United King Film Distribution (1990) LTD, et al. v. MoonPay USA LLC

              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
              SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA                              

                 Case No.: 24-cv-24955-JB/Torres                        

UNITED KING FILM                                                          
DISTRIBUTION (1990) LTD, et al.,                                          

   Plaintiffs,                                                          

v.                                                                        

MOONPAY USA LLC,                                                          

   Defendant.                                                           
_______________________________________/                                  

           ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION                            
              MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT                               

   THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant MoonPay USA LLC’s     
(“Defendant”  or  “MoonPay”)  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  and  Statement  of 
Material Facts (the “Motion”).  ECF Nos. [82], [83], [84].  Plaintiffs United King Film 
Distribution (1990) LTD and Stream IL Communications Ltd. (“Plaintiffs”) filed a 
Response in Opposition and Statement of Material Facts in Opposition.  ECF Nos. 
[88], [89].  Defendant filed a Reply, and a Reply Statement of Material Facts.  ECF 
No. [93], [91].  On March 26, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the Motion.  ECF 
No. [121].  Following the hearing and pursuant to the Court’s Paperless Order dated 
March 30, 2026, both parties filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law to address a 
United States Supreme Court decision issued after the briefing on the Motion was 
complete, ECF Nos. [126], [127].  Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, 
argument  of  counsel,  the  pertinent  portions  of  the  record,  and  the  relevant 
authorities, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDED that Defendant’s Motion is  
GRANTED.                                                                  
I.   BACKGROUND                                                         

   Plaintiffs  are  Israeli  corporations  who  produce  and  distribute  copyrighted 
movie and television content to paying subscribers via cable, satellite broadcasting, 
or through its own platforms.  ECF No. [40] ¶¶ 6–7.  Defendant is a financial 
technology company whose platform allows users to convert traditional currency (or 
“fiat”) into cryptocurrency.  ECF No. [84] ¶ 18.                          
   The parties’ dispute arises from the actions of a third-party infringer, Israel 

TV, who “own[s] and operate[s] a streaming service . . . [and has been] illegally 
broadcasting  and  streaming  pirated  copies  of  Plaintiffs’  original  content, 
broadcasting channels and TV services.”  ECF No. [40] ¶ 8.  Plaintiffs allege that 
Israel  TV  offers  these  broadcasts  at  a  significantly  lower  price  than  offered  by 
Plaintiffs, diverting customers away from Plaintiffs’ own streaming services.  Id.   As 
a result, Plaintiff United King Film Distribution Ltd., along with five other parties 
(the “New York Plaintiffs”), filed suit against Israel TV in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York.  Id. ¶ 12; see United King Distribution 
Ltd., et al., v. Does 1–10, No. 1:21-cv-11024-KPF-RWL (S.D.N.Y) (the “New York 
Action”).                                                                 
   The New York Plaintiffs obtained a $7,650,000 default judgment against the 
owners and operators of Israel TV (the “New York Default Judgment”).  See ECF No. 
[40] ¶14; ECF No. [83] at 16; ECF No. [38-6] at 5.  The New York Default Judgment 
also  permanently  enjoined  the  continued  infringement  of  Plaintiffs’  copyrights, 
including “any persons acting in concert or participation with them or third parties 
providing services used in connection with [the defendants’] operations, having actual 

knowledge  of  this  Default  Judgment  and  Permanent  Injunction  Order”  (the 
“Injunction”).  See New York Action, ECF No. [97].1                       
   Plaintiffs served the Injunction on MoonPay and requested that MoonPay 
cease providing payment processing services to Israel TV.  See New York Action, ECF 
No. [130-3].  Although MoonPay explained that it has no association with Israel TV, 
ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 1–16, the New York Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt in the New 

York Action.  ECF No. [83] at 16.  The Southern District of New York denied the 
motion for contempt, finding that Israel TV does not have a MoonPay account and 
that MoonPay “has no knowledge whatsoever of which wallets belong to [Israel TV].”  
Id.; see also New York Action, ECF No. [42], at 16:3-9–29:23-30.          
    A.  The Instant Action                                              
   The present dispute centers on the mechanics of Israel TV’s payment process.  
According to Plaintiff, Israel TV allows its users to pay for its infringing service 

through various means, including by directing subscribers to Defendant’s payment 
platform.  See ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 75.  Defendant’s platform permits users to exchange 
fiat currency for crypto currency.  ECF No. [84] ¶ 18.  The platform is non-custodial, 


1 The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in the New York Action, including the 
New York Default Judgment.  See Universal Express, Inc. v. S.E.C., 

177 F. App’x 52, 53

 (11th Cir. 2006) (a district court may take judicial notice of certain facts, including 
public records).                                                          
meaning it does not hold or control users’ wallets, digital assets, or place orders for 
payments from user wallets to third parties.  Id. ¶20.                    
   Utilizing MoonPay’s platform is straightforward.  To utilize the platform, a 

user must provide personal identifying information to satisfy certain Know Your 
Customer (“KYC”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) requirements.2  The user 
must also pass Defendant’s background check and vetting process.  Id. ¶ 23.  Only 
users who have completed Defendant’s KYC and AML processes can use Defendant’s 
platform.  Id. ¶ 24.                                                      
   Users also agree to Defendant’s Terms of Use (“TOU”) which serve as the 

governing rules of each user’s use of their own account.  Id. ¶ 27.  The TOU includes, 
among other things, prohibitions against engaging in unlawful activity, including 
copyright infringement.  Id. ¶ 27.  The TOU states in pertinent part:     
       6. PROHIBITED USE. This outlines some of the things you          
       cannot use the Services for.                                     
         1. You may not use your MoonPay Account or any of the          
       Services  to  engage  in  the  following  categories  of  activity 
       (“Prohibited Use”):                                              
                              . . .                                     
       F. Intellectual Property Infringement: Engage in transactions    
       involving  items  that  infringe  or  violate  any  copyright,   
       trademark, right of publicity . . .                              

ECF No. [84-15] at 18–19.  The TOU also requires users to certify that they own and 
control the crypto wallet address3 used in connection with their account. ECF No. [84] 

2  Defendant’s KYC and AML policies are not available to the general public. Id. ¶ 62.   

3 A crypto wallet address is a random string of letters and numbers used to send and 
receive  digital  currencies.  This  random  string  does  not  contain  identifying 
information about the wallet owner.  ECF No. [84] ¶ 29.                   
¶ 28.  According to Defendant, aside from third party AML and sanctions compliance 
checks,  it  has  no  post-transaction  monitoring  and  cannot  determine  whether 
cryptocurrency  deposited  into  a  user’s  wallet  is  being  withdrawn  to  pay  for  a 

subscription to Israel TV or any other goods or services.  Id. ¶ 38.  Defendant’s 
assertion  is  consistent  with  the  Court’s  finding  in  the  New  York  Action  that 
Defendant “has no knowledge whatsoever of which wallets belong to [Israel TV].”  See 
New York Action, ECF No. [42], at 16:3-9–29:23-30.                        
   Defendant also provides services to select businesses referred to as “Partners.”  
ECF No. [84] ¶ 39.  Partners undergo a more thorough “Know Your Business” (“KYB”) 

due diligence review, and are offered an application programing interface (“API”) 
which allows them to track their own end-user customers’ use of Defendant’s platform 
to purchase crypto in order to purchase their goods.  Id. ¶ 41.  The API includes a 
public API “key” that can be embedded into a Partner’s website to direct traffic to 
Defendant’s platform and track the customer transactions associated with the key.  
Id. ¶ 42.  This API key can also appear as a “widget” displaying Defendant’s logo, 
akin to a Paypal or Apple Pay logo. See id. ¶ 43.  These keys are publicly visible and 

can be copied by anyone.  Id. ¶45.  Defendant’s representative testified that the public 
nature of API keys complicates Defendant’s ability to differentiate traffic originating 
from a copied-and-pasted API key versus a vetted partner’s API key.  See ECF No. 
[84] ¶ 46; see also Skoberne 30(b)(6) Vol. 1, 74:23-75:23, ECF No. [84-18].  
   According to Plaintiffs, Israel TV subscribers create an account and select a 
subscription plan and are then directed to a website with the domain name “Billnet” 
to pay for the subscription.  ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 76–77.  A user then has two options: 
it can complete the purchase by credit card, or it can process its payment through 
MoonPay. Id. ¶¶ 78–79.                                                    

   In its attempts to stop Israel TV’s infringement of its content, Plaintiffs and 
their counsel asked Defendant to cease providing services to Israel TV.  See id. ¶ 86. 
In  June  2022,  when  Plaintiffs  contacted  Defendant  about  a  misappropriated 
MoonPay widget, Defendant immediately disabled the API key associated with that 
widget and required signature authentication from the authorized partner to whom 
it belonged.  Id. ¶ 50.  Defendant also notified Plaintiffs that it does not provide 

software or personnel to Israel TV, does not receive any payments from Israel TV, 
and has never had any communications with Israel TV.  ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10.4  
Defendant also initiated a whitelisting feature, which prevented non-partners from 
integrating  their  widget  into  unauthorized  websites.  Id.  ¶  50.    Additionally, 
Defendant  blocked  web  domains  associated  with  Israel  TV  or  its  alleged 
intermediary, Billnet.5  Id.                                              
   In October 2024, Plaintiffs made an additional request, that Defendant  disable 

another API key belonging to a verified Partner that Plaintiffs claimed was being 
used by Israel TV.  Id. ¶ 53.  According to Defendant, doing so caused disruptions for 


4 Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts.  ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 2, 8, 10.     
5 According to Defendant, although blocking is the best way to stop a particular 
domain from routing users to Defendant’s platform, ECF No. [83] at 17, it does not 
stop a third party from “scrubbing” or removing the information from their URL.  ECF 
No. [84] ¶¶ 50–51.  As such, blocking cannot stop the domain from routing users to 
the MoonPay platform. Id.                                                 
both it and its Partner but had little impact on Israel TV, id. ¶ 54, as it is undisputed 
that Israel TV found another API key to use less than forty-eight hours later, id. ¶ 
55.  Defendant contends that disabling these API keys each time Plaintiffs advised 

that Israel TV had misappropriated a Partner’s API key would significantly disrupt 
its platform and make little difference to Israel TV’s ability to find another API key 
since they are publicly available, and it does not preclude Israel TV from simply 
directing traffic to their website via URL.  Id. ¶¶ 57–58.                
   On November 14, 2024, Defendant sent a letter stating that it would no longer 
disable API keys and/or blacklist URLs.  ECF No. [89–17].                 

   The following day, Plaintiffs filed this action.6 The Amended Complaint raises 
four claims: (i) Count I for Contributory Copyright Infringement, (ii) Count II for 
violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, (iii) Count III for 
“Interference with Economic Expectation,”7 and (iv) Count IV for Negligence.  ECF 
No. [40] at 18–24.  Plaintiffs seek damages under the theory that Defendant is 
contributing to Israel TV’s infringement by refusing to take additional measures to 
prohibit  users  from  using  the  MoonPay  platform  to  convert  currency  that  is 

ultimately used to subscribe to Israel TV.  Id.  Plaintiffs also argue that its various 
policies are deceptive to the public and affect Florida consumers and businesses.  ECF 
No. [88] at 27.                                                           


6 This matter was originally filed in the Middle District of Florida and was transferred 
to the Southern District of Florida on December 18, 2024.                 
7 Count III was dismissed with prejudice on March 20, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s 
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. [117].                
II.  THE INSTANT MOTION                                                 
   Defendant filed its Motion arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law as to each cause of action in the Amended Complaint. See generally ECF No. 

[83].    Defendant  argues  that  it  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment  on  Plaintiffs’ 
contributory infringement claim because (i) the record contains no evidence of direct 
infringement, (ii) Defendant does not materially contribute to any infringement by 
Israel TV, (iii) Defendant’s platform is capable of substantial non-infringing use, and 
(iv) Defendant does not induce or encourage any infringement by Israel TV.8  Id. at 
19–27.  Defendant also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

FDUTPA claim because (i) the claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, (ii) there is 
no evidence that Defendant’s TOU is deceptive, (iii) the record evidence cannot 
support the “causation” element of Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim because Defendant’s 
AML, KYC, and KYB policies are not publicly available, and (iv) Plaintiffs cannot 
establish damages.  Id. at 27–30.  Further, Defendant argues that it is entitled to 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim because (i) it is preempted by the 
Copyright Act, and (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of a duty because 

there is no duty to prevent the conduct of third persons or to prevent a third party’s 
economic loss.  Id. at 31–32.  Finally, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary 


8  Defendant  also  argues  that  that  Plaintiffs  do  not  plead  a  claim  for  vicarious 
infringement.  ECF No. [83] at 25–26.  Plaintiffs do not address this argument in 
their Response, nor do they direct the Court to any evidence that establishes that 
Defendant can be liable under a theory of vicarious infringement.  See generally, ECF 
No. [88].  Accordingly, Plaintiffs have implicitly conceded that Count I cannot be 
based on vicarious infringement and, therefore, the Court does not consider this 
argument in its analysis below.                                           
judgment  on  the  issue  of  damages  and  injunctive  relief  because  (i)  there  is  no 
admissible evidence that Plaintiffs suffered lost profits as a result of Defendant’s 
alleged conduct, and (ii) Plaintiffs fail to establish copyright liability as a matter of 

law.  Id. at 32–38.                                                       
   In their Response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has 
not properly established the lack of a genuine issue of material fact for each of 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  See generally ECF No. [88].  Plaintiffs argue that Defendant is a 
payment  processor  and  can  be  held  liable  for  contributory  infringement  for 
facilitating payments to Israel TV, and that Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to 

show that Defendant materially contributes to Israel TV’s infringement.  Id. at 18–
19.  Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant’s ability to take “simple measures” to prevent 
facilitating  payments  to  Israel  TV  further  demonstrates  that  it  contributes  to 
infringement, and that its platform is not capable of non-infringing use.  Id.  at 21–
26.  With respect to their FDUTPA claim, Plaintiffs argue that (i) the claim is not 
preempted, (ii) the TOU improperly misleads users to believing that Defendant 
monitors copyright infringement, and (iii) Plaintiffs have sufficiently established 

their damages through expert reports.  Id. at 27–28.  Plaintiffs also argue that their 
negligence claim is not preempted and that Defendant’s AML and KYC policies, as 
well as the TOU, support Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.  Id. at 28–29.  Lastly, Plaintiffs 
argue that they have sufficiently established damages.  Id. at 30–35.     
   In Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law, it further argues that it is 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim based 
on  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Cox  Communications,  Inc.  v.  Sony  Music 
Entertainment, 

607 U.S. __

, 

146 S. Ct. 959

 (2026).  ECF No. [127].  Specifically, 
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite intent to support a 

contributory infringement claim because (i) Defendant does not induce Israel TV’s 
alleged infringement, and (ii) Defendant’s service is not tailored to infringement.  Id. 
at  3–5.    In  Plaintiffs’  Supplemental  Memorandum  of  Law,  they  argue  that 
Defendant’s  conduct  satisfies  both  the  “inducing  infringement”  and  “tailored  to 
infringement” forms of intent, as set forth in Cox, to support their contributory 
infringement claim.  ECF No. [126] at 3–4.                                

III.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                    
   Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322

 (1986).  A genuine issue of material fact is one with “a 
real basis in the record” such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
non-movant.”  Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 

588 F.3d 1291, 1303

 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 

9 F.3d 913, 919

 (11th Cir. 1993)); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 249

 (1986).  Speculation cannot create a genuine 
issue  of  material  fact  sufficient  to  defeat  a well-supported  motion  for  summary 
judgment.  Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 

419 F.3d 1169, 1181

 (11th Cir. 2005). 
   The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact.  Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 

929 F.2d 604, 608

 (11th Cir. 1991).  To 
determine  whether  the  movant  has  met  this  burden,  courts  view  the  movant’s 
evidence and all factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the non-movant.  Denney v. City of Albany, 

247 F.3d 1172

, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 

178 F.3d 1175, 1187

 (11th Cir. 1999)).  As to 

issues on which the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, it is 
sufficient for the movant to highlight a failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the non-movant’s case.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.           
   Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact that 
precludes summary judgment.  Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 

284 F.3d 1237, 1243

 (11th Cir. 

2002);  see  also  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(e).    “If  reasonable  minds  could  differ  on  the 
inferences  arising  from  undisputed  facts,  then  a  court  should  deny  summary 
judgment.”  Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 

975 F.2d 1518, 1534

 (11th 
Cir. 1992).  But if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact 
to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary 
judgment is proper.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587

 (1986).                                                               

   “A court need not permit a case to go to a jury[ ] when the inferences that are 
drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relied, are “implausible.”  
Mize  v.  Jefferson  City  Bd.  Of  Educ.,  

93 F.3d 739, 743

  (11th  Cir.  1996)  (citing 
Matsushita  Elec.  Indus.  Co.,  475  U.S.  at  592–94).    “Where  the  evidence  is 
circumstantial, a court may grant summary judgment when it concludes that no 
reasonable jury may infer from the assumed facts the conclusion upon which the non-
movant’s claim rests.”  

Id.

                                               
IV.  ANALYSIS                                                           
    A.  Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count I.           

   Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 
Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim of contributory infringement.  ECF No. [83] at 10–
17.  Defendant asserts that the record contains no evidence of direct infringement, 
and that Defendant does not materially contribute to any infringement by Israel TV.  

Id.

 at 10–14. Defendant further asserts that the MoonPay platform is capable of 
substantial non-infringing use.  

Id.

 at 14–16.  In addition, Defendant asserts that it 
does not “induce or encourage” any infringement by Israel TV and that its services 

are not “tailored to infringement”.  

Id.

 at 15–16.                        
   “A claim for contributory copyright infringement has two elements: “(i) direct 
infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement.” Microsoft Corp. v. 
Guirguis, No. 20-cv-24514, 

2022 WL 1664181

, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2022) (citing 
Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 

902 F.2d 829

, 845 (11th Cir. 
1990) (explaining that “[c]ontributory infringement necessarily must follow a finding 

of direct or primary infringement”).                                      
   As for the first element, to prove direct infringement, a plaintiff must show “(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work 
that are original.”  Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 

601 F.3d 1224

, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 
2010).  Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not shown direct infringement because 
they have not provided sufficient evidence that they own a valid copyright.  ECF No. 
[83] at 19.  The only evidence Plaintiffs offer to prove that they own the relevant 
copyrights are two declarations: one which contains only a conclusory assertion that 
Plaintiffs  “own[]  a  valid  U.S.  copyright  for  original  works,  subject  to  copyright 
protection as provided in the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976,” and another which merely 

identifies the name of four copyrighted works available on Israel TV without stating 
that Plaintiffs own the copyright to those works.  ECF No. [89-7] ¶7; ECF No. [89-8] 
¶13.  In its Reply, Defendant offers evidence that the U.S. Copyright Office Public 
Records System does not reflect that any of the four works identified in Plaintiffs’ 
supporting  declaration  are  registered,  copyrighted  works  belonging  to 
Plaintiffs.  ECF No. [91-6].                                              

   As to the first prong, Plaintiffs’ evidence is quite thin.  And although it is well-
settled that a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to survive summary judgment., 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 252

 (1986) (“The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there 
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”),the 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-movants.  
As such, the Court finds that as to this first issue there is a disputed issue of fact as 

to whether Plaintiffs own a valid copyright for the works available on Israel TV.  
   However,  summary  judgment  is  nevertheless  appropriate  because,  as 
explained below, there is an absence of evidence from which a reasonable juror could 
find that Defendant had the intent required for contributory liability and, thus, the 
second element is not satisfied.   During the pendency of the Motion, the Supreme 
Court  clarified  in  Cox  Communications,  Inc.  v.  Sony  Music  Entertainment,  the 
standard for the second element of a contributory infringement claim.  146 S. Ct. at 
967.  The Court explained that “[t]he provider of a service is contributorily liable for 
the user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for 

infringement.”  Id.  “The intent required for contributory liability can be shown only 
if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that 
infringement.”  Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 

545 U.S. 913, 930

 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 

464 U.S. 417

, 
440–41 (1984)).                                                           
   Plaintiffs  assert  that  Defendant’s  conduct  satisfies  both  the  “inducing 

infringement” and “tailored to infringement” forms of intent set forth in Cox.  ECF 
No. [126] at 2.  Defendant, however, asserts that there is no evidence to support that 
it induced Israel TV’s alleged infringement and that its service is not tailored to 
infringement.  ECF No. [127] at 3–5.  As explained below, the Court agrees with 
Defendant.                                                                
     1.  There is Insufficient Evidence from Which a Reasonable Juror   
        Could Find that Defendant “Induced Infringement.”               

   For  purposes  of  a  contributory  infringement  claim,  “[a]  provider  induces 
infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts[,]” such as 
promoting, marketing, or advertising its service as a tool to infringe copyrights.  Cox, 
146 S. Ct. at 967 (citing Grokster, 

545 U.S. at 942

 (holding that a jury could find two 
file-sharing companies liable for inducement where the companies promoted and 
marketed their software as a tool to infringe copyrights and the “principal object” of 
their business models “was use of their software to download copyrighted works”); see 
also Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 

222 U.S. 55

, 62–63 (1911) (finding liability where 
“[t]he defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films” 
for infringement of an author’s copyright); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 

224 U.S. 1, 49

 

(1912) (finding liability because the sale was made “with the purpose and intent” that 
the objected be used for patent infringement), overruled on other grounds, Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 

243 U.S. 502, 518

 (1917)).   
   As in Cox, “[Defendant] did not ‘induce’ or ‘encourage’ its [users] to infringe in 
any manner.”  Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 968.  Like the plaintiff in Cox, “[Plaintiffs] provided 
no ‘evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote’ infringement.”  

Id. (quoting Grokster, 

545 U.S. at 930

).  To the contrary, the undisputed evidence 
reflects that Defendant has no affirmative contact with Israel TV or its subscribers 
to be able to induce or encourage the infringement.  See ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 
14; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14.  For example, it is undisputed that Defendant 
(i) does not provide software or personnel to Israel TV; (ii) does not host, store, display 
control  or  distribute  Israel  TV’s  content  (or  Plaintiffs’);  (iii)  does  not  have  any 
independent, non-public knowledge of Israel TV’s content; (iv) does not receive any 

payments from or on behalf of Israel TV; and (v) has never communicated with Israel 
TV.  See ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14.  In 
addition,  Defendant discouraged  copyright  infringement  through  various  means, 
such  including  a  prohibition  against  copyright  infringement  in  its  TOU  and 
“blacklisting” web domains identified by Plaintiffs as belonging to Israel TV or its 
alleged intermediary.  ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 27, 50–51; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 27, 50–51.     
   Plaintiffs  argue  that  Defendant’s  “conduct  demonstrates  affirmative 
encouragement” because Defendant disabled an API key, “watched the infringement 
stop, and then allowed the pipeline to flow again” by refusing to continue disabling 

API keys. ECF No. [126] at 3.9  However, this argument is foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court’s  “repeated  admonition  that  contributory  liability  cannot  rest  only  on  a 
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it.”  Cox, 146 
S. Ct. at 969 (citing Kalem Co., 

222 U.S. at 62

 (explaining that “mere indifferent 
supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller” that the buyer will use the product 
unlawfully is “not enough” to make the seller liable for the buyer’s conduct); Sony, 

464 U.S. at 439

 (explaining that “[t]here is no precedent in the law of copyright” for 
liability  based  only  “on  the  fact  that  [the  defendant  has]  sold  equipment  with 
constructive knowledge of the fact that [its] customers may use that equipment to 
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material”); Grokster, 

545 U.S. at 939, n.12

 
(confirming that “a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability 
merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement”)).   
   In short, there is insufficient record evidence for a reasonable juror to find that 

Defendant induced infringement.  Thus, absent any evidence that Defendant’s service 
is tailored to infringement, Plaintiffs’ claim of contributory copyright infringement 
cannot stand.                                                             



9 It is undisputed that Israel TV found another API key to use less than forty-eight 
hours after Defendant disabled the API key.  ECF No. [84] ¶ 55.           
     2.  The Record Evidence Establishes that Defendant’s Services are  
        Not “Tailored to Infringement.”                                 

   “A service is tailored to infringement if it is ‘not capable of “substantial” or 
“commercially significant” noninfringing uses.’”  Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967 (quoting 
Grokster, 

545 U.S. at 942

 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Sony, 

464 U.S. at 442

 
(concluding that a tape recorder “is capable of substantial noninfringing uses”—like 
personal use—so “sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute 
contributory infringement” despite the fact that customers may use the tape recorder 
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material).  Simply put, to be tailored to 
infringement, the service must be “‘good for nothing else’ but infringement.”  Grokster, 

545 U.S. at 932

.                                                          
   Here,  as  in  Cox,  Defendant’s  service  is  “clearly  capable  of  substantial  or 
commercially significant noninfringing uses.”  Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967 (quotation marks 

omitted).    Indeed,  Plaintiffs  do  not  dispute  that  “MoonPay’s  [cryptocurrency 
exchange] platform and services … are capable of being used for non-infringing 
purposes.”  ECF No. [84] ¶ 66; ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 66 (disputing only that “MoonPay’s 
platform is designed to be used for infringing purposes” and failing to dispute that 
the platform is capable of being used or non-infringing purposes); see also ECF No. 
[88-1] ¶ 19 (Plaintiffs stating that, “MoonPay offers users the ability to exchange (1) 
traditional  currencies  for  cryptocurrency;  (2)  cryptocurrency  for  traditional 

currencies; and (3) one cryptocurrency for another cryptocurrency”).      
   Notwithstanding,  Plaintiffs  contend  that  “MoonPay’s  widget,  as  deployed 
through Israel TV’s payment flow is ‘especially adapted’ for infringement” because 
“[t]he widget operates as a turnkey payment mechanism configured with prefilled 
subscription amounts and wallet addresses to consummate transactions for pirated 
content.”  ECF No. [126] at 4.  This argument ignores the standard set forth in Cox, 

which asks only whether the service is capable of noninfringing use.  See 146 S. Ct. 
at 967.  Plaintiffs further contend that “[Defendant] has submitted no evidence that 
is platform is used for substantial noninfringing purposes[,]” such as “user testimony, 
marketing materials, or evidence of what users do with purchased cryptocurrency.”  
ECF No. [126] at 4.  Again, this argument misapprehends Cox. The inquiry turns on 
capability, not actual use, so the absence of evidence about how users in fact utilized 

the platform does not bear on the tailoring analysis.  Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967.   
   Because  the  undisputed  record  establishes  that  Defendant’s  services  are 
capable of “substantial” or “commercially significant” noninfringing uses, the Court 
finds that Defendant’s services are not tailored to infringement.  Indeed, the record 
is devoid of evidence supporting either an inducement or tailoring theory of intent, as 
required under Cox to sustain a claim for contributory copyright infringement.10  
   Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ 

contributory infringement claim, and its Motion is GRANTED as to Count I. 
    B.  Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count II.          
   Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim also fails as a matter of law.  
ECF No. [83] at 27.  Defendant offers four reasons in support of its argument: (i) 


10 Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendant’s argument regarding 
material contribution.                                                    
Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, (ii) there is no evidence 
that Defendant’s TOU is deceptive, (iii) the record evidence  cannot support the 
“causation” element of Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim because Defendant’s AML, KYC, 

and KYB policies are not publicly available, and (iv) Plaintiffs cannot establish 
damages.   As explained below, the Court concludes that while Plaintiffs’ FDUTA 
claim is not preempted, there is insufficient evidence to support the first two elements 
of a FDUTPA claim, namely a deceptive or unfair practice and causation.11   
     1.  The Copyright Act Does Not Preempt Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA Claim.   
   Defendant  argues  that  Plaintiffs’  FDUTPA claim is  preempted  by  federal 

copyright law.  The Copyright Act “preempts all state causes of action based on a 
right found in the Act or an equivalent to such a right.”  Foley v. Luster, 

249 F.3d 1281, 1285

 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 

17 U.S.C. § 301

(a)).  As the Eleventh Circuit 
explained, “Section 301 in effect establishes a two-pronged test to be applied in 
preemption cases,” namely, (i) “whether the rights at issue fall within the ‘subject 
matter of copyright’ set forth in sections 102 and 103 [of the Act]” and (ii) “whether 
the rights at issue are ‘equivalent to’ the exclusive rights of section 106 [of the Act].”  

Crow v. Wainwright, 

720 F.2d 1224

, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 1983).  With respect to the 
second prong, the Eleventh Circuit employs the “extra element” test, which asks 
whether  “an  extra  element  is  required  instead  of  or  in  addition  to  the  acts  of 
reproduction, performance, distribution or display,” such that the extra element 


11 Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendant’s arguments regarding 
damages.                                                                  
“changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different” from a copyright 
infringement or, in this case, a contributory infringement claim.  Foley, 249 F.3d at 
1285–86; see also Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226–27.  If an extra element exists, then the 

state law claim is not preempted.  

Id.

  In short, the Act “preempts only those state 
law rights that may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one 
of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law.”  Foley, 

249 F.3d at 1285

 
(quoting Comp. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 

982 F.2d 693, 716

 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
   Here, neither prong of Section 301 preemption is satisfied.  As to the first 
prong, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is not based on Defendant’s alleged contribution to 

Israel TV’s copyright infringement.  ECF No. [40] at 19–23.  Rather, it is based on 
Defendant’s  allegedly  deceptive  representations  in  their  TOU,  AML,  and  KYC 
policies.   

Id.

  As such, the “rights at issue” in Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim do not “fall 
within the subject matter of copyright” because the FDUTPA claim does not allege 
that Defendant’s conduct violates Plaintiffs’ rights in their copyrighted works.   
   Even if the first prong was met, the second prong is not.  To state a claim for 
direct  copyright  infringement  under  the  Copyright  Act,  “two  elements  must  be 

proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of 
the work that are original.”  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 

499 U.S. 340, 361

 (1991).  A claim for contributory copyright infringement likewise has two 
elements: “(i) direct infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement.” 
Microsoft Corp. v. Guirguis, No. 20-cv-24514, 

2022 WL 1664181

, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. 
March 30, 2022).  By contrast, “[t]he elements of a FDUTPA claim are: ‘(1) a deceptive 
act or unfair trade practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.’” Gov. Emp. Ins. 
Co. v. Right Spinal Clinic, No. 23-11778, 

2024 WL 4564168

, at * 9 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 
2024) (quoting Dolphin LLC v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 

715 F.3d 1243, 1250

 (11th Cir. 

2013)).                                                                   
   It is evident that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim requires proof of an additional 
element, namely that Defendant’s TOU and AML, KYC, and KYB policies contain 
deceptive representations.  Indeed, each of the elements of a FDUTPA claim (i.e., 
deceptive act, causation and damages) require Plaintiffs to provide evidence distinct 
from a copyright claim.  As such, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is qualitatively distinct 

and, therefore, has “extra elements” for purposes of Section 301 preemption.  See 
Foley,  

249 F.3d at 1286

;  TushBaby,  Inc.  v.  Shiaon,  No.  24-cv-21136,  

2024 WL 5054925

, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024) (determining that FDUTPA claim was not 
preempted because “the deception allegation is an ‘extra element’ of the FDUTPA 
claim not necessary to prove the copyright infringement claim”).  For these reasons, 
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is not preempted.  See Crow, 720 
F.2d at 1225–26; see also Ediciones Musicales Y Representaciones Internacionales, 

S.A. v. San Martin, 

582 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361

 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Unlike a claim for 
copyright  infringement,  this  particular  claim  requires  the  ‘extra  element’  of  a 
deceptive act or unfair practice.”).                                      
     2.  There is Insufficient Evidence from Which a Reasonable Juror   
        Could Find that the First and Second Elements of a FDUTPA       
        Claim Are Satisfied.                                            
   Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence to support 
that it has any “unfair” or “deceptive” practices, or that such practices caused harm 
to consumers.  ECF No. [83] at 28.  On this point, the Court agrees.  “[D]eception 
occurs if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” 

Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 

480 F.3d 1281, 1284

 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 

842 So. 2d 773, 777

 (Fla. 2003)); see also Angelo 
v. Parker, 

275 So. 3d 752, 755

 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (stating that a deceptive practice 
is  a  practice  that  is  likely  to  mislead  consumers  acting  reasonably  in  the 
circumstances, to the consumers’ detriment).  Whether an act is deceptive or unfair 
may be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Zlotnick, 

480 F.3d at 1287

; Jones v. TT 

of Longwood, Inc., No. 6:06-cv-651, 

2007 WL 2298020

 *7 (M.D. Fla. August 7, 2007).   
   Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s “policies and [TOU] are deceptive” because 
they “falsely misrepresent[ ]  that [Defendant] prohibits ‘transactions involving items 
that infringe or violate any copyright . . .’” which “misleads customers into believing 
that [Defendant] actively ensures that illegal activities do not occur through their 
platform.”  ECF No. [88] at 28.  This misreads Defendant’s TOU.  The TOU are terms 
that govern a user’s conduct, not Defendant’s own conduct.  They are instructions for 

each user’s use of the platform, as agreed to by each MoonPay user and Defendant.  
See ECF No. [84-15] at 2 (“This Agreement applies to an individual’s use of the 
following  MoonPay  products  and  services.”).    The  TOU  clearly  instructs  each 
MoonPay user to “not use [their] MoonPay Account or any of the Services to engage 
in . . . transactions involving items that infringe or violate any copyright . . . .”  Id.  
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no reasonable 
juror could understand these terms to mean that Defendant is monitoring copyright 
infringement in any way.  Tellingly, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that a 
MoonPay user had such a belief, or was otherwise misled by Defendant’s TOU.  See 

generally  ECF  No.  [88-1].    Absent  evidence  that  Defendant’s  TOU  is  deceptive, 
Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim fails as matter of law.  See e.g.,  Blobner v. R.T.G. Furniture 
Corp.,  No.  8:17-cv-1676,  

2020 WL 13597866

,  at  *  2  (M.D.  Fla.  Jan.  8,  2020) 
(“[Plaintiffs’] FDUTPA claims fail as a matter of law because there is no evidence of 
a deceptive act or unfair trade practice.”); Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 

823 F.3d 977

, 
983–84 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Florida law) (recognizing that for purposes of a 

FDUTPA claim, the alleged practice must be likely to deceive).            
   As for Defendant’s KYC, KYB and AML policies, it is undisputed that these 
policies are not available to the public.  See ECF No. [84] ¶62; ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 62.  
“To establish a violation of the FDUTPA, the plaintiff must show that ‘the practice 
was likely to deceive a consumer acting reasonably in the same circumstances.’” Pfeil 
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 

284 F. App’x 640, 643

 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting State v. 
Wyndham  Int'l,  Inc.,  

869 So.2d 592, 598

  (Fla.App.2004));  see  also,  Cold  Stone 

Creamery, Inc. v. Lenora Foods I, LLC, 

332 F. App’x 565, 567

 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that for a FDUTPA claim, “the plaintiff must prove that ‘the alleged 
practice  was  likely  to  deceive  a  consumer  acting  reasonably  in  the  same 
circumstances.’”) (quoting Office of the Att’y Gen. v. Com. Com. Leasing, LLC, 

946 So.2d 1253, 1258

 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)).  Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that 
Defendant’s internal policies are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer given that 
consumers are not privy to those policies.  Stated differently, a reasonable consumer 
cannot be deceived into believing that Defendant is complying with its AML, KYC, 
and KYB policies when the consumer necessarily has no awareness of those policies. 

As such, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the causation element of their FDUTPA claim 
because consumers have no access to such policies.                        
   Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ 
FDUTPA claim, and Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to Count II.           
    C.  Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count IV.          
   Defendant  argues  that  it  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment  on  Plaintiffs’ 
negligence  claim  because  (i)  Plaintiffs’  negligence  claim  is  preempted  by  the 

Copyright Act, and (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of a duty.  ECF No. 
[83]  at  31–32.    As  explained  below,  the  Court  concludes  that  while  Plaintiff’s 
negligence claim is not preempted, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of 
a legal duty as required to prevail on their negligence claim.            
     1.  The  Copyright  Act  Does  Not  Preempt  Plaintiffs’  Negligence 
        Claim.                                                          

   As explained above, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a two-prong test to 
determine whether the Copyright Act preempts a state law cause of action, namely 
(i) “whether the rights at issue fall within the ‘subject matter of copyright’ set forth 
in  sections  102  and  103  [of  the  Act]”  and  (ii)  “whether  the  rights  at  issue  are 
‘equivalent to’ the exclusive rights of section 106 [of the Act].”  Crow, 720 F.2d at 
1225–27.  Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs’ negligence claim relies on the same 
set of allegations as its contributory infringement claim.”  Id. at 31.  However, the 
basis of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is that Defendant breached its alleged duty “not 
to knowingly allow its platform to be used for illegal activities” and “not to make 
material misrepresentations on its website that would lead Plaintiffs and other 

consumers to believe it is complying with KYC and KYB regulations.”  ECF No. [40] 
¶¶ 68–69.  As with their FDUTPA claim, the “rights at issue” in Plaintiffs’ negligence 
claim do not “fall within the subject matter of copyright.”  Crow, 720 F.2d at 1225–
26.  Thus, the first element of Section 301 preemption is not met.        
   Once again, even if the first prong was met, the second prong is not.  A claim 
for negligence under Florida law has four elements: (1) duty, (2) a breach of that duty, 

(3) causation, and (4) damages.  See Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 

680 F.3d 1329, 1339

  (11th  Cir.  2012).    As  discussed  above,  a  claim  for  copyright  infringement 
requires that a plaintiff show (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original, Feist Publications, 

499 U.S. at 361

,  and  a  claim  for  contributory  infringement  has  two  elements:  (i)  direct 
infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement, Guirguis, 

2022 WL 1664181

, at *9.  Plaintiffs’ negligence claim requires proof of qualitatively different 

elements (i.e., duty, breach, causation, and damages) than those in a copyright claim.  
Compare Foley, 

249 F.3d at 1286

 (finding that the breach of duty essential to a trade 
secret case is an extra element that qualitatively distinguishes those claims from 
copyright claims) with Millennium Funding, Inc. v. 1701 Mgmt. LLC, 

576 F. Supp. 3d 1192

, 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (holding that state law claims for negligence and fraud 
were preempted by the Copyright Act where the copyright infringement claim relied 
on allegations of false statements).12  Stated differently, Plaintiffs’ negligence claim 
requires proof of elements beyond mere reproduction or distribution of copyrighted 
works and, therefore, is not preempted.                                   

     2.  Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish the Existence of a Legal Duty 
        as Required to Prevail on Their Negligence Claim.               

   Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails as a matter of law 
because there is no duty to prevent the conduct of third persons or to prevent a third 
party’s economic loss. ECF No. [83] at 31–32.  More specifically, Defendant argues 
that it has no duty to police third party infringement, and that such infringement is 
an intervening cause of the damages Plaintiffs allege.  Id.   In their Response, 
Plaintiffs argue that the relevant duty is Defendant’s “duty to not misrepresent to its 
users and prospective users that it was disallowing and stopping illicit activity.”  ECF 
No. [88] at 28–29.  Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant’s policies are “toothless and 
cannot…be relied upon.” Id.                                               
   Under Florida law, a claim for negligence requires proof of “a duty, breach of 
that duty, causation, and damages.” Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 

680 F.3d at 1339

.  
The existence of a duty is a question of law, rather than a question of fact for the jury.  

Id.

  Florida law establishes that a duty may arise from four general sources: “(1) 
legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of 
such enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising 

from the general facts of the case.”  Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 

873 So. 2d 1182

, 

12 Here, Plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim does not rely upon Defendant’s 
alleged misrepresentations.  See ECF No. [40] at 18.                      
1185 (Fla. 2003); see also Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., 

161 So.3d 384, 389

 (Fla. 
2015).  Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is not rooted in any of these four sources.   
   Plaintiffs do not allege, or even argue, that Defendant’s alleged duty arises 

from  any  legislative  enactments  or  administration  regulations,  or  judicial 
interpretations thereof.  See generally, ECF Nos. [40], [88].  Similarly, Plaintiffs do 
not identify any caselaw that creates the alleged duty that Defendant purportedly 
breached.  

Id.

  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Response is devoid of a single legal citation that 
establishes the existence of the duties alleged in Count IV.13  ECF No. [88] at 29.  To 
be sure, Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully address Defendant’s argument.  

Id.

   

   At best, Plaintiffs’ Response argues that their negligence claim falls within the 
fourth source, namely “a duty arising from the general facts of the case.”  However, 
this argument also fails.  “[W]hen the duty is rooted in the fourth prong, factual 
inquiry into the existence of a duty is limited to whether the defendant’s conduct 
foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to 
others.” Limones, 

161 So.3d at 389

 (internal citations omitted).  However, “a legal 
duty is not established by evidence of foreseeability alone.” Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 

878 So. 2d 392, 396

 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).  “There must also be some evidence that the risk 
was created by the alleged negligence of the defendant.”  

Id. at 397

.     


13 Plaintiffs cite Bass v. Facebook, Inc., a non-binding decision issued by the Northern 
District of California under the motion to dismiss standard where the court found 
that allegations the defendant owed a duty to protect its own users’ personal data 
from foreseeable harm of disclosure stated a claim for relief.  

394 F. Supp. 1024, 1039

 
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2019). The facts and procedural posture of this action are wholly 
inapposite to Bass.                                                       
   In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “has a duty not to 
knowingly allow its platform to be used for illegal activities,” and “a duty not to make 
material misrepresentations on its website that would lead Plaintiffs and other 

consumers to believe it is complying with KYC and KYB regulations.”  ECF No. [40] 
¶¶  68–69.    Plaintiffs  make  no  argument  as  to  how  Defendant’s  cryptocurrency 
conversion platform creates a risk of harm to consumers who seek to subscribe to 
Israel TV, particularly given the absence of evidence that Defendant induces or 
encourages them to do so.  Further, Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence that 
shows how Defendant’s internal KYC and KYB policies14 foreseeably created any risk 

to consumers, when Defendant’s KYC and KYB policies are not available to the 
public.    Given  that  these  are  internal  documents,  Defendant’s  purported 
misrepresentations on its website could not have “foreseeably created a broader zone 
of risk” that the public would be harmed by believing that Defendant was complying 
with its KYC and KYB policies.  As such, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the 
existence of a legal duty as required to prevail on their negligence claim.  
   Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as matter of law on Plaintiffs’ 

negligence claim, and its Motion is therefore GRANTED as to Count IV.     
V.   CONCLUSION                                                         
   For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
ECF No. [82], is GRANTED.  The Court will separately enter final judgment in favor 


14  In  their  Amended  Complaint,  Plaintiffs’  negligence  claim  references  only 
Defendant’s KYC and KYB policies. See ECF No. [40] ¶¶ 67–72.              
of Defendant MoonPay USA LLC.   The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case, and 
any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 
 DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 13th day of July, 2026. 

                            JACQUHLINE BECERRA 
                            UNITEDYSTATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

                                   29