Barnes v. Vanoy

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            

             MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA                            


DONALD BARNES (#385417)                                         CIVIL ACTION 

VERSUS                                            19-764-JWD-RLB          

DARRYL VANOY, ET AL.                                                      


                        RULING                                       

This matter comes before the Court1 on the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 37) 
filed on behalf of defendants Darryl Vannoy, Peter Lollis, John Maples, and Shawn Miller. The 
Motion is opposed. See R. Doc. 38. Additional briefing was submitted by the parties. (R. Docs. 
39, 40, 44).                                                              
The pro se plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), 
Angola, Louisiana, filed this proceeding pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 against defendants 
Vannoy, Lollis, Maples, and Miller complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due 
to the defendants’ failure to protect him from harm by another inmate. He prays for injunctive 
and monetary relief.                                                      
Defendants move for summary judgment relying upon the pleadings, a Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, and certified copies of plaintiff’s pertinent Request for Administrative 
Remedy and the plaintiff’s Enemies List. The plaintiff opposes the Motion relying upon the 
pleadings, his own Declaration, a copy of his Request for Administrative Remedy, 
correspondence dated September 25, 2019, a report authored by Capt. Joseph McNeely, Unusual 
Occurrence Report(s) authored by defendant Lollis and Lt. Michael Howard, and disciplinary 
reports dated February 3, 2019 and April 13, 2019.                        
                Summary Judgment Standard                            
Pursuant to well-established legal principles, summary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317

 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242

 (1986). A party moving for 

summary judgment must inform the Court of the basis for the motion and identify those portions 
of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with 
affidavits, if any, that show that there is no such genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, supra, 

477 U.S. at 323

. If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the 
opposing party must direct the Court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which 
demonstrates that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to a verdict 
in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 248. This burden is not satisfied 
by some metaphysical doubt as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstantiated 
assertions, by conclusory allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air 

Corp., 

37 F.3d 1069, 1075

 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather, Rule 56 mandates that summary judgment be 
entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 

477 U.S. at 323

. Summary judgment is appropriate in any 
case where the evidence is so weak or tenuous on essential facts that the evidence could not 
support a judgment in favor of the non-moving party. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., supra, 

37 F.3d at 1075

. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court may not evaluate 
the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. International 
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 

939 F.2d 1257, 1263

 (5th Cir. 1991).    
                    Plaintiff’s Allegations                          
In his Complaint the plaintiff alleges the following: Inmate Terrence Napoleon was in 
administrative lockdown because he had used a brick to kill another inmate. Napoleon informed 
defendants Lollis, Maples, and Miller, as well as Capt. Ashley, that “if you put ‘anyone’ in this 
cell they be carrying him out on a stretcher.”                            

Sometime between April 1, 2019, and April 11, 2019, inmate Robert Galfreth was placed 
in a cell near Napoleon in administrative lockdown. Galfreth’s neck and face were slashed with a 
piece of glass. Galfreth was the second inmate to be attacked in administrative lockdown within 
a two-week period.                                                        
On April 13, 2019, the plaintiff was written up for a work offense and was escorted to 
administrative lockdown. Defendant Miller ordered the plaintiff to stop in front of Napoleon’s 
cell. The plaintiff was then ordered to enter the cell. Napoleon continued to threaten harm and 
was enraged when he was ignored by security. Two nights later, Napoleon attacked the plaintiff 
while he was sleeping. The plaintiff’s throat was split from one side to the other. The next day, a 

security officer told the plaintiff, “sorry that had to happen to you, but we had to put you 
somewhere, even if its in the cell with someone like Napoleon.”           
                    Qualified Immunity                               
In response to the plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants assert that they are entitled to 
qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiff’s claims. The qualified immunity defense is a 
familiar one and, employing a two-step process, operates to protect public officials who are 
performing discretionary tasks. Huff v. Crites, 473 F. App’x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). As enunciated 
in Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194

 (2001), the first step in the analysis is to consider whether, 
taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct 
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 201. Second, the district court looks to whether 
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition. Id. The 
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established 
is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful in 
the situation which he confronted. Id.                                    
Undertaking the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion 

should be granted, in part and denied in part. Defendants Vannoy, Lollis, and Maples are entitled 
to summary judgment.                                                      
             Personal Involvement/Failure to Protect                 
For a prison official to be found liable under § 1983, the official must have been 
personally and directly involved in conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's 
constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of the official and 
the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 

718 F.2d 756, 768

 (5th Cir. 
1983). Any allegation that the defendant is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or 
co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone 

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 676

 (2009), citing 
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 

436 U.S. 658, 691

 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 
356 F. App’x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held 
liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). 
Further, in the absence of direct personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged 
constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional 
rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative 
wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially 
imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 

718 F.2d at 768

.            
Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a prisoner has a 
inmates. Johnston v. Lucas, 

786 F.2d 1254, 1259

 (5th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Diamond, 

636 F.2d 1364, 1373

 (5th Cir. 1981). Specifically, prison officials “have a duty ... to protect prisoners from 
violence at the hands of other inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832

 (1994). 
“Deliberate indifference” is the appropriate standard to be applied in this context, and this term 
has been defined as including an element of “subjective recklessness” as used in the criminal 

law. 

Id. at 837

. A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with 
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety only if he knows that the inmate faces a 
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to 
abate it. 

Id. at 847

. The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference. 

Id. at 837

.  
In the instant matter the plaintiff has alleged personal involvement on the part of only one 
defendant – Shawn Miller. Miller had knowledge that inmate Napoleon had recently killed 
another inmate, had been informed of Napoleon’s threat to harm anyone placed in his cell, was 
directly informed by Napoleon himself that he would harm the plaintiff, and witnessed Napoleon 

become visibly irritated when his threats were ignored. Despite the foregoing, defendant Miller 
still forced the plaintiff into the cell with Napoleon resulting in the plaintiff’s neck being slashed 
by Napoleon. As such, defendant Miller was aware of a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff, 
disregarded the risk, and failed to take reasonable steps to abate it.    
                    Supervisory Liability                            
With regards to the plaintiff’s allegations of a lack of a policy, as noted by the Court in 
Crittindon, supervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt policies if 
that failure causally results in a constitutional injury. Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 

37 F.4th 177

, 186 
(5th Cir. 2022). Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act, with “deliberate 
indifference,” a “disregard [for] a known or obvious consequence of [their] action[s].” Plaintiffs 
to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations. This typically requires showing notice 
of “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations” due to deficient policies, permitting the 
inference that Defendants deliberately chose policies causing violations of constitutional rights. 

Id.

                                                                       
In the instant matter the plaintiff has not alleged a pattern of similar constitutional 

violations due to deficient policies. The plaintiff has identified only one other attack in the area 
in which he was housed. As such, the plaintiff fails to assert a viable failure to adopt policies 
claim and summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants Vannoy, Lollis, and 
Maples. Accordingly,                                                      
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 37) be GRANTED 
IN PART, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Darryl Vannoy, Peter Lollis, and 
John Maples. As to Shawn Miller, the motion is DENIED.                    
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge 
for further proceedings herein.                                           

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 11, 2024.               



                           S                                         

                     JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES                       
                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                    
                     MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA