseminate or

restrict information on their platforms.
                                                                   16


    3.     Doctrine of present execution.   With this statutory

framework in mind, we turn to the question whether the doctrine

of present execution permits Meta's interlocutory appeal from

the order denying its motion to dismiss insofar as it concerned

Meta's affirmative defense under § 230(c)(1).    We address this

legal question de novo.    See CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc.,

488 Mass. 847

, 848 (2022).

    "Generally, a litigant is entitled to appellate review only

of a final judgment, not of an interlocutory ruling . . . ."

Lynch v. Crawford, 

483 Mass. 631

, 634 (2019).    "However, in

narrowly limited circumstances, where an interlocutory order

will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on

appeal from a final judgment, and where the order is collateral

to the underlying dispute in the case and therefore will not be

decided at trial, a party may obtain full appellate review of an

interlocutory order under our doctrine of present execution"

(quotations and citation omitted).   Patel v. Martin, 

481 Mass. 29, 32

 (2018).   "The doctrine is intended to be invoked narrowly

to avoid piecemeal appeals from interlocutory decisions that

will delay the resolution of the trial court case, increase the

over-all cost of the litigation, and burden our appellate

courts."   

Id.

    In civil cases, one of the limited circumstances in which

the doctrine of present execution applies is where a party
                                                                  17


claims a statutory right to immunity from suit.   See Estate of

Moulton v. Puopolo, 

467 Mass. 478, 485

 (2014) (present execution

doctrine applies where "protection from the burden of litigation

and trial is precisely the right to which [a party] asserts an

entitlement").   We allow an interlocutory appeal in such a

circumstance because "[w]here a party claims immunity from suit

but does not prevail on a motion to dismiss or for summary

judgment, the party cannot completely vindicate his or her

rights on appeal from a final judgment"; "the party would

already then have defended the case at trial -- exactly what

immunity from suit was 'designed to prevent.'"    Lynch, 483 Mass.

at 634, quoting Patel, 

481 Mass. at 33

.   See Kent v.

Commonwealth, 

437 Mass. 312, 316

 (2002) ("right to immunity from

suit is effectively lost as litigation proceeds past motion

practice and is not adequately vindicated if an order denying it

were not appealable until the close of litigation" [quotations

and citations omitted]).   By contrast, when a statute confers

immunity from liability, the present execution doctrine does not

apply, as the right may be vindicated fully on appeal after

trial.   See Lynch, supra at 634-635.

    In determining whether statutory immunity is from suit

altogether or a more limited immunity from liability, we

construe the statute
                                                                    18


    "according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained
    from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved
    usage of the language, considered in connection with the
    cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be
    remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end
    that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."

Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 

489 Mass. 356

, 362-363 (2022), S.C.,

494 Mass. 562

 (2024), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President

& Fellows of Harvard College, 

445 Mass. 745, 749

 (2006).

    As discussed supra, § 230(e)(3) states that "no cause of

action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any

State or local law that is inconsistent with this section"

(emphases added).   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(e)(3).   The plain meaning of

"no cause of action may be brought" is that a suit may not be

initiated in the first instance and the defendant cannot be

forced to litigate the claim.   See Black's Law Dictionary 275

(12th ed. 2024) (defining "cause of action" as "a factual

situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court

from another person").   This construction is bolstered by the

language in § 230(e)(3) "and no liability may be imposed," which

plainly confers immunity from liability as an additional

protection, separate from the immunity conferred by the phrase

"no cause of action may be brought."   See Commonwealth v.

Fleury, 

489 Mass. 421

, 427 (2022) (observing "the fundamental

and long-standing principle of statutory interpretation that we

must strive to give effect to each word of a statute so that no
                                                                  19


part will be inoperative or superfluous" [quotation and citation

omitted]).10   Thus, we join those courts11 that have concluded

that § 230(e)(3) provides an interactive computer service

provider immunity from suit against a State law claim that

conflicts with the Federal statute.12   Accordingly, the doctrine


     10For this reason, we reject the Commonwealth's
construction of the phrase "no cause of action may be brought"
in § 230(e)(3) as simply restating the immunity from liability
conferred in the phrase "and no liability may be imposed." See
A. Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 174 (2012) ("If possible, every word and every
provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored.
None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it
to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence").

     11See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

591 F.3d 250, 255

 (4th Cir. 2009), quoting Roommates.com, LLC,

521 F.3d at 1175

 ("We thus aim to resolve the question of § 230
immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that
immunity protects websites not only from 'ultimate liability,'
but also from 'having to fight costly and protracted legal
battles'"); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 ("Congress intended that
service providers . . . be afforded immunity from suit"); Zeran,

129 F.3d at 330

 ("By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service"); Hassell v. Bird, 

5 Cal. 5th 522, 544

(2018), cert. denied, 

586 U.S. 1126

 (2019) (plain language of
§ 230 "conveys an intent to shield Internet intermediaries from
the burdens associated with defending against state-law claims
that treat them as the publisher or speaker of third party
content"); Banaian v. Bascom, 

175 N.H. 151

, 158 (2022) ("plain
language [of § 230(e)(3)] confers immunity from suit"); In re
Facebook, Inc., 

625 S.W.3d 80

, 87 (Tex. 2021), cert. denied sub
nom. Doe v. Facebook, Inc., 

142 S. Ct. 1087

 (2022) (plain
language of § 230 "create[s] a substantive right to be free of
litigation, not just a right to be free of liability at the end
of litigation").

     12We decline to follow General Steel Dom. Sales, L.L.C. v.
Chumley, 

840 F.3d 1178, 1182

 (10th Cir. 2016), which addressed
                                                                    20


of present execution permits Meta's appeal as it pertains to

Meta's defense under § 230.13

     4.   Section 230(c)(1).    Having concluded that the appeal is

properly before us, we next address Meta's contention that

§ 230(c)(1) bars the Commonwealth's claims, an issue of

statutory construction that we review de novo.     See Garcia v.

Steele, 

492 Mass. 322

, 326 (2023).    Section 230(c)(1) provides:

"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be

treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided

by another information content provider."    

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).

     To fall within the protection of § 230(c)(1), a defendant

thus must show that it is a provider or user of an "interactive

computer service";14 that the claim would treat the defendant as



whether interlocutory review was available under the Federal
collateral order doctrine. The court stated, without
explanation, that § 230(e)(3) "does not contain an explicit bar
to suit" and is "merely a preemption provision." Id.

     13In view of the interlocutory nature of the present appeal
and consistent with the limited scope of the doctrine of present
execution, we decline to reach Meta's additional bases for
dismissal of the complaint. See CP 200 State, LLC, 488 Mass. at
849 ("The doctrine of present execution is a long-standing
exception to [the rule that there is no right to appeal from an
interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it],
applicable in limited circumstances").

     14"The term 'interactive computer service' means any
information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that
                                                                  21


the publisher or speaker of information; and that the

information was provided by another "information content

provider."15   See Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 

103 F.4th 732

,

738 (9th Cir. 2024), citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 

570 F.3d 1096, 1100-1101

 (9th Cir. 2009).   See also Massachusetts Port

Auth. v. Turo Inc., 

487 Mass. 235

, 240 (2021) (Turo), quoting

Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 

817 F.3d 12, 19

 (1st Cir. 2016),

cert. denied, 

580 U.S. 1083

 (2017) (Backpage.com) (§ 230[c][1]

immunity "applies when 'the defendant [1] is a provider or user

of an interactive computer service; [2] the claim is based on

information provided by another information content provider;

and [3] the claim would treat the defendant as the publisher or

speaker of that information'").

     Courts have construed § 230(c)(1) "to establish broad

federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service

providers liable for information originating with a third-party

user of the service."   Turo, 487 Mass. at 240, quoting Perfect

10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 

488 F.3d 1102, 1118

 (9th Cir.), cert.




provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(f)(2).

     15"The term 'information content provider' means any person
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(f)(3).
                                                                   22


denied, 

552 U.S. 1062

 (2007).   Immunity thus does not depend on

the form of the asserted cause of action; regardless of how a

claim is pleaded, immunity applies so long as the claim treats

an interactive computer service provider as the publisher or

speaker of third-party generated content.   See, e.g., Estate of

Bride v. YOLO Techs., Inc., 

112 F.4th 1168, 1178-1179

 (9th Cir.

2024), cert. denied, 

145 S. Ct. 1435

 (2025) (YOLO)

(misrepresentation and products liability claims barred by

§ 230[c][1]); Calise, 103 F.4th at 743-744 (unjust enrichment,

negligence, and unfair competition law claims barred by

§ 230[c][1]); Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC,

755 F.3d 398, 402, 417

 (6th Cir. 2014) (defamation, libel per

se, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims barred by § 230[c][1]).

    Nevertheless, § 230(c)(1) "immunity is not limitless."

Calise, 103 F.4th at 736.   See Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d at 1164

 (CDA "was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on

the Internet").   "Protection under § 230(c)(1) extends only to

bar certain claims imposing liability for specific information

that another party provided."   Henderson v. Source for Pub.

Data, L.P., 

53 F.4th 110, 117

 (4th Cir. 2022).   Instead, the

three requirements of § 230(c)(1) look first to the defendant's

status as an "interactive computer service" provider, then to

the kind of claim the plaintiff has brought (does it treat the
                                                                     23


defendant as a publisher of information), and finally to the

source of the information underlying the plaintiff's claim (who

provided the information).   See id. at 119-120.

     The parties agree that the first requirement is met:        Meta

is an interactive computer service provider.     Their dispute

centers on the other two requirements for § 230(c)(1) immunity.16

     a.   Treated as the publisher.   i.   Plain meaning.   The

parties' arguments regarding the applicability of § 230(c)(1)

immunity appear to rest on competing constructions of the phrase

"treated as the publisher . . . of any information."     

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).   Section 230 does not define the phrase.

Accordingly, we "begin[] with the principal source of insight

into legislative intent –- the plain language of the statute"

(quotations and citation omitted).    Patel, 489 Mass. at 362.

     A.   Business of publication.    Applying the plain meaning of

"publisher" as "one that makes public," "the reproducer of a

work intended for public consumption," and "one whose business

is publishing,"17 some Federal courts have concluded, as Meta

urges us to do, that the phrase "treated as the publisher . . .


     16For purposes of our analysis of Meta's arguments in the
present case, we address the third requirement of the test as
articulated in Turo, 487 Mass. at 240, before the second.

     17 See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1837
(1981); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1837
(1986).
                                                                   24


of any information" extends to bar claims that implicate a

provider's role as a publisher, including its editorial choices

concerning whether, how, when, for how long, and to whom to

publish information.   See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 

934 F.3d 53, 65

 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 

590 U.S. 942

 (2020) (citing

dictionary definitions, see note 17, supra).18   After all, such

editorial choices are part and parcel of the business of

publication.19   Thus, Meta presses, where a claim implicates


     18We note that the courts in Force, 

934 F.3d at 65

; Federal
Trade Comm'n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 

838 F.3d 158, 175

 (2d Cir.
2016); and Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1102

, stated that Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1837 (1986) defined "publisher" as
"one whose business is publication" rather than "one whose
business is publishing." For purposes of this opinion, we treat
"publication" and "publishing" as synonymous.

     19See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 

753 F.3d 1354, 1359

 (D.C. Cir.
2014) ("the very essence of publishing is making the decision
whether to print or retract a given piece of content"); Barnes,

570 F.3d at 1102

 ("publication involves reviewing, editing, and
deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication
third-party content"); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 

528 F.3d 413, 418

(5th Cir.), cert. denied., 

555 U.S. 1031

 (2008) (§ 230 bars "all
cases arising from the publication of user-generated content");
Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d at 1170-1171

 ("any activity that
can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that
third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under
[§] 230"); Universal Communication Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,

478 F.3d 413, 422

 (1st Cir. 2007) (Lycos) (provider's "construct
and operation" of websites, which contributed to proliferation
of misinformation by third parties regarding plaintiff's company
in violation of securities and cyberstalking laws, were "as much
. . . editorial decision[s] with respect to that misinformation
as a decision not to delete a particular posting"); Green v.
America Online, 

318 F.3d 465, 471

 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 

540 U.S. 877

 (2003) ("decisions relating to the monitoring,
screening, and deletion of content from [the provider's] network
-- actions quintessentially related to a publisher's role");
                                                                  25


traditional publishing activities such as a provider's editorial

choices, the claim "treat[s]" the provider "as the publisher

. . . of any information" under the plain meaning of that

phrase.

    This construction, which has a commonsense appeal, finds

support in the language from some Federal court decisions, which

broadly describe the immunity provided by § 230(c)(1) in

analyzing claims challenging design features and algorithms that

determine, inter alia, how and to whom service providers

disseminate information.   See, e.g., Force, 

934 F.3d at 65

(claims seeking to hold social media company liable for "giving

Hamas a forum with which to communicate and for actively

bringing Hamas'[s] message to interested parties," including

claim challenging algorithm designed to show content aligned

with user's interests, fall within "heartland of what it means

to be the 'publisher' of information" under § 230);

Backpage.com, 

817 F.3d at 20-21

 (sex trafficking claims

challenging website's posting policies, such as anonymization,

concern features that "reflect choices about what content can




Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 332

, quoting W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton,
Torts § 113, at 803 (5th ed. 1984) (publishers include "[t]hose
who are in the business of making their facilities available to
disseminate . . . the information gathered by others"); 

Zeran, supra at 330

 ("deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone
or alter content" are examples of "a publisher's traditional
editorial functions").
                                                                  26


appear on the website and in what form, are editorial choices

that fall within the purview of traditional publisher

functions," and are barred by § 230).

     B.   Common-law publisher liability.   Some Federal courts

have taken a slightly different approach to determining the

plain meaning of the phrase "treated as the publisher . . . of

any information," noting that the phrase has deep roots in the

common law of information-based torts such as defamation.     This

approach, advocated by the Commonwealth, also has some force;

where, as here, "Congress uses a common-law term, we must

assume, absent a contrary indication, that it intends the

common-law meaning."   Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 

478 Mass. 169

,

176 (2017), cert. denied, 

584 U.S. 910

 (2018).   See Neder v.

United States, 

527 U.S. 1, 23

 (1999) (when Congress uses

"common-law terms," it intends to incorporate their "well-

settled meaning[s]"); 2B N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer,

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 50:1, at 148 (7th ed. rev.

2012) ("Where an operative word is not defined in a statute, the

common law meaning controls"); id. at § 50:3, at 161-162 ("The

meaning of well-defined common law words and phrases often

carries over to statutes dealing with the same or a similar

subject matter").20


     20See also George v. McDonough, 

596 U.S. 740, 752

 (2022)
("The real question is not what [a statutory term might mean] in
                                                                  27


    Relevant here, a claim treats a defendant as a publisher of

information at common law where the claim (a) makes the

defendant liable for intentionally or negligently publishing

information to someone other than the subject of the information

(dissemination element) and (b) seeks to impose liability based

on the content of the information published (content element).

See Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 121-122

.   See, e.g., W.L. Prosser

& W.P. Keeton, Torts § 113, at 803 (5th ed. 1984) (those who

disseminate information gathered by others may be "subject to

liability for the defamatory matter that was published"

[emphases added]); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558, at 155

(1977) ("To create liability for defamation there must be . .     a

false and defamatory statement concerning another" and, inter

alia, an "unprivileged publication to a third party" [emphasis

added]); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, at 396 (1977)

(publisher may be held liable for tort of false light only when

published statement was of improper nature -- that is, when

statement "is such a major misrepresentation of [a subject's]

character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense

may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable man in



the abstract, but what was the 'prevailing understanding' of
this term of art 'under the law that Congress looked to when
codifying' it"); Stokeling v. United States, 

586 U.S. 73, 80

(2019) ("[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another
legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it
brings the old soil with it" [citation omitted]).
                                                                  28


his position"); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D, at 383

(1977) (tort of publicity given to private life imposed

liability on publisher for disseminating information "highly

offensive to reasonable person").   See also Calise, 103 F.4th at

738, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 comment a

(1938) (observing that "publisher" as used in § 230[c][1] "has a

well-defined meaning at common law" with "publication" defined

as "[a]ny act by which [unlawful] matter is intentionally or

negligently communicated to a third person"); 

Henderson, supra at 122

 ("to hold someone liable as a publisher at common law was

to hold them responsible for the content's improper character"

[emphasis added]).   In essence, common-law publisher liability

is a form of vicarious liability, holding a publisher liable as

an "intermediar[y]" of harmful content "originating with a third

party" that the publisher disseminated to others.   Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 330-331

.

    Informed by this common-law understanding, some Federal

courts have construed the phrase "treated as the publisher . . .

of any information" in § 230(c)(1) to require not only the

dissemination element but also the content element -- that is,

that the claim "impos[e] liability for specific information that

another party provided."   Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 117

.    See,

e.g., M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc., 

127 F.4th 516, 525, 530

 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 287

 (2025) (Rushing, J.,
                                                                 29


concurring) (§ 230 immunity barred plaintiff's claims that

provider "allows racist, harmful content to appear on its

platform" because "[t]hough framed in products liability

verbiage [the plaintiff's] claims undoubtedly seek to hold

Facebook liable for disseminating on its platform improper

content provided by others" [emphases added]); id. at 525

("Crucially, [the plaintiff] cannot show that [the provider's]

algorithm was designed in a manner that was unreasonably

dangerous for viewers' use without also demonstrating that the

algorithm prioritizes the dissemination of one type of content

over another" [emphasis added]).

    Courts have observed that in enacting § 230(c)(1), Congress

intended to preserve liability against the original author of

the harmful message but to eliminate "the separate route of

imposing tort liability on companies that serve as

intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious

messages."   Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 330-331

.21   See Jones, 

755 F.3d at 21

 To be sure, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Zeran also stated, "[L]awsuits seeking to hold
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions -- such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content -- are barred."
Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 330

. See Jones, 

755 F.3d at 407

 (quoting
same language from Zeran). However, the claim at issue sought
to hold the provider liable for harms flowing from defamatory
messages posted by a third person. 

Zeran, supra at 328-329

(plaintiff claimed harm from defamatory third-party posts on
provider's bulletin board stating plaintiff offered for sale
offensive and tasteless slogans related to Oklahoma City Federal
                                                                  30


407 ("Section 230 marks a departure from the common-law rule

that allocates liability to publishers . . . of tortious

material written or prepared by others" [emphasis added]).

Accord Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 

824 F.3d 846, 852

(9th Cir. 2016) (Internet Brands) (no § 230[c][1] immunity where

cause of action, failure to warn of rape scheme known to

provider through sources other than its platform, did "not seek

to impose 'intermediary' liability"; "there [was] no allegation

that [the provider] transmitted any potentially harmful messages



building bombing). See 

Jones, supra at 403-404

 (plaintiff
claimed harm from photographs and derogatory comments posted on
website). The Fourth Circuit later clarified that § 230(c)(1)
applies only where the claim seeks to hold the publisher liable
for the harmful nature of the content published. See Henderson,

53 F.4th at 122

.

     Similarly, in Turo, we acknowledged that the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "has held that § 230
protects a service provider from liability for traditional
editorial functions as well as for the provider's website
construction and operation." Turo, 487 Mass. at 245 n.3, citing
Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 

267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 346

 (D. Mass.
2017), aff'd, 

887 F.3d 542

 (1st Cir. 2018), Backpage.com, 

817 F.3d at 21

, and Lycos, 

478 F.3d at 422

. Notably, and consistent
with the common-law reading of § 230(c)(1), in each of the cases
we cited, the harm alleged flowed from specific third-party
content. See Hiam, supra at 348, 354 (immunity applied to
claims that sought to hold provider "liable for misleading or
inaccurate material" included in third-party post listing rental
property); Backpage.com, supra at 19-20 (immunity applied where
minor plaintiffs sought to hold provider liable for having been
sex trafficked by means of third-party posts advertising minors'
availability as escorts); 

Lycos, supra at 415

 (immunity applied
to claims "objecting to a series of allegedly false and
defamatory postings made under pseudonymous screen names on an
Internet message board operated by [the defendant provider]").
See also note 27, infra.
                                                                   31


between [the plaintiff and the rapists]" [emphasis added]);

Backpage.com, 

817 F.3d at 19

, quoting Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 331

("websites that display third-party content may have an infinite

number of users generating an enormous amount of potentially

harmful content, and holding website operators liable for that

content 'would have an obvious chilling effect' in light of the

difficulty of screening posts for potential issues" [emphasis

added]); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 

145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 802-803

 (2006), cert. denied, 

552 U.S. 817

 (2007) (noting policy

of § 230 is to "avoid the chilling effect upon Internet free

speech that would be occasioned by the imposition of tort

liability upon companies that do not create potentially harmful

messages but are simply intermediaries for their delivery").

    These courts have rejected the argument that § 230(c)(1)

provides immunity from liability "anytime there is a 'but-for'

causal relationship between the act of publication and

liability," as it "bears little relation to publisher liability

at common law."   Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 122

.   Engaging in

traditional publishing activity "alone is not enough."    

Id.

    See

Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

925 F.3d 135, 139-140

 (4th

Cir. 2019) (although service provider published third-party

speech in marketing defective product, § 230[c][1] did not bar

claim against provider for selling defective product because

claim was not based on "the content of [that] speech").       Accord
                                                                   32


HomeAway.com, Inc. v. Santa Monica, 

918 F.3d 676, 682

 (9th Cir.

2019) (rejecting "use of a 'but-for' test that would provide

immunity under the CDA solely because a cause of action would

not otherwise have accrued but for the third-party content");

Internet Brands, 

824 F.3d at 852-853

 ("[p]ublishing activity is

a but-for cause of just about everything [the interactive

computer service provider] is involved in," yet "Congress has

not provided an all purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for

businesses that publish user content on the internet"); Airbnb,

Inc. v. Boston, 

386 F. Supp. 3d 113

, 120 n.5 (D. Mass. 2019)

(rejecting argument that United States Court of Appeals for

First Circuit has construed § 230 to "expansively protect[] all

decisions a company makes that in any way implicate the overall

design and operation of its online platform").   Instead,

"treated as the publisher of . . . any information" requires

both the dissemination element and the content element.     See

Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 123

.

    This common-law construction is further supported by § 230

as a whole.   See S&H Indep. Premium Brands E., LLC v. Alcoholic

Beverages Control Comm'n, 

494 Mass. 464

, 467 (2024) ("We do not

read statutory language in isolation; instead, we must look to

the statutory scheme as a whole to adduce legislative intent"

[quotation and citation omitted]).   As discussed supra,

§ 230(c)(1) immunity requires that "another information content
                                                                  33


provider" supply the relevant information upon which liability

is asserted (emphasis added).   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).    More than

one person or entity, including the interactive computer service

provider itself, may be the information content provider where

they each contribute to the creation or development of the

information.   See note 15, supra (setting forth definition of

"information content provider"); Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d. at 1165

 ("the fact that users are information content providers

does not preclude [the interactive computer service provider]

from also being an information content provider by helping

'develop' at least 'in part' the information in the profiles").

     Thus, courts have determined that a service provider is an

"information content provider" where it directly and materially

contributes to "what [makes] the content itself 'unlawful'"

(emphasis added).   Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 127

, quoting Force,

934 F.3d at 68

.   Where the provider so contributes to the

unlawful content, it is not protected by § 230(c)(1).22    See


     22Compare LeadClick Media, LLC, 

838 F.3d at 176

 (defendant
not entitled to § 230[c][1] immunity because it was "an
information content provider with respect to the deceptive
content at issue"), and Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d at 1166

 (no
immunity where website provider created questions and suggested
answers, which in turn materially contributed to eliciting
information used to create "part of the [user] profile that is
alleged to offend the Fair Housing Act and state housing
discrimination laws"), with Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 

836 F.3d 1263, 1269-1270

 (9th Cir. 2016) (provider did not create or develop
content where website did "absolutely nothing to enhance the
defamatory sting of the message beyond the words offered by the
                                                                  34

Henderson, supra at 128

 ("where a company materially contributes

to a message's unlawful content, that company stops being a mere

'intermediary' for another party's message" and loses immunity);

Roommates.com, LLC, 

521 F.3d at 1168

 ("a website helps to

develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to

[§] 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality

of the content").     This construction of "information content

provider" as any person or entity that materially contributes to

the unlawful nature of the information published bolsters the

construction of "treated as the publisher . . . of any

information" to include a content element; where the service

provider created, in whole or in part, the content from which

the alleged harm flows, it is not protected by § 230(c)(1).

    ii.   Legislative history.    Where, as here, the plain

meaning of the statute lends itself to competing constructions,

we turn to legislative history to gain further insight into

legislative intent.    See Matter of the Estate of Mason, 

493 Mass. 148

, 152 (2023) ("where statutory language is not




user" [quotation and citation omitted]), Jones, 

755 F.3d at 415

-
416 (platform not information content provider where it selected
statements at issue for publication but "did not materially
contribute to the illegality of those statements"), and Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd., 

591 F.3d at 257

 (defendant who "structured its
website and its business operations to develop information
related to class-action law suits" was not information content
provider, as "there is nothing unlawful about developing this
type of content").
                                                                  35


conclusive, we may turn to extrinsic sources, including

legislative history . . . for assistance in our interpretation"

[quotation and citation omitted]).

    Significantly, § 230 was passed in the wake of two

decisions, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 

776 F. Supp. 135

(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (CompuServe), and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.

Prodigy Servs. Co., 

23 Media L. Rep. 1794

 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25,

1995) (Prodigy), each concerning the liability of an interactive

computer service provider for false and defamatory statements

made by a third-party user on its platform.   In CompuServe, the

plaintiff claimed it had been harmed by false and defamatory

statements that were included in an online newsletter and

published in CompuServe's electronic library, which consisted of

a vast number of publications.   

CompuServe, supra at 137-138

.

Acknowledging that under the common law an entity who repeats or

republishes defamatory material ordinarily is subject to

liability as if it had originally published it, the Federal

District Court first concluded that CompuServe was a common-law

distributor akin to a library, rather than a traditional

publisher, because it exercised "little or no editorial control

over" the newsletter's contents; once the third party uploaded

the newsletter into CompuServe's data banks, it became

immediately available to subscribers.   

Id. at 139-140

.    The

court reasoned that treating CompuServe as a common-law
                                                                    36


publisher liable for the defamatory statements of others "would

impose an undue burden on the free flow of information."     

Id. at 140

.    Instead, the court concluded that CompuServe could only be

held liable if it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly

defamatory information; because the plaintiffs had failed to

adduce evidence of such knowledge, the court allowed summary

judgment in CompuServe's favor.    

Id. at 141

.   While CompuServe

was spared liability, the decision left open the prospect that a

service provider might be held liable if it was on actual or

constructive notice of the unlawful content published on its

platform.23   See 

id.

       In the second case, Prodigy, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1796-1797,

the State trial court also considered a defamation claim against

an interactive computer service provider; this time, however,

the provider had undertaken to remove some offensive comments

from its bulletin board.   Because it had exercised a degree of

editorial control over the content on its platform, the court




       As Federal courts have acknowledged, the standard for
       23

common-law distributor liability –- whether the defendant knew
or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory information –-
would have a chilling effect on speech similar to that caused by
publisher liability; if liability were to attach as soon as an
individual or entity notified the service provider of a
message's defamatory nature (i.e., provided the service provider
with reason to know of the message's defamatory nature),
providers would "have a natural incentive simply to remove
messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory
or not." Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 333

.
                                                                  37


held that the interactive computer service provider was liable

as a publisher at common law for defamatory comments posted by a

third-party user on the provider's online bulletin board.   

Id.,

citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).   In so doing,

the court remarked that had the provider simply done nothing

editorially, like CompuServe, it would not have been liable.

See Prodigy, supra at 1798 (provider's "conscious choice, to

gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a

greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks

that make no such choice").

     Concerned that interactive computer service providers would

either limit speech on their platforms24 or cease efforts to

remove inappropriate content25 in order to avoid liability in




     24See 141 Cong. Rec. H8472 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (§ 230 encourages content moderation but
"doesn't violate free speech or the right of adults to
communicate with each other"); id. at H8471 (statement of Rep.
Zoe Lofgren) ("I very much endorse the [§ 230] amendment, and I
would urge its approval so that we preserve the [F]irst
[A]mendment and open systems on the Net").

     25See 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Christopher Cox) (observing that we can "keep[] pornography
away from our kids" without "hav[ing] a Federal Computer
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the
Internet"); id. (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden) (opposing solution
that would "put in place the Government rather than the private
sector about this task of trying to define indecent
communications and protecting our kids"); id. at H8471
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) ("The [§ 230] amendment is a
thoughtful approach to keep smut off the net without government
censorship").
                                                                  38


light of these decisions, Congress enacted § 230.   See 141 Cong.

Rec. H8470 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Christopher Cox)

(§ 230 "will do two basic things:   [f]irst, it will protect

computer Good Samaritans, online service providers . . . who

take[] steps to screen indecency and offensive material . . .

from taking on liability," and "[s]econd, it will establish as

the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have

content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the

Internet"); S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) ("One of the

specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-

Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have

treated [interactive computer service providers] and users as

publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because

they have restricted access to objectionable material"); id.

(decisions like Prodigy "create serious obstacles to the

important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the

content of communications their children receive through

interactive computer services"); 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (Aug. 4,

1995) (statement of Rep. Christopher Cox) (§ 230 "will protect

[interactive computer service providers] from taking on

liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case").

    In sum, Congress intended to immunize interactive computer

service providers against claims that would hold them liable as

intermediaries for injuries caused by information provided by
                                                                 39


third-party users of their platforms.26   See Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 121

 (because § 230[c][1] derives its significance from

defamation law, "the scope of 'the role of a traditional

publisher,' and therefore the scope of what § 230[c][1]

protects, is guided by the common law"); Batzel v. Smith, 

333 F.3d 1018, 1026

 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 

541 U.S. 1085

(2004), overruled on other grounds by Gopher Media LLC v.

Melone, 

154 F.4th 696

, 699 (9th Cir. 2025) ("§ 230[c][1] . . .

overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors,

and speakers under statutory and common law"); Zeran, 

129 F.3d at 332

 ("The terms 'publisher' and 'distributor' [as relevant to

§ 230(c)(1)] derive their legal significance from the context of

defamation law").

     True to Congress's intent and the common-law meaning of

"treated as the publisher   . . . of any information," we decline

Meta's invitation to read § 230(c)(1) immunity so broadly as to

encompass all claims that implicate publishing activities

regardless of whether the claims seek to hold the service

provider liable for the content of the information published.

See Henderson, 

53 F.4th at 117

 (Section 230 "is not a license to




     26Because of the ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase
"treated as the publisher . . . of any information," we look to
the historical context to help inform Congress's intent,
recognizing that "the language of the statute does not limit its
application to defamation cases." Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1101

.
                                                                   40


do whatever one wants online.   Protection under § 230[c][1]

extends only to bar certain claims imposing liability for

specific information that another party provided").   Instead, a

claim treats a provider as a publisher of information where it

meets both the dissemination and content elements.    Indeed, in

each case relied on by Meta where the court determined that
                                                               41


§ 230 immunity applied,27 save one,28 the harm alleged was

traceable to the content of the information published.


     27See Doe v. Grindr Inc., 

128 F.4th 1148, 1152-1153

 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 319

 (2025) (§ 230 protected
defendant against defective design, defective manufacturing, and
negligence claims, which sought to hold defendant liable "for
facilitating communication among users for illegal activity,
including the exchange of child sexual abuse material" [emphasis
added]); M.P., 

127 F.4th at 525

 (§ 230[c][1] shielded defendant
against tort claim challenging content-sorting algorithm where,
in essence, plaintiff took "issue with the fact that Facebook
allows racist, harmful content to appear on its platform and
directs that content to likely receptive users to maximize
Facebook's profits" [emphasis added]); YOLO, 

112 F.4th at 1182

("Plaintiffs' product liability claims attempt to hold YOLO
responsible as the speaker or publisher of harassing and
bullying speech" [emphasis added]); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 

765 Fed. Appx. 586

, 590 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 

589 U.S. 976

 (2019)
("products liability claims arise from the impersonating content
that [the plaintiff's] ex-boyfriend incorporated into profiles
he created and direct messages with other users" and therefore
seek to hold provider "liable for its failure to combat or
remove offensive third-party content" [emphases added]); Dyroff
v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 

934 F.3d 1093, 1097-1098

 (9th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 

590 U.S. 942

 (2020) (design defect
claim challenging content-neutral algorithm that connected two
users treated platform as publisher where claim sought to hold
platform liable for one user's death from heroin purchased using
information provided by second user); Force, 

934 F.3d at 65

(claim challenging Facebook's content suggestion algorithm
treated Facebook as publisher where terrorist organization
provided all complained-of content that allegedly encouraged
terrorist attacks on plaintiff victims; claim sought to "hold
Facebook liable for 'giving [the terrorist organization] a forum
with which to communicate and for actively bringing [the
organization's] message to interested parties'" via its
recommendation algorithm); Kimzey, 

836 F.3d at 1266

 (plaintiff
could not "plead around the CDA to advance the same basic
argument that the statute plainly bars: that Yelp published
user-generated [defamatory] speech that was harmful to [the
plaintiff]" [emphasis added]); Backpage.com, 

817 F.3d at 19-20

(immunity applied where third-party users provided relevant
information used to ensnare plaintiffs in sex trafficking ring);
Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1103

 (immunity applied where claim faulted
                                                                42



provider for failing to "remov[e] . . . the indecent profiles
that [the plaintiff's] former boyfriend posted" [emphasis
added]); Doe (K.B.) v. Backpage.com, LLC, 

768 F. Supp. 3d 1057

,
1062 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (civil sex trafficking and products
liability claims barred because complaint sought "to hold Meta
responsible based on its role as a publisher of [sex trafficking
related] third-party content that it failed to moderate or
otherwise remove"); Lama v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 

732 F. Supp. 3d 214

, 221 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) ("Although Plaintiff attempts to
argue that his claims are not 'based upon the content of the
vile text messages' posted to Instagram, he promptly shows that
he cannot sustain that argument . . ."); L.W. v. Snap Inc., 

675 F. Supp. 3d 1087

, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2023) ("the alleged flaws in
Snapchat's design, in essence seek to impose liability on [Snap]
based on how well [Snap] has designed its platform to prevent
the posting of third-party content containing child pornography
and to remove that content after it is posted" [quotation and
citation omitted; emphasis added]); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 

217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120

 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff'd, 

881 F.3d 739

(9th Cir. 2018) (provider immune from claims seeking to hold it
"liable for allowing [a terrorist group] to use its network to
spread propaganda and objectionable, destructive content"
[emphasis added]); Doe vs. Snap, Inc., No. H-22-00590, slip op.
at 28 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2022) ("Doe's negligent undertaking,
negligent design, and gross negligence claims all seek to hold
Snap liable for [inappropriate] messages and photos sent by"
teacher to student); Federal Trade Comm'n vs. Match Group, Inc.,
No. 3:19-CV-2281-K, slip op. at 19 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2022)
(immunity applied where "underlying communication created by a
third-party . . . is truly 'the specific harmful material at
issue,' not the automatically generated advertisement sent by"
provider [emphasis added]); V.V. vs. Meta Platforms, Inc., No.
X06-UWY-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2024)
(parents who filed product liability claims against Meta on
behalf of minor child conceded that "harmful content at issue"
–- highly sexualized content, content about self-harm and
disordered eating, unsolicited photographs of male genitalia,
and sexually inappropriate messages –- was provided by third-
party users); In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d at 93-95
(negligence and products liability claims barred because they
sought to hold Facebook liable for serving as intermediary for
injurious messages by sex traffickers).

    28 To be sure, Meta also relies on one Federal District
Court overseeing a multidistrict litigation asserting claims
similar to those asserted by the Commonwealth here. See In re
                                                                    43


    b.    Third-party content requirement.   The next requirement

of § 230(c)(1) immunity is that the relevant "information [was]

provided by another information content provider" (emphasis

added).   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).   For purposes of our present

analysis, it suffices to reaffirm that § 230(c)(1) does not

provide immunity where liability is based on the provider's own

speech.   See Turo, 487 Mass. at 240, quoting Universal

Communication Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 

478 F.3d 413, 419

 (1st

Cir. 2007) ("'an interactive computer service provider remains

liable for its own speech' and for its own unlawful conduct").

    With this understanding of § 230(c)(1), we turn to examine

the Commonwealth's claims to determine whether they seek to

treat Meta as a publisher or speaker by imposing liability based

on the content of the information it publishes, and whether the

source of the information is Meta itself.




Social Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Prods. Liab.
Litig., 

753 F. Supp. 3d 849

, 880-883 (N.D. Cal. 2024)
(addressing consumer protection claims); In re Social Media
Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Prods. Liab. Litig., 

702 F. Supp. 3d 809

, 830-834 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (addressing negligent
design claims). The court did not appear to consider the
common-law origins of publisher liability or the statute's
legislative history. We are not persuaded by its reasoning.
The matter is now pending before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See California vs. Meta
Platforms Inc., U.S. Ct. App., Nos. 24-7032, 24-7037, 24-7265,
24-7300, 24-7304, 24-7312 (9th Cir.) (oral argument held Jan. 6,
2026).
                                                                     44


    c.   Unfair business practices (count I).   The unfair

business practices claim does not seek to hold Meta liable based

on the content of the information Meta publishes and as such

does not meet the content element.   The challenged design

features (e.g., infinite scroll, autoplay, IVR, and ephemeral

content) concern how, whether, and for how long information is

published, but the published information itself is not the

source of the harm alleged.   Instead, the claim alleges that the

features themselves induce compulsive use independent of the

content provided by third-party users.

    Meta contends that the unfair business practices claim

treats it as a publisher of third-party information because, in

the absence of third-party content, the design features could

not facilitate addiction in young users.   But the fact that the

features require some content to function is not controlling;

instead, as discussed supra, to satisfy the content element, we

look to whether the claim seeks to hold Meta liable for harm

stemming from third-party information that it published.     Here,

the unfair business practices claim does not; the Commonwealth

alleges that the features themselves prolong users' time on the

platform, not that any information contained in third-party

posts does so.   In this sense, the claim is indifferent as to
                                                                  45


the content published.29   Consequently, the unfair business

practices claim in count I does not treat Meta as a publisher of

information, and § 230(c)(1) immunity does not apply.30,31

     It is no answer, as Meta emphasizes, that § 230(c)(1)

applies when Meta disseminates "any information provided by

another" (emphasis added).   

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1).   While the




     29Because the features themselves prolong young users' time
on the platform and not any information contained in third-party
posts, we also disagree with Meta that § 230(c)(1) immunity
might preclude any eventual remedy. Indeed, Meta has not shown
that, if it is found liable, any cure would require "changes to
the content posted by the [platform's] users." Internet Brands,

824 F.3d at 851

. See Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 

995 F.3d 1085, 1092

(9th Cir. 2021) (§ 230 immunity did not apply where defendant
"could have satisfied its 'alleged obligation' –- to take
reasonable measures to design a product more useful than it was
foreseeably dangerous –- without altering the content that [the
defendant's] users generate").

     30Moreover, at the least with respect to the notifications
feature, Meta appears to be the information content provider and
thus not entitled to immunity on this additional basis.

     31Relying on Lemmon, 

995 F.3d at 1092-1093

, the
Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court judge correctly
concluded that the unfair business practices claim does not
treat Meta as a publisher because the claim concerns Meta's
conduct as a product designer, rather than as a publisher. In
Lemmon, the challenged design feature was a speed filter and
reward system that encouraged young users to capture footage of
themselves driving at excessive speeds; the feature itself was
dangerous regardless of whether the users posted the resulting
footage on the platform. 

Id. at 1092

. In other words, the
claims did not concern the provider's publishing activity at
all. By contrast, here, the challenged features are publishing
tools that control how Meta publishes content to users of its
platform. Because we rest our decision on the grounds set forth
above, we need not decide whether the claim survives because it
is pled as product design defect.
                                                                   46


quoted language is an additional requirement that must be met

for § 230(c)(1) to apply, Meta must also show that the claim

"treat[s] [it] as the publisher . . . of any information."      Id.

As we explained supra, this phrase requires Meta to show that

the claim (a) makes the defendant liable for intentionally or

negligently publishing information to someone other than the

subject of the information and (b) seeks to impose liability

based on the content of the information published.   Here, Meta

has not shown the latter.

    Contrary to Meta's argument, the fact that a claim concerns

publishing activities, including the use of algorithms in

connection with publishing activities, is not enough to bring

the claim within the immunity provided by § 230(c)(1).    The

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision

in Force is not to the contrary.   There, the court addressed the

plaintiffs' argument that Facebook did not "act as the publisher

of Hamas's content within the meaning of [§] 230(c)(1) because

it uses algorithms to suggest content to users, resulting in

'matchmaking'" (emphasis added).   Force, 

934 F.3d at 65

.    The

focus of the claims at issue was the harm caused by the

published information itself -- namely, the terrorist content

posted by Hamas.   

Id.

   See 

id. at 59

 (describing use of Facebook

to "encourage[] terrorist attacks," "to celebrate these

attacks," "to transmit political messages, and to generally
                                                                  47


support further violence," thus "enabl[ing] Hamas 'to

disseminate its messages directly to its intended audiences'").

Thus, the court did not determine that § 230(c)(1) broadly

protects a provider's algorithm driven editorial decision-making

regardless of whether the claim alleges harm stemming from the

content of the information published; instead, the court

concluded that § 230(c)(1) immunity extended to Facebook's

conduct in specifically publishing Hamas's terrorist messages

and using that content to form connections between users,

including through its algorithms.    Accord YOLO, 

112 F.4th at 1180

 (§ 230[c][1] barred products liability claim challenging

messaging anonymity feature where injury alleged –- teen suicide

and mental health challenges –- stemmed from harassing content

of third-party users' messages); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software

Group, Inc., 

934 F.3d 1093, 1095, 1097-1098

 (9th Cir. 2019),

cert. denied, 

590 U.S. 942

 (2020) (§ 230[c][1] barred claim

challenging content-neutral algorithm that connected decedent

and drug dealer where injury alleged –- decedent's overdose --

stemmed from harmful communications between decedent and drug

dealer concerning sale of heroin).

    d.   Deceptive business practices (count II).    Section

230(c)(1) does not bar the deceptive business practices claim

because it is based on Meta's own speech -- its allegedly false

statements that Instagram is safe and not addictive, and that
                                                                   48


Meta prioritizes young users' well-being, despite internal

reports and communications suggesting awareness of the harmful

effects of Instagram.32   See Turo, 487 Mass. at 245 n.3 ("An

Internet service provider remains liable for its own speech

. . . as Turo does here by creating speech through the language

of this search feature [facilitating unauthorized

transactions]").

     e.   Deceptive and unfair business practices (count III).

Meta argues that § 230(c)(1) bars the deceptive and unfair

business practices claims in count III challenging its age-

gating measures as ineffective because deciding who can access

Meta's services implicates Meta's role as a publisher.   Section

230(c)(1) does not bar the deception claim in count III for the

same reasons that the provision does not bar the deception claim

in count II –- the claim focuses on Meta's own affirmative

misstatements about the inaccessibility of its platform to

underage users.

     The unfair business practices claim in count III focuses on

the ineffective design of Instagram's age-gating mechanism, not




     32Meta contends that the deception challenges are barred
insofar as they would impose liability on Meta for failing to
warn users about the allegedly addictive nature of its design
features or any specific harmful content on Instagram. Meta
misapprehends the Commonwealth's claim. The deception claim in
count II does not concern a failure to warn, and indeed, the
Commonwealth disclaims raising such a claim.
                                                                    49


on the content of any published information; accordingly,

§ 230(c)(1) does not protect Meta.     The Federal District Court

decision in Backpage.com does not support Meta's argument that

claims challenging age-gating features are barred by § 230(c)(1)

regardless of the content published.     See Backpage.com, 768 F.

Supp. 3d at 1064-1065.    In that case, the plaintiff created an

Instagram account and was connected with a third-party user, a

sex trafficker, who then repeatedly sold the plaintiff for sex

on the platform.   Id. at 1060.   The plaintiff sued Meta,

alleging, inter alia, that Meta designed an unreasonably

dangerous product by failing to include identity and age

verification requirements as part of the account setup process.

Id. at 1064.   The court concluded that § 230(c)(1) barred the

claim as the plaintiff's "theory of liability derives from

Meta's alleged failure to include adequate age and identity

verification measures that would prevent the creation of fake

accounts facilitating sex trafficking communications" (emphasis

added).   Id. at 1065.   See id. (§ 230[c][1] immunity applied as

plaintiff's "proposed verification requirements [were] designed

with the particular purpose of limiting . . . the types of

content likely to be posted," i.e., "sex trafficking content").

Accord Doe v. Grindr Inc., 

128 F.4th 1148, 1153

 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 319

 (2025) (§ 230[c][1] barred design

defect claim challenging features that matched adults and
                                                                   50


children for illegal sexual activity because "the defendant

acted as a publisher, and third-party communications caused the

harm to the victim [emphasis added]).    Here, the Commonwealth

asserts that the defective age verification features give rise

to heightened harm to underage users who are particularly

vulnerable to the design features challenged in count I.     The

Commonwealth does not allege harm stemming from the content of

any information published.33

     5.   Conclusion.   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude

that Meta's appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss

insofar as it concerns immunity pursuant to § 230(c)(1) is

properly before us under the doctrine of present execution, and

we affirm the Superior Court's order as it pertains to

§ 230(c)(1).

                                    So ordered.




     33Because we conclude that § 230(c)(1) does not bar counts
I to III, we also conclude that it does not bar the
Commonwealth's public nuisance claim, which is predicated on the
same allegedly unfair and deceptive practices in counts I to
III.