WRIGHT v. THREAD EXPERIMENT, LLC

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA                            
                      INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION                               

DEMIELI WRIGHT,                    )                                       
                                  )                                       
                  Plaintiff,      )                                       
                                  )                                       
                v.                )    No. 1:19-cv-01423-SEB-TAB          
                                  )                                       
THREAD EXPERIMENT, LLC Default Entered  )                                  
7/16/2019,                         )                                       
                                  )                                       
                  Defendant.      )                                       

          ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT                      

     Plaintiff Demieli Wright initiated this action against Defendant Thread 
Experiment, LLC on April 19, 2019, alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 

42 U.S.C. § 12181

, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 

28 CFR § 36.302

 et seq. Defendant filed no answer to the Complaint or other responsive 
pleading nor defended this action in any way. A Clerk's default was entered against 
Defendant on July 16, 2019. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Default for 
Judgment [Dkt. 10] against Defendant.1 For the reasons detailed below, this motion is 
granted in part and denied in part.                                       
                   Facts Established by the Complaint                     
     Plaintiff Demieli Wright is legally blind. Because of his blindness, Plaintiff 
utilizes a screen reading program known as "JAWS" to access the internet. In simplest 

1 Plaintiff appears to have inadvertently filed this motion twice. Accordingly, the second motion 
for default judgment [Dkt. 13] is denied as moot.                         
terms, JAWS "takes visual content and reads the content for the user" so that its users 
may navigate the internet. [Comp. ¶¶ 2, 3].                               

    Defendant Thread Experiment "is the first ever brand of home bedding dedicated 
to men."2 In the operation of its retail business, Defendant owns and manages the website 
"www.threadexperiment.com." Defendant uses its website to market bedding designed 
specifically for men. Through the website, consumers may research Defendant's bedding 
options, learn about bedding basics (for example, the distinctions between thread counts 
and fabric types), and purchase products. The website also serves as a platform to contact 

costumer service, to review Defendant's privacy policy, and to watch video 
demonstrations of various ways to make a bed.                             
    Unfortunately, Defendant's website is incompatible with most screen reader 
programs, and thus individuals who are blind or vision impaired cannot access 
www.threadexperiment.com. Indeed, though JAWS is the most widely used screen 

reading technology on the market, Plaintiff was unable to access or navigate Defendant's 
website using this program. When he attempted to do so, he was confronted with multiple 
barriers that rendered the website largely unusable, including product pages that were 
completely inaccessible as well as links and pop ups that could not be detected by JAWS 
or otherwise navigated by him.                                            

    Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 9, 2019, seeking to hold Defendant liable for 
violating Title III of the ADA. A Clerk's default was entered against Defendant on July 


2 ABOUT THREAD EXPERIMENT, https://threadexperiment.com/pages/educate.    
16, 2019, based on its failure to answer the Complaint or otherwise defend this action. 
Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant.  

                          Legal analysis                                 
I.   Liability                                                            
    As noted above, an entry of default was entered against Defendant on July 16, 
2019. Plaintiff now seeks default judgment against Defendant, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 55(b). "As a general rule, a default judgment establishes, as a matter 
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff for each cause of action alleged in the 

complaint." O'Brien v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., Inc., 

998 F.2d 1394, 1404

 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted). "Upon default, the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint relating to 
liability are taken as true." Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete, 

722 F. 3d 1319, 1323

 (7th Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, an entry of default judgment is only appropriate 
if these allegations, along with the other evidence submitted, establish a cognizable claim 

for relief. Mortland v. Lights Out Developments, LLC, 

2020 WL 3577867

, at *1 (S.D. 
Ind. July 1, 2020); Franko v. All About Travel Inc., 

2014 WL 2803987

, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 
June 19, 2014) ("Default judgment is appropriate only if the well-pleaded allegations of 
the complaint are sufficient to establish a legal claim.").               
    Here, we find that the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to state a 

cognizable claim for relief under Title III of the ADA.                   
    The ADA's "sweeping purpose" is to "remedy widespread discrimination against 
disabled individuals." PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 

532 U.S. 661

, 674–75, 

121 S. Ct. 1879

, 

149 L.Ed.2d 904

 (2001). It "prohibits discrimination based on disability in major areas of 
public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and 
public accommodations (Title III)." Access Living of Metro. Chicago v. Uber Techs., Inc., 

958 F.3d 604, 607

 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Title III provides that:  
    No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
    and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
    accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
    leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.  

    

42 U.S. Code § 12182

(1). Title III identifies various private entities that are 
considered "public accommodations," including places of lodging, restaurants, places of 
entertainment, and clothing stores or shopping centers. 

42 U.S. Code § 12181

(7).  
    Though the issue of whether websites fall within the statutory purview of Title III 
appears to be a relatively novel question of law, we are not without some guidance 
confirming that websites such as www.threadexperiment.com are bound by this statute. 
For example, in 2018, Department of Justice ("DOJ") Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen E. Boyd affirmed in a letter to members of Congress the DOJ's position that Title 
III applies to websites operated by private entities qualifying as "public 
accommodations." He wrote:                                                
    The Department first articulated its interpretation that ADA applies to public 
    accommodations' websites over 20 years ago. This interpretation is consistent with 
    the ADA's title III  requirement that goods, services, privileges, or activities 
    provided by places of public accommodation be equally accessible to people with 
    disabilities.3                                                       


3 Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice, to 
Congressman Ted Budd (Sept. 25, 2018) (accessible at https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/121/2018/10/DOJ-letter-to-congress.pdf) (hereinafter, "DOJ Letter to 
Congress").                                                               
    Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet specifically addressed whether 
commercial websites must comport with the accessibility requirements of Title III, there 

is nonetheless significant momentum from district courts across the nation supporting an 
interpretation of the ADA which mandates such compliance, regardless of whether the 
website is associated with any physical store. See, e.g.,Gathers v. 1-800-Flowers.com, 
Inc., 

2018 WL 839381

, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2018) (holding that Plaintiff stated valid 
claim for relief by alleging that defendant's website was inaccessible to him as blind 
person); Gniewkowski v. Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc, 

251 F. Supp. 3d 908, 915

 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (same); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 

268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 396

 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that retailer's website was  a "place of public 
accommodation" and noting that "[t]oday, internet technology enables individuals to 
participate actively in their community and engage in commerce from the comfort and 
convenience of their home. It would be a cruel irony to adopt the interpretation of the 

ADA espoused by [defendant.]"); Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc., 

2017 WL 6547902

, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) (adopting approach of modern case law "that commercial 
websites qualify as 'public accommodations' within the meaning of the ADA, such that 
the ADA's protections extend to blind persons who claim discriminatory access to such 
websites."); Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 

97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 575

 (D. Vt. 2015) 

(holding that a website must comply with the ADA if it falls within any of the general 
categories of public accommodations listed in the ADA); see also Laufer v. Lilly Pond 
LLC Series, 

2020 WL 7768011

, AT *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30, 2020).             
    In issuing these decisions, several of these courts relied on Seventh Circuit 
precedents holding that the ADA is not limited to physical spaces. In Doe v Omaha Ins. 

Co., for example, insured individuals brought suit against their insurer, arguing that an 
AIDs cap in the insurer's health insurance policies violated Title III of the ADA. Though 
the Seventh Circuit ultimately found that the ADA had not been violated, it nonetheless 
recognized that Title III "is not limited to physical products, but includes contracts and 
other intangibles, such as an insurance policy." The Court explained:     

    Title III of the Act, in section 302(a), provides that "no individual shall be 
    discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of 
    the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
    place of public accommodation" by the owner, lessee, or operator of such a place. 
    

42 U.S.C. § 12182

(a). The core meaning of this provision, plainly enough, is that 
    the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel agency, 
    theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic 
    space) . . .  that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from 
    entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the 
    nondisabled do.                                                      

    

179 F.3d 557

, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that ADA regulated sale, but not 
content, of insurance policies).                                          
    Two years later, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that "public accommodation" 
should not be interpreted "literally, as denoting a physical site." Morgan v. Joint Admin. 
Bd., Ret. Plan of Pillsbury Co. & Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO-CLC, 

268 F.3d 456, 459

, 

2001 WL 1205383

 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The site of the sale is irrelevant to 
Congress's goal of granting the disabled equal access to sellers of goods and services. 
What matters is that the good or service be offered to the public.").     
    District courts have relied, in part, on this guidance from the Seventh Circuit in 
interpreting the ADA within the context of addressing the novel question of law before 

us. Andrews, 

268 F. Supp. 3d at 381

; Del-Ordon, 

2017 WL 6547902

, at *7; Scribd Inc., 
57 F. Supp. 3d at 570. We do the same here and, consistent with the Seventh Circuit's 
directives that "places of public accommodations" are not limited to physical spaces, join 
the growing number of courts to hold that Title III of the ADA governs websites that 
otherwise satisfy the statutory definition of "places of public accommodation" under 

42 U.S. Code § 12181

(7).                                                     

    We further find that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of Title III of ADA 
by alleging facts that, when taken as true, establish that Defendant is a private entity that 
owns and operates a place of public accommodation, that is, the retail sales website 
www.threadexperiment.com, and that Plaintiff was deprived of equal enjoyment of the 
goods and services provided through www.threadexperiment.com because of Defendant's 

failure to ensure that its website is accessible to individuals with vision impairments. See 

42 U.S.C. § 12181

(7)(E) ("public accommodations" includes private clothing stores, 
shopping centers, and other sales establishments); Andrews, 

268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 396

 
(concluding that retailer's website was  a "place of public accommodation"); Nat'l Fed'n 
of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 

97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 575

 (D. Vt. 2015) (holding that a retail 

website falls into one of the "public accommodation" categories is bound by Title III). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is granted.          
II.  Relief                                                               
    Plaintiff does not seek damages relating to his ADA claims. In fact, he is 

foreclosed from doing so given that plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA may 
obtain only injunctive relief, not money damages. 42 U.S.C  § 12188(a)(2) (providing 
that violations are Title III are to be remedied through injunctions); Mortland , 

2020 WL 3577867

, at *2 (citing Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 

703 F.3d 1069, 1075

 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that “damages are not available under Title III"). Additionally, injunctions 
commonly issue as part of default judgments. Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Johnson, 

441 F.Supp.2d 963, 965

 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Kakvand, 

192 F.3d 656

 (7th 
Cir. 1999)); see also Mortland, 

2020 WL 3577867

, at *2 (issuing permanent injunction as 
component of default judgment in ADA case).                               
    To demonstrate that injunctive relief is appropriate, Plaintiff must show that: (1) 
he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are 

insufficient to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 

917 F.3d 933, 944

 (7th Cir. 2019) cert. denied, 

140 S. Ct. 58

, 

205 L. Ed. 2d 44

 
(2019) (noting that a court is generally required to conduct the traditional balancing of 

equities even though injunctive relief is the only available remedy prescribed by statute). 
    As previously established, Plaintiff's allegations show that he suffered an injury in 
that he was subjected to discrimination because Defendant's website is not in compliance 
with the ADA and thus not accessible to him and others with vision impairments. 
Without a monetary remedy available, no recourse is available to Plaintiff absent the 
entry of an injunction, and thus his injury irreparable. See LAJIM, 

917 F.3d at 945

 

(“[A]bsent a permanent injunction, a prevailing [Resource Conservation Recovery Act] 
plaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by definition, irreparable absent an 
injunction.”).  Additionally, Plaintiff will suffer a continued hardship absent an injunction 
in that he will be unable to participate as a consumer by accessing Defendant's website. 
    At the same time, we discern no hardship, beyond incurring certain costs 
necessary to bring www.threadexperiment.com into compliance with the ADA, that will 

be suffered by Defendant. Finally, "the public has a strong interest in eliminating 
discrimination and in enforcing the ADA[.]" Mortland, 

2020 WL 3577867

, at *2 (internal 
quotations omitted); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 

532 U.S. 661, 675

 (2001) (noting 
that, in enacting the ADA, "Congress concluded that there was a 'compelling need' for a 
'clear and comprehensive national mandate' to eliminate discrimination against disabled 

individuals, and to integrate them 'into the economic and social mainstream of American 
life.'") (citing the legislative history of the ADA)). Based on all of these factors, we find 
permanent injunctive relief to be appropriate.                            
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the scope and content of permanent 
injunctions. This rule mandates that every order granting an injunction must: "(A) state 

the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable 
detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts 
restrained or required." FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). While an injunction must state its terms 
specifically, it must also "be broad enough to be effective, and the appropriate scope of 
the injunction is left to the district court's sound discretion." Russian Media Group, LLC 
v. Cable Am., Inc., 

598 F.3d 302, 307

 (7th Cir. 2010).                    

    We have already outlined our reasons for granting injunctive relief, to wit, to 
ensure that Defendant takes the necessary steps to ensure that its website complies with 
Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations. In furtherance of this purpose, 
Defendant is hereby ordered to modify its website, www.threadexperiment.com, to 
ensure that it is in full compliance with these ADA statutory and regulatory requirements. 
The full terms of this injunction are set forth in a separate, permanent injunction.4  

Defendant shall have 90 days from the date of this Order and the issuance of the 
Permanent Injunction to fulfill the requirements therein imposed. Defendant is further 



4 In its Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff requests that we order Defendant to comply with 
"Version 2.0 of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines." We deny this request for two 
reasons. First, Plaintiff did not include this request in its Complaint, and we cannot grant broader 
relief in a default judgment than that which was included in the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). 
Additionally, the DOJ has declined to adopt these guidelines as a legal standard for evaluating 
accessibility. See DOJ Letter to Congress. We also deny Plaintiff's request that we issue an order 
authorizing Plaintiff to monitor Defendant's compliance with the permanent injunction for a 
period of up to two years and to recover any costs incurred as a result of this monitoring, given 
that no explanation as to why such monitoring is necessary has been provided. Our court retains 
contempt power over Defendant if it does not comply with the Permanent Injunction for the 
duration of the injunction's existence, that is, forever, unless and until it is dissolved. Plaintiff 
may seek to enforce the injunction through contempt or supplementary proceedings, but we deny 
the invitation to expressly authorize and compensate Plaintiff's monitoring. Additionally, we will 
not grant Plaintiff's request that Defendant employ ADA compliance expert "ADASure" to assist 
with the modifications to its website and to periodically audit Defendant's website for a duration 
of two years, nor will we order Defendant to take certain actions beyond improving the 
accessibility of its website, for example, training "no fewer than three" personnel to assist 
customers with disabilities in utilizing the website. As outlined in our Permanent Injunction, 
Defendant is required to ensure that its website complies with the ADA; however, we will not 
mandate that it utilize Plaintiff's chosen expert in this task, nor will we order Defendant to do 
more than what is required by the ADA.                                    
ordered to file a Notice of Compliance reporting on its efforts to fully comply with the 
Permanent Injunction within 90 days from the date of this Order.          

III.  Attorney's Fees and Costs                                           
    The ADA allows the Court, in its discretion, to award a reasonable attorney's fee, 
including litigation expenses and costs, to the prevailing party. 

42 U.S.C. § 12205

. 
Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may file a petition for costs and fees, no later than thirty 
days from the date of this Order.                                         

                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Plaintiff's Motion for Default, [Dkt 10], is granted in part and denied in part. It 
is denied with regard to Defendant's required compliance with the Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines, Plaintiff's authorization to monitor Defendant's compliance with 
the Permanent Injunction and costs for such monitoring, Defendant's retention of 
ADASure, and Defendant's modifications to its website and business practices that go 

above and beyond compliance with the ADA.                                 
    Plaintiff's motion is granted in all other respects. Defendant is ordered and 
permanently enjoined from operating, utilizing, or maintaining its website unless and 
until it is full compliance with Title III of the ADA, 

42 U.S.C. § 12181

 et seq., and its 
accompanying regulations, 

28 CFR § 36.302

 et seq., which must be accomplished no 

later than 90 days from the date of this Order. A failure to achieve full compliance within 
90 days will result in a permanent shutdown of the offending website.     
      The specific scope of the injunction is set forth in a separate, accompanying order. 
No later than 90 days from the date of this Order, Defendant is ordered to file a Notice of 
Compliance with the Court reporting on its compliance with the Permanent Injunction. 
      Plaintiff's second Motion for Default Judgment [Dkt. 13] is denied as moot. Final 
judgment shall issue accordingly. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may file a petition for 
costs and fees, no later than thirty days from the date of this Order. 
      IT IS SO ORDERED. 

     Date:       1/22/2021                  Sud  Bus  Bink    
                                          SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE 
                                          United States District Court 
                                          Southern District of Indiana 

Distribution: 
Noah Cartwright Thomas 
CHAPMAN LAW LLC 
noah @chapmanlaw.com 

                                      12