Opinion · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

United States v. Edward B. Williams, Jr.

475 F.2d 355

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1973-01-31
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • same under comparable D.C. law

Citator

United States v. Edward B. Williams, Jr. has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 2 S. Ct. 443 (overruled by Collins v. Youngblood). Read them before relying on it. 25 later decisions cite it.

Authority status
caution
Cited by
25 opinions
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS,475 F.2d 355(D.C. Cir. 1973)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDWARD B. WILLIAMS, JR., APPELLANT.
No. 71-1447.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued September 19, 1972.
Decided January 31, 1973.
Page 356
James S. Hostetler, Washington, D.C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.

James F. Flanagan, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Richard L. Cys, Asst. U.S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Before WRIGHT, TAMM and McCREEfn*, Circuit Judges.
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
[1] Effective February 1, 1971, Section 207(6) of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act added the following sentence to subsection (j) of 24 D.C. Code § 301: "No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." Prior to February 1, 1971 the prosecution had the burden in criminal cases of proving criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant had raised the insanity defense. Davis v. United States,160 U.S. 469,16 S.Ct. 353,40 L.Ed. 499(1895). Appellant here was charged with offenses committed on November 11, 1968. On trial appellant raised the insanity defense and, over objection, the trial court charged the jury, pursuant to Section 207(6), that appellant had the burden of establishing his insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The only question we consider on appeal is whether this instruction violated theex post factoclause1of the Constitution. We find that it did.

[2] A long time ago the United States Supreme Court definedexpost factolaws to include "[e]very law which alters thelegalrules ofevidence,and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense,in order to convict the offender." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390,1 L.Ed. 648(1798). (Emphasis in original.) That definition represents the law today just as it did in 1798.2The retroactive application given Section 207(6) by the trial court "alter[ed] thelegalrules ofevidence" so that appellant was convicted on "less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commissionPage 357of the offense."3Certainly the court's charge, "`in its relation to the offence, or its consequences, alter[ed] the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.'" Thompson v. Utah,170 U.S. 343,351,18 S.Ct. 620,623,42 L.Ed. 1061(1898),quotingUnited States v. Hall, 2 Wash.C.C. 366. Moreover, Congress, in enacting Section 207(6), specifically intended to alter the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Congress was concerned that existing law "* * * permitt[ed] dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths, to win acquittals of serious criminal charges on grounds of insanity by raising a mere reasonable doubt as to their sanity * * *." H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1970).4

[3] Under the circumstances, appellant's conviction must be reversed onex post factogrounds.

[4] So ordered.
  1. Of the 6th Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970). ↩
  2. Art.1, §9, cl.3of the United States Constitution provides: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." ↩
  3. SeeMalloy v. South Carolina,237 U.S. 180,35 S.Ct. 507,59 L.Ed. 905(1915); Duncan v. Missouri,152 U.S. 377,14 S. Ct. 570,38 L.Ed. 485(1894); Hopt v. Utah,110 U.S. 574,4 S.Ct. 202,28 L.Ed. 262(1884); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. (7 Otto) 221,2 S.Ct. 443,27 L.Ed. 506(1883); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,18 L.Ed. 366(1867); Frisby v. United States,38 App.D.C. 22(1912).See also, generally,Croseky, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Provision of Ex Post Facto Laws, 14 U.Chi.L.Rev. 539 (1947). ↩
  4. We find no language in the statute or in its legislative history, and we have been cited to none, which indicates that Congress intended it to be applied retroactively. ↩
  5. In view of the express intent of Congress and the obvious effect of the statute, the Government's argument that § 207(6) provides for a mere procedural change which, applied retroactively, does not significantly alter the situation to appellant's disadvantage may be dismissed as pure advocacy.CompareKring v. Missouri,supranote 2, and Thompson v. Utah,170 U.S. 343,18 S.Ct. 620,42 L.Ed. 1061(1898),withBeazell v. Ohio,269 U.S. 167,46 S.Ct. 68,70 L.Ed. 216(1925). ↩