Tracktime, LLC v. amazon.com Services LLC

Case: 24-1102   Document: 50     Page: 1   Filed: 07/02/2026




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  TRACKTIME, LLC,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

   AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, AUDIBLE, INC.,
             Defendants-Appellees
            ______________________

                       2024-1102
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 District of Delaware in No. 1:18-cv-01518-MN, Judge
 Maryellen Noreika.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: July 2, 2026
                 ______________________

     ROBERT GREENSPOON, Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig
 PLLC, Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also
 represented by WILLIAM W. FLACHSBART.

    J. DAVID HADDEN, Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain
 View, CA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also repre-
 sented by RAVI RAGAVENDRA RANGANATH, SAINA S.
 SHAMILOV; TODD RICHARD GREGORIAN, San Francisco, CA;
 MELANIE LYNE MAYER, JONATHAN THOMAS MCMICHAEL,
 Seattle, WA.
                ______________________
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50     Page: 2    Filed: 07/02/2026




 2                TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




  Before PROST and TARANTO, Circuit Judges, and KOVNER,
                     District Judge. 1
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
      TrackTime, LLC owns U.S. Patent Nos. 8,856,638 and
 8,862,978, which it asserted against Amazon.com Services
 LLC and several other entities (collectively, Amazon) in an
 infringement action it filed in the United States District
 Court for the District of Delaware. TrackTime’s patents
 claim methods and systems for use on a mobile device to
 navigate within a multimedia file by using a time-corre-
 lated transcript. For the ’978 patent, the district court con-
 strued two limitations of the asserted claims—reciting, for
 mobile devices, “executable program code configured to fa-
 cilitate annotation” and “executable program code config-
 ured to synchronously play . . . multimedia”—as means-
 plus-function claim terms subject to 

35 U.S.C. § 112

(f), and
 it then held the asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness
 because the patent’s written description has inadequate
 disclosure of structure corresponding to those terms.
 TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-1518,
 

2021 WL 2823163

, at *5–8 (D. Del. July 7, 2021) (Claim
 Construction Order). For the ’638 patent, the only claim
 now at issue is claim 9, which a jury found to be invalid and
 also not infringed, and the district court denied post-trial
 motions to set aside the verdict. TrackTime, LLC v. Ama-
 zon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-1518, 

2024 WL 4300101

, at *3–14
 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2024) (JMOL Decision). TrackTime ap-
 peals.
     Regarding the ’978 patent, TrackTime argues that the
 disputed “executable program code” limitations should not
 be treated as § 112(f) means-plus-function terms under the



     1  Honorable Rachel P. Kovner, District Judge,
 United States District Court for the Eastern District of
 New York, sitting by designation.
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 3    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                    3



 approach set forth in our decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target
 Corp., 

28 F.4th 1360

 (Fed. Cir. 2022), which issued after
 the district court ruled on the matter in this case. We agree
 to this extent: Further analysis of the issue is warranted in
 light of our intervening precedent. Because the needed
 analysis may benefit from new factual as well as legal sub-
 missions, we vacate the district court’s indefiniteness rul-
 ing and remand for further proceedings to determine
 whether § 112(f) applies (and, if so, is satisfied).
     Regarding the ’638 patent, TrackTime challenges the
 judgment on the verdict on several grounds. We affirm the
 judgment of invalidity under 

35 U.S.C. § 102

 for anticipa-
 tion. We need not address TrackTime’s other challenges.
                               I
                               A
     The ’978 and ’638 patents share a specification in all
 respects material here. Unless otherwise indicated, we cite
 only the ’978 patent’s specification.
     The specification addresses navigating, on a mobile de-
 vice, through multimedia files containing audible words.
 See ’978 patent, col. 3, line 54, through col. 4, line 5. For a
 given multimedia file, the specification describes creating
 a “synchronization index,” i.e., a transcript indicating, by
 an accompanying time specification, “when a word or range
 of words is audible in the multimedia.” 

Id.,

 col. 3, lines 54–
 63. The index makes possible “tap-to-jump” functionality
 (TrackTime Opening Br. at 2): When a synchronization in-
 dex is displayed on a user’s touch-sensitive mobile device,
 the user can tap a portion of the text to play the correspond-
 ing portion of the multimedia file. ’978 patent, col. 1, lines
 58–62; col. 33, lines 47–53; col. 40, lines 20–27. The user
 also can annotate the synchronization index (e.g., with
 color-coded highlighting or the user’s comments) and can
 then share the annotated synchronization index with
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 4     Filed: 07/02/2026




 4                TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 others. 

Id.,

 col. 64, lines 42–53; see also 

id.,

 col. 49, lines
 12–38.
      The specification discloses that “transcript manage-
 ment utilities” existed in the prior art, 

id.,

 col. 6, lines 1–
 14, and that there were known methods for making syn-
 chronization indices, 

id.,

 col. 8, lines 5–15, for using the in-
 dex to navigate to a position in a multimedia file and
 playing the located content, 

id.,

 col. 8, lines 47–61, and for
 annotating transcripts, 

id.,

 col. 6, lines 38–55. But the
 specification identifies two limitations of the prior-art
 methods: First, “some transcript management utilities”
 could only “operate on a full version of Microsoft Windows,”
 which the specification calls “unsuitable for mobile compu-
 ting devices,” 

id.,

 col. 6, lines 11–17; second, the functions
 of creating a synchronization index, annotating it, and us-
 ing it to navigate multimedia, among others, were scat-
 tered across “disparate software applications,” 

id.,

 col. 8,
 lines 15–22; see 

id.,

 col. 11, lines 39–57.
     The specification proposes to “solve . . . these shortcom-
 ings” by providing a “synchronization index and software
 suited for use on a mobile computing device” facilitating
 “convenient navigation” and “annotation,” among other ca-
 pabilities. 

Id.,

 col. 11, lines 15–38; see 

id.,

 col. 3, line 54,
 through col. 4, line 5. In one embodiment of the assertedly
 inventive system, a mobile computing device communi-
 cates with a web application for transcript management.
 See 

id.,

 col. 27, lines 19–40. The web application includes
 several kinds of “logic,” including “annotation and edit
 logic” and “video, display, and playlist logic.” 

Id.,

 col. 27,
 lines 27–35; 

id.,

 fig. 6. The mobile computing device, in
 turn, has its own software (including “logic”) for communi-
 cating with the web application, synchronously playing
 multimedia with a scrolling transcript, navigating by using
 the transcript, and annotating the transcript, among other
 functions. See 

id.,

 col. 32, line 37, through col. 38, line 59.
Case: 24-1102   Document: 50      Page: 5    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                  5



     The claims most relevant to this appeal are claims 1
 and 2 of the ’978 patent and claim 9 of the ’638 patent.
 Claims 1 and 2 of the ’978 patent are shown here:
    1. A method for social networking with a mobile
    computing device comprising:
    providing for use on a mobile computing device a
    synchronization index, wherein said synchroniza-
    tion index is associated to multimedia, wherein the
    synchronization index comprises an electronic
    transcript that indicates text corresponding to au-
    dio from the multimedia, and wherein the synchro-
    nization index indicates respective times within
    the multimedia corresponding to when a word or
    range of words is audible in the multimedia;
    providing mobile computing device software,
    wherein said mobile computing device software
    comprises executable program code configured to
    receive the synchronization index, and wherein
    said text is able to be displayed other than as a web
    page,
    wherein said mobile computing device comprises a
    viewing screen and a touch-sensitive input inter-
    face,
    wherein said viewing screen is able to display mul-
    timedia and text from said synchronization index,
    wherein performing a user’s selected gesture on a
    portion of said viewing screen corresponding to a
    portion of said text is recognized by said touch-sen-
    sitive input interface to facilitate annotation of a
    portion of said synchronization index, and
    wherein said mobile computing device soft-
    ware comprises executable program code
    configured to facilitate annotation of a por-
    tion of said synchronization index responsive
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 6      Filed: 07/02/2026




 6               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




     to user input received by the mobile compu-
     ting device; and
     communicating said annotation for subsequent re-
     trieval on a second computing device via a network.
     2. The method of claim 1, wherein said mobile
     computing device software comprises execut-
     able program code configured to synchro-
     nously play said associated multimedia with
     said synchronization index other than as part
     of a web page.
 

Id.,

 col. 64, lines 23–57 (emphases added).
     Claim 9 of the ’638 patent is reproduced here:
     9. A method for a multimedia seek sequence using
     a synchronization index and a mobile computing
     device comprising the steps:
     displaying on a mobile computing device text from
     a synchronization index, wherein said synchroniza-
     tion index comprises respective times within mul-
     timedia corresponding to a word or range of words
     and wherein said text is displayed other than as a
     web page;
     wherein said mobile computing device comprises a
     viewing screen and a touch-sensitive input inter-
     face;
     receiving information indicating a user’s selected
     mobile computing device touch-sensitive input in-
     terface gesture performed on a portion of said view-
     ing screen corresponding to a word, or range of
     words, from said synchronization index, wherein
     said gesture is recognized by said touch-sensitive
     input interface;
     performing a data lookup using said synchroniza-
     tion index, wherein said synchronization index is
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50        Page: 7   Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                    7



     referenced to provide data for a time location t1
     that corresponds to said word or range of words se-
     lected by the recognized gesture; and
     seeking on said mobile computing device multime-
     dia corresponding to said synchronization index,
     and if found, accessing multimedia at t1.
 ’638 patent, col. 65, lines 44–67.
                               B
     TrackTime sued Amazon for infringement of the ’638
 and ’978 patents in the District of Delaware in October
 2018. See J.A. 235. Amazon, as now relevant, contended
 that the asserted claims (claims 1–10, all of which depend
 on claim 1) of the ’978 patent were invalid for indefinite-
 ness, J.A. 1378–84, 1398–99, and that claim 9 of the ’638
 patent was invalid for anticipation by a reference called
 LiveNote, see J.A. 5381.
                               1
      The district court conducted claim-construction pro-
 ceedings that led to a holding of invalidity of the asserted
 claims of the ’978 patent in July 2021. Claim Construction
 Order, at *1. Amazon argued invalidity for indefiniteness
 in two steps. First, Amazon argued, the two “executable
 program code” limitations highlighted above—the mobile-
 device code “configured to facilitate annotation of a portion
 of [the] synchronization index” (claim 1) and “configured to
 synchronously play . . . multimedia” (claim 2)—were
 means-plus-function claim terms under 

35 U.S.C. § 112

(f). 2


     2   The applications that issued as the patents here
 were both filed on December 6, 2013. J.A. 59, 142. The
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) amended § 112
 with respect to “‘any patent application that is filed on or
 after’ September 16, 2012.” D Three Enterprises, LLC
 v. SunModo Corp., 

890 F.3d 1042

, 1045 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 8    Filed: 07/02/2026




 8                TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 Second, Amazon added, indefiniteness followed because
 the specification did not disclose corresponding structure
 for the claimed functions, as required for a § 112(f) term.
 See J.A. 1379–84, 1398–99. In support, Amazon cited the
 declaration of its expert, Dr. Dan Schonfeld, who stated
 that the terms “do not inform a [relevant artisan] what the
 underlying algorithms or instructions are” for the claimed
 code and that the inclusion of a “mobile computing device”
 in the claim did not “provide any additional details . . .
 about the structure performing the recited [ ] function[s].”
 J.A. 1478; see J.A. 1482; J.A. 1379, 1398. TrackTime re-
 plied that the terms were not governed by § 112(f), because,
 according to TrackTime’s expert, Dr. Maneesh Agrawala,
 the terms would have been understood by relevant artisans
 at the time of the invention to refer to specific types of code
 within existing programs, including, for example, the Liv-
 eNote program alleged by Amazon to be anticipatory. See
 J.A. 1385–89, 1400–01 (citing J.A. 1635–44). TrackTime
 also argued that the specification’s disclosures of numerous
 subsidiary functions of the annotation and synchronous-
 play logic described the operation of the claimed code with
 enough specificity that the claims conveyed adequate
 structure to relevant artisans. J.A. 1389–91, 1402–03.
      The district court, in a July 2021 order, agreed with
 Amazon that the “executable program code” limitations are
 means-plus-function terms and that the specification lacks
 adequate disclosure of corresponding structure, so held the
 claims invalid for indefiniteness. Claim Construction Or-
 der, at *5–8. As to whether § 112(f) applied at all, the dis-
 trict court recognized that, because “means” is not used in
 the claims, it presumed that § 112(f) did not apply, but the



 (quoting 

Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4

(c), 

125 Stat. 284

, 296–97
 (2011)). Post-AIA § 112(f) therefore applies here, not its
 pre-AIA predecessor (

35 U.S.C. § 112

 ¶ 6 (2008)), though
 no material difference has been identified in this case.
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 9    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                    9



 court held that the presumption was rebutted. In particu-
 lar, the term “executable program code” (and, similarly, the
 “logic” referred to in the specification), the district court
 reasoned, is merely “generic,” rather than indicating suffi-
 ciently specific structure, and although the specification re-
 fers to prior-art programs, it “does not state that these
 prior art software applications contain the claimed execut-
 able program code.” 

Id.,

 at *5–6. Having held § 112(f) to
 be applicable, the district court then concluded that the
 specification lacks sufficient disclosure of an “algorithm or
 procedure that explains how” the executable program code
 accomplishes the claimed functions. Id., at *7. Accord-
 ingly, it held the claims invalid. See id., at *8.
                               2
      TrackTime tried its case of infringement of the ’638 pa-
 tent to a jury in September 2023. J.A. 265–66. Although
 TrackTime pressed claims 1 and 9, the present appeal re-
 lates only to claim 9. See JMOL Decision, at *1 & n.1,
 *3 & n.3; TrackTime Opening Br. at 3. Amazon disputed
 infringement and also pressed invalidity assertions, invok-
 ing ineligibility, 

35 U.S.C. § 101

, anticipation, § 102, obvi-
 ousness, § 103, and inadequacy of written-description
 support, § 112(a). See J.A. 5379–83.
     The jury rejected the written-description challenge but
 otherwise agreed with Amazon on claim 9—finding no in-
 fringement, anticipation by each of three references, obvi-
 ousness in light of one of those references, and ineligibility.
 J.A. 5379–83. As most relevant now, the jury was pre-
 sented with evidence about LiveNote, a commercial pro-
 gram that is described in three Amazon trial exhibits: a
 written installation guide, tutorial, and user guide. See
 J.A. 8611–9105. The LiveNote user guide describes the
 program as “enabl[ing a user] to organize, view, search,
 and annotate transcripts,” and it highlights two “new fea-
 tures for tablet PCs,” including the ability to “use [a] tablet
 pen to write a note” in an “annotate dialog box” when
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 10    Filed: 07/02/2026




 10               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 “using[ ] . . . a tablet PC.” J.A. 8758, 8762, 8906 (capitali-
 zation altered). Dr. Schonfeld testified based on the user
 guide that “[y]ou can use LiveNote with a desktop PC . . .,
 but you can also use it with . . . a tablet PC [and] if it’s a
 tablet PC, the document makes clear that you can tap on
 the tablet and use it just like any other tablet, instead of
 clicking.” J.A. 6145. Dr. Agrawala disagreed, opining that
 the LiveNote user guide had no disclosure of claim 9’s “ges-
 ture” for navigating a transcript, instead disclosing the use
 of a tablet “just to annotate.” J.A. 6377–78. At trial, Track-
 Time moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of in-
 fringement and no invalidity as to claim 9, which motion
 the district court denied. Trial Transcript, Tracktime
 v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-1518, ECF No. 320 at 904,
 926–27 (D. Del. Oct. 12, 2023). The jury found, among
 other things, that claim 9 was anticipated by LiveNote.
 J.A. 5381.
     Following the jury’s verdict, TrackTime renewed its
 motion for JMOL and moved for a new trial. J.A. 6631–56.
 Regarding LiveNote, TrackTime argued that it was enti-
 tled to judgment of no anticipation because “[t]he evidence
 showed that LiveNote only discloses a tablet PC for . . . text
 annotations . . ., not to navigate multimedia and not using
 human touch gestures,” and it “indisputably used a big
 desktop CPU, with [Microsoft] Windows, for its playback
 operations, not a mobile device.” J.A. 6643–44. “For the
 same reasons,” TrackTime contended, it should at least re-
 ceive a new trial because the verdict went “against the
 great weight of the evidence.” J.A. 6646 (capitalization al-
 tered).
      In September 2024, the district court denied the post-
 trial motions. As to anticipation by LiveNote, the court
 concluded that the LiveNote exhibits and Dr. Schonfeld’s
 testimony “directly contradict[ed] [TrackTime’s] position”
 and that the jury could have “reasonably concluded that
 LiveNote anticipated” based on that evidence. JMOL
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 11   Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                 11



 Decision, at *7. It rejected the clear-weight argument for a
 new trial “substantially for the same reason[ ].” Id., at *8.
      Thereafter the district court dismissed with prejudice
 TrackTime’s infringement suit as to claims 2–8 and 10–20
 of the ’638 patent, which had not been discussed at trial,
 J.A. 31, and entered final judgment of noninfringement
 and invalidity of ’638 claims 1 and 9. J.A. 32–33. The ear-
 lier Claim Construction Order holding claims 1 and 2 of the
 ’978 patent invalid for indefiniteness merged into that final
 judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). TrackTime timely
 appealed.     We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295

(a)(1).
                              II
      TrackTime challenges the judgment of the district
 court with respect to both patents. A determination that a
 claim term invokes § 112(f) is a claim-construction issue
 that we resolve without deference except to the extent that
 the district court made legally pertinent findings of fact
 based on extrinsic evidence, which we review for clear er-
 ror. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 

792 F.3d 1339, 1346

 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the district court’s denial of
 JMOL here without deference, following the law of the dis-
 trict court’s regional circuit, the Third Circuit. Amgen Inc.
 v. Hospira, Inc., 

944 F.3d 1327, 1333

 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (re-
 viewing District of Delaware decision). When only eviden-
 tiary sufficiency is at issue, JMOL is to be denied if there
 is “enough evidence from which a jury reasonably could”
 have found as it did. Secretary, United States Department
 of Labor v. East Penn Manufacturing Co., 

123 F.4th 643

,
 650–51 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and cita-
 tion omitted). We review the district court’s denial of a new
 trial for abuse of discretion. Amgen, 

944 F.3d at 1333

 (cit-
 ing Third Circuit authority).
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 12     Filed: 07/02/2026




 12               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




                               A
      TrackTime urges us to reverse the district court’s in-
 definiteness ruling on the ’978 patent, arguing that the “ex-
 ecutable program code” limitations are not subject to
 § 112(f) and, even if they are, the specification discloses the
 required corresponding structure that carries out the
 claim-specified functions. We reach only the first part of
 that submission. On the record and arguments presented
 to us, we are not persuaded to hold, as TrackTime urges,
 that the contested terms are outside § 112(f). We are per-
 suaded, however, that the district court’s analysis, espe-
 cially in light of our intervening Dyfan decision, was
 insufficient to support the conclusion that the contested
 terms come within § 112(f). We therefore vacate the dis-
 trict court’s indefiniteness ruling and remand for a new de-
 termination about the § 112(f) status of the “executable
 program code” limitations, with proceedings appropriate to
 making that new determination.
                               1
     Under § 112(f), as relevant here, a claim element “may
 be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified
 function without the recital of structure . . . in support
 thereof,” and if the claim element is so written, it “shall be
 construed to cover the corresponding structure . . . de-
 scribed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 3 If a



      3  The full language is: “An element in a claim for a
 combination may be expressed as a means or step for per-
 forming a specified function without the recital of struc-
 ture, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim
 shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
 material, or acts described in the specification and equiva-
 lents thereof.” In this case, the parties do not rely on the
 language of “step” or the corresponding word “acts” for the
 claim elements at issue—referring to “executable program
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 13     Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                   13



 claim element is subject to § 112(f), i.e., expressed in that
 form, we search the specification for corresponding struc-
 ture, and if sufficient structure is missing, the claim is in-
 definite. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52.
     Our focus here is on the first step of that inquiry, which
 examines whether a claim phrase (“claim element”) is a
 means-plus-function phrase, i.e., “expressed as a means . . .
 for performing a specified function without the recital of
 structure . . . in support thereof.” The question is one of
 claim construction. Id. at 1346; see Dyfan, 28 F.4th at
 1365–66; TEK Global, S.R.L v. Sealant Systems Interna-
 tional, Inc., 

920 F.3d 777, 785

 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Specifically,
 whether the words used themselves “recit[e]” structure for
 performing the recited function(s) turns on the meaning of
 those words in context, which can be informed not just by
 the intrinsic evidence but also by evidence of extra-patent
 usage in the relevant field (extrinsic evidence)—the latter
 presenting an underlying issue of fact for the court. See
 Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1366

; Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp El-
 evator Americas Corp., 

649 F.3d 1350, 1357

 (Fed. Cir.
 2011). The proponent of the means-plus-function construc-
 tion has the burden to establish that the phrase is subject
 to § 112(f), and where the claim construction involves an
 underlying fact issue, the fact must be proved by a prepon-
 derance of the evidence. See Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1367

; Ad-
 vanced Ground Information Systems, Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
 

830 F.3d 1341, 1347

 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (both citing Apex Inc.
 v. Raritan Computer Inc., 

325 F.3d 1364, 1372

 (Fed. Cir.
 2003)).
     Whether a claim phrase uses the word “means” does
 not decisively determine whether the phrase is covered by
 § 112(f), but we have established presumptions to frame


 code”—and they likewise do not rely on the word “mate-
 rial.” We therefore focus on the statutory language about
 “means” and “structure,” as have the parties.
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 14   Filed: 07/02/2026




 14              TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 the analysis. Whereas a claim phrase that uses “means” is
 presumptively covered by § 112(f), a claim phrase that does
 not use the word “means”—as is true in the present case—
 is presumptively not expressed in means-plus-function
 form. Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348

 (en banc in relevant
 part). Importantly, the presumption relevant here is re-
 buttable, i.e., a claim phrase that does not use “means” may
 nonetheless, when properly understood, be shown to be one
 “for performing a specified function without the recital of
 structure . . . in support thereof.” 

35 U.S.C. § 112

(f).
     Reflecting the language of the statute, our precedents
 direct inquiry to whether the claim phrase “recites ‘func-
 tion without reciting sufficient structure for performing
 that function.’” Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348

 (quoting
 Watts v. XL Systems, Inc., 

232 F.3d 877, 880

 (Fed. Cir.
 2000)). One way to establish that condition is to show that
 the phrase “refers only to a general category of whatever
 may perform specified functions,” Robert Bosch, LLC
 v. Snap-On Inc., 

769 F.3d 1094, 1099

 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
 Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 

972 F.3d 1367

, 1374
 (Fed. Cir. 2020), as when the relevant non-function term in
 the phrase is as devoid of specificity of structure as the
 word “means” (hence is, in that way, a “nonce” term)—as
 can be true of, e.g., “module,” “mechanism,” “element,” or
 “device” if viewed in isolation, Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1350

; see MTD Products Inc. v. Iancu, 

933 F.3d 1336, 1341

 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Robert Bosch, 

769 F.3d at 1099

; Massa-
 chusetts Institute of Technology & Electronics for Imaging,
 Inc. v. Abacus Software, 

462 F.3d 1344, 1354

 (Fed. Cir.
 2006). But the standard is not so limited. “The question is
 not whether a claim term recites any structure but whether
 it recites sufficient structure—a claim term is subject to
 § 112(f) if it recites ‘function without reciting sufficient
 structure for performing that function.’” Egenera, 972 F.3d
 at 1374 (quoting Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348

); see also
 Sage Products, Inc v. Devon Industries, Inc., 

126 F.3d 1420

,
 1427–28 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that a phrase is outside
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 15    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                    15



 § 112(f) if it recites enough matter “within the claim itself
 to perform entirely the recited function”). In answering
 that question, due effect must be given to the distinction
 between “function” and “structure” on which § 112(f) is ex-
 pressly built.
      This inquiry usefully begins with parsing of the claim
 phrase—identifying the portion that recites the function(s)
 and the non-function term (a word or group of words) recit-
 ing what performs the function(s). See Wenger Manufac-
 turing v. Coating Machine Systems, Inc., 

239 F.3d 1225

,
 1232–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Of significance here, correct
 identification of the claimed function(s) is necessary not
 only to determine what structures to look for in the speci-
 fication if § 112(f) applies, id. at 1233, but also to determine
 whether § 112(f) applies in the first place. The search for
 corresponding structure and the determination whether
 § 112(f) applies, though “distinct,” are “inherently related.”
 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 

757 F.3d 1286, 1296

 (Fed. Cir.
 2014). The identity of a claimed function logically bears on
 whether the claim recites enough structure to avoid
 § 112(f), because that part of the inquiry asks whether the
 relevant non-function term in the claim identifies “suffi-
 cient structure for performing [the claimed] function,” Wil-
 liamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348

 (citation omitted). See also
 Egenera, 972 F.3d at 1374 (rejecting idea that “any” or
 “some” structure, divorced from claimed functions, was suf-
 ficient); Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1368

 (looking to “availability of
 off-the-shelf code to perform the recited claim functions” to
 determine that term “code” was not governed by § 112 ¶ 6
 (emphasis added)).
     Whether the non-function term (here, “executable pro-
 gram code”) identifies sufficient structure has two aspects
 that are of particular importance for the present case.
 First: We have often asked whether the non-function term
 would be understood by relevant artisans to name some-
 thing identified by structural (not just functional) proper-
 ties at all (a necessary predicate to being a structure that
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 16    Filed: 07/02/2026




 16               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 suffices for the claimed function(s)). Dyfan, 28 F.4th at
 1365–66; Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348, 1351

. The non-
 function term (a word or group of words) may identify
 structure because the term is “generally known in the art”
 as the name for structure. Apple, 

757 F.3d at 1299

; see Wil-
 liamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348, 1351

. Accordingly, “a critical
 question is whether ‘the claim term is used in common par-
 lance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate
 structure.’” MTD Products, 

933 F.3d at 1341

 (quoting
 Skky, Inc v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l., 

859 F.3d 1014, 1019

 (Fed.
 Cir. 2017)); see, e.g., Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP
 v. AOL, LLC, 

641 F.3d 1331, 1341

 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“frac-
 tional rate encoding means” not a means-plus-function
 term because “self-descriptive” to relevant artisan and
 “used in publications and published patents”). That can be
 so, we have recognized, even if the name was derived from
 or reflects a function. Lighting World, Inc v. Birchwood
 Lighting, Inc., 

382 F.3d 1354

, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see,
 e.g., Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 

91 F.3d 1580, 1583

 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing “detent mecha-
 nism” as not governed by § 112 ¶ 6 and comparing terms
 like “screwdriver” and “container”); Rembrandt, 

641 F.3d at 1341

 (“fractional rate encoding means”); Personalized
 Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Com-
 mission, 

161 F.3d 696

, 704–05 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“detector”).
 Similarly, a claim term need not “call to mind a single well-
 defined structure” as long as it is “reasonably well under-
 stood” to refer to a class of structures identified by some-
 thing beyond its function of producing a general result.
 Greenberg, 

91 F.3d at 1583

; Apple, 

757 F.3d at 1300

.
     Second: Not just extra-patent usage in the field on its
 own, but, consistent with the importance of context to claim
 construction generally, the claim language may suffice to
 make clear whether certain claim words name sufficient
 structure in the understanding of the relevant artisan.
 Thus, we have recognized that even if a non-function term
 would be non-structural “in a vacuum,” surrounding claim
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 17     Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                   17



 language can establish that the non-function term is un-
 derstood by a relevant artisan as having a particular struc-
 ture. Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1370

; see MTD Products, 933 F.3d
 at 1341–42; TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Systems Inter-
 national, Inc., 

920 F.3d 777

, 785–86 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Zero-
 click, LLC v. Apple Inc., 

891 F.3d 1003, 1008

 (Fed. Cir.
 2018); Inventio, 649 F.3d at 1358–59; Linear Technology
 Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp, 

379 F.3d 1311, 1320

 (Fed. Cir.
 2004); see also Apple, 757 F.3d at 1299–301 (explaining
 that a specification may define a claim term). In a phrase
 referring to a computer process, this may occur where the
 claim makes clear (expressly or implicitly) that the non-
 function term calls for a particular “operation,” which “is
 more than just its function; it is how the function is
 achieved in the context of the invention.” Apple, 

757 F.3d at 1299

; see also Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1366

 (quoting Apple,
 

757 F.3d at 1299

); Inventio, 

649 F.3d at 1358

.
     The function-operation distinction warrants particular
 attention in the software context, which is at issue here,
 because a non-functional term referring to code “is partly
 defined by its function.” Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1368

. Con-
 sistent with the required structure/function statutory dis-
 tinction, our cases reflect the significance in this context of
 the degree of generality of the claimed “function(s)” and the
 presence or absence in the claim of what relevant artisans
 would understand to disclose “how” the function is per-
 formed, going beyond calling for a functional result. Com-
 pare Egenera, 972 F.3d at 1374–75 (holding “logic to
 modify” governed by § 112(f) where there was “no struc-
 tural limitation to the ‘inputs, outputs, connections, and
 operation’”), and Robert Bosch, 769 F.3d at 1099–100 (hold-
 ing § 112(f) applicable to term “device” where function was
 highly general (“program recognition”), claim “d[id] noth-
 ing more than identify functions for the ‘device’ to perform,”
 and specification was “silent about any interaction between
 the ‘program recognition device’ and other components”),
 and Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1351

 (holding “distributed
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 18    Filed: 07/02/2026




 18               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 learning control module” subject to § 112 ¶ 6 where “cer-
 tain inputs and outputs” were described only at “a very
 high level” and claim lacked description of “interact[ion]
 with other components . . . that might inform the struc-
 tural character of the limitation”), with Apple, 

757 F.3d at 1301

 (holding that term “heuristic” was not governed by
 § 112 ¶ 6 where the “claim language and specification dis-
 close[d] the heuristics’ operation within the context of the
 invention, including the inputs, outputs, and how certain
 outputs are achieved”), and Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367–68
 (holding term “code” not subject to § 112(f) “when coupled
 with language describing its operation,” e.g., claimed steps
 of detecting movement, receiving information, and display-
 ing information, which “connotes structure”).
                                2
      Our body of case law implementing the structure/func-
 tion principle built into § 112(f), especially as illuminated
 by Dyfan, calls for analysis of this case that goes beyond
 what has already been done by the parties and the district
 court as the case comes to us. It is true, as the district court
 said, that a “definition of ‘executable program’” to mean a
 “‘program that is ready to run on a given computer’ . . .
 gives no indication that ‘executable program code’ is a spe-
 cific code with definite structure.” Claim Construction Or-
 der, at *5–6. It is also true that even if the “executable
 program code” limitations refer to “logic,” the term “logic”
 “[b]y itself” is similarly unstructured and generic. Id., at
 *6. But additional analysis is needed.
     Further attention to the character of the claimed func-
 tions is required for a sound determination whether the
 claims’ recitation of annotation or synchronous-play func-
 tionality (though on their face seemingly more about user-
 desired results than technological means to achieve them)
 provides adequate structure even if “executable program
 code” standing alone does not. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at
 1368–69 (stressing need to “[r]eview[ ] the alleged means-
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 19    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                  19



 plus-function limitation in full” and analyze whether “the
 recitation of the code[’s] . . . operation would have connoted
 structure to” relevant artisans (emphases added)). In ad-
 dition, although expert declarations were submitted, they
 may not have been focused on the full scope of the issue,
 and in any event, the district court did not find facts based
 on that evidence. See Claim Construction Order, at *5
 (mentioning expert evidence only in passing). Instead, it
 appears that the district court resolved the issue on the in-
 trinsic record, but without conducting the inquiry into ex-
 tra-patent usage that can be essential to determining
 whether an alleged means-plus-function phrase, including
 the recitation of the claimed function, names or describes
 at least a class of structures sufficient to perform the func-
 tion. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1366–68.
      Amazon urges us to uphold the district court’s decision,
 citing Robert Bosch and Egenera, but there is more analysis
 to be done for how those decisions, together with Dyfan,
 properly apply here. In Robert Bosch, we determined that
 the term “program recognition device” was subject to § 112
 ¶ 6 because, looking to both the claim language and the
 specification, the claim “d[id] nothing more than identify
 functions for the ‘device’ to perform.” 769 F.3d at 1099–100
 (emphasis added); see id. at 1099 (“[A]ll of the proffered ci-
 tations from the specification merely explain [the term’s]
 function.” (emphasis added)). In Egenera, we focused on
 whether there was recited structure for “the claimed func-
 tions,” rejecting the idea that the term “logic” was not sub-
 ject to § 112(f) simply because it denoted “some possible
 structure” in the form of “software, firmware, or circuitry.”
 972 F.3d at 1374.
     TrackTime does not argue that the phrase “executable
 program code” avoids § 112(f) because it connotes any
 structure at all, but that the recitation of “‘executable pro-
 gram code’ that is ‘configured’ to perform specific opera-
 tions” would be understood, “read as a whole, to refer to
 ‘well-understood’ code for performing those operations.”
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 20    Filed: 07/02/2026




 20              TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 TrackTime Opening Br. at 20; J.A. 1386–87, 1389–91,
 1400–03 (arguing same to district court). It provided ex-
 amples from the prior art that, according to TrackTime,
 would have been understood to be the referred-to structure.
 E.g., J.A. 1636. That argument may well be wrong, but the
 district court should have explained why the pertinent ev-
 idence requires the conclusion that a relevant artisan
 would not so understand the disputed terms before holding
 that § 112(f) applies. Accordingly, we vacate the determi-
 nation that the “executable program code” terms are inva-
 lid for indefiniteness.
     On remand, the focus of the § 112(f) analysis should be
 on whether the disputed limitations, read in full and in con-
 text, recite enough structure to perform the claimed func-
 tions. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1368–69; Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1348

. Here, the relevant claimed functions are an-
 notation and synchronous play (1) on a mobile computing
 device and (2) integrable with the other functionality de-
 scribed in the claims. 4 That the code runs on a mobile de-
 vice is the natural import of the claims’ references to
 “mobile computing device software.” ’978 patent, col. 64,
 lines 47–51 (annotation function); col. 64, lines 54–57 (syn-
 chronous-play function). And the ordinary meaning of a
 claim to a single element having multiple features is that
 a single instance of the element must meet each limitation.
 See In re Varma, 

816 F.3d 1352, 1363

 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“For
 a dog owner to have ‘a dog that rolls over and fetches
 sticks,’ it does not suffice that he have two dogs, each able
 to perform just one of the tasks.”). The claim language that



      4  We note that, because the asserted ’978 claims all
 incorporate claim 1’s disputed annotation limitation, it
 would not be necessary to reach the synchronous-play lim-
 itation were the district court to again decide on remand
 that the annotation limitation is an indefinite means-plus-
 function term.
Case: 24-1102     Document: 50      Page: 21    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                    21



 here requires the annotation, synchronous-play, and other
 functions to be carried out by the same “software” com-
 municates that the code referred to must be capable of be-
 ing implemented with code that performs the other claimed
 functions. Our reading of the claim language is confirmed
 by the specification, because mobile-device implementation
 and integrability are the key assertedly inventive features
 of the disclosure; the specification distinguishes prior-art
 software “unsuitable for mobile computing devices,” assert-
 ing that mobile computing devices “cannot run [certain ex-
 isting] transcript management utilities,” 

id.,

 col. 1, lines
 55–58, and purports to solve the problem of “disparate soft-
 ware applications,” 

id.,

 col. 8, lines 15–22; see 

id.,

 col. 11,
 lines 46–50.
     The parties’ arguments to date have not been focused
 on whether the claims reveal structure for those precise
 functions. In light of that fact, and of the foregoing elabo-
 ration of the required § 112(f) analysis, it may be appropri-
 ate and helpful to the court for the parties to have a new
 opportunity to present arguments and evidence directed to
 the correct questions. We leave that determination to the
 district court’s sound discretion, but, however the court
 proceeds, certain aspects of the record appear to warrant
 closer attention now that the relevant functions have been
 pinpointed.
      The ’978 patent’s claims, taken alone, do not recite a
 description of the code’s operations sufficient to define
 structure. For claim 1’s annotation function, mere “user
 input” is recited, ’978 patent, col. 64, line 50, and for claim
 2’s synchronous-play function, not even that much is pre-
 sent. See Egenera, 972 F.3d at 1374 (inquiring whether the
 claims provide structure by describing “inputs, outputs,
 connections, and operation” of “logic”). But the specifica-
 tion requires more attention, to consider passages that pro-
 vide some details, see, e.g., ’978 patent, col. 33, lines 11–12;
 col. 33, lines 21–32; col. 33, lines 47–50; col. 34, lines 44–
 46; col. 34, lines 60–62, and whether such details are
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 22    Filed: 07/02/2026




 22              TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 properly understood to limit the meaning of the claim lan-
 guage at issue.
      Additionally, more attention must be paid to whether
 the “executable program code” limitations, for the functions
 stated above, were generally known in the art at the time
 of the invention as names for known code. See Williamson,
 

792 F.3d at 1348

. Extrinsic evidence may be particularly
 useful in determining whether that is so, if it is placed in
 dispute. See Inventio, 

649 F.3d at 1357

; Dyfan, 

28 F.4th at 1366

. But we do not read the existing expert evidence to
 which the parties refer us as directly addressing the ques-
 tion. See J.A. 1478 (Schonfeld declaration, opining on bare
 terms “executable” and “program code”); J.A. 1635–38
 (Agrawala declaration, identifying examples of code for an-
 notation but not stating whether identified code is mobile
 device software); J.A. 1640–44 (similar for synchronous-
 play code). We also cannot exclude the possibility that ei-
 ther “executable program code” limitation might yet be
 held on the intrinsic evidence alone to be a means-plus-
 function term. It has, for example, been intimated in this
 court (though hardly explained) that either the specifica-
 tion or the prosecution history of the ’978 patent disclaims
 the prior art code that TrackTime points to as the suffi-
 ciently identified structure. See Amazon Br. at 56, 61; Oral
 Arg. at 12:42–13:31 (Amazon’s counsel arguing that speci-
 fication demonstrates that “[claimed] mobile computing de-
 vice software did not exist”), https://www.cafc.us
 courts.gov/oral-arguments/24-1102_05082026.mp3. If the
 district court, after considering the relevant intrinsic evi-
 dence, determines that it is not necessary to reach extrinsic
 sources, it should explain why the intrinsic record resolves
 the § 112(f) question to the degree of clarity required. See,
 e.g., Williamson, 

792 F.3d at 1351

 (reasoning that a “fact
 [attested in an expert declaration] cannot create structure
 where none otherwise is disclosed [by the claims]”); Diebold
 Nixdorf, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 

899 F.3d 1291

, 1299–300 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that “in
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 23    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                 23



 appropriate cases, a party advocating [for a § 112(f) con-
 struction] can overcome the presumption against its appli-
 cation solely by reference to evidence intrinsic to the
 patent”).
                              B
                              1
     Regarding the ’638 patent, TrackTime contends that it
 was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Amazon
 infringes claim 9 because there was insufficient evidence to
 find otherwise. TrackTime Opening Br. at 25–51. The
 jury’s special verdict provides six independent bases for the
 determination that Amazon is not liable for infringement.
 See J.A. 5378–83. We focus on only one ground, anticipa-
 tion of claim 9 by LiveNote, for which we determine the
 record contains sufficient support. It is therefore unneces-
 sary for us to decide the merits of TrackTime’s remaining
 arguments for reversing the denial of JMOL.
     TrackTime argues that there was insufficient evidence
 for the jury to find that LiveNote anticipates ’638 claim 9
 because (1) LiveNote does not disclose “performing a data
 lookup”; (2) LiveNote does not disclose the claimed “mobile
 computing device”; and (3) LiveNote does not disclose a
 “touch-sensitive input interface,” which TrackTime says
 requires sensitivity to “human touch gestures.” TrackTime
 Opening Br. at 44–46. These arguments are without merit.
     TrackTime wholly fails to explain why the jury was not
 permitted to find that LiveNote discloses performing a data
 lookup. Moreover, that argument was not presented to the
 district court, see J.A. 6643–44; JMOL Decision, at *7–8, so
 TrackTime has forfeited it. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Bax-
 ter International, Inc., 

582 F.3d 1288

, 1295–96 (Fed. Cir.
 2009).
     As for the “mobile computing device” limitation, the
 LiveNote user guide expressly discloses using the program
 on a “tablet PC,” J.A. 8762, 8906, which is one example
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50      Page: 24    Filed: 07/02/2026




 24               TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 given by the ’638 patent itself of a “mobile computing de-
 vice,” ’638 patent, col. 18, lines 19–21 (“[T]he term mobile
 computing device may be used interchangeably with the
 term tablet computer[.]”); see 

id.,

 col. 12, line 18; col. 18,
 line 4. TrackTime’s understanding of the LiveNote tablet
 disclosure as relating only to an annotation function, and
 not to navigating a transcript using a mobile device, is
 merely one possible interpretation of the evidence, and
 TrackTime cites nothing in the LiveNote exhibits that says
 that less than the full suite of the program’s features is
 available on tablet PCs to support its position. See Track-
 Time Opening Br. at 45–46 (citing only Dr. Agrawala’s tes-
 timony, J.A. 6377–78, for this understanding).
 TrackTime’s interpretation was also contradicted by
 Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony, which the jury was permitted to
 credit. J.A. 6145 (“You can use LiveNote . . . with some-
 thing called a tablet PC . . . [and] the [user guide] makes
 clear that you can tap on the tablet . . . instead of click-
 ing[.]”); see J.A. 6145–46, 6151, 6321–22. The LiveNote
 user guide’s tablet-computer disclosure and the testimony
 of Amazon’s expert were sufficient evidence from which a
 jury could reasonably find that LiveNote discloses the
 claimed mobile computing device.
     Regarding the “touch-sensitive input interface” limita-
 tion, the LiveNote user guide expressly discloses using a
 tablet pen for some of the program’s functionality, J.A.
 8762, 8906, and the jury heard expert testimony that all of
 LiveNote’s disclosures would thus have been understood by
 a relevant artisan to be operable on a touchscreen device
 “with a pen or a finger,” J.A. 6148–49; see J.A.6151, 6321–
 22. There is therefore no merit to TrackTime’s contention
 that LiveNote does not disclose transcript navigation by
 human touch gestures; the jury was entitled to credit
 Dr. Schonfeld’s contrary testimony. Moreover, TrackTime
 did not seek a construction that would limit the claimed
 “touch-sensitive input interface” to human touch, see Claim
 Construction Order, at *1, and the jury could reasonably
Case: 24-1102    Document: 50     Page: 25    Filed: 07/02/2026




 TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC                 25



 find that LiveNote’s express disclosure of an interface op-
 erable with a tablet pen comes within the ordinary mean-
 ing of “touch-sensitive input interface.” See Akamai
 Technologies, Inc. v. MediaPointe, Inc., 

159 F.4th 1370

,
 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2025). For these reasons there was suffi-
 cient evidence to find that LiveNote discloses claim 9’s
 touch-sensitive input interface. We therefore uphold the
 finding of anticipation by LiveNote, and that is enough to
 reject TrackTime’s challenge to the denial of JMOL.
                              2
     TrackTime also argues in the alternative that, even if
 it was not entitled to JMOL, the jury’s finding of anticipa-
 tion by LiveNote was contrary to the “clear weight of the
 evidence” such that TrackTime should have been granted
 a new trial. TrackTime Opening Br. at 55. We do not
 agree.
     The Third Circuit will find an abuse of discretion in re-
 fusing to grant a new trial when a verdict “cries out to be
 overturned” or “shocks [the] conscience.”            Leonard
 v. Stemtech International Inc, 

834 F.3d 376, 386

 (3d Cir.
 2016) (citations omitted). TrackTime’s arguments on this
 score consist of a single sentence citing the same testimony
 of Dr. Agrawala that is the basis of TrackTime’s JMOL
 challenge with respect to anticipation by LiveNote. The
 LiveNote user guide alone provides significant support for
 the jury’s anticipation verdict, because its disclosures of
 tablet PCs, without disclosing that the program’s function-
 ality is in any way constrained when run on a tablet,
 strongly imply that all of the manual’s disclosures apply
 equally to tablet PCs. See J.A. 8762, 8906. And Dr. Schon-
 feld testified to the same effect. J.A. 6145–46. TrackTime
 thus, at most, identifies a run-of-the-mill contest between
 experts that was within the competence of the jury to re-
 solve. The district court did not abuse its discretion in de-
 termining that such evidence does not show that the
 verdict was so deeply flawed that a new trial was
Case: 24-1102      Document: 50      Page: 26    Filed: 07/02/2026




 26                TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC




 warranted. See Leonard, 

834 F.3d at 386

. We thus affirm
 the district court’s denial of a new trial. TrackTime’s other
 arguments for a new trial do not implicate the anticipation
 ground on which we affirm the denial of judgment as a mat-
 ter of law, so we need not and do not reach them.
                               III
      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 vacate the district court’s judgment of invalidity of the as-
 serted claims of the ’978 patent and remand for further pro-
 ceedings consistent with this opinion. As to the ’638
 patent, we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL and
 its refusal to grant a new trial.
       The parties shall bear their own costs.
      AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
                    REMANDED