Opinion · Illinois Supreme Court
People v. Coleman
996 N.E.2d 617
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Illinois Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Illinois
- Date
- 2013-10-03
- Topic
- litigation
holding that although the Supreme Court has not clarified whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is 18 USCA4 Appeal: 21-278 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/21/2023 Pg: 19 of 32 the text to require a constitutional violation separate from the claim of innocence, characterize § 2244(b)(2 | explaining that to succeed on a claim of actual innocence the petitioner must present evidence that, “when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result [on retrial]” | "Weighed against the State's evidence, the defendant's new evidence is conclusive enough that another trier of fact would probably reach a different result." | “Weighed against the State’s evidence, the defendant’s new evidence is conclusive enough that another trier of fact would probably reach a different result.”
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- Cited by
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2013 IL 113307
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 113307)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 3, 2013.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The central issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court of
Peoria County’s decision to deny relief to defendant Christopher
Coleman following an evidentiary hearing on his second successive
postconviction petition, which raised a claim of actual innocence, was
manifestly erroneous. In resolving that issue, we also must address
whether People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475
(1996), which
announced the standard in Illinois for evaluating postconviction
claims of actual innocence, should be discarded in favor of a more
rigorous standard with roots in federal law.
¶2 Today, we reaffirm our holding in Washington, and reverse the
judgments of the circuit court and the appellate court (2011 IL App (3d) 100419-U
) and remand for a new trial.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 22, 1994, several men entered a house in Peoria,
where Bertha Miller lived with her two daughters, Tequilla and
Tekelia, and her two sisters, Myre Lott and Angela Stimage. The men
demanded money, then threatened and beat the occupants of the
house. Two of the men took Tekelia into a bathroom, and one of them
sexually assaulted her. She was 17 years old. When the police arrived,
some of the men escaped. James Coats, Tekelia’s assailant, and
Robert Nixon were arrested at the house. At the police station that
night, Tequilla saw Nixon and the defendant, who had been arrested
at his girlfriend’s nearby apartment in connection with the attack,
walking with police officers. Tequilla subsequently identified the
defendant in a photo array and a lineup as one of the men. He was
indicted for armed robbery, aggravated criminal sexual assault, home
invasion, and residential burglary. Several months later, the defendant
was tried before a jury.
¶5 Because our decision ultimately rests on the evidence presented
at the defendant’s trial and his postconviction evidentiary hearing, a
thorough review of the record is necessary.
¶6 The State’s case consisted of testimony from several of the
victims, as well as two police officers and a 13-year-old named
Anthony Brooks.
¶7 At trial, the State called 10 witnesses, and offered stipulations
from 4 other witnesses.
¶8 Lott testified that there were six men wearing bandanas and a boy
in the house during the attack. Though Lott described what happened
throughout the house, she was in the living room with her head
wrapped in a blanket for most of that time. Her account was based
largely on what she heard for approximately two hours. She only saw
the face of one of the men, whom she did not recognize, and she did
not identify any of them.
¶9 Tequilla testified that on the night of the attack she was sleeping
in her bedroom when she heard a noise. She awoke and ran to the
living room, where she saw seven men, six of whom had guns,
standing over Lott. The men pointed a gun at Tequilla, frisked her,
and threw her to the floor, where they attempted unsuccessfully to put
a leather couch pillow over her head. They wore dark clothes and
bandanas, so Tequilla could see only their eyes. According to
Tequilla, the men ordered her to lie still on the floor, then started
beating her and Lott and demanding money. A tall man came into the
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living room, grabbed Tequilla by the hair, threatened to harm her if
Lott did not give the men money, and cut Lott’s leg. Tequilla stated
the men kicked Lott in the face and pushed Tequilla back to the floor,
where “a little boy” tripped over her on his way to run outside to
serve as “a watch-out.” The boy announced that he was tired of
waiting outside, and that he did not see anyone coming.
¶ 10 Tequilla testified that two of the men took the bandanas off their
faces. She did not recognize “the kind of light skin one” because she
did not know him, but she recognized “the dark skin one” as “Fats”
because her family had grown up with him over a five- or six-year
period. Tequilla stated that she saw his face for a “good three
minutes.” In court, she identified this man as the defendant.
¶ 11 Tequilla testified that the boy returned to the house and said “5-
o,” meaning the police were coming to the house. The light-skinned
man and the dark-skinned man, the defendant, fled together out the
front door. The remaining five men locked the door and ordered the
victims to go upstairs to Stimage’s bedroom. Tequilla sensed the
police were inside the house when the men began to hide their guns
by wrapping them in Stimage’s clothes. Prior to the police entering
the house, two of the men jumped out the upstairs window, and “[t]he
other one was trying to get into the closet,” then “some of them” tried
to jump out again, but “didn’t get to.”
¶ 12 Tequilla further testified that she did not know whether Fats had
a gun on the night of the attack because she was looking at his face.
He was telling the other men what to do, and when he asked them to
hurry and get the money, they beat the victims. Tequilla stated that on
the day after the attack, she went to the police station, where Peoria
Police Detective Rabe showed her “a whole bunch,” more than a
hundred, of photographs of possible suspects. From the photographs
she picked out “[e]veryone that was there,” including Fats. Later,
Tequilla viewed a line-up of African-American men. From the line-up
she picked out “[t]he ones that were there that night that I picked out
in the photo[s],” including Fats. Tequilla stated that she picked him
out “because his face stood out from the other ones.” His face stood
out because she remembered it; she remembered it because she knew
him.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Tequilla testified that the attack lasted
approximately 30 minutes. She confirmed that there were seven men,
who were all wearing bandanas. When she came into the living room,
it was ransacked. According to Tequilla, Lott and two family friends
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were lying on their chests on the floor, but their heads were not
wrapped in blankets. Six of the men were standing, and one was
sitting, while the boy repeatedly exited and entered the front door.
Tequilla stated that once the boy yelled “5-o,” he and two men ran out
the front door. After that, when the police knocked on the door, five
men remained in the house. Tequilla explained that she did not count
the boy among the men. But later she stated that during the attack, “It
was six dudes left in the house, and one went outside, which he was
a little boy.”
¶ 14 Tequilla testified that only two of the men removed their
bandanas, and only for three minutes, then they left. Tequilla stated
that Fats, the defendant, stayed in the living room chair “most of the
time” during the attack. He only removed his bandana when he was
in the living room. According to Tequilla, Miller was not in the living
room during the attack. Defense counsel asked Tequilla how she
could have picked out all of the men if only two had removed their
bandanas, and she stated that the two men who fled out the front door
had removed their bandanas in the living room, but the remaining
men did so upstairs.
¶ 15 Tequilla testified that at the police station she did not disclose she
had seen the faces of two of the men. She stated that several weeks
after the attack she testified before the grand jury, where she was
asked if she recognized any of the men, and answered that she
recognized one of them, Nixon. According to Tequilla, she did not
give the grand jury the defendant’s name “because I didn’t remember
until then—until now, I mean.” She “just forgot” his name. Tequilla
acknowledged that she picked out Elbert Nickerson in the
photographs and the line-up at the police station, and told the police
that he was one of the men. Tequilla insisted that she mentioned to
police at the line-up that she was unsure about whether Nickerson
was one of the men. Looking at the photographs again on the day
before trial, she said that Nickerson was not one of the men “because
he looked different from it personally face-to-face.”
¶ 16 Tequilla testified that she identified six of the men in the line-up,
including the defendant, Nickerson, and Mark Roberson. According
to Tequilla, the police told her that in the line-ups they had
“volunteers, and then there were people that I named out that were in
the line-up.” When asked whether it was easy for her to pick out
suspects from the line-up because she had already seen their photos,
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Tequilla answered, “Yes, it was, because, hey, this, people have a
look similar to what the people in the picture.”
¶ 17 Defense counsel turned his questioning to the boy and asked
whether the boy wore a bandana. Tequilla stated that she got “a real
good look” at him when he tripped over her, but she could not
determine whether he had a bandana over his face, even though he
was a few inches away from her. She was lying down, and her eyes
were looking at his eyes. Tequilla testified that she could look at the
defendant’s face without the bandana from the floor, and she saw it
again when she was pulled off the floor to go upstairs. At that point,
she “got to see him before he left because he was sitting in the chair
still.”
¶ 18 On redirect examination, Tequilla testified that she was positive
that the man in the chair was the defendant, and that she had seen his
whole face. She did not tell the grand jury the defendant’s nickname
because she did not know his name. She also did not tell the police
the defendant’s nickname. Tequilla stated that she picked out
Nickerson in the line-up, even though she was unsure he was one of
the men, “[b]ecause him and the dude look similar to each other.” She
picked out the defendant because she was positive that his face was
the face she saw on the night of the attack.
¶ 19 Detrice Friend, Tekelia’s boyfriend who was at Miller’s house
during the attack, and Edward Gaffney, a Peoria police department
officer who responded to a call about the attack, testified. Neither
identified the defendant.
¶ 20 Miller testified that on the night of the attack she was asleep in
her bed, when one of her daughters shook her and said they were
being robbed. Miller awoke to see a gun in her daughter’s mouth.
According to Miller, she followed the directions of the men and
handed them her purse. She stated that she gave it to the defendant.
The State asked Miller about him.
“Q. And as you sit here today, how do you know
Christopher Coleman?
A. Because I know his voice, and I know how he walk.
Q. What is distinctive about his walk?
A. Walk kind of crooked like. He doesn’t walk like a
regular walk.
Q. And what about his voice was familiar to you?
-5-
A. I know his voice. He done growed up, but I know his
voice from being a kid.
Q. How do you know him from being a kid?
A. I used to run around the street with his mom when we
was younger. He was, he at my house and what happened.
Q. So how long have you known Christopher Coleman?
A. About 19 or 20 years.”
¶ 21 Miller gave the men her purse because they had threatened to kill
her daughter. The men asked her for more money, and she said that
Lott had it. The men thought Miller was lying, so they flipped her
mattress and found more money. According to Miller, the men started
beating her, struck her head, and put a knife to her back. They
threatened to hurt her daughters if she did not give them all of her
money. Miller suggested that the man get a job, and he smashed a
vase on her head. Miller testified that she pleaded for the men to
leave, but they insisted that they expected to find $1,500 in the house.
The men then repeatedly beat and kicked Miller, while she had a foot
in her back and a gun in her face. She heard crying, as the men took
Tekelia into the bathroom and raped her.
¶ 22 Miller testified that there were six or seven men in the house
when the police arrived. The police called for her and said they would
not leave until they spoke with her. She told them that she could not
get up because she was under her mattress. The police eventually
helped her to her feet, and she ran to the back door with Tekelia,
whom the men had released to stop the police from coming through
that door. The police ordered Miller and Tekelia to take cover behind
a truck sitting in the yard. Miller saw two men jump from the
window, and she screamed to tell the police. Those two men escaped,
but a third man who jumped from the window was apprehended.
According to Miller, the third man was Coats. The police
apprehended Nixon inside the house.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Miller testified that during the attack she
did not leave her bedroom until she ran to the back door. Miller stated
that the men had scarves over their faces and hats on their heads. Two
or three of the men stayed in her room at all times during the attack.
She could not recall “how many hours” the attack lasted, but she
knew it was a long time.
¶ 24 Miller stated that she knew the defendant “real well” from his
walk. She did not see his face, or any of the men’s faces, until she
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saw Nixon’s face after he was apprehended and brought out of the
house by the police. During the attack the defendant was standing in
her bedroom doorway while other men beat and kicked her. He took
her purse and ordered one of the men to hit her with the vase. Miller
insisted to defense counsel that the defendant was one of the men:
“You understand me, *** he was there. Do you understand what I am
saying? I know him. Can nobody doubt me that I would know him.
Thank you, sir. I know that he was there.” She added:
“I know that from his voice, and I know that from his walk.
I was not blind. *** I know his voice from being an
individual; I know his voice from being an adult, too. I seen
Chris Coleman a lot of time. I don’t associate with him
because I have no right. He’s a kid to me, but I know Chris
Coleman.”
¶ 25 Miller testified that she did not give the police details about the
men because she was “shook up” after the attack, and she did not give
the police the defendant’s name because they did not ask her in detail
about him. She would have told the police more if they had asked her
more questions. On re-cross-examination, defense counsel asked
Miller if, when questioned before the grand jury about the identity of
the men, she remembered saying, “I know Chris Coleman from a little
kid, but I didn’t know at the time that was him.” She stated that she
might have given that answer.
¶ 26 Tekelia testified that she did not know how many men were in the
house during the attack, but mentioned that a boy was with them. She
stated that one of the men smashed a vase over her mother’s head,
then forced her into the bathroom, where another man sexually
assaulted her. She identified that man as Coats, but she did not
identify any of the other men.
¶ 27 Stimage testified that she was upstairs when the attack began, and
that it lasted for approximately one hour. She saw the faces of four of
the men, including a light-skinned man, who threw her into a wall
and caused her to lose consciousness for several seconds. Like Lott,
Stimage did not identify any of the men.
¶ 28 Peoria police department Officer Walter Jatkowski testified that
he processed the inside of the house for evidence on the night of the
attack. According to Officer Jatkowski, fingerprint and palm prints
that he lifted from the floor of the bathroom indicated Coats was the
man who sexually assaulted Tekelia. On cross-examination by
defense counsel, Officer Jatkowski stated that none of the fingerprints
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he lifted from the house matched the defendant. On redirect
examination, Officer Jatkowski explained, “I don’t have fingerprints
that match up to Chris Coleman. I can’t put him at the scene, but I am
not eliminating him from being at the scene, just physical evidence,
there’s nothing that shows.”
¶ 29 The State offered stipulations from two nurses and a doctor at
Methodist Hospital in Peoria, as well as a forensic scientist at the
Morton Crime Lab, who would have testified regarding the sexual
assault on Tekelia. None of these witnesses would have testified
regarding the defendant.
¶ 30 Anthony Brooks testified that he was 13 years old and was on
juvenile probation for the home invasion of Miller’s house.
According to Brooks, he went to the house on the night of the attack
with “Bug,” Nixon, and “light skin” Fats. Brooks stated that there was
another Fats. He also stated that the Fats who was at Miller’s house
was not in the courtroom, but that Fats, “the light skin one, kind of
chubby,” was in a holding cell at the courthouse that morning.
¶ 31 Brooks testified that he was interviewed by Detective Pat Rabe of
the Peoria police department on the day of the attack.
“Q. At that time, did you or did you not tell Detective Pat
Rabe that Christopher Coleman was with you on the morning
of August 22, 1994?
A. There was two Fats on that day when he showed me.
Q. Pardon me?
A. They had two dudes. Both of them name was Fats on
that paper, a light skin one and a dark skin one.
Q. Which Fats did you tell him that was with you on the
morning of August 22, 1994?
A. Told both of them.
Q. Both of them. Well, who is the dark skin Fats that you
told Officer Rabe that was with you?
A. But it was the light skin one.
Q. Are you saying you told Officer Rabe on August 22,
1994, there were two Fats with you?
A. He showed me two pictures of—He showed me the
light skin picture of the other Fats, and he showed me that
picture of him.
-8-
Q. Who of him? Who is the other Fats picture he showed
you?
A. Some lights skins Fats. I don’t know his real name.”
Brooks identified the dark skin Fats from the police pictures as the
defendant, and stated that he was at Miller’s house on the night of the
attack.
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Brooks testified that he knew two men
nicknamed Fats. One is light-skinned with braids, and he was in a
holding cell at the courthouse.
“Q. And did you say on when [the prosecutor] was
questioning you, that was the person that was with you this
night [at Miller’s house] on August 22?
A. Yeah, I said that.
***
Q. All right. And then you said, did I hear you just now to
say that this person was with you [at Miller’s house]?
A. Just said it.
Q. So are you saying that both people nicknamed Fats
were [at Miller’s house] now?
A. I’m saying it was one of them, and it was that light skin
one with the braids in his head.
***
Q. And you’re saying the dark skin Fats was not with you
[at Miller’s house]?
A. Yeah.”
Brooks stated that he told Detective Rabe that dark-skinned Fats was
at Miller’s house, but that statement was untrue. Brooks further stated
that Detective Rabe showed him the picture of dark-skinned Fats and
told him to identify him as one of the men at Miller’s house, or
Brooks would never see his family again. On redirect examination,
Brooks testified that only three men went with him to Miller’s house:
Bug, Nixon, and Fats.
¶ 33 Detective Rabe testified that he investigated the attack at Miller’s
house and spoke to Brooks the next afternoon. Detective Rabe stated
that Brooks described the defendant as “the ringleader in charge of
the group” behind the attack. According to Detective Rabe, Brooks
picked the defendant’s photograph from an array. Detective Rabe
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conducted a line-up of five persons, which Tequilla viewed. She
identified the defendant as one of the men without hesitation.
¶ 34 On re-cross-examination, Detective Rabe testified that Miller did
not view photographs. The police did a computerized “cold search”
of photographs of arrestees in Peoria County fitting the age, weight,
and height of possible suspects. The defendant’s photograph appeared
inadvertently, and Miller identified him. On redirect examination,
Detective Rabe testified that Tequilla viewed photographs of
juveniles and adults. In the 8 to 10 photographs of juveniles, she
identified Brooks. On re-cross-examination, Detective Rabe testified
that Tequilla identified Nickerson, Mark Roberson, and the defendant
after viewing the results of the cold search.
¶ 35 The defendant called four witnesses.
¶ 36 Nixon testified that he pleaded guilty after the attack and was
sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Nixon stated that he was
questioned by the police, but did not tell the truth. He admitted that
he participated in the attack. According to Nixon, he knew the
defendant, but the defendant was not at Miller’s house that night.
¶ 37 On cross-examination, Nixon testified that “Merk, Lamont, Bug,
Drey, and Rob” were with him on the night of the attack. Lamont was
Lamont Lee. Bug was Coats. Drey was a person that Nixon knew
from the Warner Housing Project in Peoria, who had come there
possibly from Detroit. Merk was Robert McKay. Rob was “another
dude” that Nixon knew “through somebody else.”
¶ 38 Shondra Dunn, the defendant’s fiancee, testified that she was with
him at a friend’s apartment on the night of the attack from around
10:30 p.m. until he was arrested there around 3 a.m.
¶ 39 Tamika Young testified that she had known the defendant for
approximately five years, and that she saw him on the night of the
attack at that apartment. According to Young, the defendant was there
from 12:15 a.m. until the police arrived at 2 a.m. On cross-
examination, Young testified that she called the defendant by his
nickname, Fats.
¶ 40 The defendant testified that on the night of the attack he was with
Dunn at the apartment on the night of the attack from 10 p.m. until 3
a.m., when he was arrested. He denied participating in the attack.
¶ 41 On cross-examination, the defendant testified that some people
called him Fats. He stated that he grew up in Peoria, and that he knew
Miller: “I know Bertha Miller, but I don’t know Bertha Miller like she
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say I know her. I didn’t even know, I don’t even know how she look
until yesterday.” The defendant further stated that he knew Tequilla
when they were children, but not well enough to speak to her. He also
knew Brooks from their neighborhood.
¶ 42 In rebuttal, the State called Tequilla back as a witness. She
testified about her erroneous identification of Elbert Nickerson. She
stated, “Because at the line-up I was unsure, and I wanted to make
sure that everything was okay because I didn’t want him to go to jail
for something he didn’t do. So I had them recall his picture back up
to me so I can look at it again or any mistakes be made.” After she
reexamined Nickerson’s picture, she decided that he was not one of
the men in her mother’s house on the night of the attack. She stated
that she had no doubt that the defendant was one of the men.
¶ 43 The jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion, aggravated
criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and residential burglary. Prior
to sentencing the defendant filed a posttrial motion in which he
argued, inter alia, that the State had failed to prove him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. The trial court conducted a hearing on that
motion.
¶ 44 At that hearing, Coats testified that he had pleaded guilty in
connection with the attack. He stated that Nixon, Lee, McKay, and
“some guy named Dray” were with him at Miller’s house, where they
went to obtain money and drugs. According to Coats, the defendant
was not there. On cross-examination, Coats testified that Brooks also
was not there. Coats admitted that after his arrest he did not tell the
police about Nixon, McKay, Lee, and Dray. On re-cross-examination,
Coats stated that the defendant, through his attorney, had asked Coats
to testify at the defendant’s trial and that Coats had refused on fifth
amendment grounds.
¶ 45 The defendant testified that defense counsel was concerned that
Nixon and Coats would say different things, and convinced him that
they should not be called as witnesses. The defendant stated that he
talked to defense counsel about Mark Roberson. According to the
defendant, Roberson’s nickname was also Fats, and, like the
defendant, he was “misidentified” by Tequilla as one of the men.
When the defendant talked to defense counsel about Nickerson,
another person misidentified in connection with this case, it was too
late to call him as a witness.
¶ 46 In denying the posttrial motion, the trial court stated that “the acts
of the victims misidentifying people was thoroughly placed before the
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jury.” The court stated that the case was not “particularly unique”
because the outcome hinged on whether the jury found the State’s
witnesses or the defense’s witnesses more credible. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 30 years’
imprisonment for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual
assault. The appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentences.
People v. Coleman, No. 3-95-0576 (1997) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 47 The defendant filed a postconviction petition, alleging that he
received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The trial
court dismissed that petition, and the appellate court affirmed that
decision. People v. Coleman, No. 3-99-0414 (2001) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 48 The defendant then filed a pro se successive postconviction
petition, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel on the appeal of his postconviction petition. The trial court
dismissed the successive petition as frivolous and patently without
merit. The defendant filed a notice of appeal, but then filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal, which was granted.
¶ 49 In 2009, the defendant filed a second successive postconviction
petition, claiming actual innocence.1 The petition was supported by
affidavits from McKay, the defendant’s brother Deondre Coleman
(Deondre), Coat’s brother Robert Coats (Robert), Roberson,
Nickerson, Brooks, Nixon, and Coats. In response, the State did not
ask the trial court to deny that motion, but, instead, denied the
allegations in the petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. The
trial court docketed the case for further proceedings and held a
hearing.
¶ 50 The defendant called eight witnesses.
¶ 51 Coats testified that on the night of the attack he was at the Warner
Housing Project “hanging out with friends”—Robert, Lee, “a homie
named Dre,” who was the defendant’s brother Deondre, Nixon, and
McKay. According to Coats, McKay walked with a limp. Coats stated
that he and his friends went to Miller’s house that night looking for
money and drugs. The defendant was not with them.
1
The petition was signed by Karen Daniel of the Center on Wrongful
Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law.
-12-
¶ 52 Coats stated that he knew Brooks, Nickerson, and Roberson,
whose nickname is “Fats.” None of them were at Miller’s house on
the night of the attack. Coats further stated that the defendant’s
nickname is also “Fats,” and he walks with a limp. Coats testified that
he pleaded guilty to armed robbery in connection with the attack and
received a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. According to Coats,
his attorney told him that he could receive a sentence of six years’
imprisonment if he testified that the defendant was involved in the
attack. Coats rejected that offer because the defendant “didn’t have
any involvement.”
¶ 53 On cross-examination, Coats testified that he was currently
incarcerated for felony possession of a controlled substance. He
repeated that both McKay and the defendant walk with a limp. Coats
stated that when McKay proposed going to Miller’s house, he and
some friends were drinking beer and smoking marijuana. Coats
admitted that he told Detective Rabe a different story on the night of
the attack. He said that he and a friend were forced into the house at
gunpoint, but that story was untrue. When Detective Rabe asked
whether the defendant was involved in the attack, Coats answered
that the defendant was not involved.
¶ 54 The State reviewed Coats’ affidavit with him. He stated that he
was first contacted about signing it in 2006 or 2007 by a student from
Northwestern University law school. He told the student that the
defendant was not involved in the attack. He also told his parents and
brother, Phillip Graham, and “just numerous of other people” that
asked him about it.
¶ 55 On redirect examination, Coats stated that Detective Rabe first
mentioned the defendant’s name. Coats’ affidavit did not implicate
his brother Rob for fear of getting him in trouble, and he did not
implicate his brother at the hearing on the defendant’s posttrial
motion for the same reason.
¶ 56 Lee testified that he was currently incarcerated for armed robbery.
According to Lee, he was at Miller’s house with Coats, Robert,
Nixon, and McKay. Coats entered the house by the back window, and
opened the door for the other men. Then Lee stated that an armed
robbery took place. There were one or two guns involved, though
some of the men pretended to have guns. Their faces were covered,
and some wore hats. Lee estimated that seven or eight people
occupied the house when the men entered it. When the police arrived,
the men went upstairs. Lee stated that he and Robert escaped by
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jumping from an upstairs window. McKay left before the police
arrived.
¶ 57 Lee testified that the attack lasted about an hour. After he escaped,
Lee returned to the Warner Housing Project, and saw the police arrest
the defendant. Lee had seen the defendant earlier that night with
Dunn, and they went inside an apartment between 11 p.m. and
midnight. According to Lee, the defendant was not at Miller’s house
“in no form or fashion,” he was just inside the apartment. Lee did not
speak to the defendant’s attorney, only to law students around
February 2007. Lee did not testify at the defendant’s trial because that
would have been “hanging” himself.
¶ 58 On cross-examination, Lee stated he knew Deondre, but he knew
the defendant better. Neither was at Miller’s house; only Lee, Coats,
Robert, Nixon, and McKay. Lee stated that if he would have been
called to testify at the defendant’s trial, he would have “pleaded the
Fifth, period.”
¶ 59 The trial judge then asked Lee some questions. Lee confirmed that
before the attack, he was with Coats, Robert, Nixon, and McKay. He
saw the defendant at the Warner Housing Project sometime earlier
that day.
¶ 60 Deondre testified that he is the defendant’s brother. On the night
of the attack, he saw the defendant, but he later left the Warner
Housing Project with Nixon, McKay, Coats, Robert, and another
man. According to Deondre, McKay walked with a limp, as does the
defendant. The defendant did not accompany the men to Miller’s
house. McKay planned to rob the occupants of the house, but
Deondre refused to participate and stood across the street from the
house during the attack. Deondre stated that the defendant and Brooks
were not at the house that night. Deondre intended to testify at the
defendant’s trial, but before it occurred he was shot three times and
left Peoria for a hospital in Detroit, Michigan.
¶ 61 On cross-examination, Deondre stated that the original plan on
the night of the attack was to go to Miller’s house to buy drugs with
money that he and Nixon had. When they reached the house, McKay
changed the plan. Deondre did not participate in the attack because he
“don’t about to rob nobody.” When the men went around Miller’s
house toward the back door, Deondre began walking back to the
Warner Housing Project.
¶ 62 Deondre testified that the next day, he was stopped at the Warner
Housing Project by Barbara Stimage, Angela Stimage’s daughter. He
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learned that the defendant had been arrested in connection with the
attack. Deondre told Nixon, McKay, and Robert that he planned to
testify that the defendant was not at Miller’s house. Deondre was shot
three days later. When he learned that the defendant was in prison,
Deondre “felt bad,” but did not tell the police or the defendant’s
attorney that he was not at Miller’s house that night. Deondre did tell
his father on the day before he was shot. Deondre added that,
although he did not tell anyone else that the defendant was not
involved, he would have told someone if he had been in Peoria at the
time of trial.
¶ 63 Brooks testified that he was currently incarcerated. On the night
of the attack, he was 12 years old, and he was arrested and charged
with home invasion and robbery. At the police station, officers
questioned Brooks. According to Brooks, “They started pulling out
pictures. They said they knew I was there and they wanted me to
point out Mr. Coleman and kept pointing at his picture, you know
what I’m saying?” Brooks stated that he told police that he was not at
Miller’s house, and the police, including Detective Rabe, told him
that he would never see his family again. In response, Brooks pointed
to the defendant’s picture and said he was at the house. Brooks stated,
“I *** didn’t know if he was there or not, I just was doing it so I
could go home.” He also told police that he was the lookout at the
house.
¶ 64 On cross-examination, Brooks testified that he was in prison for
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. He was also convicted twice of
felony possession of a controlled substance and was imprisoned for
those offenses. According to Brooks, Detective Rabe said that he
would never see his family and would be in prison for the rest of his
life if he did not tell police who was at Miller’s house on the night of
the attack. Because Brooks was not involved in the attack, he did not
know who was. However, he told Detective Rabe that he was there,
and that the defendant directed the other men during the attack.
Brooks repeated that his trial testimony implicating the defendant was
untrue: “[E]verything about it was a lie.” On redirect examination,
Brooks stated that he “[f]elt kind of wrong because it wasn’t true that
another person was going to go to jail because from the lies I was
telling just to go home.” Brooks lied because he did not care about
anyone except himself, but cared only about going home.
¶ 65 Nickerson testified that he was currently incarcerated. He was
arrested and charged with home invasion, armed robbery, burglary,
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and sexual assault in connection with the attack. He stated that he was
never involved. According to Nickerson, the defendant, Coats, Nixon,
and some other men were also charged in connection with the attack.
Nickerson stated that on the day of his trial, the charges against him
were dismissed. Nickerson testified that while he and Coats were in
the same pod at the Peoria County jail, awaiting trial, Coats said that
he knew Nickerson and the defendant were not involved. Coats also
said that some men involved were his brother Robert, Nixon, and “a
couple of their other friends,” including Lee and McKay. Nickerson
stated that McKay walked with a limp.
¶ 66 On cross-examination, Nickerson stated that he was incarcerated
for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was serving a 4½-year
sentence. He was also convicted for violating an order of protection,
for forgery, and for a bail bond violation. Nickerson saw the
defendant in jail. After he was released, Nickerson left Peoria, and did
not learn that the defendant was convicted until he returned several
months later. He never told the police that the defendant was not
involved in the attack because “they already knew.” Nickerson talked
to the defendant’s lawyer in 2009, and would have testified sooner if
he would have been contacted sooner.
¶ 67 Robert testified that he was Coats’ younger brother. He stated that
he knew Nixon, Deondre, and McKay. McKay walked with a limp.
When postconviction counsel asked Robert about the night of the
attack, he asked for an attorney. A public defender was appointed and
consulted with him. The trial court held a hearing, and concluded that
the limitations period had run on any of the offenses with which he
could be charged and ordered him to resume his testimony.
¶ 68 Robert testified that on the day before the attack, he was with
Coats, Lee, Nixon, McKay, and Deondre. The group walked to
Miller’s house. The defendant, who walks with a limp, was not with
them. Brooks, Nickerson, and Roberson, whose nickname is “Fats,”
were also not with them. Robert stated that after his brother opened
the back door of Miller’s house, the men entered and robbed the
victims. Robert was the only one with a gun. The men all wore
bandanas to cover their faces. Robert did not remember Deondre
being inside the house. According to Robert, he went into the living
room, and “[p]ut the people down” at gunpoint and collected the
money and the marijuana. He tried to get into the bathroom, but could
not because Lee was inside holding the door closed. At some point,
the police arrived at the house. Lee went to the door and told them
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“everything was cool,” and they were “just having a party.” Everyone
in the house then went upstairs. Robert stuffed his gun in a box and
jumped out the window. Lee and Coats also jumped out the window.
Robert escaped, and he was never arrested or questioned in
connection with the attack. He stated that he would not have testified
at the defendant’s trial for fear of imprisonment.
¶ 69 On cross-examination, Robert testified that he was smoking
marijuana all day before the attack, and he was under the influence of
marijuana when he left the Warner Housing Project for Miller’s
house. According to Robert, the men went to the house to buy
marijuana. Before that night, Robert had been there “a few times” to
buy marijuana. He estimated that the attack lasted around 10 minutes.
Robert stated that he probably told Deondre that the defendant was
not involved. He told others the same story: “I said there is only one
person that’s in jail and they didn’t do it and that’s Christopher
Coleman. I said that to a lot of people in the joint, out of the joint.”
He added, “I didn’t say it was too bad. I said it’s messed up that he is
in there, but sometimes that’s how life goes. You get a bad break.”
On redirect examination, Robert testified that, even though he was
under the influence of marijuana on the night of the attack, he knew
that the defendant was not at Miller’s house.
¶ 70 McKay testified that he was currently incarcerated. His nickname
is Merk. McKay walks with a limp, after jumping out a window and
injuring his leg in 1993. Hours before the attack, McKay was at the
Warner Housing Project with Lee, Nixon, Robert, and Deondre.
Coats joined them shortly. McKay testified that the defendant was
with them initially, but went “in the house with his girlfriend” when
the men left for Miller’s house. According to McKay, the men went
to Miller’s house to buy marijuana, but a robbery took place after they
entered the house. McKay stated that the men “got reefer and money
and left.” The money and marijuana were in a bedroom. McKay
covered his face with a shirt that was in the house. The defendant was
not there at any time during the attack.
¶ 71 McKay testified that he knew Nickerson and Roberson, and they
were not at the house that night. According to McKay, Brooks was
with him when he went there. McKay was arrested on an unrelated
charge a few days after the attack, and was incarcerated for
approximately a year. He would not have testified at the defendant’s
trial because that testimony would have implicated himself.
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¶ 72 On cross-examination, McKay testified that he had smoked “two
or three dime bags” of marijuana with Lee, and when he left for
Miller’s house, he had a “mild buzz.” Lee had the idea to turn the
purchase of marijuana into a robbery. McKay stated that he thought
Lee was the first person to break into the house. And Lee, Coats,
Nixon, Robert, and Deondre all went in the house. They were inside
the house for “[p]robably about almost two minutes.” McKay found
money and marijuana on the floor of a bedroom beside the bed. He
picked up the money and marijuana and left the house with Deondre.
He stated that he did not go upstairs, and Lee was the only man with
a gun.
¶ 73 McKay testified that he did not speak with Roberson or Nickerson
about the attack. He learned that the defendant had been arrested in
connection with the attack a couple of days later. He spoke to Nixon
about the defendant and his lack of involvement, while the two were
in jail together. McKay cared that the defendant was going to prison
for crimes he did not commit, but McKay “was facing some trouble”
himself.
¶ 74 Roberson testified that he was arrested in October or November
1994 in connection with the attack. According to Roberson, “I was
told that I supposed to participated in armed robbery and home
invasion and rape. And they [the police] asked me where I was at, and
I told him—I gave them my alibi and told them I was at work and
they called my alibi and confirmed it.” At the time, Roberson was
working at a fast food restaurant in Glendale Heights, Illinois, near
Chicago. He was released three days later.
¶ 75 The State called a single witness, Detective Rabe.
¶ 76 Detective Rabe testified that in the course of his investigation into
the attack, he interviewed Brooks. He did not threaten Brooks, and
did not tell him that he would never see his family again if he did not
answer questions about the attack or if he did not identify the
defendant as one of the men. According to Detective Rabe, Brooks
stated that the defendant was at Miller’s house and participated in the
attack. On cross-examination, Detective Rabe testified that Coats and
Nixon both denied involvement in the attack when they were
interviewed, and neither identified any accomplices. Because the
victims said that several men were involved, and one of the victims
recognized one of the men from the Warner Housing Project,
Detective Rabe spoke to officers who worked that beat. The officers
identified the defendant, Brooks, Roberson, and Nickerson as
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possible suspects. Detective Rabe assembled some photo arrays with
pictures of the men, and Tequilla identified all four as being in her
mother’s house on the night of the attack.
¶ 77 In a written order, the trial court denied relief to the defendant.
The trial court reviewed the postconviction evidence in light of the
trial evidence. The court noted that several of the defense witnesses,
who claimed that the defendant was not involved in the attack, had
extensive criminal records, and that they “gave significantly
conflicting accounts on what happened and who was present.”
Additionally, none of them mentioned the sexual assault. The trial
court concluded:
“Is it possible that that the Petitioner is actually innocent?
Yes, even the most efficacious court system in the world
cannot achieve absolute truth. Is it possible that these cohort
witnesses are now coming forth with nothing to lose in order
to help Petitioner—the person giving the orders during the
home invasion?[ ] yes. Is the evidence offered at this hearing
of such a conclusive character that it would probably change
the result on retrial? No.”
¶ 78 The appellate court affirmed. 2011 IL App (3d) 100419-U
. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court’s “well reasoned decision,
finding the information provided to the court during the
postconviction hearing would not be likely to affect the outcome of
a new trial.” Id. ¶ 55
. According to the appellate court, that decision
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
¶ 79 This court allowed the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The court also allowed
40 Illinois attorneys to file a joint amicus curiae brief in support of
the defendant. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 80 ANALYSIS
¶ 81 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act allows a criminal defendant to
assert that “in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction
there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.”
725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2010). The Act contemplates the filing of
a single petition: “Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional
rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010). That statutory bar will be relaxed
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only “when fundamental fairness so requires.” People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458
(2002) (citing People v. Flores,
153 Ill. 2d 264, 274
(1992)).
¶ 82 We have stated that, outside the context of capital litigation, there
are two such instances, or two exceptions, to this procedural default
rule. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22
. First, a defendant
may raise a defaulted constitutional claim by satisfying the so-called
“cause-and-prejudice” test. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459
; 725
ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010). To establish “cause,” the defendant must
show some objective factor external to the defense impeded his
ability to raise the claim in the initial postconviction proceeding.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460
. To establish “prejudice,” the
defendant must show the claimed constitutional error so infected his
trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id. at 464
.
¶ 83 Second, even without showing cause and prejudice, a defendant
may bring a claim of actual innocence to prevent a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 329
(2009). In
People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475
(1996), we considered whether
a claim of actual innocence implicates a federal or state constitutional
right, which would allow a defendant to raise that claim in a
postconviction proceeding. In addressing federal due process, we
examined Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993). There, the United
States Supreme Court used the terms “freestanding” and “gateway”
to describe two types of actual-innocence claims raised in successive
federal habeas corpus petitions. According to the Court, a
freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of any claims of
constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant’s factual
innocence in light of new evidence. Id. at 400
. A gateway actual-
innocence claim is ancillary to any claims of constitutional trial error.
Such a claim is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a
gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his
otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 404
. In closing, the Court stated that assuming, arguendo, the
execution of a capital defendant who made a “truly persuasive
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ ” would violate the Constitution,
the evidentiary burden on such a defendant to obtain federal habeas
relief would be “extraordinarily high.” Id. at 417
.
¶ 84 In Washington, we concluded that despite this comment, “Herrera
clearly states *** that a freestanding claim of innocence is not
cognizable as a fourteenth amendment due process claim.”
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Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 485
. But because “we labor under no self-
imposed constraint to follow federal precedent in ‘lockstep’ [citation]
in defining Illinois’ due process protection,” we turned to our state
constitution. Id.
We observed that there are decisions in which this
court has “perfunctorily evaluated” new evidence claims under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act as if they were raised in a motion for a
new trial. Id.
at 486 (citing People v. Silagy,116 Ill. 2d 357, 368
(1987), citing People v. Molstad,101 Ill. 2d 128, 134
(1984)). But
those decisions have never expressly identified the constitutional
basis for such claims. We clarified that actual-innocence claims are
grounded in due process and departed from Herrera, holding “as a
matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that a claim of newly
discovered evidence showing a defendant to be actually innocent of
the crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as a matter of due
process.” Id. at 488-89. Procedurally, a trial court should treat such a
claim like any other postconviction claim. Id. at 489. Substantively,
a court should grant relief only if the defendant has presented
supporting evidence that is “new, material, noncumulative and, most
importantly, ‘ “of such conclusive character” ’ as would ‘ “probably
change the result on retrial.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d at 368
,
quoting Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d at 134
).2
¶ 85 But before we can discuss the defendant’s evidence and review
the trial court’s decision on that evidence, we must address a
threshold issue raised by the State. In its response brief, the State
contends for the first time in this case that Washington is
fundamentally flawed and its substantive standard should be
discarded. According to the State, that standard is too lenient because
it excuses the defendant from making a truly persuasive
demonstration of actual innocence. The State proposes a stricter
standard, which purportedly derives from Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995).
¶ 86 In Schlup, the Court, as it had in Herrera, again distinguished
between freestanding and gateway claims of actual innocence. The
Court held that to obtain habeas relief on a gateway actual-innocence
claim, a defendant must show that “it is more likely than not that no
2
In People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314
(2006), we noted that
Washington modified the “limited lockstep approach” adopted in People v.
Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226
(1984), “to allow for consideration of state tradition
and values as reflected by long-standing state case precedent.”
-21-
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.” Id. at 327
. Although the Court has never recognized the
viability of a freestanding actual-innocence claim, and, consequently,
has not decided which standard would apply to such a claim, it has
speculated that such a standard would theoretically require more
convincing proof. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555
(2006).
¶ 87 The State expands upon this point, arguing that the proper
substantive standard for a postconviction freestanding claim of actual
innocence in Illinois is an “enhanced Schlup showing.” That proposed
standard would force the defendant to prove that no reasonable juror
would have found him guilty in light of the new evidence, which is
what Schlup requires, and do so by clear and convincing evidence,
which would enhance what Schlup requires. According to the State,
the so-called enhanced Schlup standard is appropriate because (1) it
demands a truly persuasive demonstration of innocence, so it fits the
reasoning of Washington better than the standard we adopted there;
(2) it tracks the practice for litigating actual-innocence claims in other
states; and (3) “adopting the enhanced Schlup standard for
freestanding innocence claims, while reserving the Schlup standard
for gateway claims, will cure the current anomaly in this Court’s
actual innocence jurisprudence, under which freestanding actual
innocence claims are easier to establish than gateway actual
innocence claims.”
¶ 88 We reject the State’s argument for several reasons.
¶ 89 The State’s argument rests largely on a faulty initial premise. The
State simply assumes that this court, like the United States Supreme
Court, has recognized two types of actual-innocence claims. We have
not. To the Court, the distinction between freestanding and gateway
claims hinges on fundamentally different “assumptions about the
validity of the proceedings” and concomitantly different levels of
respect afforded to the resulting convictions. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315
.
When faced with a freestanding claim, in which a defendant
challenges only his factual innocence, a habeas court may have
confidence in the result because the underlying trial was error-free. Id.
When faced with a gateway claim, in which the defendant challenges
both his factual innocence and the fairness of his trial, a court may
have less confidence in the result. Id. at 316
. That, in the Court’s
view, changes the evidentiary burden:
“In Herrera (on the assumption that petitioner’s claim was, in
principle, legally well founded), the evidence of innocence
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would have had to be strong enough to make his execution
‘constitutionally intolerable’ even if his conviction was the
product of a fair trial. For [the petitioner in Schlup], the
evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to
justify the conclusion that his execution would be a
miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product
of a fair trial.” (Emphases in original.) Id.
¶ 90 We departed from precisely this approach in Washington. There,
we stated:
“The Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as a
means to recognize freestanding innocence claims because of
the idea that a person convicted in a constitutionally fair trial
must be viewed as guilty. That made it impossible for such a
person to claim that he, an innocent person, was unfairly
convicted.
We think that the Court overlooked that a ‘truly
persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would, in hindsight,
undermine the legal construct precluding a substantive due
process analysis. The stronger the claim—the more likely it
is that a convicted person is actually innocent—the weaker is
the legal construct dictating that the person be viewed as
guilty. A ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would
effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction. At the point where
the construct falls apart, application of substantive due
process principles *** is invited.” Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488
.
The assumptions that led the Court to distinguish between
freestanding and gateway claims, and the legal construct that springs
from those assumptions, are integral parts of the federal due process
rubric that we declined to follow, as a matter of state constitutional
law. We may have used the label “freestanding” to describe the claim
in Washington, but not as an alternative to the label “gateway.”
¶ 91 In Illinois, a postconviction actual-innocence claim is just that—a
postconviction actual-innocence claim. Where a defendant makes a
claim of trial error, as well as a claim of actual innocence, in a
successive postconviction petition, the former claim must meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard, and the latter claim must meet the
Washington standard. See Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330
(“where a
defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive
postconviction petition, the defendant is excused from showing cause
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and prejudice”). There is no anomaly in our case law because the
evidentiary burden for an actual-innocence claim is always the same
whether or not it would be considered a freestanding or gateway
claim under federal law.
¶ 92 Without the benefit of that distinction, the State’s argument
unravels. Schlup, as well as any cases from other states that have
chosen to align themselves with federal law in this context, are
irrelevant. Further, because the Court has never recognized the
viability of a freestanding actual-innocence claim raised in a
successive habeas corpus petition, its comments in Herrera on the
evidentiary burden required to advance such a claim are pure obiter
dicta, and unpersuasive. Finally, the State’s proposed standard, which
would impose a “clear and convincing” burden of proof and make an
actual-innocence claim harder to prove than any other postconviction
claim, is inappropriate. An actual-innocence claim should be treated
procedurally like any other postconviction claim (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489
), and “[i]n a post-conviction hearing the burden of proof is
upon the petitioner to show a denial of [a] constitutional right by a
preponderance of the evidence.” People v. Stovall, 47 Ill. 2d 42, 47
(1970).
¶ 93 The State’s argument essentially repackages an argument made by
then-Chief Justice Bilandic in his dissent upon denial of rehearing in
Washington. See Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 505-10
(Bilandic, C.J.,
dissenting upon denial of rehearing, joined by Miller, J.). That
argument was rejected by a majority of this court. In the 17 years
since we decided Washington, nothing has changed. Our commitment
to that holding is unwavering. We have not diluted the substantive
standard for actual-innocence claims, as the State thinks we did in
Ortiz. And we have not strengthened that standard, as the State hopes
we did in Edwards. In both cases, we reiterated that Washington
provides the appropriate standard for ultimate relief. See Edwards,
2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32
(stating the “elements of a claim of actual
innocence” and citing Washington); Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333
.
¶ 94 As we stated in Washington, “no person convicted of a crime
should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of
actual innocence.” Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489
. That statement
indicates that the standard we adopted is extraordinarily difficult to
meet. In fact, as amicus informs us and our research confirms, courts
of review have granted postconviction relief on actual-innocence
claims in only three reported cases since 1996. See People v.
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Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169
(1996) (decided the same day as
Washington); Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319
; People v. Starks,365 Ill. App. 3d 592
(2006).
¶ 95 Although Washington is now familiar to the bench and bar, we
take this opportunity to clarify how it should be applied.
¶ 96 Substantively, in order to succeed on a claim of actual innocence,
the defendant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence
that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial.
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489
. New means the evidence was
discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier
through the exercise of due diligence. See Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d at 180
.
Material means the evidence is relevant and probative of the
petitioner’s innocence. People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 82-83
(1997).
Noncumulative means the evidence adds to what the jury heard.
Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d at 135
. And conclusive means the evidence,
when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead
to a different result. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 336-37
.
¶ 97 In practice, the trial court typically will review the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing to determine first whether it was
new, material, and noncumulative. If any of it was, the trial court then
must consider whether that evidence places the evidence presented at
trial in a different light and undercuts the court’s confidence in the
factual correctness of the guilty verdict. This is a comprehensive
approach and involves credibility determinations that are uniquely
appropriate for trial judges to make. But the trial court should not
redecide the defendant’s guilt in deciding whether to grant relief. See
Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d at 136
(“this does not mean that [the defendant]
is innocent, merely that all of the facts and surrounding circumstances
*** should be scrutinized more closely to determine [his] guilt or
innocence”). Indeed, the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to convict
beyond a reasonable doubt is not the determination that the trial court
must make. If it were, the remedy would be an acquittal, not a new
trial. See Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 497
(McMorrow, J., specially
concurring) (“where a reviewing court determines that no rational
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the proper remedy is not a new trial but an acquittal”).
Probability, not certainty, is the key as the trial court in effect predicts
what another jury would likely do, considering all the evidence, both
new and old, together. See People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (4th)
-25-
110305, ¶¶ 62-64 (“New evidence need not be completely dispositive
of an issue to be likely to change the result upon retrial.”).
¶ 98 Turning to the central issue in this case, the merits of the
defendant’s petition and actual-innocence claim, we review the trial
court’s decision to deny relief following an evidentiary hearing for
manifest error. People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155
(2004).
Manifest error is “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Id. at 155
.
Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident. In re Cutright, 233 Ill. 2d 474, 488
(2009). On this point, the parties’ positions are clear and simply
stated. The defendant contends that the trial court’s decision was
manifestly erroneous under the Washington standard. The State
summarily disagrees, responding in the last few pages of its brief that
the trial court’s decision was not manifestly erroneous under that
standard. The State, however, does not dispute that the defendant’s
evidence was new, material, and noncumulative.
¶ 99 The trial court found that the evidence was new, except for the
testimony of Brooks, who testified at trial, and Coats, who testified
at the hearing on the defendant’s posttrial motion. The trial court
further found that the evidence was material, except the testimony of
Nickerson and Roberson, who did not state that the defendant was not
involved in the attack. Finally, the trial court found that the remaining
evidence—namely, the testimony from Coats, Lee, Deondre, Robert,
and McKay—was cumulative of the trial testimony of Nixon, who
stated that the defendant was not involved.
¶ 100 Regarding the testimony of Nickerson and Roberson, we conclude
that it was not new because it could have been discovered earlier
through the exercise of due diligence. None of the eight defense
witnesses, except Brooks, testified at trial, but Nickerson and
Roberson were arrested in connection with the attack. Presumably,
the defense knew this before trial, but chose not to call them as
witnesses, even to undermine Tequilla’s credibility after
misidentifying them. In the hearing on the defendant’s posttrial
motion, defense counsel explained that he did not call Roberson as a
witness because his testimony would not have helped the defendant.
Additionally, the defendant stated that he talked to defense counsel
about Nickerson, but by then it was too late to call him.3
3
We note that Nickerson testified that while he was incarcerated and
awaiting trial, he spoke with Coats, who said he knew Nickerson and the
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¶ 101 Regarding the testimony of Brooks, we conclude that it was not
material. At the defendant’s trial, Brooks’ testimony was nearly
incomprehensible, particularly his answers to questions about two
men nicknamed “Fats.” Brooks stated that he was at Miller’s house
on the night of the attack, and he seemed to implicate the defendant
on direct examination, then exculpate him on cross-examination. In
the evidentiary hearing, Brooks was less equivocal. He stated that he
was not involved in the attack and did not know who was. This was
a different story from the one he offered at trial, but it was not
relevant or probative of the defendant’s innocence.
¶ 102 That leaves the testimony of the five men who admitted that they
were involved in, or present for, the attack: Coats, Lee, Deondre,
Robert, and McKay. Nixon’s trial testimony implicating these men
seems to indicate that the defense may have known about their roles
before trial, but they likely would have asserted their fifth amendment
privileges if called to testify. Lee, Robert, and McKay said they
would have done so, and, in his testimony at the hearing on the
defendant’s posttrial motion, Coats also said he would have done so.
Only Deondre did not say this, and he asserted that he never entered
Miller’s house and left the area before the attack began. The
testimony of these witnesses was new evidence. See Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d at 134-35
.
¶ 103 The testimony of these witnesses was also material and
noncumulative. All five of them stated that they were present for or
involved in the attack, and all of them insisted that the defendant was
not. This evidence was relevant, and probative of the defendant’s
innocence. Additionally, although they, like Nixon at trial, stated that
the defendant was not at Miller’s house on the night of the attack,
their testimony was not before the jury at trial. The uncorroborated
testimony of one of the men does not render the testimony of five of
them merely cumulative, particularly where four of them were never
charged in connection with the attack. Their testimony corroborated
Nixon’s testimony regarding the defendant, but also offered
significant details that were missing from his account, including the
defendant were not involved in the attack. Nickerson’s testimony about that
conversation was hearsay. Roberson’s affidavit included a similar statement
about a conversation he had with McKay after the attack. Roberson did not
testify about that conversation, but testimony about it would also be
hearsay.
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fact that McKay and the defendant both walk with a limp. Thus, we
conclude that the testimony of Coats, Lee, Deondre, Robert, and
McKay was new, material, and noncumulative evidence.
¶ 104 Next, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision that
that evidence was not conclusive enough to probably change the
result on retrial was manifestly erroneous.
¶ 105 The trial court noted that Coats, Lee, Robert, and McKay all had
extensive criminal records, and that Coats, Robert, and McKay
admitted drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana before the attack.
The court observed that these witnesses offered conflicting accounts,
particularly regarding the defendant’s involvement, but none of them
mentioned the sexual assault of Tekelia.
¶ 106 Although we agree that their voluntary intoxication and criminal
records would affect their credibility on retrial, as would the
discrepancies in their accounts nearly 16 years after the attack, these
men were remarkably consistent on certain key details: they
socialized at the Warner Housing Project before the attack; they went
to Miller’s house to steal drugs and money; Coats entered the house
first through the back window, then opened the back door for the
other men; the men had their faces covered during the attack; the men
ordered many of the victims to lie on the living room floor, then took
them upstairs; and three of the men jumped from the upstairs window
when the police arrived. Most significantly, they were consistent on
the issue of who was involved in, or present for, the attack.4 Like
Nixon, who testified at trial, they all stated that six men—Nixon,
Coats, Lee, Deondre, Robert, and McKay—were at Miller’s house
that night, and the defendant was not. Lee, Deondre, and McKay even
corroborated the defendant’s alibi. And although none of the men
mentioned the sexual assault, neither did Tequilla, whose sister was
the victim of a terrible crime. The men were not asked about the
sexual assault because that was not relevant to the ultimate issue of
whether the defendant was there.
¶ 107 The trial court stated that these witnesses had “nothing to lose,”
a veiled reference to the fact that the limitations period had passed on
the offenses committed during the attack. But in his trial testimony,
Nixon implicated himself, McKay, Lee, Coats, Deondre, and Robert.
And Coats, in his testimony at the hearing on the defendant’s posttrial
4
Only Lee testified that Dondre was not there. The other men, including
Deondre himself, stated that he was present at Miller’s house.
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motion, implicated Nixon, who had already pleaded guilty, as well as
Lee, McKay, and Deondre.5 Despite this testimony, the State never
pursued charges against any of these men in connection with the
attack, and criminal liability weighed on their minds. Lee even
refused to provide an affidavit, and Robert had to be counseled by a
public defender that his testimony would not have penal
consequences. This lends credence to their accounts.
¶ 108 Additionally, Detective Rabe’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing was inconsistent with his trial testimony regarding his
investigation. At trial, Detective Rabe described a computerized “cold
search” that produced the photographs Tequilla saw. But Detective
Rabe provided more details at the evidentiary hearing. Because the
two men arrested at the crime scene, Coats and Nixon, refused to
name their accomplices, Detective Rabe talked to officers who
worked around the Warner Housing Project. These officers offered
the names of four possible suspects—the defendant, Brooks,
Nickerson, and Roberson—all of whom still maintain that they were
not involved in the attack, and two of whom were actually released by
the police. Detective Rabe assembled a photo array with pictures of
those men, and Tequilla identified them all.
¶ 109 The State’s evidence at trial was sufficient to convict the
defendant, but it was far from overwhelming. There was no forensic
evidence to link the defendant to the attack, and the State offered
three identifications, all of which were significantly impeached.
¶ 110 Brooks’ testimony on direct examination may have implicated the
defendant as dark-skinned Fats, but his testimony on cross-
examination definitely exonerated him.
¶ 111 Miller and Tequilla offered different versions of the attack
because they were in different places. In Miller’s version, the
defendant orchestrated the attack from her bedroom doorway, not the
living room. Miller did not see the defendant’s face during the attack
because it was covered, but she identified him from his voice as a
child and as an adult, a characteristic she knew even though she
denied associating with him, and his limp, a characteristic he shared
with McKay. Miller did not give the defendant’s name to the police
after the attack because they did not ask about him. And she did not
5
At the evidentiary hearing, Coats explained that he did not include
Robert in this group because he wanted to protect him.
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name him to the grand jury because she did not know at the time of
the attack that was him.
¶ 112 In Tequilla’s version, the defendant sat on a chair in the living
room for most of the attack, directing the other men. Tequilla did not
mention that the defendant was ever near Miller’s bedroom. Tequilla
saw the faces of two men while she was lying on the living room
floor and they removed their bandanas. She identified one of them as
the defendant, who, like Roberson, was nicknamed Fats. However,
like her mother, she did not give the defendant’s name or nickname
to the police. And she named only Nixon to the grand jury because
she had forgotten the defendant’s name, and presumably his
nickname. Of the six men she picked out from the photo array and the
lineup, two—Coats and Nixon—were arrested at the scene,
two—Nickerson and Roberson—were misidentified, and
two—Brooks and the defendant—continue to deny their involvement.
Tequilla never identified any of the four men who were implicated by
Nixon and Coats, who were never arrested in connection with the
attack, and who now assert they were at Miller’s house that night.
¶ 113 The testimony of Coats, Lee, Deondre, Robert, and McKay was
discredited by their criminal backgrounds, intoxication, and
acquaintance with the defendant. Those men, however, all directly
contradicted Miller and Tequilla on the ultimate issue before the jury:
who was involved in the attack. We believe that the evidence
presented by the defendant at the evidentiary hearing, together with
the evidence presented by the defendant at trial, places the evidence
presented by the State in a new light and undermines our confidence
in that evidence and the result it produced. Weighed against the
State’s evidence, the defendant’s new evidence is conclusive enough
that another trier of fact would probably reach a different result.
¶ 114 This case is strikingly similar to Molstad. There, the State
presented testimony from an eyewitness who identified the defendant
and his five codefendants as participants in the battery of her
boyfriend. The defendant denied that he was present for the attack,
and he presented alibi testimony from his parents. This court granted
the defendant a new trial. Here, we reach the same conclusion.
Because the trial court’s decision was manifestly erroneous, the
defendant is entitled to postconviction relief in the form a new trial.
As we stated in Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 337
, on remand, “[t]he fact finder
will be charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses in
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light of the newly discovered evidence and with balancing the
conflicting eyewitness accounts.”
¶ 115 CONCLUSION
¶ 116 For the reasons that we have stated, the judgments of the circuit
and appellate courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
¶ 117 Judgments reversed.
¶ 118 Cause remanded.
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