Network-1 Technologies, Inc. v. Google LLC

Case: 24-1893   Document: 69     Page: 1   Filed: 04/23/2026




        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.


   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

         NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

           GOOGLE LLC, YOUTUBE, LLC,
               Defendants-Appellees
              ______________________

                  2024-1893, 2024-1948
                 ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Southern District of New York in No. 1:14-cv-09558-PGG-
 SN, Judge Paul G. Gardephe.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 23, 2026
                 ______________________

     BRIAN DAVID LEDAHL, Russ August & Kabat, Los
 Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also
 represented by MARC A. FENSTER.

     ANDREW V. TRASK, Williams & Connolly LLP,
 Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also
 represented by XUN LIU; KEVIN HARDY, Quinn Emanuel
 Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Washington, DC.
                 ______________________
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 2               NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and REYNA, Circuit
                           Judges.
 LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
     Network-1 Technologies, Inc. (“Network-1”) filed suit
 in the United States District Court for the Southern
 District of New York, asserting that two separate versions
 of Google LLC and YouTube, LLC’s (collectively, “Google”)
 Content ID system infringed several claims of its U.S.
 Patents 8,010,988 (“the ’988 patent”), 8,205,237 (“the ’237
 patent”), 8,904,464 (“the ’464 patent”) (collectively, “the
 asserted patents”). Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Google LLC,
 No. 14-cv-PGG-02396, 

2024 WL 1814296

 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
 24, 2024) (“Decision”). The district court issued a combined
 claim construction and summary judgment decision. 

Id.

 The court first determined that the asserted claims of the
 ’988 and ’464 patents are invalid as indefinite. Id. at *1. It
 then determined that neither version of Google’s Content
 ID system infringed the asserted claims of the ’237 patent
 as a matter of law and thus Google was entitled to
 summary judgment of noninfringement as to that patent.
 Id.
     Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
 whether one version of Content ID infringes the ’237
 patent, we reverse and remand as to that issue. We affirm
 the district court’s conclusion of invalidity of the ’988 and
 ’464 patents for indefiniteness and grant of summary
 judgment of noninfringement of the ’237 patent as to the
 other version of Content ID.
                        BACKGROUND
                               I
     Network-1 owns the asserted patents, which are
 directed to methods for “linking traditional media to new
 interactive media, such as that provided over the internet,”
 and “identifying a work . . . without the need to modify the
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                   3



 work.” See ’988 patent col. 1 ll. 23–28. 1 As an example, the
 patent describes “[c]ommerce opportunities” where
 television viewers could “place[] . . . direct orders for
 products” they see on screen via an “interactive capability,”
 i.e., an internet link to a website associated with the
 specific product. Id. at col. 1 ll. 36–60. The asserted
 patents facilitate this process by describing a technique for
 identifying work (such as content or an advertisement)
 without inserting an identification code, such as a bar code.
 See id. at col. 1 ll. 25–28, col. 3 ll. 8–23, col. 4 ll. 7–19.
     In relevant part, claims 15 and 17 of the ’988 patent
 and claim 1 of the ’464 patent recite a method comprising
 identifying an electronic work or correlating an electronic
 work with an identifier via a “non-exhaustive search.” See
 ’988 patent col. 25 l. 65–col. 26 l. 6; ’464 patent col. 24 ll.
 44–49.
     In relevant part, independent claim 33 of the ’237
 patent recites “[a] computer-implemented method
 comprising . . . [a] determin[ation] by the computer
 system, an identification of [a] media work using the media
 work extracted features to perform a sublinear
 approximate-nearest neighbor search of reference
 extracted features of reference identified media works.”
 ’237 patent col. 28 ll. 5, 10–14 (emphasis added).
     Google operates the website YouTube, which allows
 users to upload content to the internet to be viewed by the
 public. Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *3. Google employs
 a “Content ID” system that allows content owners (e.g.,
 copyright owners) to control how their content is used on
 YouTube. Id. at *4. The Content ID system generates
 matches by comparing an uploaded video, also known as a
 “query work,” to a database of reference works. Id. There



     1   We cite the ’988 patent as representative of the as-
 serted patents’ specifications.
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 4              NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




 are two versions of Google’s Content ID system at issue in
 this appeal: an older version known as “LSH,” and a newer
 version known as “Siberia.” Id.
     The LSH version of Content ID works by searching
 over an index of local sensitive hashing (“LSH”) bands, into
 which “subfingerprints” corresponding to short snippets of
 reference works are organized. Id. Subfingerprints for
 query works and reference works are generated in the
 same manner so that when a search is conducted for a
 particular query work, the LSH version of Content ID
 returns only the reference works associated with a
 matching LSH band. Id. These reference works are then
 further processed to eliminate candidates unlikely to be a
 match with the query work. Id.
      The Siberia version of Content ID works by generating
 a sequence of embeddings corresponding to short snippets
 or frames of content. Id. The reference embeddings are
 further processed and stored in multiple reference indices
 for searching, organized by content type. Id. at *5–6. Each
 index is divided into smaller indices known as “shards”
 that can each fit on one computer. Id. at *6.
                              II
     In April 2014, Network-1 sued Google for infringement
 of several claims of the asserted patents. 2 Decision,
 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *7.
    In June 2015, Google petitioned the United States
 Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal
 Board (“the Board”) for inter partes review (“IPR”),



     2   The original complaint asserted only the ’988 and
 ’237 patents. Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *7. Later in
 2014, Network-1 asserted the ’464 patent in a related case,
 which was consolidated with the original one. See 14-cv-
 02396-PGG-sn, ECF 137–38.
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                   5



 asserting that the ’237 and ’988 patents were unpatentable
 as anticipated and obvious. See 

id.

 The district court
 stayed the case pending resolution of the IPRs. 

Id.

 The
 Board instituted the IPRs, and the proceedings before the
 Board turned on the term “non-exhaustive search.” 

Id.

 The Board found that Google had failed to carry its burden
 of demonstrating the claims were not patentable. Google
 LLC v. Network-1 Techs., Inc., 

726 F. App’x 779

, 780
 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“IPR Appeal Decision”). Google appealed,
 and we vacated and remanded the Board’s decision because
 it erred in its construction of “non-exhaustive search.” Id.
 at 787. Using the broadest reasonable construction
 standard, we construed “non-exhaustive search” as “a
 search that locates a match without conducting a brute-
 force comparison of all possible matches, and all data
 within all possible matches.” Id. at 786.
      In January 2019, the Board terminated the
 proceedings on remand upon joint stipulation of the
 parties.     Google, Inc. v. Network-1 Techs., Inc.,
 No. IPR2015-00343, 

2019 WL 104044

 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 4,
 2019). Following the Board’s decision, the district court
 lifted the stay in this case and the parties narrowed the
 claims to claim 17 of the ’988 patent; claims 1, 8, 10, 16, 18,
 25, 27, and 33 of the ’464 patent; and claims 33–35 of the
 ’237 patent. See Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *9, 11.
     In April 2024, the district court published a combined
 claim construction and summary judgment order disposing
 of all asserted claims. Id. at *38. It concluded that the
 term “non-exhaustive search” recited in the asserted
 claims of the ’988 and ’464 patents was indefinite,
 rendering those claims invalid. Id. at *20. The district
 court also granted summary judgment of noninfringement
 of the asserted claims of the ’237 patent, concluding that
 there was no genuine issue of material fact that Google’s
 LSH and Siberia Content ID systems met the “sublinear
 search” limitation. Id. at *34, 38.
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 6              NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




    Network-1 timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
 under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295

(a)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
    Network-1 appeals the district court’s invalidity and
 summary judgment determinations. See Open. Br. 26–27.
 We address each in turn.
                               I
      Patent claims must “particularly point[] out and
 distinctly claim[] the subject matter” regarded as the
 invention. 

35 U.S.C. § 112

 ¶ 2. “A claim fails to satisfy this
 statutory requirement and is thus valid for indefiniteness
 if its language, read in light of the specification and
 prosecution history, ‘fail[s] to inform, with reasonable
 certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
 invention.’” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 

766 F.3d 1364

, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v.
 Biosig Instrs., Inc., 

572 U.S. 898, 901

 (2014)). Definiteness
 is measured from the viewpoint of a skilled artisan “at the
 time the patent was filed.” Nautilus, 

572 U.S. at 908

.
     We review a determination of indefiniteness de novo.
 Interval Licensing, 

766 F.3d at 1370

. Because “[g]eneral
 principles of claim construction apply to indefiniteness,”
 “we review a district court’s determinations of subsidiary
 facts based upon extrinsic evidence for clear error, and
 those based upon intrinsic evidence (the patent claims,
 specification, and prosecution history) de novo.” HZNP
 Medicines LLC v. Actavis Lab’ys UT, Inc., 

940 F.3d 680

,
 688 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Biosig Instrs., Inc. v. Nautilus,
 Inc., 

783 F.3d 1374

, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
     The claims of the ’988 patent, which are representative
 of the asserted claims of both that patent and the ’464
 patent for purposes of analyzing the indefiniteness inquiry,
 see Open. Br. 25, read as follows:
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                      7



     15. A method for associating an electronic work
     with an action, the electronic work comprising at
     least one of audio and video, the method
     comprising:
         a) electronically extracting features from
         the electronic work;
         b)    electronically     determining     an
         identification of the electronic work based
         on the extracted features, wherein the
         identification is based on a non-exhaustive
         search identifying a neighbor;
         c) electronically determining an action
         based on the identification of the electronic
         work; and
         d) electronically performing the action.
     17. The method of claim 15, wherein the non-
     exhaustive search is sublinear.
 ’988 patent col. 25 l. 65–col. 26 l. 9; 

id.

 col. 26 ll. 14–15
 (emphases added).
     Network-1 submits the following construction for “non-
 exhaustive search” in contending that the term is not
 indefinite: “a search designed to locate a [near] neighbor
 without comparing to all possible matches (i.e., all records
 in the reference data set), even if the search does not locate
 a [near] neighbor.” Open. Br. 52. Google submits that the
 district court was correct and the term is indefinite. Resp.
 Br. 21. We conclude that the district court correctly
 determined that the “non-exhaustive” search limitation is
 indefinite.
     We begin with the claim language. Claims 15 and 17,
 taken together, refer to a “non-exhaustive search
 identifying a neighbor” which can be “sublinear.” ’988
 patent col. 26 ll. 5–6, 14–15. Other than demonstrating
 that “non-exhaustive searches” do not inherently identify a
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 8              NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




 neighbor (i.e., a close match) or are sublinear, the scope of
 that language sheds little light on how a skilled artisan
 would understand this term.
      The written description also does not inform a skilled
 artisan as to the scope of “non-exhaustive search” with
 reasonable certainty. Our previous analysis of the term
 from the IPR Appeal Decision, although not binding, is
 informative. See 726 Fed. App’x at 786. There, Network-1
 argued that the written description of a materially similar
 patent reasonably conveyed the scope of the term because
 it differentiated between “exhaustive searches” and “non-
 exhaustive searches” because it “identifie[d] ‘a linear
 search of all N entries’ as an ‘exhaustive search’” and
 “[o]ther forms of matching,” such as “those based on
 clustering, kd-trees, vantage point trees and excluded
 middle vantage point forest,” as “non-exhaustive searches.”
 

Id.

 at 784–85. We rejected that argument because the
 written description did not “draw a clear line between
 ‘exhaustive’ and ‘non-exhaustive’ searching in terms of how
 much data within a record a search must consider in order
 to qualify as one or the other.” Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
      That same reasoning applies here. Network-1 argues
 that column 9, lines 24–32 of the written description
 informs a skilled artisan as to the scope of “non-exhaustive
 searches” with reasonable certainty. Open. Br. 52–53. But
 that language fails to do so. The written description does
 not contain the terms “exhaustive” or “non-exhaustive,” but
 instead contrasts “linear search[es]” which “can be
 computationally very expensive” with “[o]ther forms of
 matching,” including “kd-trees, vantage point trees and
 excluded middle vantage point forests.” ’988 patent col. 9
 ll. 24–30. Although the written description refers to a
 “linear search,” nothing in the written description suggests
 that a skilled artisan would understand a “linear search”
 to be interchangeable with a “non-exhaustive search.” Nor
 does it inform a skilled artisan with reasonable certainty
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                  9



 as to how much data within a record the “non-exhaustive
 search” must consider.
     Indeed, the phrase “non-exhaustive search” appears
 nowhere in the original patent application that led to the
 ’988 and ’464 patents, but rather was added to the claims
 nine years after the filing of the provisional application and
 three years after the patent filing date which contained the
 “linear search” language, in part to overcome prior art. J.A.
 3245–53; see J.A. 79. To narrow “non-exhaustive search”
 based on the “linear search” language used in the written
 description would thus be to “view[] matters post hoc”––a
 practice the Supreme Court has admonished.                 See
 Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 911–12 (“[T]he definiteness inquiry
 trains on the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time
 of the patent application.”). It does the patent system or
 the public no favor for this court to accept the
 distinguishing of prior art with vague language that only
 results in the uncertainty illustrated by this appeal and
 this case’s long history.
     Furthermore, the publications incorporated by
 reference into the written description do not meaningfully
 narrow the scope of “non-exhaustive search.” See ’988
 patent col. 7 ll. 37–43, col. 9 ll. 32–38. The works cited––
 Duda & Hart, 3 Fukunaga, 4 and the Yianilos papers 5––
 either make passing references to an “exhaustive search”


     3   Richard O. Duda & Peter E. Hart, Pattern Classifi-
 cation and Scene Analysis, Stanford Research Institute
 (1973), J.A. 2830–31, 2871–72.
     4   Keinosuke Fukunaga, Introduction to Statistical
 Pattern Recognition (2d), J.A. 2912, 2961.
     5   Peter N. Yianilos, Excluded Middle Vantage Point
 Forests for Nearest Neighbor Search, NEC Research Insti-
 tute (Aug. 1, 1999), J.A. 1400–11; Peter N. Yianilos, Locally
 Lifting the Curse of Dimensionality for Nearest Neighbor
 Search, NEC Research Institute, J.A. 1413–22.
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 10             NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




 without any further information, see J.A. 2872 (Duda &
 Hart), J.A. 2961 (Fukunaga), or conflict with Network-1’s
 proposed “non-exhaustive searches,” see J.A. 1403–04
 (Yianilos describing a vantage point forest search possibly
 being “exhaustive”).
     Even if the intrinsic record were not dispositive on its
 own, the extrinsic evidence further supports a conclusion
 of indefiniteness.    The district court considered the
 declaration of Dr. Michael Mitzenmacher, Network-1’s
 expert witness, as well as several academic papers which
 provided definitions of “exhaustive” versus “non-
 exhaustive searches.” Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *15–
 18; see J.A. 2764–95 (Mitzenmacher declaration). It
 ultimately concluded that the extrinsic evidence did not
 support     Network-1’s      construction   but     instead
 “highlight[ed] the vague nature of ‘exhaustive search’ and
 ‘non-exhaustive search.’” Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at
 *18.
     We find no clear error in the district court’s analysis.
 Mitzenmacher’s declaration simply repeats the same failed
 points above regarding the written description. See J.A.
 2781–86. The declaration also relies on academic papers
 Denny 6 and Orwant. 7 Id. at 2783, 2786–87. But these do
 not inform a skilled artisan as to the meaning of “non-
 exhaustive search.” Orwant states that “the definition of
 exhaustive search is vague.” J.A. 3020. And Denny defines
 a “non-exhaustive search strategy” as one that “traverse[s]
 the search space more or less at random and thus certain
 states may never be examined.” J.A. 3011. But as the


      6  Paul C. Denny, Search and Enumeration Tech-
 niques for Incidence Structures, Centre for Discrete Math-
 ematics and Theoretical Computer Science (May 1998),
 J.A. 3003, 3010–12.
     7   Jon Orwant et al., Mastering Algorithms with Perl
 (Aug. 1999), J.A. 3015, 3017–20.
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                  11



 district court observed, this is inconsistent with Network-
 1’s proposed construction because the proposed
 construction does not have such a requirement to “traverse
 the search space more or less at random.” Decision,
 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *17.
     Network-1’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive.
 It argues that our analysis of “non-exhaustive search” in
 the IPR Appeal Decision should not inform our decision
 here because it was under the broadest reasonable
 interpretation (“BRI”) standard. Open. Br. 57–58. We
 disagree. It is true that we utilized the BRI, not Phillips,
 standard in the IPR Appeal Decision. See 726 Fed. App’x
 at 786.      But the analysis regarding the written
 description’s lack of identification of “non-exhaustive
 search” is the same––i.e., regardless of standard, the
 written description does not draw a clear line between
 “exhaustive” and “non-exhaustive.” See id. at 785.
     In sum, neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence
 offers sufficient guidance to a skilled artisan as to the scope
 of the term “non-exhaustive search” with reasonable
 certainty. The asserted claims of the ’988 and ’464 patent
 are thus invalid for indefiniteness.
                               II
     We next consider the district court’s grant of summary
 judgment of noninfringement of the ’237 patent. 8 “We
 review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
 under the law of the regional circuit in which the court sits,
 here, the Second Circuit.” See Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic,


     8   Although the written description of the ’237 patent
 includes the same disputed language regarding “linear
 search” versus “other forms of searching,” ’237 patent col.
 8 ll. 59–67, the definiteness of the asserted claims of the
 ’237 patent is not before us. We accordingly do not deal
 with it here.
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 12              NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




 Inc., 

843 F.3d 942, 947

 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
 “The Second Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment
 without deference, construing the evidence in the light
 most favorable to the nonmovant and drawing all
 reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” 

Id.

 (citing
 Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 

643 F.3d 352, 358

 (2d Cir.
 2011)). “Summary judgment may only be granted when no
 ‘reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
 party.’” 

Id.

 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
 

477 U.S. 242, 248

 (1986)).
      “Summary        judgment       of   noninfringement       is
 appropriate where the patent owner’s proof is deficient in
 meeting an essential part of the legal standard for
 infringement, since such failure will render all other facts
 immaterial.” Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
 

247 F.3d 1316, 1323

 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[I]n order for a court
 to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence
 of every . . . [limitation] or its substantial equivalent in the
 accused device.” Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.,
 

38 F.3d 1192, 1199

 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
      Claim 33 of the ’237 patent, which is representative for
 purposes of analyzing summary judgment, reads as
 follows:
      33. A computer-implemented method comprising:
         a) obtaining, by a computer system includ-
         ing at least one computer, media work ex-
         tracted features that were extracted from a
         media work, the media work uploaded from
         a client device;
          b) determining, by the computer system,
         an identification of the media work using
         the media work extracted features to per-
         form a sublinear approximate nearest
         neighbor search of reference extracted
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                13



         features of reference identified media
         works; and
         c) determining, by the computer system, an
         action based on the determined identifica-
         tion of the media work.
 ’237 patent col. 28 ll. 5–16 (emphasis added).
      The parties’ dispute centers on whether the LSH or
 Siberia versions of Content ID meet the “sublinear search”
 limitation as recited in claim 33 of the ’237 patent. Open.
 Br. 30; Resp. Br. 41. The parties agree that LSH or Siberia
 meet the “sublinear” limitation if its “execution time scales
 with a less than linear relationship to the size of the data
 set to be searched, assuming computing power is held
 constant.” Open. Br. 44; Resp. Br. 41; see also Decision,
 

2024 WL 18142962024

, at *28.             The district court
 concluded that Network-1 did not create a material issue
 of fact as to whether either version met this limitation and
 thus granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Id.
 at *34, *38. We address each version in turn.
                              A
     We begin with the LSH version of Content ID.
 Network-1 relied on three pieces of evidence in opposing
 summary judgment before the district court: (1) the
 academic work of Google research scientist Dr. Shumeet
 Baluja (“the Baluja papers”) and his testimony; (2) a
 Google 2010 draft document; and (3) Mitzenmacher’s
 report. See Decision, 

2024 WL 18114296

 at *28. The
 district court concluded that none of the three created a
 genuine issue of material fact as to whether the LSH
 version was sublinear. Id. at *34. After de novo review of
 each, we agree with the district court.
      The Baluja papers and his testimony do not create a
 genuine issue of material fact. See J.A. 9690–9703 (paper
 titled “Waveprint”); J.A. 9714–51 (paper titled “Learning
 to Hash”); J.A. 7225–26, 7321–24, 7361–63, 7371–74,
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 14             NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




 7398–7400, 7403, 7406 (Baluja testimony). Network-1
 argues that the papers contain statements which a
 reasonable trier of fact could interpret to describe LSH
 systems as sublinear. See Open. Br. 32–33. But neither
 paper describes the LSH version of Content ID. See
 generally J.A. 9690–703; J.A. 9714–51. Rather, they
 describe a system called Waveprint, which uses computer-
 vision techniques for identifying audio, see J.A. 9690, and
 describe hash functions only generally without addressing
 the LSH version, see J.A. 9716–18. And at his deposition,
 Baluja confirmed that he was not involved in
 implementation, but rather only research. J.A. 7399.
 Network-1’s argument is thus unavailing, as there is
 insufficient evidence connecting Baluja’s papers or
 testimony to Google’s LSH version to create a genuine issue
 of material fact.
     The Google 2010 draft document suffers from a similar
 flaw: there is insufficient evidence connecting it to the
 implementation of the LSH version. Network-1 argues it
 creates a genuine issue of material fact because it describes
 Google’s matching infrastructure as having LSH tables
 that will scale sublinearly. Open. Br. 34–35 (citing J.A.
 9387). We disagree. There is no evidence in the record that
 Google implemented such tables from the 2010 draft
 document. Indeed, the document contemplates two types
 of LSH tables: one that scales sublinearly and one that does
 not. J.A. 9387. But Network-1 points to no evidence that
 one was implemented over the other. See Open. Br. 34–36.
 Rather, Network-1 is essentially arguing that Google was
 capable of infringing the ’237 patent. But even with all
 reasonable inferences in Network-1’s favor, there is no
 evidence of what Google actually implemented to present a
 genuine issue of material fact. See Miken Composites,
 L.L.C. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 

515 F.3d 1331

, 1340–
 41 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment of
 noninfringement when there was no record evidence of
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                15



 literal infringement, even though the possibility of
 infringement existed).
     Finally, the Mitzenmacher report does not create a
 genuine issue of material fact.            Indeed, it relies
 significantly on the Baluja papers, Baluja’s testimony, and
 the Google 2010 draft document. See J.A. 6598–99. But as
 we explained above, those do not create a genuine issue of
 material fact because there is insufficient evidence
 connecting them to the implementation of the LSH version.
 Furthermore, Mitzenmacher’s review of Google’s code does
 not demonstrate that the LSH version is sublinear; it
 rather steps through the process of the content
 identification without any analysis as to how it is
 sublinear. See J.A. 6599–6602. Because Mitzenmacher’s
 report contains no other support, it does not create a
 genuine issue of material fact. See Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C.,
 

680 F.3d 1341

, 1352 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-
 established that unsupported expert opinions do not create
 a genuine issue of material fact.” (citations omitted)).
     In sum, no piece of evidence considered by the district
 court, and which Network-1 relies on before us, creates a
 genuine issue of material fact. Google is thus entitled to
 judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement of the ’237
 patent as to the LSH version.
                              B
     We next consider the Siberia version. The district
 court granted summary judgment of noninfringement
 because, in its view, the evidence indicated that the Siberia
 version did not scale sublinearly. See Decision, 

2024 WL 1814296

 at *36.
     Upon de novo review, we conclude that there is a
 genuine issue of material fact regarding the Siberia version
 so as to preclude summary judgment of noninfringement of
 the ’237 patent.
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 16              NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC




     First, there is a fundamental dispute as to how the
 Siberia version functions. Network-1 argues that the
 Siberia version is sublinear because the algorithm has
 different “tunable knobs,” which Google adjusted to lower
 resource costs. See Open. Br. 45–47 (citing J.A. 9812; J.A.
 10395–96). Google counters that the Siberia version is
 undisputedly linear because it “search[es] a fixed fraction
 of the data set.” Resp. Br. 54 (citing J.A. 3953). And it
 further argues that “[e]ven if Google reduced the number
 of searched [components], Siberia would still search a
 predetermined proportion of all partitions and thus scale
 linearly.” 

Id.

 at 60 (citing J.A. 4447–48).
     We conclude that this dispute is best left to a factfinder.
 With all reasonable inferences in Network-1’s favor, a
 factfinder could find that the Siberia version as an overall
 system was designed to have an execution time which
 scaled in less than a proportional relationship to the size of
 the reference set because the “tunable knobs” allowed the
 system to adapt to a growing dataset size. See J.A. 9812;
 J.A. 10335; J.A. 10378–79; J.A. 10395–96. For purposes of
 summary judgment, it is immaterial that the Siberia
 version, once that “knob” is turned, may search that new
 “fixed fraction” linearly.
     Furthermore, an internal Google document regarding
 the Siberia version states that Google “will need . . . a
 sublinear search.” J.A. 10265 (emphasis added). That is
 also enough to create a factual issue; with reasonable
 inferences in Network-1’s favor, a factfinder could consider
 this document to describe the implementation of the
 Siberia version as sublinear. Google argues this document
 “is referring to a potential strategy, not Siberia as
 implemented.”      Resp. Br. 56.        That argument is
 unpersuasive. A factfinder could reasonably read the
 phrase “will need” as imposing a requirement of a
 sublinear search on any future Siberia implementation.
 J.A. 10265. It thus creates a genuine issue of material fact
 regarding whether the Siberia version is sublinear.
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 NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC                 17



     Because there is a genuine issue of material fact,
 summary judgment of noninfringement of the ’237 patent
 as to the Siberia version is inappropriate.
                         CONCLUSION
      We have considered the remainder of the parties’
 arguments but find them unpersuasive. We reverse the
 district court’s grant of summary judgment of
 noninfringement of the ’237 patent as to the Siberia version
 of Content ID and remand for further proceedings. We
 affirm the district court’s conclusion of indefiniteness as to
 the ’988 patent and ’464 patent. We affirm the district
 court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of
 the ’237 patent as to the LSH version of Content 

ID.

   AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
                 REMANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.