People v. Hollis

JUSTICE APPLETON,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the disposition reached by the majority and would find the courts of Illinois were, at the inception of this cause, completely devoid of either subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.

D.S. was born in Indiana, and the case before us concerns only the first 24 hours of his life. At his birth in Crawfordsville, Indiana, and for the length of his life until he was placed into the custody of DCFS, he had never lived in the State of Illinois. His only state of residence was Indiana. The majority cannot use the general language quoted from section 2—1 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2—1 (West 2002)) to avail this state of jurisdiction. To use that language in such a way would, for instance, give the Vermilion County circuit court jurisdiction over the children of California in the event DCFS considers one or more of them to be abused, neglected, or dependent. To so hold would be absurd and contrary to our federal system of government. Simply put, the Illinois legislature has no authority to subject the children of another state to its laws. Nor may safe harbor be found in section 201 of the Act (750 ILCS 36/201 (West Supp. 2003)). D.S. had a home state at his birth — the State of Indiana. It was the only state in which he had ever resided. This determination is buttressed by the definitions found in this same Uniform Act:

“In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term [‘home state’] means the state in which the child lived from birth with [a parent].” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West Supp. 2003).

Here, the child lived for 24 hours with his mother in Indiana.