Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc.

Case: 23-2140    Document: 74     Page: 1   Filed: 05/22/2025




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  REBECCA CURTIN,
                      Appellant

                             v.

      UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.,
                     Appellee
              ______________________

                        2023–2140
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
 91241083.
                  ______________________

                  Decided: May 22, 2025
                  ______________________

    RYAN C. MORRIS, Workman Nydegger, Salt Lake City,
 UT, argued for appellant. Also represented by MATTHEW
 BARLOW, JOHN C. STRINGHAM, DAVID R. TODD.

    ERIK PELTON, Erik M. Pelton & Associates, PLLC, Falls
 Church, VA, argued for appellee.

    SARAH E. CRAVEN, Office of the Solicitor, United States
 Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for
 amicus curiae Coke Morgan Stewart. Also represented by
 CHRISTINA J. HIEBER, AMY J. NELSON, FARHEENA YASMEEN
 RASHEED.
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 2                CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




     ______________________

     Before TARANTO and HUGHES, Circuit Judges, and
                   BARNETT, Judge. 1
 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
     Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition under 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

 to United Trademark Holdings’ registration of the
 mark RAPUNZEL in International Class 28, which covers
 dolls and toy figures. The Trademark Trial and Appeal
 Board dismissed her opposition after concluding she was
 not statutorily entitled to oppose a registration under
 § 1063. Because the Board properly applied the Lexmark
 framework to conclude that Ms. Curtin was not entitled to
 bring her opposition under § 1063, we affirm.
                               I
     This appeal concerns whether Ms. Curtin was entitled
 to oppose United Trademark Holdings’ (UTH’s) registra-
 tion of a trademark under the Lanham Act, alleging that
 the mark fails to function as a trademark and that the
 mark is generic and descriptive. We begin with an overview
 of the structure of the Lanham Act.
     The Lanham Act created a system “for the registration
 and protection of trademarks used in commerce.” Lanham
 (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 

60 Stat. 427

 (July 5,
 1946), codified at 

15 U.S.C. § 1051

 et seq. The Lanham Act
 established an administrative process administered by the
 United States Patent and Trademark Office by which
 trademark owners may register their marks on the princi-
 pal register and sets forth conditions for refusing registra-
 tion of certain trademarks. One basis for refusing a
 trademark registration is when “a mark which . . . when



     1   Honorable Mark A. Barnett, Chief Judge, United
 States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                   3



 used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
 merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.”
 

15 U.S.C. § 1052

(e)(1). Another basis for refusing a trade-
 mark registration is because it is generic, meaning it “is the
 common descriptive name of a class of goods or services”
 such that it is incapable of denoting a unique source as re-
 quired by the statutory definition of trademark. Royal
 Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 

892 F.3d 1358, 1366

 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l
 Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 

782 F.2d 987, 989

 (Fed. Cir.
 1986)); see 

15 U.S.C. § 1127

 (defining a trademark as being
 used “to identify and distinguish . . . goods, including a
 unique product, from those manufactured or sold by oth-
 ers”). In that way, genericness is encompassed by descrip-
 tiveness. See Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands,
 LLC, 

130 F.4th 1025, 1029

 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“The term de-
 scriptive encompasses generic terms because a generic
 term is the ultimate in descriptiveness and is ineligible for
 federal trademark registration.” (internal citations and
 quotation marks omitted)). A third basis for refusing regis-
 tration is that the mark “comprises any matter that, as a
 whole, is functional,” for which trademark protection would
 intrude on the subject addressed by patent law. 

15 U.S.C. § 1052

(e)(5); see Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 

278 F.3d 1268

, 1273–75 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
      After a trademark application is filed, it is referred to
 an examiner who determines whether the mark is entitled
 to registration. 

15 U.S.C. § 1062

. If the USPTO examining
 attorney allows the applicant to register the mark, the
 USPTO publishes the mark in its Official Gazette. 

Id.

 § 1062(a). 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

 (Section 13 of the Lanham Act)
 provides that “[a]ny person who believes that he would be
 damaged by the registration of a mark . . . may . . . file an
 opposition” with the USPTO within 30 days of the USPTO’s
 publication of the mark in the Official Gazette. In the case
 of an opposition, the USPTO “Director shall give notice to
 all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal
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 4                CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 Board to determine and decide the respective rights of reg-
 istration.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1067

. “In such proceedings,” the
 Board (on behalf of the Director) “may refuse to register the
 opposed mark, . . . may modify the application . . . , or may
 register the mark.” 

Id.

 § 1068. Grounds for opposing the
 registration of a mark include any ground for refusing the
 registration. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual
 Procedure § 309.03(c)(1) (June 2023). “Unless registration
 is successfully opposed,” the USPTO shall register the
 trademark if it is “entitled to registration,” issue a certifi-
 cate of registration, and publish a notice of registration in
 the Official Gazette. 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

(b); see Heritage All.
 v. Am. Pol’y Roundtable, 

133 F.4th 1063, 1071

 (Fed. Cir.
 2025) (“The opposition provision of the Lanham Act says
 that registration generally follows when an opposition, if
 any, fails, but the stated precondition is that the mark at
 issue be a ‘mark entitled to registration,’ 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

(b), which might allow the PTO, after an opposition
 fails, to reconsider the examiner’s pre-opposition allow-
 ance.”).
      

15 U.S.C. § 1064

 (Section 14 of the Lanham Act) estab-
 lishes a similar administrative process to seek cancellation
 of a trademark registration after it has been registered on
 the USPTO’s principal register. Like § 1063, it provides
 that “[a]ny person who believes that he is or will be dam-
 aged . . . by the registration of a mark” may initiate an ad-
 ministrative process by applying to cancel said registration
 “[w]ithin five years from the date of the registration of the
 mark[.]” 

15 U.S.C. § 1064

. Such a person may also apply to
 cancel the registration “[a]t any time if the registered mark
 becomes the generic name for the goods or services,” the
 mark “has been abandoned, or its registration was ob-
 tained fraudulently,” or certain other circumstances arise.
 

Id.

 § 1064(3). The Lanham Act separately provides trade-
 mark holders various avenues to enforce their mark in dis-
 trict court. See id. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1).
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                   5



                               II
      UTH sells dolls, including dolls with long blonde hair
 under the name Rapunzel. On November 20, 2017, UTH
 filed an application to register the RAPUNZEL trademark
 (Ser. No. 87/690,863), asserting use of the mark in com-
 merce in connection with dolls and toy figures in Interna-
 tional Class 28. J.A. 38–40. UTH’s application was
 approved by the USPTO examiner and published in the Of-
 ficial Gazette for opposition on April 10, 2018.
      On May 9, 2018, Ms. Curtin filed an opposition under
 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

 to UTH’s registration of the mark
 RAPUNZEL. Ms. Curtin first amended her opposition in
 July 2018. UTH moved to dismiss both oppositions, claim-
 ing Ms. Curtin did not have statutory standing to oppose
 UTH’s mark. This appeal arises from Ms. Curtin’s Second
 Amended Notice of Opposition filed on January 22, 2019,
 in which she opposed the RAPUNZEL mark as descriptive,
 generic, failing to function as a trademark, and for fraud in
 the application. Regarding her interest in bringing this op-
 position, Ms. Curtin alleged that, as a doll collector and
 mother to a young daughter, she is “a consumer who par-
 ticipates amongst other consumers in the marketplace for
 dolls and toy figures of fairytale characters, including Ra-
 punzel.” J.A. 266. Regarding the injury that justified her
 opposition, she claimed that “[she] and other consumers
 will be denied access to healthy marketplace competition
 for products that represent” Rapunzel if private companies
 are allowed “to trademark the name of a famous fairy tale
 character in the public domain.” J.A. 266. She further al-
 leged that “[she] and other consumers will also likely face
 an increased cost of goods associated with Rapunzel mer-
 chandise, given the lack of competition.” J.A. 266. She
 stated her belief that registration of UTH’s mark “could
 chill the creation of new dolls and toys by fans of the fair-
 ytale, crowding out the substantial social benefit of having
 diverse interpreters of the fairy tale’s legacy,” and deny her
 and other consumers “access to classic, already existing,
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 6                CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 Rapunzel merchandise.” J.A. 266. She included a petition
 with 432 signatures of those who shared her belief that reg-
 istration of the RAPUNZEL mark would impact consum-
 ers’ ability to find Rapunzel dolls and adversely affect
 marketplace competition for Rapunzel dolls. UTH denied
 her allegations in its answer.
     Ms. Curtin twice moved for partial summary judgment
 on the grounds that the RAPUNZEL mark is generic, de-
 scriptive, and fails to function as a trademark; the Board
 denied both motions. The Board bifurcated the opposition
 proceeding into two separate trial phases, with the first
 phase to focus solely on the issue of Ms. Curtin’s entitle-
 ment to a statutory cause of action, and, if necessary, a sec-
 ond phase to focus on the specific grounds pleaded.
 Following briefing for Phase One by the parties, the Board
 dismissed the opposition, finding Ms. Curtin “failed to
 prove she is entitled to the statutory cause of action she
 invoked—opposing registration of Applicant’s mark.” J.A.
 6. The Board relied on this court’s opinion in Corcamore,
 LLC v. SFM, LLC, 

978 F.3d 1298

 (Fed. Cir. 2020), which
 invokes the zone-of-interests test set forth by the Supreme
 Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Com-
 ponents, Inc., 

572 U.S. 118

 (2014), to evaluate whether
 Ms. Curtin was entitled to bring her opposition. J.A. 5, 10.
 Specifically, the Board read Corcamore to instruct that “[a]
 plaintiff may oppose registration of a mark when doing so
 is within the zone of interests protected by the statute and
 she has a reasonable belief in damage that would be proxi-
 mately caused by registration of the mark.” J.A. 5. The
 Board explained that while “[e]ntitlement to the statutory
 cause of action . . . is a requirement in every inter partes
 case,” and “mere consumers such as [Ms. Curtin] are gen-
 erally not statutorily entitled to oppose registration under
 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

.” J.A. 5–6. The Board explained this devi-
 ation from its prior denial of UTH’s motion to dismiss the
 prior versions of Ms. Curtin’s Notices of Opposition for lack
 of statutory entitlement was based mostly on Ritchie v.
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                 7



 Simpson, 

170 F.3d 1092

 (Fed. Cir. 1999), “a case that ad-
 dressed a section of the Trademark Act barring registration
 of ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ matter,” but “the Supreme
 Court [had since] found the bar on registration of ‘immoral’
 or ‘scandalous’ matter unconstitutional” in Iancu v. Bru-
 netti, 

588 U.S. 388

 (2019). J.A. 3 n.4.
     Ms. Curtin timely appealed the Board’s dismissal of
 her opposition. 

15 U.S.C. § 1071

(a)(2). We have jurisdiction
 over this appeal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295

(a)(4)(B) and
 

15 U.S.C. § 1071

(a).
                             III
     The issue before us is not whether the RAPUNZEL
 mark UTH seeks to register is properly registrable under
 trademark law. Rather, the question presented is a narrow
 one: whether Ms. Curtin, in her capacity as a consumer, is
 entitled to oppose UTH’s registration of the RAPUNZEL
 mark under 

15 U.S.C. § 1063

 as generic, descriptive, and
 fraudulent. Where entitlement to oppose or cancel a trade-
 mark registration “turns on statutory interpretation,” we
 “review[] the question de novo.” Empresa Cubana Del
 Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 

753 F.3d 1270, 1274

 (Fed. Cir.
 2014).
     Ms. Curtin challenges the Board’s decision to apply the
 Lexmark framework to determine whether she was entitled
 to bring an opposition under § 1063. She then argues that,
 even if its use of the Lexmark framework was proper, the
 Board erred in concluding that she did not fall within the
 class of individuals authorized by the statute to bring an
 opposition of the nature she brought here. We address each
 argument in turn.
                              A
                              1
     The parties disagree over whether the Board’s use of
 the Supreme Court’s zone-of-interests framework set forth
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 8                CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 in Lexmark was proper in determining whether Ms. Curtin
 was entitled to oppose UTH’s registration of the
 RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063. Ms. Curtin contends that
 this court’s decision in Ritchie v. Simpson is controlling au-
 thority on entitlement to oppose a trademark registration,
 and that the Board erred in applying the Lexmark frame-
 work instead.
      Ritchie v. Simpson concerned a party’s entitlement to
 oppose the registration of a mark under § 1063 on the basis
 that the mark comprised “immoral or scandalous matter.” 2
 

170 F.3d at 1093

. In Ritchie, this court noted that “‘case’
 and ‘controversy’ restrictions for [Article III] standing do
 not apply to matters before administrative agencies and
 boards[.]” 

Id. at 1094

 (internal citations omitted). Instead,
 we held “the starting point for a standing determination for
 a litigant before an administrative agency . . . is the statute
 that confers standing before that agency.” 

Id. at 1095

. Ac-
 cordingly, we held that § 1063’s provision that “[a]ny per-
 son who believes that he would be damaged by the
 registration of a mark . . . may . . . file an opposition in the
 Patent and Trademark Office, stating the grounds there-
 for” “establishes a broad class of persons who are proper
 opposers; by its terms the statute only requires that a per-
 son have a belief that he would suffer some kind of damage
 if the mark is registered.” Id. We explained that an opposer
 under § 1063 must also “meet two judicially-created re-
 quirements—the opposer must have a ‘real interest’ in the



     2   As mentioned above, this basis for barring trade-
 mark registration, stated in § 1052(a), has since been in-
 validated by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional on
 First Amendment grounds. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 

588 U.S. 388, 388

 (2019); cf. Matal v. Tam, 

582 U.S. 218, 218

 (2017)
 (affirming Federal Circuit’s invalidation of “dispar-
 age[ment]” portion of § 1052(a) on First Amendment
 grounds).
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                   9



 proceedings and must have a ‘reasonable’ basis for his be-
 lief of damage.” Id. The real interest requirement man-
 dates that the opposer have “a legitimate personal interest
 in the opposition;” that is, a “direct and personal stake in
 the outcome.” Id. The reasonable basis requirement re-
 quires that the opposer’s belief of damage “have a reasona-
 ble basis in fact.” Id. at 1098 (internal citation and
 quotation marks omitted). Ms. Curtin argues that an op-
 poser bringing a claim under § 1063 “need only satisfy the
 language of [§ 1063], as well as the ‘real interest’ and ‘rea-
 sonable’ basis requirements.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 29.
      Fifteen years later, in Lexmark, the Supreme Court ad-
 dressed entitlement to sue under the cause of action for
 false advertising provided by the Lanham Act (codified as
 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(a)). 

572 U.S. at 129

. The Supreme Court
 explained that “we presume that a statutory cause of action
 extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the
 zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” 

Id.

 (inter-
 nal citation and quotation marks omitted). After noting
 that the zone-of-interests test is not “especially demand-
 ing,” the Supreme Court held that “to come within the zone
 of interests in a suit for false advertising under § 1125(a),
 a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in
 reputation or sales. A consumer who is hoodwinked into
 purchasing a disappointing product may well have an in-
 jury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot in-
 voke the protection of the Lanham Act[.]” Id. at 130, 131–
 32 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
 Supreme Court in Lexmark further noted that “a statutory
 cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are
 proximately caused by violations of the statute.” Id. at 132.
 The zone-of-interests test and proximate cause require-
 ment are together referred to as the Lexmark framework
 for evaluating entitlement to exercise a statutory cause of
 action.
     In Corcamore, this court held there is “no principled
 reason why the analytical framework articulated by the
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 10               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 Court in Lexmark should not apply” to determine the class
 of parties who may seek cancellation of a mark under
 § 1064. 

978 F.3d at 1305

. We then applied the Lexmark
 framework to conclude that the party seeking to cancel the
 mark at issue “f[ell] within the class of parties whom Con-
 gress has authorized to sue under the statutory cause of
 action of § 1064.” Id. at 1307. Specifically, we found that
 trademark challenger SFM had sufficiently alleged that it
 sold substantially similar goods under its mark SPROUTS
 to those that Corcamore, the owner of the registration for
 the mark SPROUT, sold under its mark. Thus, we con-
 cluded that “SFM’s allegation . . . identifie[d] an interest
 falling within the zone of interests protected by § 1064.” Id.
 at 1306–07. We also found that SFM had sufficiently al-
 leged proximate causation by demonstrating its “reasona-
 ble belief of damage resulting from a likelihood of confusion
 between SFM’s SPROUTS mark and Corcamore’s
 SPROUT mark.” Id. at 1307.
                               2
      Ms. Curtin argues that the entitlement to bring oppo-
 sition proceedings to a trademark registration under
 § 1063 provides for an administrative proceeding, not a
 cause of action, and that the Lexmark framework is only
 applicable to parties seeking to assert a statutory cause of
 action. Invoking this court’s statement in a citation in
 Ritchie that “[a]dministrative adjudications . . . are not an
 [A]rticle III proceeding to which either the ‘case or contro-
 versy’ or prudential standing requirements apply,’”
 

170 F.3d at 1094

 (quoting Ecee, Inc. v. Fed.l Energy Regul.
 Comm’n, 

645 F.2d 339

, 349–50 (5th Cir.1981)), she argues
 that § 1063 does not provide a cause of action in court, but
 rather a “basis for ‘[a]ny person’ to oppose registration of a
 trademark in an administrative proceeding before an
 agency,” and “[t]he distinction between participation in an
 administrative proceeding and a private right of action in
 court is critical,” Appellant’s Opening Br. 21, 26. Ms. Cur-
 tin argues that the Board thus erroneously relied on
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                 11



 Corcamore, because Corcamore concerns entitlement to
 bring a cancellation proceeding against an existing regis-
 tration under § 1064. She argues that, unlike § 1063,
 § 1064 does provide a cause of action to which the Lexmark
 framework is properly applied to determine who is entitled
 to bring such a cancellation proceeding.
      Ms. Curtin accordingly contends that only the lan-
 guage of § 1063 and cases specifically addressing entitle-
 ment to bring an opposition under § 1063 are applicable in
 determining whether she is authorized to oppose the regis-
 tration of UTH’s RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063. See Ap-
 pellant’s Opening Br. 31–33. She argues that any person
 may oppose registration of a trademark under § 1063 sub-
 ject only to the requirements articulated in Ritchie that she
 “show ‘a belief that he would suffer some kind of damage if
 the mark is registered,’ ‘have a “real interest in the pro-
 ceedings,”’ and ‘have a “reasonable” basis for his belief of
 damage.’” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26–27 (quoting Ritchie,
 

170 F.3d at 1095

). We disagree.
     To start, Ms. Curtin does not address this court’s prior
 observation that “[g]iven [their] similarities in purpose and
 application, a party that demonstrates a real interest in
 cancelling a trademark under § 1064 has demonstrated an
 interest falling within the zone of interests protected by
 § 1064.” Corcamore, 

978 F.3d at 1306

. That is, she does not
 explain why applying the real-interest test articulated in
 Ritchie instead of the Lexmark analytical framework would
 change the Board’s ultimate determination that she is not
 entitled to oppose UTH’s mark under § 1063. 3



     3  Indeed, if the Board had applied Ritchie’s pre-
 Lexmark real-interest test, it likely would have reached the
 same conclusion that Ms. Curtin was not entitled to bring
 her opposition based only on her interests as a consumer,
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 12               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




     Regardless, Ritchie is distinguishable from the present
 case because in Ritchie, the basis for opposition under
 § 1063 was disparagement and reputational harm to the
 opposer based on statutory prohibitions of the registration
 of immoral or scandalous marks which may disparage per-
 sons or beliefs (which were later invalidated on First
 Amendment grounds). Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1093–94. In
 Ritchie, we held that an opposer who stated he would suffer
 disparagement of his beliefs from the opposed mark’s reg-
 istration had adequately alleged a real interest in the out-
 come of that opposition proceeding. Id. at 1097. This basis
 for opposing a trademark is unrelated to protecting any
 commercial interest, and the person who alleged he would
 be disparaged by the mark’s registration was properly
 found eligible to oppose the mark on that basis.
      In this case, the bases for Ms. Curtin’s opposition to
 UTH’s mark (that the mark fails to function as a trade-
 mark and is generic and descriptive) are rooted in commer-
 cial interests, as discussed in more detail in the next
 section. Lexmark and Corcamore, which provide a frame-
 work for evaluating whether a party falls within the zone-
 of-interests of statutory provisions of the Lanham Act, pro-
 vide the better line of cases by which to evaluate Ms. Cur-
 tin’s ability to bring her opposition in this case.
     Ms. Curtin further argues that Corcamore cannot ap-
 ply to this case because it pertains to entitlement to initiate
 cancellation proceedings under § 1064. Her attempt to dis-
 tinguish between § 1063 and § 1064 is unavailing in view
 of our clear precedent on this matter. First, both statutes
 state in nearly identical terms that the group of individuals
 entitled to bring an action challenging a trademark


 as we explain in the next section. See, e.g., Corcamore,
 978 F.3d at 1305–06 (“[L]ike the zone-of-interests test, a
 petitioner can satisfy the real-interest test by demonstrat-
 ing a commercial interest.”).
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                     13



 registration under their respective sections are those who
 believe they will be damaged by the mark’s registration.
 Compare § 1063 (“Any person who believes that he would
 be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the princi-
 pal register . . . may . . . file an opposition[.]”), with § 1064
 (“A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the
 grounds relied upon, may . . . be filed . . . by any person
 who believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the regis-
 tration of a mark on the principal register[.]”). This court
 has observed that “[t]he linguistic and functional similari-
 ties between the opposition and cancellation provisions of
 the Lanham Act mandate that we construe the require-
 ments of these provisions consistently. There is no basis for
 interpreting them differently.” Young v. AGB Corp.,
 

152 F.3d 1377, 1380

 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal citation
 omitted); see also Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
 

38 F.4th 1067

, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Corca-
 more, 

978 F.3d at 1305

) (explaining that the “similar stat-
 utory language” between 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(a)’s false-
 advertising provision at issue in Lexmark and § 1064 justi-
 fied “hold[ing] that the Lexmark zone-of-interests and
 proximate-causation requirements control the statutory
 cause of action analysis under § 1064”). Indeed, in our
 court’s most recent case addressing which parties are au-
 thorized to commence administrative proceedings chal-
 lenging a trademark under the Lanham Act, Luca
 McDermott Catena Gift Trust v. Fructuoso-Hobbs SL, we
 noted that “[t]he statutory requirements to cancel registra-
 tion of a mark under § 1064 are substantively equivalent to
 those required to oppose registration under § 1063.”
 

102 F.4th 1314

, 1321 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (emphasis
 added). We reject Ms. Curtin’s argument that our caselaw
 regarding entitlement to challenge a trademark under
 § 1064 is inapplicable to entitlement to challenge a trade-
 mark under § 1063. The Board correctly applied the
 Lexmark framework in assessing whether Ms. Curtin was
 entitled to bring her opposition to UTH’s mark under
 § 1063.
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 14               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




                               B
     Ms. Curtin next argues that even if the Board was cor-
 rect to apply the Lexmark framework in determining
 whether she was entitled to oppose registration under
 § 1063, the Board erred in its application of the framework
 to conclude that she does not fall within the class of indi-
 viduals whom the statutory scheme empowers to bring an
 opposition of the nature she brought in the present case.
       Under the Lexmark framework, a plaintiff may oppose
 registration of a mark when (1) her interests are within the
 zone of interests protected by the statute and (2) she has a
 reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately
 caused by registration of the mark in violation of the oppo-
 sition statute. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129–134; see also Cor-
 camore, 

978 F.3d at 1303

. In Corcamore, this court
 specified “that the purpose of the zone-of-interests test is
 to ‘foreclose[ ] suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so
 marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes im-
 plicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
 that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.’” 

Id.

 (altera-
 tion in original) (quoting Lexmark, 

572 U.S. at 130, 134

).
 Applying this framework, the Board concluded that
 Ms. Curtin, who asserts only interests in the mark’s regis-
 tration related to her status as a consumer of dolls, did not
 fall within the zone of interests to bring an opposition un-
 der § 1063, and that the damage she sought to avoid is too
 remote to be proximately caused by violations of the stat-
 ute. We agree with the Board on both conclusions.
                               1
     In discerning whether Ms. Curtin’s interests as a con-
 sumer were within the zone of interests of § 1063, the
 Board determined that it must look to the interests pro-
 tected by the Lanham Act as a whole. J.A. 7. The Board
 concluded that Lexmark had already addressed what those
 interests were: “regulat[ion] [of] commerce and protect[ing]
 plaintiffs with commercial interests.” J.A. 7. The Board
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                 15



 held that “Lexmark’s holdings on entitlement to a statutory
 (Trademark Act) cause of action apply to opposition pro-
 ceedings such as this one,” under § 1063, even though
 Lexmark itself concerned the cause of action in § 1125(a)
 J.A. 10. And because Ms. Curtin is a “mere consumer that
 buys goods or services,” the Board concluded she “is not un-
 der the Trademark Act’s aegis” and that the “statutory
 cause of action is reserved for those with commercial inter-
 ests,” meaning actual or potential competitors or other of-
 ferors of goods or services (using sufficiently similar
 marks), as opposed to consumers. J.A. 10–11.
      Ms. Curtin first argues that the Board erred in con-
 cluding that her interests as “a consumer of fairytale-
 themed products” did not fall within the zone of interests
 protected by § 1063 because this “statutory cause of action
 is reserved for those with commercial interests.” J.A.
 10–11; see Appellant’s Opening Br. 34. She argues that the
 Board incorrectly overextended the Supreme Court’s hold-
 ing in Lexmark to conclude that a commercial interest is
 necessary to oppose a mark’s registration under § 1063.
 J.A. 7–10; see Appellant’s Opening Br. 35–36 (“The Su-
 preme Court in Lexmark nowhere suggested that it was
 opining broadly about all interests that might fall within
 the zone of interests protected by all provisions of the Lan-
 ham Act. Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that ‘the
 breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the pro-
 visions of law at issue.’”) (quoting Lexmark, 

572 U.S. at 130

). In reaching this conclusion, the Board invoked
 

15 U.S.C. § 1127

, which states “[t]he intent of this chapter
 is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
 making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
 marks in such commerce; . . . [and] to protect persons en-
 gaged in such commerce against unfair competition.” The
 Board also quoted the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
 Lexmark that “‘to come within the zone of interests in a
 suit’ under Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(a)(1) – which, similar to [§ 1063], may be invoked
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 16               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 only by a plaintiff ‘who believes that he or she is or is likely
 to be damaged’ by the challenged act – ‘a plaintiff must al-
 lege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or
 sales.’” J.A. 8 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lexmark,
 572 U.S. at 131–32). UTH invokes Corcamore to argue for
 the broader position that “a commercial interest is required
 to satisfy the zone-of-interests requirement.” Appellee’s
 Br. 18.
      As the United States Patent and Trademark Office
 points out in its amicus brief, “given the potential for dif-
 ferent provisions of the Lanham Act to protect different in-
 terests,” we should not adopt UTH’s “broader position that
 a commercial interest is always required to satisfy the
 zone-of-interests test,” since “[o]ther grounds for opposing
 or seeking to cancel the registration of a mark may or may
 not call for a different analysis, and may or may not protect
 different interests.” USPTO Amicus Br. 23 (citing as an ex-
 ample 

15 U.S.C. § 1052

(b), which disallows “registration of
 marks that consist of the ‘flag or coat of arms’ of certain
 governments”). The USPTO correctly notes that “[w]hether
 a zone-of-interests limitation applies in a particular admin-
 istrative context, and whether the class of people who may
 seek administrative relief in a particular context is coex-
 tensive with the class of people who may sue in court, will
 depend on the language of the particular statute and the
 particular interests involved.” USPTO Amicus Br. 23. The
 interest protected by a particular provision of the Lanham
 Act should not be subject to a blanket rule that always as-
 sumes the intended protected interest is commercial. In-
 stead, the protected interest should be evaluated based on
 the particular ground for the challenge, since there are
 clearly grounds against registration of a mark in the Lan-
 ham Act that are not intended to protect commercial inter-
 ests. In the context of challenges to a trademark under the
 Lanham Act, both in the form of an opposition proceeding
 under § 1063 or a cancellation proceeding under § 1064, the
 zone-of-interests test should be tailored based on the
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                  17



 specific bases cited for opposing registration or seeking
 cancellation of the registration for a mark.
     In the present case, the opposition under § 1063 is
 based on allegations that the mark fails to function as a
 trademark and is generic and descriptive. Ms. Curtin ar-
 gues the Board failed to assess the specific interests pro-
 tected by her opposition under § 1063. However, as noted
 above, the Board did assess her grounds for opposition and
 concluded the interests protected by those grounds were
 commercial. See J.A. 7 n.6 (“Opposer’s grounds for opposi-
 tion in this case arise out of the Trademark Act’s ‘intent’ to
 ‘protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
 competition.’” (quoting 

15 U.S.C. § 1127

)). Ms. Curtin does
 not contest our binding precedent, which unequivocally
 provides that the prohibitions against descriptive and ge-
 neric marks protect commercial interests. This court’s pre-
 decessor has noted that “[t]he major reasons for not
 protecting [descriptive] marks are: (1) to prevent the owner
 of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of partic-
 ular goods; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use
 the language involved, thus avoiding the possibility of har-
 assing infringement suits by the registrant against others
 who use the mark when advertising or describing their own
 products”—these are commercial interests. In re Abcor
 Dev. Corp., 

588 F.2d 811, 813

 (C.C.P.A. 1978). We have
 similarly explained that the prohibition against granting
 trademark registration for generic terms was established
 to avoid “grant[ing] the owner of the mark a monopoly,” an-
 other commercial interest. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating
 Corp., 

240 F.3d 1341, 1344

 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal cita-
 tion and quotation marks omitted).
     Insofar as Ms. Curtin contends that the risk to consum-
 ers from registering this mark exists in the form of decep-
 tive or misleading use, which may implicate consumer
 interests, these were not among her bases for opposing the
 mark before the Board, so we need not consider whether
 these provisions also protect commercial interests. And to
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 18               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 the extent Ms. Curtin contends that § 1063 is also intended
 to protect the interests of consumers because trademark
 law exists to some extent to protect consumers in their abil-
 ity to distinguish among products, the Supreme Court has
 explained that this goal may be served by conferring rights
 that only commercial actors have statutory standing to ex-
 ercise. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 

573 U.S. 102

, 107 (2014) (“Though in the end consumers also benefit
 from the [Lanham] Act’s proper enforcement, the cause of
 action [for false advertising] is for competitors, not consum-
 ers.”); USPTO v. Booking.com B. V., 

591 U.S. 549, 552

 (2020) (explaining that while “[g]uarding a trademark
 against use by others . . . secures to the owner of the mark
 the goodwill of her business and protects the ability of con-
 sumers to distinguish among competing producers,” “[t]he
 Lanham Act . . . arms trademark owners with federal
 claims for relief.” (alteration omitted) (emphasis added) (in-
 ternal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The
 Board’s holding that only commercial actors affected by the
 mark’s registration fall within the zone of interests to op-
 pose the registration as generic, descriptive, or functional
 under § 1063 is not inconsistent with the Lanham Act’s
 purpose of protecting consumers.
                               2
     The Board also found Ms. Curtin’s showing of injury
 insufficient to invoke an opposition proceeding under
 § 1063. The Board correctly found Ms. Curtin’s evidence
 too “limited” and the damage “too remote” to establish
 proximate causation where all her alleged harms are deriv-
 ative of those harms that may be suffered by UTH’s com-
 mercial competitors as a result of UTH’s registration of the
 mark. J.A. 12. We agree.
     Ms. Curtin’s alleged injury from the registration of the
 RAPUNZEL mark is that “[she] and other consumers will
 be denied access to healthy marketplace competition for
 products that represent” Rapunzel if private companies are
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                   19



 allowed “to trademark the name of a famous fairy tale char-
 acter in the public domain.” J.A. 266. She further alleged
 that “[she] and other consumers will also likely face an in-
 creased cost of goods associated with Rapunzel merchan-
 dise, given the lack of competition.” J.A. 266. She stated
 her “belie[f] that a trademark registration [for the name
 Rapunzel] could chill the creation of new dolls and toys by
 fans of the Rapunzel fairytale, crowding out the substantial
 social benefit of having diverse interpreters of the fairy
 tale’s legacy.” J.A. 266. She further testified that “[she] and
 other consumers will also likely be denied access to classic,
 already existing, Rapunzel merchandise whose sale may be
 precluded if Applicant receives a registration for the name
 ‘Rapunzel.’” J.A. 266. Ms. Curtin included with her
 amended notice of opposition a petition with 432 signa-
 tures from people who shared her belief that registration of
 the “RAPUNZEL” mark would impact consumers’ ability to
 find Rapunzel dolls and adversely affect marketplace com-
 petition for Rapunzel dolls.
      The Board held that a person opposing a registration
 “must show economic or reputational injury flowing di-
 rectly from” the registration, and “‘[t]hat showing is gener-
 ally not made when’ a defendant’s conduct ‘produces
 injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the
 plaintiff.’” J.A. 11–12 (alteration in original) (quoting
 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133–34). The Board found Ms. Cur-
 tin’s “limited evidence . . . is too remote from registration
 and is entirely speculative.” J.A. 12. It found that insofar
 as Ms. Curtin relied on “general economic theories” to as-
 sume registration of the mark would “harm ‘healthy mar-
 ketplace competition,’” there was no evidence in the record
 about any specific economic theory nor evidence that fairy-
 tale related markets perform according to general economic
 principles. J.A. 12.
     Ms. Curtin first argues the Board’s analysis of direct
 economic or reputational injury is faulty for being limited
 to commercial interests. We reject this argument for the
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 20               CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.




 same reasons we rejected this argument in the context of
 the zone of interests; only injury to those interests that fall
 within the zone of interests are relevant to this inquiry.
 Ms. Curtin then argues that the Board erred in concluding
 her alleged injuries were “too remote, because the alleged
 damage to [her] depends first on the alleged effect of regis-
 tration on other commercial doll makers or sellers.” J.A. 13.
 The Board noted that the proximate cause showing “is gen-
 erally not made when’ a defendant’s conduct ‘produces in-
 juries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the
 plaintiff.” J.A. 11–12 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133–
 34). Ms. Curtin contests this analysis as at odds with
 Lexmark’s instruction that an “intervening step” in causa-
 tion “is not fatal to showing of proximate causation.” Ap-
 pellant’s Opening Br. 43 (quoting Lexmark, 

572 U.S. at 133

). However, as we explained in Luca McDermott, “a
 harm will be ‘too remote’ from the alleged unlawful conduct
 if it ‘is purely derivative of misfortunes visited upon a third
 person by the defendant’s acts.’” 

102 F.4th at 1327

 (quoting
 Lexmark, 

572 U.S. at 133

). This court concluded that the
 challenger of a registered mark had not satisfied the prox-
 imate causation requirement where the “alleged injury is
 merely derivative of any injury suffered by [another party],
 it is too remote to provide [the challenger] with a cause of
 action under § 1064.” Id. at 1327. Ms. Curtin’s alleged
 harms are all, as UTH points out, “speculative tertiary ef-
 fects of registration, namely, reduced marketplace compe-
 tition, increased cost of RAPUNZEL merchandise, and
 fewer interpretations and creations of RAPUNZEL dolls.”
 Appellee’s Br. 23. These harms are insufficient to establish
 proximate causation for the same reasons provided by Luca
 McDermott—they are downstream harms first suffered by
 a commercial actor.
     Ms. Curtin’s only response to the Board’s contention
 that her evidence of harm is too speculative is a citation to
 the Supreme Court’s statement in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
 Samara Brothers, Inc., that a trademark may distort
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 CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.                21



 competition “not merely by successful suit but by the plau-
 sible threat of successful suit.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 45
 n.3 (citing 

529 U.S. 205, 214

 (2000)). However, Ms. Curtin
 does not address how the Board erred in concluding that
 her speculative evidence does not establish such a plausi-
 ble threat of suit that would chill competition in the ways
 she alleges. Neither party addresses the fact that the party
 alleging injury must establish that their belief is reasona-
 ble: Ms. Curtin has not provided any arguments refuting
 the Board’s findings that her reliance on general economic
 theories without any case-specific data fails to establish a
 reasonable belief of proximate causation of injury. The
 Board properly found Ms. Curtin’s allegations of harm
 were at best downstream effects of harms to commercial
 actors and were too remote to support a reasonable belief
 in injury.
                             IV
     We have considered the remainder of Ms. Curtin’s ar-
 guments and find them unpersuasive. Because the Board
 correctly applied the Lexmark framework to find that
 Ms. Curtin did not have statutory standing to oppose
 UTH’s registration of the RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063,
 we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED